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**DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1929**

DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1929

EDITED BY
JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT

*Hon. Information Secretary, Royal Institute
of International Affairs*

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH
G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

*Chairman of the Information Committee of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs*

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INTRODUCTION

I FEEL confident that the 1929 volume, the second annual volume, of *Documents on International Affairs* maintains the high standard set by its predecessor. Edited by Mr. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Hon. Information Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, whose explanatory notes reflect in their lucidity his knowledge and experience of international affairs, it is intended to accompany and supplement the annual *Survey of International Affairs* produced by Professor Arnold J. Toynbee.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs possesses an active Information Department, one of whose chief functions is the collection of documents on every aspect of international affairs, which are carefully indexed and filed. This mass of material is exhaustively examined periodically, and also at the end of each year, and from it a preliminary list is drawn up to form the basis upon which the final selection is made.

To all those who are interested in or engaged in the study of international affairs I can confidently recommend the present volume as containing a unique collection of documents which, though of necessity their number is curtailed by space, are fully representative of the year 1929.

G. M. W. MACDONOGH,

Lieut.-General,

*Chairman of the Information Committee,
Royal Institute of International Affairs.*

* * *

CHATHAM HOUSE,
ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

PREFACE

IN compiling this second volume of *Documents on International Affairs* I have had the advantage of past experience and the benefit of the comments and criticisms which the publication of the first volume elicited. In form this first volume was largely experimental, and in shaping its successor a number of changes have been made. Fewer translations are printed, and these only in cases where the original document was in some language other than French, English and French being recognized as now the official languages of modern diplomacy. On the other hand the explanatory notes have been increased both in number and in length.

In choosing the material for the volume I have received the advice of a number of experts in this country, on the Continent, and in the United States, and to them is due my sincere gratitude. The responsibility for the final selection must, however, rest with me, and I would stress once again the necessarily arbitrary nature of such a selection.

Within the restricted nature of the volume every care has been taken to include only those documents which illustrate some particular phase of international affairs, or which are necessary for the study of some specific aspect of a country's foreign policy. In some cases, an important document has had to be omitted owing to its length. An example of this is the Young Plan, a document of some seventy printed pages which lends itself neither to extract nor summary.

Other documents have been postponed to a future volume. This has been done in the case of the Anglo-Egyptian Proposals of 1929, which will be printed next year together with the documents of the abortive Anglo-Egyptian Conference of 1930, to which they form a necessary background for reference and from which they cannot be conveniently separated.

A new feature of the volume is an appendix comprising a list of international and bilateral agreements concluded during 1929. This list is the work of Miss V. M. Boulter, Assistant to the Director of Studies.

The work of editing has been carried on throughout in close collaboration with Professor Toynbee's department, and to him and his Assistant I am indebted for much valuable and indispensable advice. I am also greatly indebted to those Embassies, Legations, and organizations, at home and abroad, who have co-operated in assisting me in the collection of the documents.

More especially are my sincere thanks due to Mr. Stephen Heald, Assistant Information-Secretary, for whose invaluable and untiring assistance I am very grateful; and also to Mr. Hugh Latimer and Mrs. Ronald Baker for their diligent care in checking and correcting proofs.

JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT.

A. 14. ALBANY,
PICCADILLY, W. 1.
August 21, 1930.

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A. GENERAL

I. LIQUIDATION OF THE WAR

A. REPARATIONS

THE policy of carrying out the final liquidation of the War, as initiated in Geneva during the autumn of 1928, was pressed forward during 1929. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the Geneva Communiqué of September 16, 1928,¹ and with the Agreement of December 22, 1928,² a Committee of Experts, charged with the task of drawing up proposals for a complete and final settlement of the Reparations Problem, was appointed in January 1929.

The Committee was composed of twelve members chosen from amongst the nationals of the Six Powers, together with two American citizens. The Belgian, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Experts were appointed by the Reparation Commission upon the nomination of their respective Governments. The German Experts were appointed by the German Government and the American Experts by the Reparation Commission conjointly with the German Government. Each expert was empowered to appoint an alternate.

The following were the original members of the Committee as appointed:

Belgian: MM. Émile Francqui and Cambon Gutt.

British: Sir Josiah Stamp, G.B.E., and Lord Revelstoke, G.C.V.O.

French: MM. Émile Moreau and Jean Parmentier.

German: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht and Dr. A. Vögler.

Italian: Dr. Alberto Pirelli and Signor Fulvio Suvich.

Japanese: Mr. Kengo Mori and Mr. Aoki.

American: Mr. Owen D. Young and Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan.

Subsequently Sir Charles Addis, K.C.M.G., replaced Lord Revelstoke, who died suddenly, and Herr L. Kastl replaced Dr. Vögler, who resigned from the Committee.

The Committee met in Paris from February 11–June 7, 1929, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Owen D. Young; on the latter date its Report was completed and signed.³

During the months of June and July, the Young Plan was the subject of discussion in the Governments of the Six Powers. Belgium, France,

¹ For text see *Documents on International Affairs, 1928*, p. 53.

² For text see *ibid.*, pp. 55–6.

³ The full text of the Young Plan, with its complement of annexes, comprises a document of some seventy pages, and is too long to include here. It has, however, been published by H.M. Stationery Office as a White Paper (Cmd. 3343). Price 1s. 3d.

For the history and background of the Young Plan and the Hague Agreements see *Information on the Reparation Settlement*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and H. Latimer (Allen & Unwin, London, 1930).

Germany, Italy, and Japan approved the idea jointly and agreed to it as a basis for discussion.¹

In England the publication of the details of the Plan aroused considerable dissatisfaction, both official and unofficial, when it became known that changes had been made in the Spa percentages, as modified by the Financial Agreement of January 1925. It was felt that Great Britain was not receiving her fair share of Reparation payments, and at the International Conference which met at The Hague in August 1930 for the purpose of putting into effect the new Plan, Mr. Snowden, Chancellor of the Exchequer, secured a revision in Great Britain's favour of the terms of payment.

The final Agreement took the form of the following documents:

2. THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE, AUGUST 1929.

(i) *Protocol.*

1. The Representatives of the Government of the German Reich, the Government of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, His Britannic Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Government of India, the Government of the French Republic, the Government of the Greek Republic, the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Poland, the Government of the Republic of Portugal, the Government of His Majesty the King of Rumania, the Government of His Majesty the King of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, accompanied by the Representative of the Government of the United States of America in the capacity of Observer and with specifically limited powers;

Being assembled at the Binnenhof under the Chairmanship of His Excellency M. Jaspar, Prime Minister of Belgium, on the conclusion of the first stage of the Conference which met at The Hague on August 6, 1929;

The President informs the Conference that on all the political questions on the agenda of the Conference an agreement has been come to between the Powers interested.

2. The President states that in view of the fact that various questions relative to the application of the Plan of June 7, 1929,² drawn up in Paris by the Committee of Experts, have been settled in outline in accordance with the documents annexed hereto (Annexes I,

¹ Germany on June 21, Belgium on July 24, France on July 31, and Italy on August 1. The date of Japan's acceptance of the Plan is uncertain.

² For the Experts' Report see Cmd. 3343.

II, III, and IV), all the Governments represented by delegates at the Conference have accepted the said Plan in principle. These observations figure in the minutes of the meeting of the Financial Commission of August 30, 1929.

The President states also that agreement has been reached that the balance of the unconditional part of the annuities under the Experts' Report, the distribution of which was to be settled by the Governments, shall be distributed as follows:

	<i>Reichsmarks.</i>
The British Empire	55,000,000
Japan	6,600,000
Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom	6,000,000
Portugal	2,400,000
	<hr/>
	70,000,000

3. The Conference notes the appointment of the Organization Committee for the adaptation of the German Laws set up under the Dawes Plan¹ in accordance with Annex V to the Experts' Report, and considers that the Organization Committee for the Bank of International Settlements referred to in section iii of Annex I to the Experts' Report should be appointed as soon as possible.

4. The Conference decides on the appointment of technical committees charged with the duty of preparing detailed recommendations in regard to:

- (a) the framing in conformity with Annex II of new regulations for deliveries in kind, and to suggest any steps necessary in connexion with the transition from the present to the new system in so far as concerns such deliveries;
- (b) the final settlement of the reciprocal claims of the Creditor Governments in respect of ceded properties and liberation debts, and the final settlement of the liabilities of the Debtor Governments under the Treaties of St. Germain, the Trianon, and Neuilly.

The Conference also decided to appoint a Committee of Jurists in order to draft the detailed texts to be embodied in the Final Protocol for putting into force the Experts' Plan.

Furthermore, and subject to the declarations and reservations made in the course of the meetings of the Financial Commission on August 30 and 31, 1929, and which are set out in the Minutes of those

¹ For the Dawes Plan, see Cmd. 2105.

meetings, the Conference decided on the appointment of a committee charged with the duty of preparing the necessary provisions in order to apply the recommendations of Chapter IX of the Report of the Experts relating to the liquidation of the past and the proposal of the measures required to effect the change from the existing to the new régime.

5. The Conference requests each of the Inviting Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes to nominate a representative for the Committee to frame new Regulations as regards deliveries in kind, and to request the Belgian, British, French, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese, Rumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene, and Czechoslovak Governments, if they so desire, to nominate two representatives on the Committee on Ceded Properties and Liberation Debts and the liabilities of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, on the understanding that when the Committee deals with the liabilities of the Austrian, Hungarian, or Bulgarian Governments, each of those Governments will be invited to nominate two representatives on the Committee when its interests are concerned.

6. The Committees appointed by the Conference will meet at a date and place to be fixed by the President of the Conference.

7. The Conference will reassemble at a date and place to be fixed by the President after consultation with the Inviting Powers for the purpose of considering the Reports which will be submitted to it by all the committees referred to above, and for giving such effect thereto as may be considered desirable.

Done at The Hague the 31st day of August, 1929.

HENRI JASPAR, *President.*

M. P. A. HANKEY,
Secretary-General.

(ii) *Annex I.*

Financial Agreement between the Belgian, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Delegations, and the German Delegation, in so far as Germany is concerned.

The Belgian, British, French, Italian, and Japanese Delegations, and the German Delegation, in so far as Germany is concerned, have agreed on the following arrangements with a view to securing the approval in principle of the Experts' Report, viz.:

I

In accordance with paragraphs 83 and 84¹ of the Experts' Report of June 7, 1929, and paragraph 192² of the Annexes, Great Britain will receive, out of the payments due by Germany in respect of the last five months of the fifth Dawes Annuity, the amount (estimated at 100 million gold marks) which is required together with her receipts under the Dawes Plan, to cover in full her net debt outgoings during the year ending March 31, 1930, and the current costs of the British Army of Occupation up to August 31, 1929.

In pursuance of the same provisions, Italy and Greece will receive the sums required to cover in full their debt outgoings during the year ending March 31, 1930, as defined in paragraph 93³ of the Experts' Report.

II

Save as provided in the preceding Article, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan make, and will make, no claim on the sums paid or payable by Germany in respect of the last five months of the fifth Dawes Annuity, including the sum of about 79 million gold marks due in September 1929.

In return Belgium and France guarantee to Great Britain to the extent of their liability the payments for which they are responsible in accordance with Article III below.

¹ Paragraphs 83 and 84 read:

83. 'Payments to be made under the Dawes Plan, during the five months period preceding September 1, 1929, after allowing for the Dawes Loan, should be treated as payments necessary to cover requirements of the creditor nations during this transition period, including outpayments for the year ending March 31, 1930.'

84. 'Should there remain any surplus after meeting the foregoing requirements, the question of disposing of such surplus, as well as all matters and expenses in connexion with the transition from the operation of the existing arrangements to the new Plan, shall be settled and adjusted between the Governments.'

² Paragraph 192 of Annex VII reads:

192. 'The sums received under the Dawes Plan in respect of the period April 1 to August 31, 1929, shall, after allowing for expenses in respect of administration of the Dawes Plan and Armies of Occupation, be redistributed to the extent necessary to provide each of the creditor Powers with cover for its net debt outgoings during the year ending March 31, 1930. The necessary adjustments for this purpose could be made against the payments during the last seven months of that year.'

³ Paragraph 93 reads:

93. 'France R.M. 338·1, Great Britain, R.M. 366·6, Italy, R.M. 107·8, Belgium, R.M. 23·4, Rumania, R.M. 8·8, Serbia, R.M. 5·9, Greece, R.M. 5·3, Portugal, R.M. 7·2 millions. Total (millions Reichsmarks) 863·1.'

III

The Belgian and French Governments guarantee without reserve the payment to Great Britain, in addition to the annuities allocated to her by the Experts' Report, of an annuity of 19,800,000 Reichsmarks for thirty-seven years as from 1929, to be paid in sterling in such instalments as may be agreed. The division of this annuity between the French and Belgian Governments will be the subject of a special agreement between them, which will be communicated to the British Government.

IV

Italy having undertaken to apply in favour of Great Britain a part of the claims to which she is entitled under the Agreements of September 10, 1919, and December 8, 1919, in regard to the costs of liberation and the ceded properties, guarantees to Great Britain without reserve a further annuity of 9,000,000 Reichsmarks for thirty-seven years, as from 1929, to be paid in sterling in such instalments as may be agreed.

V

For the purposes of the two preceding Articles, the Reichsmark is defined as in paragraph 91¹ of the Experts' Report and in the letter from Dr. Schacht dated June 6, 1929 (Annex II to Experts' Report).

VI

It is agreed that the payments due to each of the Creditor Governments in respect of their net war debts shall be made by the Bank for International Settlements on the dates fixed by the various Funding Agreements for the payment of the war debt annuities.

VII

The amount of the unconditional annuity provided for in paragraph 89² of Chapter VIII of the Experts' Report shall be fixed at 612,000,000

¹ Paragraph 91 reads:

91. 'The German Government undertakes, for the purpose of the present provisions, as well as for the general purposes of the Plan, that the Reichsmark shall have and shall retain its convertibility into gold or devisa as contemplated in Section 3. i. of the present Reichsbank Law, and that for these purposes the Reichsmark shall have and shall retain a mint parity of 1/2790 kilogram of fine gold, as defined in the German Coinage Law of August 30, 1924. (Attention is called to the letter from the President of the Reichsbank given in Annex II of the Report.)'

² Paragraph 89 reads:

89. 'Out of the above annuities the following amounts shall be unconditional,

Reichsmarks a year (excluding whatever sums are required for the service of the German External Loan, 1924). Out of the balance of the unconditional annuity not distributed by the Experts' Report, 55,000,000 Reichsmarks a year will be allocated to the British Empire, and 6,600,000 Reichsmarks to Japan.

HENRI JASPAR, *President*.

B. EVACUATION OF THE RHINELAND

NOTE.—The Hague Conference had for its purpose the final implementing of the terms of the Geneva Communiqué of September 16, 1928. It will be remembered that paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Communiqué referred to the evacuation of the Rhineland.¹ The method for carrying out this measure was worked out by the Political Commission of the Conference, under the chairmanship of Mr. Arthur Henderson, and is embodied in the following documents.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE EVACUATION OF THE RHINELAND TERRITORY.

The Hague, August 30, 1929.

The undersigned duly authorized:

Having taken note of the Notes annexed hereto which have been exchanged between the Belgian, British, and French Governments of the one part and the German Government of the other part with a view to the evacuation of the Rhineland territory occupied by the Belgian, British, and French troops,

Note the agreement which has been arrived at on this question. Note, also, that in order to facilitate in the common interest a friendly and practical settlement of any difficulty which may arise between Belgium and Germany or between France and Germany concerning the observance of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the German, Belgian, and French Governments have agreed that the task of settling amicably any such difficulty shall be accomplished by the Commissions set up under the Arbitration Agreements concluded at Locarno on October 16, 1925, by Belgium and by France with Germany. These commissions will act in conformity with the procedure laid down and with the rights accruing under these conventions.

If any such difficulty should arise, it will be submitted either to i.e. without any right of postponement of any kind, in foreign currencies by equal monthly instalments, viz. 660 million Reichsmarks per annum, to include whatever amounts are required for the service of the German External Loan, 1924.'

¹ For text see *Documents on International Affairs, 1928*, p. 49.

the Belgo-German Conciliation Commission or to the Franco-German Conciliation Commission, according to whether the difficulty arises between Belgium and Germany or between France and Germany.

This agreement does not in any way affect the general provisions applicable in such cases and in particular is subject to the reservation that the powers of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations to make investigations under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles remain intact. It is also subject to the understanding that each of the Powers who signed the Treaty concluded at Locarno on October 16, 1925, between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy retains the right to lay any difficulty at any time before the Council of the League of Nations in conformity with Article 4 of that Treaty.

The present agreement and the arrangements relating to the acceptance in principle of the Plan of June 7, 1929, are mutually interdependent.

Done at The Hague, the 30th day of August, 1929.

STRESEMANN.
PAUL HYMANS.
DINO GRANDI.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.
ARISTIDE BRIAND.

*Text of Joint Note to Dr. Stresemann.*¹

Secretariat-General, The Hague,
August 30, 1929.

Your Excellency,

In the course of the proceedings of the Political Commission of the Conference at The Hague the three Occupying Powers have agreed to begin the evacuation of the Rhineland during the month of September on the conditions laid down in the attached Notes. The withdrawal of the Belgian and British forces will be completed within three months of the date on which the operation of evacuation begins. The French forces will evacuate the Second Zone within the same period. The evacuation of the Third Zone by the French troops will begin immediately after the Young Plan is ratified by the German and French Parliaments and put into operation. It will proceed without interruption as rapidly as conditions permit, and in any case will be completed at the latest in a period of eight months terminating not later than the end of June 1930.

In order to enable the Belgian, British, and French troops to com-

¹ Herr Stresemann's reply merely confirmed this arrangement.

plete the evacuation within the periods indicated above, it is necessary that the Government of the Reich should take the measures laid down in the annexed Notes mentioned above. We should be greatly indebted to Your Excellency if you would let us know if you are in agreement with regard to these measures.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of our highest consideration.

PAUL HYMANS.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

ARISTIDE BRIAND.

II. NAVAL DISARMAMENT

During the months of April and May 1929 there began a course of events which finally terminated in the signing of the London Naval Treaty just twelve months later. The sixth session of the League Preparatory Disarmament Commission met at Geneva on April 15, faced with a deadlock in the matter of naval disarmament, and in the midst of that unfortunate atmosphere of, perhaps, involuntary suspicion, which had surrounded Anglo-American naval relations ever since the collapse of the Coolidge Conference in August 1927, and which was in no way dispelled by the affair of the Anglo-French compromise of October 1928.¹

Ever since his inauguration on March 4, 1929, however, the world had been waiting for some *démarche* from President Hoover in connexion with naval armaments, in fulfilment of the statement in his inaugural address that 'Peace can be contributed to by respect for our ability in defence. Peace can be promoted by the limitation of arms, and by the creation of the instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement of controversies. I covet for this administration a record of having further contributed to advance the cause of peace.'²

On April 22, Mr. Hugh Gibson, United States delegate to the Preparatory Commission, made a remarkable speech on naval disarmament from which the following extract has been taken.

1. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY THE HON. HUGH S. GIBSON, AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION, GENEVA, APRIL 22, 1929³

My country's defence is primarily a naval problem. The American Government has found no reason for modifying its view that the simplest, fairest, and most practical method is that of limitation by tonnage by categories—a method which has been given practical and

¹ For the documents of the Compromise see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, pp. 27-33.

² For text of President Hoover's Inaugural Address see below, pp. 242-7.

³ Official text issued by the U.S. Department of State.

satisfactory application in the Washington Treaty. While it is realized that this does not constitute an exact and scientific gauge of strategic strength, we have nevertheless found that it constitutes a method which has the advantage of simplicity and of affording to each Power the freedom to utilize its tonnage within the limitation of each category according to its special needs.

The American Delegation has urged this view throughout the first reading, but, in view of the inacceptability to some other delegations of our unmodified thesis, my Government has sought in the various methods presented some solution which might offer the possibility of compromise and general acceptance. During the Third Session of the Preparatory Commission, the French Delegation brought forward a method which was an attempt to combine its original total tonnage proposals with the method of tonnage by categories. Under this method, a total tonnage was assigned to each nation, and this total divided among categories of ships by specified tonnages. If I am not mistaken, certain modifications were suggested in informal discussions, so as to provide that the tonnage allocated to any given category might be increased by a certain percentage to be agreed upon, such increase to be transferred from any other category or categories not already fixed by existing treaty.

In the hope of facilitating general agreement as to naval armaments, my Government is disposed to accept the French proposal as a basis of discussion. It is, of course, the understanding of my Government that this involves an agreement upon the method alone and not upon any quantitative tonnages or the actual percentages to be transferred from one category to another. All quantitative proposals of any kind should properly be reserved for discussion by a final conference.

My Government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary methods of limitation which may be calculated to make our proposals, the French thesis,¹ or any other acceptable

¹

(Article NA of French Draft)

The limitation of naval armaments agreed to by each of the High Contracting Parties is shown in the annexed Table X. [*This Table is left blank in the draft, and is not printed here.*]

The figures in column I of this table represent the total tonnage that each of the High Contracting Parties considers it essential to attain for the purposes of security and the defence of its national interests.

The figures in column II represent the total tonnage that each of the High Contracting Parties considers it necessary to complete before the expiry of the Convention.

The figures in column III represent, for each of the High Contracting Parties,

to other Powers, and if such a course appears desirable, my Government will be prepared to give consideration to a method of estimating equivalent naval values which takes account of other factors than displacement tonnage alone. In order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age, unit displacement, and caliber of guns. My Government has given careful consideration to various methods of comparison and the American Delegation will be in a position to discuss the subject whenever it comes before the Commission.

In alluding briefly to these possible methods, I desire to lay special emphasis on the fact that for us the essential thing is the achievement of substantial results. Methods are of secondary importance.

I feel that we are able to deal to best advantage with the specific questions on our agenda only if we bear clearly in mind the recent important changes in world conditions.

Since our last meeting the nations of the world have bound themselves by solemn undertaking to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. We believe (and we hope that our belief is shared by the other nations) that this agreement affirming humanity's will to peace will advance the cause of disarmament by removing doubts and fears which in the past have constituted our principal obstacle. It has recently been my privilege to discuss the general problem of disarmament at considerable length with President Hoover, who has always been an ardent advocate of peace and good understanding. I am in a position to realize, perhaps as well as any one, how earnestly he feels that the Pact for the Renunciation of War opens to us an unprecedented opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament, an opportunity which admits of no postponement.

the division of the total tonnage stated by it in column II into total tonnage by groups.

These total tonnage groups apply to all ships of a similar nature in the following manner: (a) capital ships; (b) aircraft carriers; (c) surface ships of less than 10,000 tons; (d) submarines.

Each of the High Contracting Parties, while keeping within the limits of total tonnage stated in column II, can alter such division as it deems necessary for its security, subject to informing the Secretariat of the League of Nations of the changes brought to the division of its total tonnage, at least one year before laying down the portion of the tonnage which is to be transferred.

NOTE.—Each of the High Contracting Parties states in column III the division of its total tonnage, either into the four groups of vessels as stated in paragraph 4, or only into those groups which it considers necessary for its needs of security.

Any approach to the disarmament problem on purely technical grounds is bound to be inconclusive. The technical justification of armaments is based upon the experience of past wars and upon the anticipation of future wars. So long as the approach to the problem is based upon old fears and old suspicions, there is little hope of disarmament. The lessons of the old strategies must be unlearned. If we are honest, if our solemn promise in the Pact means anything, there is no justification for the continuation of a war-taxed peace. Great armaments are but the relic of another age, but they will remain a necessary relic until the present deadlock is broken, and that can be accomplished only by the decision of the Powers possessing the greatest armaments to initiate measures of reduction.

In the opening statement at the Three Power Naval Conference in 1927, I took occasion, in suggesting certain tonnage levels as a basis of discussion, to say that the United States is prepared to agree to a plan for limitation at still lower levels which maintain the relative status of existing treaties with respect to the Powers represented at that Conference. This is still the attitude of my Government, and I am authorized to state that on this basis we are willing to agree to any reduction, however drastic, of naval tonnage which leaves no type of war vessel unrestricted.

A large part of the suggestions for limitation hitherto made seem to have been of such a nature as to sanction existing armaments or even to set higher levels with tacit encouragement to increase existing establishments. This is only a timid expedient, and an agreement on the basis of existing world armaments (or at higher levels) can never be justified before enlightened public opinion as a positive achievement. At best it is purely negative. Fundamentally, our purpose should be to release large numbers of men from military service to productive effort, and second, to reduce the heavy burden of taxation. So long as the nations are burdened with increasing taxation for the maintenance of armaments it is idle to pretend that the world is really advancing toward the goal of disarmament. In recent years the word 'limitation' has come to be used chiefly in describing agreements at existing levels or still higher levels, and is generally looked upon as having nothing to do with actual reduction. It is useless to attempt to correct this impression by explaining that limitation may be at any level lower or higher than those existing. As a practical matter, it would seem to be best to accept the general public understanding of these terms. Let us therefore take the bold course and begin by scrapping the term 'limitation' in order to concentrate upon a general reduction of armaments.

My Government believes that there can be no complete and effective limitation of armament unless all classes of war vessels, including cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, are limited. It could not agree to any method which would result in leaving any class of combatant vessels unrestricted. In its reply, under date of September 28, 1928, to communications from the British and French Governments concerning an understanding reached between them as to a basis of naval limitation, my Government pointed out that this understanding applied to only one type of cruiser and one type of submarine, and would leave totally unlimited a large class of effective fighting units. This Note also called attention to the American position at the Geneva Naval Conference and the fact that a proposal for general reduction was urged by the American Delegation.

The willingness of my Government, I may even say its eagerness, to go to low levels, is based upon the fundamental belief that naval needs are relative, namely, that what we may require for our defence depends chiefly upon the size of the navies maintained by others. Aside from the signatories of the Washington Treaty, there is no conceivable combination of naval power which could threaten the safety of any of the principal naval Powers. What justification can there be for the Powers which lead in the respective classes of naval vessels to sanction further building programmes in those classes? In the case of the United States we have already expressed our willingness to agree on a basis that would mean a substantial reduction of our present destroyer and submarine types. In the case of cruisers it is only possession by others of greatly superior strength in this class which has led to the adoption of the present building programme.

My Government cannot find any justification for the building and maintenance of large naval establishments save on the ground that no Power can reduce except as a result of general reduction. Let us ask ourselves honestly what these establishments are for. As regards the relations of the maritime Powers among themselves, there is no such need. Even if the danger of war is admitted, it could be guarded against just as well by the maintenance of relative strength at low levels as at higher levels. The principal naval Powers have nothing to fear from the naval strength of the countries non-signatory to the Washington Treaty. There is no conceivable combination of naval strength among the non-signatory Powers which need give concern. As an example, the cruiser strength of all the non-signatory countries in the world does not attain to one-half of the cruiser tonnage of the greatest single fleet.

The people of every country are crying out against the burdens of taxation and demanding the suppression of unnecessary expenditure. My Government is convinced that expenditure for disproportionate naval establishments is indefensible in that it can be avoided by a sensible agreement among the naval Powers. And we must recognize that the people who pay taxes are bound to feel well-founded resentment against any policy which commits them to needless taxation through failure to reach rational agreements.

My Government believes firmly in its idea that naval needs are relative, and that radical general reduction is possible only on the theory of relative needs. I trust that these views may commend themselves to other Governments, and that it may be possible to agree upon such reductions. If, however, it is impossible to agree on this thesis, it is obvious that there will remain only the thesis of absolute naval needs. This would mean that all thought of reduction is abandoned, that each country retains a free hand in building with an inevitable tendency toward competition. Surely we can hardly envisage such a sequel to our solemn undertaking to keep the peace.

My Government has always felt that we need no exact balance of ships and guns which can be based only upon the idea of conflict—what is really wanted is a common-sense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means. My Government has never believed that an effective approach to the problem of disarmament could be made by methods of reduction of armaments alone. It feels that genuine disarmament will follow only from a change of attitude toward the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. It is for that reason that I venture to make this appeal that the countries here represented examine the whole problem afresh in the hope that they will find in general world conditions and in the solemn obligation they have taken among themselves a reassurance as to their security and that they will find in this the confidence to enable them to dispense with the armaments which hitherto have seemed so essential.

NOTE. Mr. Gibson's speeches made a profound effect, not only upon the Preparatory Commission, where they met with general satisfaction, but upon the world at large. In England this new line of policy influenced the leaders of the three political parties in conducting their electoral campaigns, and emphasis was laid by all three on the necessity of the reduction of naval armaments and of the maintenance of Anglo-American friendship.

The next direct step, however, came from President Hoover himself, who took the opportunity in his Memorial Day Speech on May 30 to develop still further his plans for naval reduction. If the Kellogg Treaty was to fulfil its high purpose, he said, the nations of the world would have to 'clothe

faith and idealism with action', which would have to 'march with the inexorable tread of common sense and realism to accomplishment'.¹

Negotiations between Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the new American Ambassador, General Dawes, proceeded throughout the summer, and agreement was reached on a tentative basis. It was decided that the British Government should call a Five-Power Conference in London to discuss the problem of naval disarmament, and at the end of September Mr. MacDonald sailed for the United States for a personal conference with President Hoover. This took place at the Presidential fishing camp on the Rapidan, and as a result a joint statement was issued by the two statesmen on October 9. Two days previously the British Foreign Office had issued invitations to the Conference.

2. TEXT OF INVITATION TO THE FIVE-POWER NAVAL CONFERENCE. DISPATCHED OCTOBER 7, 1929

The invitation of the British Government to the United States, France, Italy, and Japan to take part in the naval conference in London was communicated to the Embassies of those countries in London on October 7.

Mr. Henderson also wrote a covering note to General Dawes, enclosing copies of the Notes which he had addressed to the French, Italian and Japanese Ambassadors, and adding that he understood that the Government of the United States concurred in the terms of the Notes.

The following is the text of the Note addressed to the French Ambassador:²

'I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the informal conversations on the subject of naval disarmament, which have been proceeding in London during the last three months between the Prime Minister and the Ambassador of the United States, have now reached a stage at which it is possible to say that there is no point outstanding of such serious importance as to prevent an agreement.

From time to time the Prime Minister has notified Your Excellency of the progress made in these discussions, and I now have the honour to state that provisional and informal agreement has been reached on the following principles:

1. The conversations have been one of the results of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in 1928, which brought about a realinement of our national attitudes on the subject of security, in consequence of the provision that war should not be used as an instrument of national policy in the relations of nations one to another. Therefore, the Peace Pact has been regarded as the starting-point of agreement.

2. It has been agreed to adopt the principle of parity in each of the

¹ For text of President Hoover's Memorial Day Speech see below, pp. 242-7.

² See *Times*, October 8, 1929; also, *Bulletin of International News*, vol. vi, no. 8, October 24, 1929.

several categories and that such parity shall be reached by December 31, 1936. Consultation between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions has taken place, and it is contemplated that the programme of parity on the British side should be related to the naval forces of all parts of the Empire.

3. The question of battleship strength was also touched upon during the conversations, and it has been agreed in these conversations that, subject to the assent of other signatory Powers, it would be desirable to reconsider the battleship replacement programmes provided for in the Washington Treaty of 1922, with the view to diminishing the amount of replacement construction implied under that Treaty.

4. Since both the Governments of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the attitude that they have publicly adopted in regard to the desirability of securing the total abolition of the submarine, this matter hardly gave rise to discussion during the recent conversations. They recognize, however, that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in conference with the other naval Powers.

In view of the scope of these discussions both Governments consider it most desirable that a conference should be summoned to consider the categories not covered by the Washington Treaty, and to arrange for and deal with the questions covered by the second paragraph of Article 21 of that Treaty. It is our earnest hope that the French Government will agree to the desirability of such a conference. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States are in accord that such a conference should be held in London at the beginning of the third week of January 1930, and it is hoped that the French Government will be willing to appoint representatives to attend it.

A similar invitation is being addressed to the Governments of Italy, Japan and the United States; and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are being asked to appoint representatives to take part in the conference. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would cause the above invitation to be addressed to the French Government.

In the same way as the two Governments have kept your Excellency informally *au courant* of the recent discussions, so now His Majesty's Government will be willing, in the interval before the proposed conference, to continue informal conversations with Your Excellency on any points which may require elucidation. The importance of reviewing the whole naval situation at an early date is so

vital, in the interests of general disarmament, that I trust that Your Excellency's Government will see their way to accept this invitation and that the date proposed will be agreeable to them. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom propose to communicate to you in due course their views as to the subjects which they think should be discussed at the conference, and will be glad to receive a corresponding communication from the French Government.

It is hoped that at this conference the principal naval Powers may be successful in reaching agreement. I should like to emphasize that His Majesty's Government have discovered no inclination in any quarter to set up new machinery for dealing with the naval disarmament question; on the contrary, it is hoped that by this means a text can be elaborated which will facilitate the task of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission and of the subsequent General Disarmament Conference.'

NOTE.—Acceptances to the above invitation were received from the U.S. Government on October 10; from Italy on October 15, and from France and Japan on October 16.

3. TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENT HOOVER AND MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD, OCTOBER 9, 1929

The following statement was issued simultaneously at the British Embassy and at the White House for publication on October 9:¹

'The visit of the British Premier to Mr. Hoover, which has now terminated, had as its chief purpose the making of personal contacts which will be fruitful in promoting friendly, frank relations between the two countries.

'Both the President and the Prime Minister are highly gratified by the keen interest which the people of both countries have taken in their meeting and regard it as a proof of the strong desire of both nations to come to a closer understanding. The British Prime Minister has been particularly impressed and gratified by the warmth of his welcome and by the flood of expressions of goodwill which have been poured upon him.

'At the moment of his leaving Washington the following joint statement is issued:

'“During the last few days we have had an opportunity in the informal talks in which we have been engaged not only to review the conversations on naval agreement which have been carried on during this summer between us, but also to discuss some of the more impor-

¹ See *The Times*, October 10, 1929; also *Bulletin of International News*, vol. vi, no. 8, October 24, 1929.

tant means by which the moral force of our countries can be exerted for peace.

““We have been guided by the double hope of settling our own differences on naval matters and so establishing unclouded goodwill, candour and confidence between us, and also of contributing something to the solution of the problem of peace in which all other nations are interested and which calls for their co-operation.

““In signing the Paris Peace Pact fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of our good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct our national policy in accordance with its pledge.

““The part of each of our Governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active co-operation with its European neighbours; but each of our Governments will direct its thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world.

““Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual relations of the two countries in the light of the situation created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense, the two Governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence our national policy.

““We approach the old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between us has been banished and that conflicts between our military or naval forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their meaning and character, and their solution in ways satisfactory to both countries has become possible.

““We have agreed that those questions should become the subject of active consideration between us. They involve important technical matters requiring detailed study. One of the hopeful results of the visit which is now terminating officially has been that our two Governments will begin conversations upon them, following the same method as that which has been pursued during the summer in London.

““The exchange of views on naval reduction has brought the two nations so close to agreement that the obstacles in previous conferences arising out of Anglo-American disagreements seem now to be substantially removed. We have kept the nations which took part

in the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 informed of the progress of our conversations, and we have now proposed to them that we should meet together and try to come to a common agreement which would justify each in making substantial naval reductions. An agreement on naval armaments cannot be completed without the co-operation of the other naval Powers, and both of us feel sure that by the same free and candid discussion of needs which has characterized our conversations, such mutual understandings will be reached as will make naval agreement next January possible, and thus remove this serious obstacle to the progress of world disarmament.

“Between now and the meeting of the proposed conference in January our Governments will continue their conversations with the other Powers concerned in order to remove as many difficulties as possible before the official formal negotiations open. In view of the security afforded by the Peace Pact we have been able to end, we trust for ever, all competitive building between ourselves, with the risk of war and the waste of public money involved, by agreeing to a parity of our fleets, category by category.

“Success at the coming conference will result in a large decrease in the naval equipment of the world, and, what is equally important, the reduction of prospective programmes of construction which would otherwise produce competitive building to an indefinite amount. We hope and believe that the steps we have taken will be warmly welcomed by the people whom we represent as a substantial contribution to the efforts universally made by all the nations to gain security for peace—not by military organization—but by peaceful means rooted in public opinion and enforced by a sense of justice in the civilized world.”

4. SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 5, 1929¹

On his return to England from the United States, Mr. MacDonald made the following statement to Parliament:

I do this in order that I may have an opportunity of reporting to the House upon the visit I recently made to the United States and Canada. Any statement that can be made regarding that visit can add but little to what has already appeared in the press, but by reporting to this House and thanking my hosts from this place I perform an official duty which is required at the close of my journey. What success the visit had was largely owing to the hearty support given to it by all parties and sections in this country, and by all the great

¹ House of Commons Debates (Hansard), November 5, 1929.

organs of public opinion. I went out not as a Party leader, but as a national representative. I take this opportunity of thanking President Hoover and his Cabinet, and both the Senate and the House of Representatives, for the welcome they gave me, and the honours they paid to me as the representative of this country. They showed the best kind of friendship by the candour with which they exchanged views and the straightforwardness with which they raised and discussed questions of delicacy. Though some of the matters I had to deal with might easily have been presented to the public so as to rouse old prejudices, from beginning to end I found nothing but thoughtful fairness and a desire to co-operate in placing facts and issues justly before the country.

No Ambassador could have received a warmer welcome, no Government or people could open their doors, their lives and their hearts wider to a guest. I did my best as I crossed their boundary to express my thanks to them, but I feel that it is here in the House of Commons, in your presence and with you joining in, that my final grateful adieu should be waved to them. I took with me a staff limited with great severity on the soundest Treasury principles. Frequently I had to regret this regard for public economy, for at times my colleagues were grossly overworked. By their devotion to the work in hand they contributed much to its success, and it is due to them that I should from this place acknowledge the debt which the nation owes them.

I went with no draft agreements either in my mind or in my pocket. I went to try by personal contact and by direct address to establish a new relationship between the two peoples, a relationship based upon mutual understanding, not only of common objects to be pursued but of natural differences to be respected. I must leave the result to fructify in policy and action as time goes on. The breeze which blew me across the Atlantic was created by the conversations I had had during the summer with the American Ambassador, who personifies in such a delightful way the downright desire of his Government for peace and goodwill. These conversations had already removed every fear that at an international conference the unbridged differences between the United States and ourselves would doom such a conference to failure. I reviewed those conversations with the President and studied with him ways and means of filling in the narrow gaps still remaining in a programme of building which should at the same time recognize both parity and strength and variety in the use of tonnage. Both of us recognized, however, that the agreement we were seeking was not merely one between ourselves but one which

would have to be set into a wider co-operation, and that a final settlement would have to depend upon the Five Powers' Conference, invitations to which, we learned during our deliberations, had been accepted by all the Powers concerned.

These Powers will very probably have a good deal to say from their own point of view upon the naval problems we were discussing. We decided to urge that preliminary or more or less informal conversations between and with these Powers should be entered upon, so that when the Conference meets, the difficulties which lie at any rate on the fringe of our task may have been overcome. The success of that Conference, which will meet here in January, is our next objective, and meanwhile I can say nothing which will put difficulties in its way. Above and beyond the definite subject of a naval agreement was a desire to make it clear to everybody that in our mutual relations the Paris Pact of Peace was a reality, and so in the joint statement issued by us a declaration is made for the first time officially by the representatives of the two nations speaking together. Both of us put our signatures to this, and I quote:

‘Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.’

Further, and I quote again:

‘Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense, the two Governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrust and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national policy.’

We approach old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere on the assumption that war between us is banished, and that conflicts between our military and naval forces cannot take place. These problems have changed their meaning and characters, and their solution in ways satisfactory to both countries has become possible. The United States pursues with vigilant jealousy its historic policy of keeping free from old-world entanglements, and is therefore not in the League of Nations. We are in the League of Nations. We have contracted obligations to the League, and we shall remain loyal to these obligations. On neither side was any attempt made to change these facts. They were recognized as axioms in all our discussions. They were stated in the Memorandum which we jointly gave to the press. In the course of our conversations the President raised some of the major historical causes of difference between us,

like belligerent rights, so-called fortified bases, and so on, which are still active in forming public opinion, and we agreed mutually to examine them in the hope that we might arrive at understandings upon them. Even should one hold the opinion, as I do, that the only satisfactory way to settle legal and other disputes which arise from war conditions is success in the establishment of peace, I believe that nothing but good could come from a frank exchange of views between the Government of the United States and ourselves on this question.

NOTE. Although agreement had been reached between Great Britain and America, thereby greatly facilitating the forthcoming negotiation as far as the High Seas Group were concerned, the Continental Powers remained dissatisfied. On December 20 the French Government addressed a Note to the British Government, which, taken in conjunction with the British reply of January 12, 1930, illustrates eloquently the two schools of thought, conflict between which brought about the partial failure of the London Naval Conference.

5. TEXT OF THE FRENCH MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON DECEMBER 20, 1929¹

The following is the text of the French Memorandum, setting forth the views of the French Government on naval limitation, which was delivered in London by the French Ambassador on December 20.

When accepting, on October 16 last, the invitation of the British Government to take part in the Naval Conference in London, the French Government reserved its liberty to define its views with regard to the problems to be included in the agenda and other matters that may come up for discussion at that international meeting. After the exchange of views that has already taken place, the French Government believes that the time has come to explain its position in respect of the more vital questions of principle and detail that will arise during the negotiations, and the importance of which, as overstepping purely technical limits, requires to be fully brought to light.

I

The French Government has already had the opportunity to express its appreciation of the considerations underlying the step taken by the British Government in conjunction with the Government of the United States. It is well aware of the vital character of the task of limiting armaments, and it has taken too active a part in the work hitherto done in this direction not to welcome a suggestion tending, as expressly stated by his Excellency Mr. Arthur Henderson in his letter of October 7, to facilitate the task of the Preparatory Com-

¹ *The Times*, December 27, 1929.

mission of the League of Nations, and, later on, the work of the General Conference on Disarmament.

Moreover, the problem of naval disarmament must be considered, since the meeting in April and May last of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva, as holding up the work carried on by that Commission, which had the efficient co-operation of the American delegates. Furthermore, the last Assembly of the League of Nations declared that an agreement between the leading naval Powers was necessary in order to prepare a general understanding with regard to the methods to be used for the reduction of naval armaments. The conversations already proceeding at the time appeared to that Assembly as being likely to lead to the resumption and completion of the interrupted work of the Preparatory Commission and ultimately to the calling of a general conference.

A General Convention.

It is therefore primarily on principles and methods permitting of the subsequent drafting of a general convention for the limitation of armaments that the Powers meeting in London should, in the view of the French Government, come to an agreement.

The British Government has stated that the Government of the United States and itself had based their conversations on the Pact of Paris. The French Government, which has already had an opportunity of expressing the satisfaction with which it welcomed this statement, took too large a share in the working out of that Pact for it to be necessary for it to lay emphasis on the importance it attaches to it. The Pact is based on the force of public opinion, which is great. But its rational application has not yet been organized; it does not settle all the questions of peaceful procedure, of mutual assistance against an aggressor implied in the outlawry of war. It is undoubtedly a real step towards the preservation of peace, but it cannot be looked upon as sufficient in its present state to guarantee the security of nations.

It was this consideration, no doubt, that prevented the British Government from contemplating the substantial reduction of its naval armaments, and the United States Government from giving up the prompt execution of its latest naval programme. While both were in agreement as to the impossibility of any actual conflict between them, they were bound to consider that the primary task of their respective navies was to provide for the protection of their communications, which would not appear to rule out the hypothesis of their being ready to intervene in a conflict originating in the violation of solemn pledges.

Notwithstanding the significance ascribed to the Paris Pact, it was primarily on the Covenant of the League that the French Government, as well as the other Governments belonging to the League, undertook to base the limitation and reduction of their armaments, whereof naval armaments are but a part. Incomplete as are the measures adopted for carrying it into effect, the Covenant already provides the basis of a complete system of security, based upon the application of the methods of peaceful settlement and assistance to any State unlawfully attacked. Only in proportion to such assistance as they may be able to rely upon from without could the nations be in a position actually to reduce their armaments. Just as a general technical agreement upon armaments implies a previous political agreement, so does a complete naval agreement presuppose an understanding on the question of the freedom of the seas, defining the rights of belligerents and the rights of neutrals, and providing for the prospective co-operation of other fleets against that of an aggressor country.

Washington and Geneva.

However deeply it may regret the present situation, the French Government is nevertheless determined to extend its full assistance to the Powers meeting in London, with a view to the conclusion of such arrangements as may be in keeping with present possibilities.

The question of methods is no less important. In accordance with the example set by the Washington Conference, the Government of the United States and the British Government would appear to have contemplated the adoption of a method of assessing naval armaments dealing merely with the armaments of the five numerically most powerful navies and based on mathematical ratios. The experience, however, of the Naval Conference in Rome tends to remind us that the principles of the Washington Treaty met with a setback when the League attempted, in 1924, to extend them to every navy; and it has frequently been demonstrated in Geneva that mere ratios do not permit of a rational application, appropriate for every State, of the principles laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant, which provides for a general reduction of armaments to a minimum compatible with the security of each State and with the international obligations imposed upon it according to its geographical position and its particular conditions.

In fact the conference will fail to achieve its object to the full unless it makes it lead to a general agreement in Geneva as to the methods for the limitation of naval armaments.

II

It was necessary to recall the above general observations before proceeding to define the principles whereby the French Government will be guided in the London negotiations.

(1) It is upon Article 8 of the Covenant that the French Government, faithful to its pledged word, intends to base the reduction of its armaments. It is, indeed, upon this basis alone, a basis which does not imply the *a priori* application of mathematical ratios, and upon which the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament already based its work—that it would be possible, in its opinion, to work out an agreement acceptable to the Governments not represented in London.

Two Methods.

On the lines of Article 8 two opposite methods for the limitation of naval armaments were suggested in Geneva, the one by total tonnage, the other by classes of ships. The stronger navies inclined to the latter method, while the rest were all in favour of the former. Desirous of reconciling these conflicting views, the French delegation proposed, as early as April 1927, a compromise which met with the approval of all the navies that will not be represented in London and was sympathetically considered by several others.

The United States, in particular, took the opportunity on two separate occasions of publicly stating that it was willing to accept it as a basis for discussion. Under this arrangement the limitation of fleets by total tonnage was to be supplemented by measures of publicity concerning the distribution of that tonnage between the chief classes of ships and by rules for the transfer of tonnage from one class to another.

Such a system, which has the further advantage of permitting minor adjustments, may adapt itself the better to the needs of the projected understanding between the United States and British Governments in that it leaves any States that may desire it full liberty to bind themselves more closely as between themselves. In spite of its preference for the method of limitation by total tonnage, the French Government is willing to agree to this compromise, should it prove likely to lead to a general agreement.

(2) The preparatory work in Geneva has revealed the close interdependence that exists in a country's defensive armaments between its land, sea, and air forces. The French Government has frequently had occasion to explain that this was a fundamental principle of its policy of national defence, and one the importance of which results in

particular from the geographical position of France, a Power both continental and maritime, and the metropolis of a colonial empire spread out over the whole surface of the earth.

French Needs.

The French Government does not wish to find itself compelled to raise in London any questions relating to the limitation of land and air armaments, but it cannot conceal the fact that the tonnage required to meet the needs of its naval defence is closely related to its needs in land and air armaments, computed in accordance with the methods laid down by the Preparatory Commission at its last meeting. Were the decisions of the latter Commission again to be put in question the particulars they will afford as regards their naval armaments would become utterly valueless.

The French Government desires to state, moreover, that these difficulties will not prevent it from seeking any such solutions as would allow any Powers desirous of doing so and being of opinion that they could do so without danger to enter into a binding agreement as between themselves, without awaiting the conclusion of a general convention for the limitation of all armaments.

(3) Subject to the preceding observations, the French delegation will have no difficulty in making known the importance of the tonnage corresponding with the national needs of France, taking into account her geographical position on three seas, the extent of a colonial empire with an area of 11,000,000 square kilometres, populated by 60,000,000 inhabitants, and a trade amounting to 32,000,000,000 francs.

The existence of such an empire, the necessity of providing for the separate defence of each of the big communities it comprises, the many political and economical ties which bind these big communities to each other and to the mother country, the need to protect the integrity and economic life of the latter, the task of providing for the security of more than 30,000 kilometres of seaboard, all told, impose upon the French Navy duties which the French Government cannot ignore when it is called upon to apply Article 8 of the Covenant. The French naval Budget is lower to-day than it was in 1914, and the same desire of strict moderation will continue to inspire France in the appreciation of her needs, and in computing the forces necessary to meet them.

The Mediterranean.

In this respect the French Government will take fully into account any guarantee of security that might be made, and which would

give full effect to the undertakings of international solidarity against an aggressor contained in Article 16 of the Covenant.

(4) Moreover, remembering the beneficial effects produced by the Pacific Treaty on the conclusion of the Washington Naval Agreements, the French Government considers that in a narrower field, but one in which most of the European fleets are concerned, some progress might be achieved. Its communications through the Mediterranean are of an importance for the British Empire which the French Government by no means disregards. They are equally vital for France. Might not an agreement of mutual guarantee and non-aggression be negotiated between the Mediterranean Naval Powers, to which those not represented in London would be associated, and first and foremost a Power like Spain, on the importance of whose naval interests in the Mediterranean emphasis need hardly be laid? The French Government asks this question, declaring itself in favour of the principle of such an agreement, because it is earnestly desirous of bringing about a reduction of naval armaments.

As a conclusion to this statement of the general views suggested to it by a study of the agenda of the conference, the French Government desires to state that none of the difficulties to which it has thought it necessary to draw attention appears to it to be insuperable. Convinced that all the Governments that are to meet in London will enter upon these discussions with the same will as themselves to co-operate sincerely in giving effect to such means as may lead to the overcoming of every difficulty, the French Government relies upon the success of a negotiation that will pave the way for such a general conference for the limitation and reduction of armaments as alone seems capable of fulfilling the common will of the nations to organize peace.

6. TEXT OF H.B.M. GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO THE FRENCH
MEMORANDUM OF DECEMBER 20, 1929. [REPLY DATED
JANUARY 12, 1930.¹]

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have given the most careful consideration to the Memorandum communicated to them on December 20 last in which the French Government explain their views upon various questions connected with the forthcoming London Naval Conference. His Majesty's Government much appre-

¹ *The Times*, January 13, 1930. Although this document belongs chronologically to the 1930 collection, it has been included here as suitably rounding off the preliminary period of the negotiations.

ciate the frank and friendly attitude of the French Government in furnishing them with so comprehensive an elucidation of their point of view, and in reiterating their assurance that they are determined to make the Conference successful.

In issuing their invitation to the London Conference, His Majesty's Government considered that it would not conduce to the success of the Conference if the various Governments were to entrench themselves, before the Conference opened, in positions—based perhaps on misunderstandings—from which they could not recede; nor in the invitation did His Majesty's Government refer to obligations contracted under the Covenant, or to questions of national security and such considerations, because they are clearly inherent in all disarmament negotiations and must be in the mind of every nation taking part in this Conference. One of the great advantages of the frequent meetings at Geneva is that Governments have opportunities to understand each other's respective positions and problems, and His Majesty's Government felt that it was unnecessary to recite elementary obligations, internal and external, but rather to concentrate upon the supremely important problems which have to be faced. The considerations set out in such a friendly spirit in the French memorandum will of course be in the minds of all the delegates.

It is true that there may not yet have been devised a complete machinery of sanctions to enforce the various peace agreements now in existence; but in the meantime much has been done and His Majesty's Government place considerable trust in the fact that fifty-six countries have declared their intention to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and to resort only to pacific means for the settlement of international disputes. Unless a beginning in the reduction of naval armament is held to be justified by the measure of security already achieved through the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Quadruple Treaty relating to the Pacific, the Treaties of Locarno, the signature of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice by thirty-three countries, and, finally, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, public expectation will be disappointed, the tendency towards an expansion in arms which is only too evident already will develop, and the nations will be taught once more in practice to trust only to military preparations for their security. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the nations attending the London Conference may, by agreement on reduced naval strengths, register their confidence in the great advance made since the War in the provision of national security by political agreement.

His Majesty's Government observe with interest the distinction drawn in the French memorandum between the Pact of Paris and the Covenant of the League. They would suggest, however, that the two documents may also be regarded as complementary one of another. From this standpoint the Pact of Paris, by its renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, may be held by the States which are members of the League of Nations to have completed the structure of peace which the more restricted language of the Covenant had for the time left unfinished. His Majesty's Government accept fully and unreservedly all the obligations of the Covenant, which, however, must not be held to involve a delay in progressive steps for disarmament, for which the Pact of Paris is a justification.

His Majesty's Government note the suggestion of the French Government that it is doubtless due to the absence from the Kellogg Pact of any provisions for its methodical application that they have been deterred from contemplating any considerable reduction in their naval establishment. His Majesty's Government desire to remove the error upon which this observation rests. In response to the better prospects of peace and of an international agreement the British proposals, as a matter of fact, provide for a very considerable reduction in the strength which the British Empire has considered necessary in all categories of combatant vessels, from capital ships to submarines.

In Part II, section i, of their memorandum the French Government refer to the system of limitation of naval armaments by 'global tonnage'. His Majesty's Government have consistently expressed their preference for dealing with the problem of naval disarmament by a strict limitation of the types, tonnages, and guns of all categories of warships, since they feel confident that any other method of limitation must tend to preserve those elements of competition and uncertainty which it will be one of the express objects of the Conference to eliminate. The problem of naval armaments involves not only the amount of tonnage but the use to which it is put. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government have studied with great care the 'transactional proposal' to which the French Government refer, and are ready to discuss the possibility of some arrangement based upon that proposal.

The French Government emphasize in Part II, section ii, of their Memorandum that there is a close interdependence between the various defensive armaments of a country, and give the reasons why they regard this as a fundamental principle of their policy of national defence. His Majesty's Government agree that the problems of naval,

land, and air disarmament cannot be completely dissociated one from another, but they do not take the view that no attempt should be made to deal with one unless all are being dealt with simultaneously. His Majesty's Government consider that the approach to disarmament can best be facilitated by attacking the problem in detail as is now proposed at the Naval Conference. In the end a complete disarmament agreement must cover the whole field of arms, and steady and continuous work will be required until that field has been covered. They, therefore, join the French Government in earnestly hoping that the Conference will result in an agreement which will commend itself to all the Powers represented on the Preparatory Commission, and, by facilitating the task of that body, hasten the summoning of a general disarmament conference.

As regards Part II, section iii, of the Memorandum, His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the French Government, while taking due account of the naval requirements imposed by France's geographical position, will, like His Majesty's Government, continue to observe strict moderation in the appraisal of their needs, and that the French delegation will have no difficulty in indicating the extent of the tonnage required to meet the needs of their country.

His Majesty's Government have learnt with interest the views of the French Government regarding the desirability of a treaty of mutual guarantee and non-aggression between the Mediterranean Powers. They agree that the Four-Power Treaty relating to the Pacific which resulted from the Washington Conference exerted a happy influence upon the negotiation of the Washington Naval Treaty. His Majesty's Government would only point out at this stage that a treaty such as that suggested by the French Government appears to go considerably farther than the Pacific Treaty above mentioned, which provided only for the summoning of a conference for the settlement of controversies and for joint consultations in the face of aggressive actions. Inasmuch as all the Mediterranean Powers are members of the League of Nations, it would appear that facilities already exist for joint consultation in the event of need. There is a great measure of security in this, but His Majesty's Government would be glad to exchange views on the subject with all the Powers concerned.

In conclusion His Majesty's Government note with particular pleasure the opinion expressed by the French Government that none of the problems mentioned in their Memorandum amount to irremovable obstacles, and they share entirely the confidence felt by the

French Government that there will be cordial co-operation among the delegations to promote the great aims of the Conference, and that success will terminate their labours.

NOTE.—The reader is referred to the following work as giving a concise record of the Naval Disarmament Question from the Washington Conference of 1921–2 to the opening of the London Conference on January 21, 1930:

Naval Disarmament, by Hugh Latimer. Published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, price 3s. 6d.; and to the *Survey for 1929* (Part I A, section iii).

III. THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

A. ADHERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

The connexion of the United States with the World Court dates officially from February 1923, when the Secretary of State, Hon. Charles Evans Hughes, proposed to President Harding that American participation in the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice was desirable subject to certain reservations. It was not until three years later, however, that the Senate adopted, on January 27, 1926, a resolution that the United States should adhere to the Protocol of the Court with the following five reservations:

1. That such adherence shall not be undertaken to involve any legal relation on the part of the United States to the League of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the United States under the Treaty of Versailles.
2. That the United States shall be permitted to participate, through representatives designated for the purpose and upon an equality with the other State Members, respectively, of the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations, in any and all proceedings of either the Council or the Assembly for the election of the judges or deputy-judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice or for the filling of vacancies.
3. That the United States will pay a fair share of the expenses of the Court as determined and appropriated from time to time by the Congress of the United States.
4. That the United States may at any time withdraw its adherence to the said Protocol and that the Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice adjoined to the Protocol shall not be amended without the consent of the United States.
5. That the Court shall not render any advisory opinion except publicly after due notice to all States adhering to the Court and to all interested States, and after public hearing or opportunity for hearing given to any State concerned; nor shall it, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion

touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest.

These reservations were circulated to the States signatories to the Protocol and a conference of these States was called at Geneva in September 1926 to consider them. The conference considered that the first four reservations should be accepted but made certain qualifications as to the fifth.

As regards the first part of the fifth reservation, dealing with Advisory Opinions, it was pointed out that the recently amended Articles 73 and 74¹ of the Rules of Court seemed to give full satisfaction to the United States. The Court, therefore, would continue to render its advisory opinions in public. As regards the second part of the fifth reservation the Final Act made a distinction between advisory opinions asked for in a dispute to which the United States was party, and those asked for in a dispute in which the United States only claimed an interest.

To satisfy the United States in the first of these classes of disputes it seemed enough to call attention to a pronouncement which the Court had already had occasion to make in a dispute of this kind (Advisory Opinion No. 5—*Eastern Carelia*),² to the effect that ‘an opinion relating to the substance of a dispute between a State Member of the League of Nations and a Non-Member State could not be given without the consent of the said Power’.

As regards the second class of disputes, the Final Act declared that the Conference understood ‘the object of the United States to be to assure to itself a position of equality with States represented either on the Council or in the Assembly of the League of Nations’. The principle, the Conference thought, should be agreed to, observing at the same time that the presumption upon which the fifth reservation appeared to rest, namely that the adoption of a request of an advisory opinion by the Council or Assembly required a unanimous vote, had not been so far established. ‘In any event the United States should be guaranteed a position of equality in this respect.’

Being convinced that the United States had ‘no desire to diminish the value of such opinions in connexion with the functions of the League of Nations’, the Conference thought it desirable that the manner of consent provided for in the second part of the fifth reservation should form the object of a supplementary agreement which would ensure that the peaceful settlement of future differences between Members of the League would not be made more difficult.

The Final Act concluded as follows: ‘The application of some of the reservations of the United States would involve the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between the United States and the other States signatories of the Protocol of December 16, 1920. . . . To this end, it is

¹ Article 73, as amended, provides for the giving of ‘notice of a request for an Advisory Opinion to the members of the Court, to the Members of the League of Nations . . . and to any States entitled to appear before the Court’.

Article 74, as amended, provides that ‘Advisory Opinions shall be read in open Court, notice having been given to the Secretary General of the League of Nations and to the representatives of States, Members of the League and of international organizations immediately concerned’.

² Publications of the Permanent Court, Series B, no. 4, pp. 52–3.

desirous that the States signatories . . . should conclude with the United States a Protocol of execution, which, subject to such further exchange of views as the Government of the United States may think useful might be in the form set out below' (attached to the Final Act).

The Final Act of the Conference was communicated to the United States Secretary of State by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, but no official comment was forthcoming from Washington. It seemed as if President Coolidge was prepared to see his hopes dashed without making any further effort to save them, for there was a ring of finality in the words of his Armistice Day speech at Kansas City on November 11, 1926:

'While no final decision can be made by our Government until the final answers are received,¹ the situation has been sufficiently developed so that I feel warranted in saying that I do not intend to ask the Senate to modify the position. I do not believe that the Senate would take favourable action on any such proposal, and unless the requirements of the Senate resolution are met by the other interested nations I see no prospect of this country adhering to the World Court.'²

There the matter rested for the remainder of President Coolidge's administration, but a new note was struck by President Hoover in his inaugural address on March 4, 1929, and three days later the Secretary-General of the League received a letter from the outgoing Secretary of State, Hon. Frank B. Kellogg, suggesting the reopening of negotiations and stating that with regard to the Reservation 5 'possibly the interest of the U.S.A. thus attempted to be safeguarded may be fully protected in some other way or by some other formula'.

This letter arrived as the Council of the League was on the eve of its 54th Session and there was already sitting at Geneva a Committee of Jurists studying the revision of the Statute of the Court. On this Committee was the Hon. Elihu Root, who had, himself, taken a large share in framing the original Statute.

Mr. Kellogg's proposals were referred to this Committee, and on March 17, 1929, a new formula was submitted by Mr. Kellogg which, when it had been adopted, took the form of the following draft Protocol. This document was considered and adopted by the Council of the League at Madrid in June 1929, and was referred for re-examination to a Conference of representatives of States parties to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which met at Geneva in September.

¹ By May 1, 1928, forty-seven of the signatory States had replied to the Secretary of State of the United States. Of these, five only, Albania, Cuba, Greece, Liberia, and Luxemburg, accepted the United States proposals without condition. The acceptances of Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay had also been forecast. Fifteen of the replies were mere acknowledgements, and no reply had been received from three of the signatories. The twenty-four replies, from Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugo-Slavia, were in accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference.

² See *Survey for 1926* (Part I A, section ii) and *Survey for 1929* (Part I A, section b).

Both the Conference and the Assembly unanimously adopted the Protocol, which was thereupon thrown open for signature.¹

Mr. Hoover authorized the U.S.A. Chargé d'Affaires at Berne to sign the Protocol, an event which took place on December 9, 1929. At the present moment the Protocol has not been presented to the U.S.A. Senate for ratification, but this will probably take place when Congress reconvenes in December 1930.²

1. DRAFT PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION³

The States signatories of the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, dated December 16, 1920, and the United States of America, through the undersigned duly authorized representatives, have mutually agreed upon the following provisions regarding the adherence of the United States of America to the said Protocol subject to the five reservations formulated by the United States in the resolution adopted by the Senate on January 27, 1926.

Article 1

The States signatories of the said Protocol accept the special conditions attached by the United States in the five reservations mentioned above to its adherence to the said Protocol upon the terms and conditions set out in the following Articles.

Article 2

The United States shall be admitted to participate, through representatives designated for the purpose and upon an equality with the signatory States Members of the League of Nations represented in the Council or in the Assembly, in any and all proceedings of either the Council or the Assembly for the election of judges or deputy-judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided for in the Statute of the Court. The vote of the United States shall be counted in determining the absolute majority of votes required by the Statute.

¹ By the middle of August 1930 the Protocol had been signed by fifty-three states, of which 19 had ratified; for list see below, p. 37.

² A comprehensive collection of the documents concerning this latest phase of the proposed adherence of the United States to the World Court will be found in *The United States and the World Court*, by Philip C. Jessup. (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1929.) For a full account of the relations between the United States and the Court see *Information on the World Court, 1918-28*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and Maurice Fanshawe (Allen & Unwin, 1929), pp. 147-62.

³ League of Nations Document A. 49 [Annexe], 1929, V.

Article 3

No amendment of the Statute of the Court may be made without the consent of all the Contracting States.

Article 4

The Court shall render advisory opinions in public session after notice and opportunity for hearing substantially as provided in the now existing Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court.

Article 5

With a view to ensuring that the Court shall not, without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall, through any channel designated for that purpose by the United States, inform the United States of any proposal before the Council or the Assembly of the League for obtaining an advisory opinion from the Court, and thereupon, if desired, an exchange of views as to whether an interest of the United States is affected shall proceed with all convenient speed between the Council or Assembly of the League and the United States.

Whenever a request for an advisory opinion comes to the Court, the Registrar shall notify the United States thereof, among other States mentioned in the now existing Article 73 of the Rules of Court, stating a reasonable time-limit fixed by the President within which a written statement by the United States concerning the request will be received. If for any reason no sufficient opportunity for an exchange of views upon such request should have been afforded and the United States advises the Court that the question upon which the opinion of the Court is asked is one that affects the interests of the United States, proceedings shall be stayed for a period sufficient to enable such an exchange of views between the Council or the Assembly and the United States to take place.

With regard to requesting an advisory opinion of the Court in any case covered by the preceding paragraphs, there shall be attributed to an objection of the United States the same force and effect as attaches to a vote against asking for the opinion given by a Member of the League of Nations in the Council or in the Assembly.

If, after the exchange of views provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, it shall appear that no agreement can be reached and the United States is not prepared to forgo its objection, the exercise of the powers of withdrawal provided for in Article 8 hereof will

twenty-nine, in a single copy, of which the French and English texts shall both be authoritative.

2. LIST OF STATES WHICH HAVE SIGNED AND RATIFIED THE
PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE ADHERENCE OF THE U.S.A.

<i>Signatories.</i>	<i>Date of Deposit of Ratification.</i>
Albania	
Australia	August 28, 1930
Austria	February 26, 1930
Belgium	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Bulgaria	
Canada	August 28, 1930
Chile	
China	? (date unknown)
Colombia	
Cuba	
Czechoslovakia	
Denmark	March 11, 1930
Dominican Republic	
Estonia	? (date unknown)
Finland	August 28, 1930
France	
Germany	August 13, 1930
Great Britain and Northern Ireland .	February 12, 1930
Greece	August 29, 1930
Guatemala	
Haiti	
Hungary	August 13, 1930
India	February 26, 1930
Irish Free State	August 2, 1930
Italy	
Japan	? (date unknown)
Latvia	August 29, 1930
Liberia	
Lithuania	
Luxemburg	? (date unknown)
Netherlands	August 8, 1930
New Zealand	June 4, 1930
Nicaragua	
Norway	April 10, 1930

Panama	
Paraguay	
Persia	? (date unknown)
Peru	
Poland	May 13, 1930
Portugal	June 12, 1930
Rumania	August 4, 1930
Salvador	
Siam	June 2, 1930
South Africa	February 17, 1930
Spain	July 15, 1930
Sweden	March 20, 1930
Switzerland	July 5, 1930
Uruguay	
United States of America	
Venezuela	
Yugoslavia	August 27, 1930

B. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE

The attitude which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government intended to adopt with regard to the Optional Clause¹ was clearly foreseen

¹ The text of the Optional Clause and of Article 36 of the Statute, to which it refers, is as follows:

The Optional Clause

'The undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, further declare on behalf of their Government, that, from this date, they accept as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special Convention the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court under the following conditions.'

Article 36, paragraph 2

'The Members of the League of Nations and the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant may, either when signing or ratifying the protocol to which the present Statute is adjoined or at a later moment, declare that they recognize as compulsory, *ipso facto*, and without special agreement, in relation to any other Member or State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning:

- (a) The interpretation of a Treaty.
- (b) Any question of International Law.
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation.
- (d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

'The declaration referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain Members or States, or for a certain time.

'In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.'

in the following extract from the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament on July 2:¹

'My Government consider that the time has come to submit to judicial settlement international disputes in which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights. For this purpose they are now consulting with My Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India respecting the signing of the Optional Clause embodied in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.'

This consultation was actively continued during the months preceding the Assembly of the League of Nations, and reached its conclusion at Geneva, when, on September 19, the British Foreign Secretary signed the Clause with the following reservations.

1. TEXT OF BRITISH RESERVATIONS²

'On behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and subject to ratification, I accept as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, for a period of ten years and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the said ratification, other than:

Disputes in regard to which the parties to the dispute have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement, and

Disputes with the Government of any other member of the League which is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, all of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties have agreed or shall agree, and

Disputes with regard to questions which, by International Law, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom;

And subject to the condition that His Majesty's Government reserve the right to require that proceedings in the Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted to, and is under consideration by, the Council of the League of Nations, provided that notice to suspend is given after the dispute has been submitted to the Council and is given within ten days of the notification of the initiation of the proceedings in the Court, and provided also that such suspension shall be limited to a period of twelve months or such longer period as can be agreed by the parties to the dispute

¹ *The Times*, July 3; also *Bulletin of International News*, vol. v, no. 26, July 6, 1929.

² British White Paper, Cmd. 3452, p. 4.

or determined by a decision of all the members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute.’¹

New Zealand, India, Canada, and Australia signed on the same terms, but South Africa made the following statements as well: ²

‘With regard to the reservation as to disputes between Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, I wish to state that, although in the view of my Government, such disputes are justiciable by the International Court of Justice, my Government prefers to settle them by other means—hence the reservation.’³

The representative of the Irish Free State had previously signed on September 14, making the following declaration: ⁴

‘On behalf of the Irish Free State, I declare that I accept as compulsory *ipso facto* and without special convention the jurisdiction of the Court in conformity with Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice for a period of twenty years and on the sole condition of reciprocity. This declaration is subject to ratification.’

2. EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM ON THE SIGNATURE BY HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE. ⁵

On December 12, 1929, the British Government issued a Memorandum, from which the following extracts have been made, explaining its policy with regard to signature of the Optional Clause.

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Reasons why Signature of the Optional Clause is desirable

6. Article 2 of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, now generally known as the Pact of Peace, provides that:

‘The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.’

The Treaty, however, does not provide any machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes. As regards disputes of a justiciable character,

¹ The House of Commons, without the formality of a division, agreed to ratification on January 27, 1930.

² *The Times*, September 20, 1929.

³ The South African House of Assembly ratified on January 27, 1930.

⁴ British White Paper, Cmd. 3452, p. 5. ⁵ British White Paper, Cmd. 3452.

therefore, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider signature of the Optional Clause as the logical consequence of the acceptance of the Pact of Peace. Acceptance of the Optional Clause means that disputes falling within its terms will receive from the Permanent Court of International Justice a definite solution, which the parties to the dispute are bound under Article 13 of the Covenant to 'carry out in full good faith'. If the Pact of Peace is to be made fully effective, it seems necessary that the legal renunciation of war should be accompanied by definite acts providing machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom believe that the first step in thus building up barriers against war is to secure the general acceptance of a system under which justifiable disputes will be settled by the operation of law. His Majesty's Government were, therefore, most anxious to sign the Optional Clause at the earliest possible moment. By so doing they hoped both to give to the world a proof of their confidence in the Pact of Peace and an earnest of their own desire to secure the peaceful settlement of justiciable disputes in which they might become involved, and also to do what lay in their power to stimulate other nations to do the same. The extent to which the latter object has already been fulfilled is shown by the fact that the Optional Clause was signed during the last Assembly by Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Latvia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Siam, in addition to all the Dominions which are separate Members of the League and India. There are, indeed, at the present moment, only thirteen Members of the League which have not signed the Optional Clause, and it is understood that some of the thirteen now have the matter under consideration.

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*The Effect of the Exclusions contained in the Declaration of
 Signature*

10. At the time of signature the Secretary of State made the following statement explaining the formula of acceptance adopted by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom:

11. 'The "Optional Clause", which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are now accepting, gives the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague jurisdiction over juridical disputes with other parties accepting the like obligation without the necessity for framing in respect of each dispute a special agreement for its submission to the Court.

'The formula which I have just signed on behalf of the United Kingdom, and copies of which are, I believe, available, follows the

usual practice in being subject to reciprocity and in including a time-limit. This is fixed at ten years, but the acceptance continues in force after the expiration of the period, unless notice is given to terminate it. The signature is also subject to ratification. This will enable the question to be raised in Parliament, if so desired, before the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction comes into operation.

‘The declaration accepting the jurisdiction covers only disputes which may arise in future. Past disputes and disputes relating to past events will continue to be submitted to the Court under a special agreement concluded in each case.

‘Three classes of disputes are excluded from the operation of the declaration of acceptance. These are disputes for the submission of which to some other method of peaceful settlement provision is made by existing or future agreements, disputes with other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and disputes about matters which fall within what is called the domestic jurisdiction of a State. Commercial treaties and conventions dealing with special subjects, such as reparations, or with technical matters, such as copyright, very often contain provisions setting up special tribunals to deal with disputes which may arise as to the meaning or application of their terms. When that is the case, the dispute will be dealt with as provided in the agreement and will not be submitted to the Court at The Hague. This is the effect of the exclusion of the first class of disputes.

‘Disputes with other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations are excluded because the members of the Commonwealth, though international units individually in the fullest sense of the term, are united by their common allegiance to the Crown. Disputes between them should, therefore, be dealt with by some other mode of settlement, and for this provision is made in the exclusion clause.

‘On certain matters international law recognizes that the authority of the State is supreme. When once it is determined that the subject-matter of the dispute falls within the category of cases where this is so, there is no scope for the exercise of the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.

‘At the end of the formula comes a proviso which enables disputes to be referred to the Council of the League before they are dealt with by the Court. This is to cover disputes which are really political in character though juridical in appearance. Disputes of this kind can be dealt with more satisfactorily by the Council, so that the conciliatory powers of that body may be exercised with a view to arriving at a friendly settlement of the dispute. This formula places the United Kingdom in much the same position as a State which has

agreed to a treaty of arbitration and conciliation providing for the reference of all disputes to a conciliation commission before they are submitted to judicial settlement. The formula is wide in character because the extent to which it operates depends on the Council itself. It would cease to operate from the moment when the Council decided that it was better that the question should be submitted to the Court, and therefore declined to keep the dispute under consideration. Within these limits, however, the proviso would apply to any justiciable dispute, whatever its origin. It would extend, for instance, to disputes arising out of cases where it had been necessary for the United Kingdom to take action at the instance of the Council in pursuance of its obligations as a member of the League.'

Objections raised to Signature of the Optional Clause at the Present Time

12. With the objects which have led His Majesty's Government to sign the Optional Clause, and to ask Parliament to approve their action in doing so, there is, it is believed, general sympathy throughout the country. The objections which have been raised to the signature of the clause—or, it might be more accurate to say, the hesitation which is felt in some quarters as to the desirability of doing so at the present time—relate rather to certain risks to which it is thought the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in justiciable disputes might expose this country and the British Empire. The view has been expressed that so much uncertainty still exists both as to the scope of international law and as to what on many points it really is, that to bind ourselves to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in all questions of international law involves a leap in the dark, and may expose us to decisions which it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to accept. In particular, reference has been made to the difference which is alleged to exist between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental schools of thought in international law, and to the diversity in relation to such matters as the evidence which is admissible in connexion with the interpretation of treaties.

13. In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, there is, as regards the matters with which the Optional Clause deals, much less uncertainty in international law than is suggested. The alleged diversity between Anglo-Saxon and Continental schools of thought exists mainly, if not entirely, in relation to the question of belligerent rights at sea, which is dealt with later in this memorandum. In any case, this argument, if pressed to its logical

conclusion, really means that the Optional Clause should not be signed until such time as international law has been codified to such an extent as to leave no room for uncertainty as to what it is in relation to any subject. This would mean that this country must postpone the acceptance of the obligation to have all justiciable disputes determined by an international court for a period the length of which it is impossible to determine. A commencement of the work of codification has already been made under the auspices of the League of Nations, and in this His Majesty's Government are taking their share, but they see no prospect of a complete code of international law materializing in the near future. Moreover, His Majesty's Government desire to point out that codification is rather a Continental than an Anglo-Saxon method of creating and clarifying a system of law.

While there are doubtless certain branches of international law which are suitable for codification, His Majesty's Government believe that the method of building up a body of law by a series of legal decisions, a method which produced the English Common Law, may be the more suitable for at any rate some important branches of the Law of Nations. This process would be indefinitely retarded if States were unwilling to submit their differences to that Court on the ground that the rules of law applicable to such cases were not definitely laid down in a code. As regards questions of evidence and procedure, His Majesty's Government consider that the Permanent Court can be trusted to build up a satisfactory system in relation to these matters, even if it does not conform in every respect to our British practice.

14. Another objection which has been raised is that there may well be disputes which, though falling within one of the categories defined in the Optional Clause, are really more of a political than a legal nature, and are therefore better dealt with by a political than by a legal tribunal. His Majesty's Government fully recognize that this may be so, and they have accordingly reserved the right, by means of the declaration whose terms are quoted above, to bring any such dispute before the Council of the League. This does not, of course, mean that such a dispute will not receive a peaceful settlement, but it does mean that if the Council considers that the dispute is one which should be settled on political rather than on legal lines, it will have the opportunity of bringing about such a settlement.

Belligerent Rights and the Optional Clause

15. It seems probable, however, that the practical question which underlies the apprehensions referred to above is whether the signature

of the Optional Clause would, by exposing the legitimacy of British belligerent action at sea to the decision of an international court, hamper the operations of the British Navy in time of war, and on this point His Majesty's Government desire to explain fully their view of the position created by acceptance of the Covenant, the Pact of Peace, and the Optional Clause.

16. At the outset of any consideration of this subject it is important to emphasize that the possibility of British naval action at sea being brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice in consequence of our signature of the Optional Clause can only arise if the country which desired to challenge the validity of such action had itself signed the Optional Clause. The only States which can sign the Protocol establishing the Permanent Court, and consequently the only States which can sign the Optional Clause, are the Members of the League and the States mentioned in the annex to the Covenant. The only States mentioned in the Annex who are not now Members of the League are the United States, Brazil, Ecuador and The Hejaz.

17. The position of Brazil, which has signed the Optional Clause but is no longer a Member of the League, is peculiar, but for present purposes the question may be discussed on the basis that only another Member of the League could bring our naval action before the Permanent Court under the Optional Clause.

18. It should also be borne in mind that the possibility of our belligerent action in the past being brought before the Permanent Court in consequence of our acceptance of the Optional Clause is excluded by the terms of our Declaration.

19. Disputes as to the exercise of belligerent rights at sea have in the past arisen from the clash of two conflicting rights; the right of the belligerent to make use of his naval strength to interfere with the sea-borne commerce of the enemy, and the right of the neutral to continue his trade irrespective of the existence of a war in which he is not engaged. Both of these rights are, within certain limits, equally recognized by international law, and in the course of the last two hundred years certain principles have emerged whose effect was to define the respective scope of these conflicting rights and to lay down certain rules for regulating the situation which arose from their clash. No one, however, will suggest that the establishment of rules of international law on this subject has reached a stage which eliminates the possibility of disputes between belligerents and neutrals, and unless one is prepared to accept the possibility of the production and general acceptance of a code which

would provide a satisfactory solution for every question of this sort which might arise in a quite indeterminate future, it is difficult to see how this process could ever eliminate the possibility of serious disputes of this nature. And public opinion in this country is naturally sensitive as regards any action which might be considered as unduly limiting the exercise of British sea power in time of war.

20. But the whole situation described in the preceding paragraph rests, and international law on the subject has been entirely built up, on the assumption that there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an instrument of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, that the position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent of the circumstances of any war which may be in progress. Before the acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of the law of neutrality was that the rights and obligations of neutrals were identical as regards both belligerents, and were entirely independent of the rights and wrongs of the dispute which led to the war, or the respective position of the belligerents at the bar of world opinion.

21. Now it is precisely this assumption which is no longer valid as regards States which are Members of the League of Nations and parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those instruments, taken together, is to deprive nations of the right to employ war as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid the States which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an offender. As between such States, there has been in consequence a fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty's present Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative Government) is based upon a determination to comply with their obligations under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact. This being so, the situation which we have to envisage in the event of a war in which we were engaged is not one in which the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals will depend upon the old rules of war and neutrality, but one in which the position of the Members of the League will be determined by the Covenant and the Pact. If His Majesty's Government comply with their obligations under those instruments, there are only two conditions in which they could be involved in war: (1) where a State has attacked them in violation of one or both of those instruments,¹

¹ It is still possible, in narrowly restricted circumstances, for a State to go to war in violation of the Pact without necessarily violating the Covenant, and in such a case Article 16 would theoretically not apply. These circumstances seem, however, most unlikely to arise in practice, and the possibility of their

or (2) if they were engaged in belligerent action, in fulfilment of Article 16 of the Covenant, against a Covenant-breaking State. In either case Article 16 would apply, and so far from the other Members of the League being in the position of neutrals with a right to trade with our enemy, which might conflict with our belligerent rights and thus produce a justiciable dispute, they would be bound under that Article to sever all relations with him; they could neither trade direct with him nor allow their territories to be used for the passage of commerce between him and any other State. This being so, the conditions which might produce a justiciable dispute between this country as a belligerent and another Member of the League as a neutral would not exist; either the other Members of the League would fulfil their obligations under Article 16, in which case we should not require to effect any interference with their commerce, or if they did not, and such interference on our part therefore became necessary, they would have no ground on which to protest against our action, since any protest must be based on a claim to trade with the enemy, which would be inconsistent with their obligations under the Covenant. In other words, as between Members of the League, there can be no neutral rights, because there can be no neutrals.

22. Once this fundamental change in the situation is realized, it will be seen that the ordinary arguments against submitting British naval action to arbitral decision have ceased to be relevant to any discussion of the Optional Clause. Once it is established that in the conditions created by the Covenant and the Pact a Member of the League does not possess any right to carry on commerce with the State with which we are at war, and that we are no longer obliged to rely, in order to stop such commerce, on the old rules governing the relations of belligerent and neutral, it is immaterial to argue that those rules are uncertain and liable to become out of date, or that there is a difference between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental schools of law, or that the Permanent Court has no rules of evidence, or that the majority of its judges will be neutrals and biased against the belligerent. Any such arguments can only be based on the assumption, express or implied, that the Covenant and the Pact will break down in practice. If this assumption is made, it means that the whole machinery for the preservation of peace, so laboriously constructed since 1918, would have broken down; the Peace Pact and the Covenant would have become scraps of paper, but at the same time the one thing which remained standing in the general wreck doing so will be eliminated if the Covenant is amended as proposed by the British Delegation at the 1929 Assembly.

would be the Optional Clause and our commitments thereunder. This seems to His Majesty's Government an inconceivable situation. They do not believe that it would be possible for the Optional Clause to survive in the general ruin.

23. It is not, however, necessary to maintain that no difficulties would arise in the circumstances indicated in paragraph 21 above. It is always possible that a British warship might seize a ship under the mistaken belief that it was engaged in trade with the enemy State, and it is possible that a British prize court might condemn the ship or cargo on insufficient evidence of enemy destination. In such a case another Member of the League whose nationals were interested in the transaction in question might protest and make a claim against us. But the issue so raised would not involve any question of principle as to the legitimacy of our belligerent action at sea; the question would be simply one of fact—whether the transaction did, in fact, involve commerce with the enemy—and such matters can, if necessary, be disposed of, without involving any question of principle, by the release of the property or the payment of compensation. In any case, we have reserved the right to bring any such dispute before the Council instead of leaving it to the Court, and in so far as the action complained of was taken in accordance with Article 16, it is reasonable to claim that the Council, as the body at whose instance such action is taken, should deal with any such complaints. If, as suggested above, the issue raised in any such dispute could only be one of the facts in a particular case, it is likely that the dispute would be settled without being brought before the Court.

24. The above considerations may be summed up as follows:

- (1) The policy of His Majesty's Government is based on a determination to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant of the League and the Peace Pact.
- (2) If those obligations are fulfilled, we cannot be involved in war in circumstances in which any Member of the League could claim the rights of a neutral; only Members of the League which have signed the Optional Clause can bring us before the Permanent Court under its terms, and, therefore, no dispute arising out of neutral complaints of our naval action could come before the Court. Arguments based on the state of affairs created by the old law of belligerency and neutrality are therefore irrelevant.
- (3) If any dispute should, nevertheless, arise with another Member

of the League as to the legitimacy of particular action which we have taken, it is probable that such a dispute would be more suitable for settlement by the Council than by the Court, and we have the right to bring it before the Council if we wish to do so.

- (4) If the system erected by the Covenant and the Peace Pact breaks down, this catastrophe would sweep away the Optional Clause as well.

Questions which by International Law fall exclusively within the Jurisdiction of the United Kingdom

25. The suggestion has been made that the exclusion from our acceptance of the Optional Clause of 'questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom' would enable us to maintain that questions of prize were excluded from our acceptance of the Optional Clause. His Majesty's Government wish to make it plain that this is not their view. Although it is true that jurisdiction in matters of prize belongs to the courts of the States concerned, the law which prize courts administer in such matters is international law, and His Majesty's Government do not consider it possible to contend that international law regards such questions as being 'matters of domestic jurisdiction'; such an argument would involve that belligerent action at sea could in no circumstances whatever properly become the subject of diplomatic discussion. As has been indicated above, however, it is possible that, should such a dispute arise with another signatory of the Optional Clause, the matter might be considered more suitable for determination by the Council than by the Court. His Majesty's Government further consider that our acceptance of the Optional Clause makes no difference to the principle that prize cases must be decided first in our own prize courts before any question of a reference to the Permanent Court could arise. The rule of international law that arbitration cannot be claimed unless and until the remedies provided by municipal courts have been exhausted is, in their opinion, as applicable to prize courts as to any other municipal tribunals. Moreover, the function of prize courts is to decide whether the action of the captor was legitimate, and until a final decision on this point has been given by those courts, it cannot be known whether any case for international complaint has arisen.

26. As considerable attention has been directed to the reservation relating to 'questions which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom', it may be pointed

out that this is merely an explicit recognition of a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court which results from international law itself. It is merely the application in this connexion of the principle that, subject to any relevant treaty stipulations, a State is entitled to regulate as it pleases matters which fall exclusively within the domain of its national sovereignty. Within that domain, and subject always to treaty provisions, a foreigner must take things as he finds them, and his State is not entitled to protest against the result.

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Conclusion

30. The above examination of the effect of the signature of the Optional Clause by His Majesty's Government under the terms of the Declaration cited above shows that the fears which have been expressed as to the consequences of this signature are without foundation. The broad question remains: Is it safe to trust British interests to the decision of the Permanent Court? The question may be transposed: Is it wise to leave British interests without any safeguard except war, which we have undertaken not to wage? His Majesty's Government believe that to the last question only one answer can be returned. They hold that the whole course of international development for many years past has been in the direction of the substitution of arbitration for war, and they rejoice to think that there now exists an International Court, whose competence and impartiality are unchallenged, to which may safely be referred all international disputes of, at any rate, a justiciable character. Such a reform is, in their view, an essential part of the effort seriously to implement the undertakings of the Pact of Peace and to utilize the early years of peace in creating effective safeguards against war, before its realities have been forgotten.

3. PRESENT STATE OF RATIFICATION OF THE OPTIONAL CLAUSE

1. The following 31 States were bound by the Optional Clause on September 1st, 1930:

Abyssinia	Estonia	India ¹
Australia	Finland	Irish Free State ¹
Austria	France ¹	Latvia
Belgium	Germany	Lithuania
Brazil	Great Britain ¹	Netherlands
Bulgaria	Greece ¹	New Zealand ¹
Canada ¹	Haiti	Norway
Denmark	Hungary	Panama

¹ Denotes signature at Tenth Assembly, 1929.

Portugal	South Africa ¹	Switzerland
Siam ¹	Sweden	Uruguay
Spain		

2. The following States have not yet ratified their signature:

Czechoslovakia ¹	Luxembourg
Dominican Republic	Peru ¹
Guatemala	<i>Costa Rica</i> ²
Italy ¹	<i>Nicaragua</i> ²
Jugoslavia	<i>Salvador</i> ²
Liberia	<i>China</i> ³

IV. THE KELLOGG PACT

A. THE LITVINOV PROTOCOL

On December 29, 1928, M. Litvinov, Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R., proposed to the Polish Government that the U.S.S.R. and Poland, together with Lithuania, should enter into an agreement making the provisions of the Kellogg Pact binding upon them as soon as all three had ratified it, without waiting for the general exchange of ratifications between the original signatories. Subsequent negotiations added Estonia, Latvia, and Rumania to the Contracting Parties, whose representatives signed the following Protocol at Moscow on February 9, 1929. Lithuania refused to be one of the original signatories, but later adhered. Other States invited by the Soviet Government to adhere were Finland, Turkey, Persia, and the Free City of Danzig; of these only the first refused.

1. PROTOCOLE SIGNÉ À MOSCOU LE 9 FÉVRIER 1929 PAR LES REPRÉSENTANTS DES GOUVERNEMENTS D'ESTONIE, DE LETTONIE, DE POLOGNE, DE ROUMANIE ET DE L'U.R.S.S.⁴

Le Gouvernement de la République estonienne, le président de la République de Lettonie, le président de la République de Pologne, Sa Majesté le roi de Roumanie et le Comité central exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes et socialistes.

Animés du désir de contribuer au maintien de la paix existante entre leurs pays⁵ et de mettre à ces fins sans délai en vigueur entre les peuples de ces pays le traité de renonciation à la guerre, en tant qu'instrument de politique nationale, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928.

¹ Denotes signature at Tenth Assembly, 1929.

² These States have not ratified the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

³ China has allowed her signature to expire without ratification.

⁴ Official French text issued by the *Narkomindel* (Peoples' Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), Moscow.

⁵ *Cette phrase a été ajoutée dans le protocole Litvinov à la demande de la Roumanie afin de préciser l'attitude des puissances signataires sur la question de la Bessarabie.*

Ont décidé de réaliser ces intentions par l'effet du présent protocole et ont nommé comme plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Le gouvernement de la République estonienne: M. Julius Seljamaa, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire d'Estonie à Moscou ;

Le président de la République de Lettonie: M. Charles Ozols, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de Lettonie à Moscou ;

Le président de la République de Pologne: M. Stanislaw Patek, envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de Pologne à Moscou ;

Sa Majesté le roi de Roumanie: M. Charles A. Davila, son envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire à Varsovie, et

Le Comité central exécutif de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes: M. Maxime Litvinov, membre du Comité central exécutif, commissaire du peuple *ad interim* aux affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont tombés d'accord sur ce qui suit :

Article 1. Le traité de renonciation à la guerre en tant qu'instrument de politique nationale, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928, dont copie est jointe au présent protocole comme sa partie intégrante, entre en vigueur entre les parties contractantes après la ratification du dit traité de Paris de 1928 par les organismes législatifs compétents des États contractants respectifs.

Article 2. La mise en vigueur par le présent protocole du traité de Paris de 1928 dans les relations mutuelles des parties au présent protocole sera valable indépendamment de l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Paris de 1928, comme elle est stipulée par l'article 3 de ce dernier.

Article 3. 1. Le présent protocole sera ratifié par les organismes législatifs compétents des parties contractantes, conformément aux exigences de leurs constitutions respectives.

2. Les instruments de ratification seront déposés par chacune des parties contractantes au gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes dans le délai d'une semaine à partir de la date de la ratification du présent protocole par la partie respective.

3. Dès le jour du dépôt de l'instrument de ratification par deux des parties contractantes, le présent protocole entrera en vigueur entre ces deux parties. Dans les relations mutuelles des autres parties contractantes et des États pour lesquels le protocole est déjà entré en vigueur, il entrera en vigueur au fur et à mesure du dépôt de leur instrument de ratification.

4. Le gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes

socialistes notifiera immédiatement chaque dépôt à tous les signataires du présent protocole.

Article 4. Afin de donner effet à l'article premier du présent protocole, chaque partie contractante, après ratification par ses organismes législatifs du traité de Paris de 1928, en notifiera immédiatement par voie diplomatique le gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes et toutes les autres parties au présent protocole.

Article 5. Le présent protocole est ouvert à l'adhésion des gouvernements de tous les pays. La notification de l'adhésion définitive devra être faite au nom du gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes qui en notifiera toutes les autres parties au présent protocole. Dès la réception de la dite notification concernant l'adhésion, le présent protocole sera mis en vigueur dans les relations mutuelles de l'État adhérent et de toutes les autres parties au présent protocole.

Article 6. La mise en vigueur par l'effet du présent protocole du, traité de Paris de 1928 dans les relations mutuelles de l'État adhérent et de toutes les autres parties au présent protocole devra être réalisée dans la voie prévue à l'article 4 du présent protocole.

Article 7. Le présent protocole est dressé en un seul exemplaire, dont copie authentique sera communiquée par le gouvernement de L'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes à chacun des États signataires ou adhérents.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent protocole et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Moscou, le 9 février 1929.

(Signé): JUL. SELJAMAA, K. OZOLS, ST. PATEK,
DAVILA, MAXIME LITVINOV.

NOTE:—The parties to the Protocol, both the original signatories and the subsequently adhering States, deposited their respective documents of ratification in Moscow on the following dates, which are those on which the Protocol entered into force for the respective States:

U.S.S.R.	March 5, 1929.
Latvia	March 5, 1929.
Estonia	March 15, 1929.
Poland	March 30, 1929.
Rumania	March 30, 1929.
Lithuania	April 1, 1929.
Danzig	April 30, 1929.
Turkey	July 3, 1929.
Persia	July 4, 1929.

For the history of the negotiations see *Survey* for 1929, Part I, section iv.

B. THE PACT IN OPERATION

The ratification of the Peace Pact by the Emperor of Japan on June 27, 1929, and the deposit of the instrument at Washington on July 24, fulfilled the provision of Article III, to the effect that the Pact 'should take effect as between them (the original signatories) as soon as all their instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington'.

On the same day, therefore, July 24, President Hoover, in the presence of Ex-President Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg, as well as of his own Cabinet and the Diplomatic Corps, proclaimed the Pact as being in force as between the fifteen original signatories and such as had subsequently adhered and deposited their instruments of ratification.¹

1. TEXT OF PROCLAMATION BY PRESIDENT HOOVER,
JULY 24, 1929

Whereas a Treaty between the President of the United States of America, the President of the German Reich, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, The President of the Republic of Poland, and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic, providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, and that the solution of disputes among parties shall ever be sought by pacific means, was concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at Paris on August twenty-seven, 1928;

And whereas it is stipulated in the said Treaty that it shall take effect as between the High Contracting Parties as soon as all the several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington;

And whereas the said Treaty has been duly ratified on the parts of all the High Contracting Parties and their several instruments of ratification have been deposited with the Government of the United States of America, the last July twenty-fourth, 1929;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Herbert Hoover, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Treaty to be made public to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

¹ For the previous documentary history of the Kellogg Pact, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1928*, pp. 1-14. Also *Information on the Renunciation of War*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (Allen & Unwin, 1928), and *Survey for 1929*, Part I. A, Section (i).

2. PRESENT STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF AND ADHERENCES TO THE TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR.¹

The following countries have deposited with the Department of State their instruments of ratification of, or instruments of adherence to, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War:

Signatory Countries.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Date of deposit of instrument of ratification.</i>	<i>Country.</i>	<i>Date of deposit of instrument of ratification.</i>
Australia	Mar. 2, 1929	Irish Free State	Mar. 2, 1929
Belgium	Mar. 27, 1929	Italy	Mar. 2, 1929
Canada	Mar. 2, 1929	Japan	July 24, 1929
Czechoslovakia	Mar. 2, 1929	New Zealand	Mar. 2, 1929
France	Apr. 22, 1929	Poland	Mar. 25, 1929
Germany	Mar. 2, 1929	Union of S. Africa	Mar. 2, 1929
Great Britain	Mar. 2, 1929	United States	Mar. 2, 1929

Adhering Countries.

<i>Country.</i>	<i>Date of deposit of instrument of adherence.</i>	<i>Country.</i>	<i>Date of deposit of instrument of adherence.</i>
Afghanistan	Nov. 30, 1928	Liberia	Feb. 23, 1929
Albania	Feb. 12, 1929	Lithuania	Apr. 5, 1929
Austria	Dec. 31, 1928	Luxemburg	Aug. 24, 1929
Bulgaria	July 22, 1929	Mexico	Nov. 26, 1929
Chile	Aug. 12, 1929	Netherlands	July 12, 1929
China	May 8, 1929	Nicaragua	May 13, 1929
Costa Rica	Oct. 1, 1929	Norway	Mar. 26, 1929
Cuba	Mar. 13, 1929	Panama	Feb. 25, 1929
Denmark	Mar. 23, 1929	Paraguay	Dec. 4, 1929
Dominican Republic	Dec. 12, 1928	Persia	July 25, 1929
Egypt	May 9, 1929	Peru	July 23, 1929
Estonia	Apr. 26, 1929	Portugal	Mar. 1, 1929
Ethiopia	Nov. 28, 1928	Rumania	Mar. 21, 1929
Finland	July 24, 1929	Siam	Jan. 16, 1929
Free City of Danzig	Sept. 11, 1929	Spain	Mar. 7, 1929
Greece	Aug. 3, 1929	Sweden	Apr. 12, 1929
Guatemala	July 16, 1929	Switzerland	Dec. 2, 1929
Haiti	Mar. 10, 1930	Turkey	July 8, 1929
Honduras	Aug. 5, 1929	Venezuela	Oct. 24, 1929
Hungary	July 22, 1929	U.S.S.R.	Sept. 27, 1928
Iceland	June 10, 1929	Yugoslavia	Feb. 20, 1929
Latvia	July 23, 1929		

The countries which were invited to adhere but have not yet adhered are : Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay. Of these, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay have expressed an intention to adhere. Danzig, though not originally invited, deposited its instrument of adherence on September 11, 1929.

¹ *Bulletin of Treaty Information*, no. 7, April 1930. Published by the U.S. Department of State.

B. EUROPE

I. BELGIUM

A. TEXT OF BELGO-GERMAN MARKS AGREEMENT, JULY 13, 1929¹

IN the course of the discussions of the Young Committee, the Belgian Government brought a claim against the German Government for compensation for the amount of paper marks left behind in Belgium after the War. For some time this point threatened to bring about a rupture in the Committee, and finally it was recommended to both the disputants that the matter would be more suitably settled by direct negotiation. To this the Belgian Government demurred, but the German Foreign Office at once began conversations with the Belgian Embassy in Berlin. As a result the following agreement was signed:

Le *Gouvernement allemand* et le *Gouvernement belge*, également animés du désir de régler d'une manière définitive par voie d'entente réciproque, dans le cadre du règlement général des questions financières nées de la guerre, les questions encore pendantes entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique et relatives aux dommages économiques spéciaux résultant de l'occupation de celle-ci,

Ont résolu, tout en maintenant chacun leur point de vue juridique, de conclure le présent accord.

A cette fin, ont été nommés pour Plénipotentiaires, savoir:
par le *Président du Reich allemand*:

M. le Dr. *Ritter*, Directeur ministériel à l'*Auswärtiges Amt*,
par *Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges*:

M. Gutt,

lesquels, après avoir examiné leurs pleins pouvoirs respectifs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Article 1

Le Gouvernement allemand paiera au Gouvernement royal belge les annuités qui figurent au table ci-annexé.

Article 2

Ces annuités prendront — sous réserve des dispositions du présent accord — une forme identique à celles dont il est question dans le rapport des experts signé à Paris le 7 juin 1929.

¹ Official text issued by Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. See also *Reichsgesetzblatt* (Teil 11), March 19, 1930, no. 7.

For a statement on this Agreement by the German Chancellor, Herr Müller, see below, p. 98.

Elles seront payables, pendant chaque année, par versements mensuels égaux, le 15 de chaque mois au compte de l'État belge à la Banque Nationale de Belgique.

Dans le cas où, pour les annuités fixées dans le dit rapport, la suspension de transfert ou de paiement prévue à la partie viii d et viii e ainsi que dans l'annexe IV de ce rapport deviendrait effective, les annuités prévues dans le présent accord, venant à échéance pendant cette suspension, seraient payables sous forme de prestations en nature pour autant que le Gouvernement allemand donnât notification à cet effet au Gouvernement royal belge en même temps qu'il annoncerait la dite suspension.

Le règlement d'exécution pour les prestations en nature qui devra, conformément à la partie viii f du rapport des experts, être élaboré de commun accord par les Gouvernements intéressés, serait applicable dans ce cas.

Article 3

Les divergences de vues qui pourraient se manifester dans l'exécution du présent accord au sujet d'une question d'interprétation ou d'application du rapport des experts, seront soumises au tribunal arbitral prévu dans la partie VIII de ce rapport.

La convention d'arbitrage germano-belge conclue à Locarno le 16 octobre 1925 s'appliquera à toute autre contestation relative à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent accord.

Article 4

Le présent accord sera ratifié et entrera en vigueur après l'échange des instruments de ratification, au moment où entreront en vigueur les traités ou accords qui seront conclus au sujet du rapport des experts.

Cet échange aura lieu en même temps et au même endroit que celui des instruments de ratification des dits traités ou accords.

Fait à Bruxelles, le 13 Juillet, 1929.

RITTER.

GUTT.

SOMMES A PAYER PAR L'ALLEMAGNE A LA BELGIQUE

En millions de Reichsmarks.

Du 1 ^{er} septembre 1929 au 31 mars 1930 . . .	16,2
Année fiscale allemande	
1930-1931	21,5
1931-1932	21,5

EUROPE

1932-1933	21,5
1933-1934	26,0
1934-1935	26,0
1935-1936	26,0
1936-1937	26,0
1937-1938	26,0
1938-1939	26,0
1939-1940	26,0
1940-1941	26,0
1941-1942	20,1
1942-1943	20,1
1943-1944	20,1
1944-1945	20,1
1945-1946	20,1
1946-1947	20,1
1947-1948	20,1
1948-1949	20,1
1949-1950	9,3
1950-1951	9,3
1951-1952	9,3
1952-1953	9,3
1953-1954	9,3
1954-1955	9,3
1955-1956	9,3
1956-1957	9,3
1957-1958	9,3
1958-1959	9,3
1959-1960	9,3
1960-1961	9,3
1961-1962	9,3
1962-1963	9,3
1963-1964	9,3
1964-1965	9,3
1965-1966	9,3

PROTOCOLE FINAL

1. Au cas où le Plan des Experts n'aurait pas encore été mis en vigueur le 1^{er} septembre 1929, les mensualités prévues à l'accord de ce jour et échues au moment de la mise en vigueur de ce Plan, feront

à ce moment l'objet d'un paiement global, augmentées des intérêts à 5½% depuis la date de l'échéance.

2. Si le moratoire de transfert ou de paiement était déclaré après l'expiration de la période de fonctionnement des prestations en nature, et que le Gouvernement allemand recourût à la possibilité d'exécuter en nature les paiements prévus à l'accord de ce jour, les deux Gouvernements auraient à se mettre d'accord sur une procédure d'exécution s'inspirant de celle qui aurait fonctionné précédemment.

3. Pour l'exécution de l'accord de ce jour, le mot 'reichsmark' sera interprété conformément à la lettre du 6 juin du Dr. Schacht, président de la Reichsbank, à M. Owen D. Young, président du Comité des Experts.

4. Les dispositions ci-dessus auront même force et valeur que l'accord de ce jour dont elles doivent être considérées comme faisant partie intégrante.

Bruxelles, le 13 Juillet, 1929.

RITTER.

GUTT.

II. FRANCE

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY BY M. BRIAND IN THE CHAMBER, DECEMBER 27, 1929¹

In this speech M. Briand defended his whole policy with regard to the Young Plan and the first Hague Conference.

.
A ceux qui reprochent à la politique que j'ai pratiquée au ministère des affaires étrangères de constituer une série d'abandons, je le demande ici une fois de plus: Quels abandons? Dans quelles circonstances?

Jusqu'à présent, je n'avais jamais reçu de réponse. J'en ai entendu une à l'avant-dernière séance. On m'a dit: abandon pour le châtimement des coupables de guerre; abandon pour les livraisons de charbon à la charge de l'Allemagne; abandon pour la limitation des effectifs de l'armée allemande. Or pas un de ces abandons ne m'est imputable. Pas un!

En ce qui concerne les coupables de guerre, je puis même dire que ma responsabilité fut tout autre, car sous mon ministère, en 1921, à la suite de certains acquittements prononcés par la cour suprême de Leipzig, et que nous considérions comme scandaleux, l'initiative fut prise de réunir à Paris une commission de juristes des pays alliés.

La commission ainsi constituée se réunit au quai d'Orsay, le 1^{er} janvier 1922, sous la présidence de l'honorable M. Bonnefoy, alors

¹ See *Le Temps*, December 28, 1929.

garde des sceaux, et en conclusion de ses travaux, deux résolutions furent prises, dont l'une appréciait sévèrement les diverses procédures engagées devant la cour de Leipzig, tandis que l'autre requérait la livraison des coupables aux puissances alliées.

On y a renoncé plus tard, et je ne critiquerai pas ceux qui en sont responsables, car leur décision leur a sans doute été dictée par la prudence, mais enfin, cette responsabilité, ce n'est pas à moi qu'elle appartient.

Je ne suis pas davantage responsable de l'abandon des livraisons de charbon, non plus que de l'élévation du chiffre des soldats de l'armée allemande par l'adjonction des schupos. Alors, je vous le demande, quand donc ai-je commis des abandons ?

Certaines conférences ont eu à enregistrer des réductions de créances, résultat de transactions. Mais quelle est la conférence qui ne comporte pas de transaction ?

Messieurs, je ne crois pas céder à un mouvement de mauvaise humeur, mais j'ai bien le droit de me défendre. Je suis suffisamment attaqué pour y avoir droit.

Et maintenant, parlons de ce traité de Versailles lui-même, que je suis accusé de n'avoir pas su appliquer, d'avoir constamment méconnu dans ses clauses essentielles, et de violer encore aujourd'hui dans ses articles les plus importants pour la sécurité de la France.

Je n'ai jamais récriminé contre ce traité et je ne le fais pas davantage aujourd'hui.

C'est une observation que je tiendrai toujours à rappeler. J'ai toujours reconnu que ce traité avait été élaboré dans des conditions très difficiles, et je n'ai jamais dit que si j'avais été placé dans ces mêmes conditions je n'eusse pas été obligé de subir certaines clauses acceptées par nos négociateurs. Mais enfin ces clauses ont bien été subies, et si l'on entend aujourd'hui refuser l'indulgence à un homme qui, aux prises aussi avec des difficultés impérieuses, doit parfois s'incliner devant elles, pourquoi donc réserver à tel autre, avant lui, cette même indulgence ?

Messieurs, le fait est là, le traité de Versailles contient des lacunes, et cela tient aux exigences contraires qui s'affrontaient. Au sortir de la guerre, lorsque la cohésion n'était plus aussi parfaite que sur les champs de bataille, les préoccupations particulières se projetaient déjà dans l'avenir.

Et voici, pour la France, une première lacune : on réunit la conférence de la paix. Quelles puissances vont élaborer le traité ? la France, l'Angleterre, les États-Unis, l'Italie, les grands champions de la guerre.

D'autres pourraient participer au travail, qui sont de nos amies : la Belgique, la Roumanie, la Serbie, la Grèce. Pourquoi ne sont-elles pas admises, auprès de nous, à délibérer des conditions de la paix ? Pourquoi n'obtenons-nous pas que leurs voix, à nos côtés, soient entendues ?

Elles sont laissées à l'écart et on leur dit : 'Vous êtes des nations à intérêts limités. . . . Seules les cinq grandes nations feront le traité.' Impossible d'agir autrement, dira-t-on ? Soit ! Je comprends. Mais il a donc fallu s'incliner devant certaines exigences.

Autre chose : nous sortons victorieux de la guerre, et de cette victoire la France a eu la plus large part ; tout le monde le reconnaît. Elle est entourée de sympathie, d'admiration et de reconnaissance. Et voici que la langue française, cette langue que notre défaite de 1871 n'avait pas empêchée de demeurer la langue diplomatique du monde entier, doit perdre, après la victoire, le privilège de sa primauté. Impossible de faire autrement, dira-t-on ? Exigence de nos amis anglo-saxons ? Soit ! Je comprends. Je ne dis rien. Mais il a donc fallu, là encore, s'incliner ?

Autre chose : l'aménagement de la frontière germano-polonaise.

J'entends dire aujourd'hui — et contre cela je proteste et protesterai toujours de toutes mes forces, car si on laissait s'accréditer pareille accusation, elle ferait des ravages contre la France — j'entends dire aujourd'hui : Ah ! Locarno, ce n'est pas une œuvre complète, vous l'avez limitée à votre frontière, sans souci de la Pologne sacrifiée. Messieurs, ce n'est pas l'habitude de la France de sacrifier ses amis ou ses alliés.

A aucun moment nous n'avons songé à faire une politique de sécurité égoïste. Et quand on relit les documents qui ont précédé la signature des actes de Locarno, qui relatent la négociation même du pacte, on constate qu'âprement, jour par jour, jusqu'à la dernière minute, la France a eu à discuter et à combattre non pas tant pour son propre intérêt que pour la sauvegarde et la sécurité de la Pologne et de ses autres alliés heure par heure, et pied à pied, jusqu'à l'extrême limite ! Mais les conditions de cette sécurité — je m'adresse à mes contradicteurs — pourquoi donc n'ont-elles pas été inscrites dans le traité de Versailles ? Pourquoi ?

Et tout d'abord pourquoi, après avoir recréé géographiquement un peuple, une nation qui s'était battue vaillamment avec nous, après l'avoir appelée comme État à la vie, pourquoi ne l'a-t-on pas, un seul instant, admise à délibérer avec nous sur son sort ? Pourquoi dans le traité de paix n'y a-t-il jamais eu pour la frontière orientale de l'Allemagne des articles 42 et 43, accompagnés de pactes de garantie,

comme pour la frontière occidentale ? Pourquoi ? Pourquoi cette nouvelle lacune dans le traité de Versailles ? Et comment, dès lors, accuser celui qui a essayé de la combler, celui qui, avant de signer le pacte de Locarno, a exigé que l'Allemagne déclarât renoncer à toute entreprise de violence contre sa voisine de l'est ?

Le traité de Versailles n'a rien prévu à cet effet, et nul ne dénonce là le moindre abandon. Mais obtient-on de l'Allemagne une déclaration comme celle de Locarno, voici qu'on parle d'abandon !

Autre chose, enfin :

Au cours des négociations de paix, des clauses de garantie avaient été prévues, qui, pour notre frontière n'ont pu jouer, par suite de circonstances trop connues. Et, de cela non plus, personne n'est responsable, mais il a bien fallu, un jour, mesurer cette lacune.

Eh bien, ces clauses, au moins pour partie, qui donc les a fait revivre ?

L'honorable M. Franklin-Bouillon a dit : 'Locarno n'est pas de conception française, ce n'est pas un pacte jailli de l'esprit français : c'est une combinaison allemande.' Et notre collègue a voulu remonter jusqu'en 1922, pour en chercher le germe. Or, le germe, messieurs, vous savez où il se trouve, en réalité. C'est dans les conversations que j'ai eues avec les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, à Cannes.

Oui, le germe est bien là. Car quand je discutais avec les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, ce n'était pas avec l'intention d'aboutir à un texte identique à celui des traités de garantie, stipulant que la Grande-Bretagne, ou les États-Unis, ou tous deux, 'consentent à venir immédiatement à l'aide de la France, dans le cas de tout acte non provoqué d'agression dirigé contre elle par l'Allemagne'. Non, je n'ai pas voulu de cette idée d'assistance et j'ai dit à nos amis de Grande-Bretagne : soyons francs ; venir sur le Rhin protéger notre frontière, ce n'est pas nous prêter assistance, c'est vous prêter assistance à vous-mêmes.

Venir sur le Rhin protéger notre frontière, c'est en réalité protéger une frontière qui nous est commune. C'est dans cet esprit que les négociations ont commencé. Et, par la suite, l'accord une fois conclu devait, dans ma pensée, s'ouvrir pour que l'Allemagne y fût admise. Voilà ce qui avait été prévu et que vous pourrez trouver, du reste, tout au long, dans les recueils officiels de documents, publiés, en France et en Angleterre, sur cette négociation. C'est peut-être pour avoir eu cette idée que j'ai été, subitement, considéré comme suspect. Et c'est alors que, n'ayant aucun goût pour certains conflits d'une certaine nature, j'ai préféré m'en aller.

Voilà le véritable germe de Locarno.

Mais le pacte franco-britannique qui aurait été signé après Cannes n'aurait pas été accompagné de ce que l'on appelle une convention militaire. L'honorable M. Paul Reynaud vous l'a dit dans son très beau discours, si parfaitement clair et probant, que tout le monde ici a applaudi.

La Grande-Bretagne n'envisageait rien de ce genre. Elle nous disait : 'Pas de convention militaire, c'est inutile. Il n'y en avait pas en 1914. Suffisante est la promesse donnée par la Grande-Bretagne d'être à vos côtés dans une éventualité déterminée, avec toutes ses forces de terre, de mer et d'air. Et vous savez bien ce que sont ces forces, et ce qu'elles signifient. Vous l'avez déjà vu.'

Voilà quelle était déjà la situation avant Locarno.

La conception du pacte de garantie n'est donc pas venue de l'Allemagne. Notez bien que si elle est bonne, ce n'est pas le fait de venir de l'Allemagne qui la rendrait mauvaise.

La formule classique, *Timeo Danaos*, doit être déclassée en matière diplomatique. Pour apprécier les choses à leur valeur réelle, il faut les examiner objectivement. L'idée était bonne ou mauvaise ; j'ai considéré qu'elle était bonne. Elle a subi une éclipse de plusieurs années et je crois que c'était nécessaire, car entreprendre une œuvre de cette envergure quand l'opinion publique n'a pas encore assez évolué pour la favoriser de sa complaisance, c'est faire œuvre téméraire et vouée à l'insuccès.

Mais alors, dans toute cette période, le traité de Versailles a dû s'appliquer seul, c'est-à-dire avec toutes les difficultés qu'impliquaient forcément certaines de ses dispositions : il s'est appliqué sous la forme d'une politique de coercition, et c'était fatal. Car il y avait, d'un côté, l'Allemagne qui disait : 'Je ne reconnais pas ce traité, je l'ai signé contrainte et forcée, c'est pour moi un traité de violence devant lequel je ne m'inclinerai jamais, contre lequel je resterai toujours dressée.'

J'entends bien, on peut dire : 'Nous étions vainqueurs, nous pouvions faire ce que nous voulions.' La compression à perpétuité d'un peuple de 60 millions d'habitants ? Je n'y crois pas. Il faut avoir quelque grain de folie et d'orgueil pour vouloir s'assigner une telle tâche, et ce serait exposer son pays à des heures bien décevantes.

Mais, en fait, il n'y avait alors que les dispositions signées à Versailles, il n'y avait pas encore les accords de Locarno ; et moi aussi, j'avais dû la pratiquer cette politique de coercition, j'avais même dû le faire assez rudement, en accord avec nos alliés ; d'autres l'ont pratiquée ensuite, car on ne s'arrête pas dans cette voie, dès qu'on se trouve dans l'engrenage.

Si vos critiques étaient reconnues fondées, si elles avaient pour conséquence logique de faire abandonner la politique que représente le gouvernement dont je fais partie et de nous ramener à ces heures de coercition, quelle serait la situation, je ne dirai pas de ce pays, mais de l'Europe tout entière ?

Nous pourrions, certes, y faire face. Car, quels que soient les dangers qui nous menacent, ici ou là, en Europe ou dans le monde, moi, j'ai confiance en mon pays ; et je ne conçois pas sa politique comme celle d'un pays vaincu, mais d'un pays vainqueur.

La France, pour qui la voit sous son vrai visage, celui de la nation victorieuse dans la plus grande guerre qui ait affligé l'humanité, ne saurait exprimer la crainte, ni la méfiance, ni la timidité. Elle doit être le pays qui a confiance en soi-même et qui n'a besoin que de soi-même pour assurer sa propre sécurité. C'est porter atteinte au prestige moral de notre pays que de toujours le montrer aux prises avec certaines préoccupations.

En tout cas, une politique différente de celle que vous propose le gouvernement entraînerait des conséquences sur lesquelles j'ai le devoir d'attirer votre attention.

Si la politique de Locarno n'avait pas été pratiquée, que serait-il arrivé ? L'Allemagne n'entrait pas à la Société des Nations. Elle continuait de subir des coercitions continuelles. Une atmosphère de haine se développait encore entre Allemands et Français. L'Allemagne devenait le centre d'attraction de tous les mécontentements en Europe. Elle tendait à se rapprocher d'un grand pays comme la Russie. D'autres pays, enfin, restés étrangers à la Société des Nations, pouvaient se grouper autour d'elle.

Voilà la situation européenne en face de laquelle la France se serait trouvée au bout d'un certain nombre d'années. Et qu'aurait-elle obtenu pendant cette période ? Il suffit de se demander ce que la coercition lui a apporté. De maigres résultats et des éléments d'inquiétude sur lesquels je n'ai pas besoin de revenir.

Cette politique, messieurs, je l'ai jugée dangereuse pour mon pays, et c'est pourquoi j'ai préféré me tourner vers des possibilités d'accord.

Ah ! messieurs, ces possibilités étaient faibles, et pour aller vers elles, il fallait avoir confiance, il fallait avoir la foi.

La tâche que j'ai entreprise avait été, il est vrai, singulièrement facilitée par l'établissement du plan Dawes, qui menait évidemment à des tentatives de rapprochement entre la France et l'Allemagne. La conséquence logique de ce plan, c'était la tentative même que je me proposais.

Mais, avant de réussir, j'ai passé bien des heures d'angoisse. Avant

la signature du pacte de Locarno, pendant les négociations si délicates, si difficiles qui l'ont précédée, je me suis demandé bien souvent s'il me serait possible d'atteindre le but.

On a parlé de la Pologne. Mais elle a été appelée à Locarno, comme l'ont été la Belgique, la Tchécoslovaquie. Elle a été invitée à signer elle-même les accords.

Qui pourrait dès lors nous représenter dans cette circonstance comme ayant négligé nos amis et nos alliés, intimement et constamment mêlés à nos négociations ? Ils ont fait plus que de signer les accords, ils s'en sont félicités publiquement.

Et ici, je crois devoir répondre à certaines citations par d'autres paroles polonaises qui ont été prononcées, non pas par des hommes de parti, mais par un homme responsable et qualifié pour parler au nom de son pays, par le ministre des affaires étrangères de Pologne.

Voici ce qu'il disait, cette année même, devant la Diète polonaise :

‘Nous n'avons jamais fait et nous ne ferons jamais obstacle à la tendance de l'Allemagne à s'entendre avec la France, car nous sommes profondément convaincus que l'amitié franco-allemande n'aura et ne peut avoir pour but ni pour résultat d'affaiblir l'amitié franco-polonaise, reposant sur un fond solide d'anciennes traditions et d'intérêts communs des deux États et sur les liens de sympathie unissant les deux nations.

‘Aussi je ne doute pas que l'opinion allemande comprendra que c'est précisément l'alliance avec la Pologne qui rendra possible à la France un rapprochement avec l'Allemagne.’

Et, dans une interview donnée plus récemment, le 9 novembre dernier, M. Zaleski a déclaré :

‘Par un Locarno de l'Est, on entend généralement un traité qui placerait la sécurité de notre frontière avec l'Allemagne sous la garantie des grandes puissances. Cette garantie est contenue dans le pacte de Paris. Sous réserve de la ratification du pacte par les puissances participantes, j'estime que la situation actuelle, du point de vue des traités, suffit à assurer nos besoins de sécurité.’

Des déclarations de ce genre, le ministre des affaires étrangères de Pologne les a renouvelées en plusieurs occasions. Je n'aurai pas la mauvaise grâce de vous faire subir toutes les citations que je pourrais produire pour vous montrer qu'en Pologne, on sait rendre justice à l'effort fait par la France pour assurer la sécurité des frontières de son alliée.

Et, puisqu'on m'a dit aussi que nos autres alliés avaient pu s'inquiéter de notre politique, je vous rappellerai les déclarations déjà citées par l'honorable M. Paul Reynaud, de mon collègue et ami

M. Benès, ministre des affaires étrangères de Tchécoslovaquie. Il s'est félicité des accords de Locarno comme devant apporter des années de sécurité, comme lui donnant la certitude du maintien de la paix. Aussi bien, n'a-t-il jamais manqué de me féliciter chaque fois qu'un effort, vers ce même but, a été tenté par moi, parce qu'il le jugeait aussi favorable à la Tchécoslovaquie qu'à la France elle-même.

Voilà, messieurs, comment nous avons abandonné nos alliés.

Il est vraiment pénible pour l'homme qui est à cette tribune d'entendre insinuer qu'il ait pu jamais méconnaître les intérêts de la Pologne et de la Tchécoslovaquie. Après le plébiscite de Haute-Silésie, c'est moi qui ai eu la rude charge de régler les difficultés qui en résultaient. Elles n'étaient pas négligeables, si l'on pense à ce qu'avait été le plébiscite. Faut-il rappeler que, pour faire consacrer ce que je considérais comme des droits de la Pologne et comme un élément de sécurité pour elle, j'ai poussé les choses jusqu'à l'extrême limite d'un malentendu avec la Grande-Bretagne, notre amie fidèle et dévouée ?

Après ce règlement, il n'est pas un Polonais qui n'ait reconnu la valeur de mes efforts et qui n'en ait su gré au gouvernement français.

Laissons donc, messieurs, ces procédés de discussion. N'essayons jamais, en quelque circonstance que nous nous trouvions, de faire croire à nos amis, à nos alliés, que nous puissions avoir des vues égoïstes, qui nous porteraient à régler nos intérêts en méconnaissant les leurs.

M. Franklin-Bouillon a dit : 'On essaye de faire un accord entre deux peuples qui se sont battus et qui pourraient se réconcilier. En réalité, cet accord repose sur un malentendu fondamental : d'une part, un pays comme la France qui, loyalement, veut exécuter le traité ; de l'autre, un pays qui, systématiquement, veut le détruire.'

Si une pareille critique était fondée, il ne vous resterait qu'à prendre immédiatement les dispositions nécessaires pour faire cesser une politique aussi néfaste.

Heureusement, il n'en est pas ainsi.

L'honorable M. Franklin-Bouillon a cité des articles de journaux. Dans les journaux on peut trouver, suivant les colonnes, maintes et maintes choses souvent contradictoires. Mais, quand on veut juger un pays, quand on veut déterminer l'opinion de tout un peuple et de ses gouvernants, il ne faut pas prendre quelques citations d'hommes de parti et les présenter à un Parlement comme l'expression de l'opinion de tout un peuple.

Voulez-vous que je vous montre comment une partie notable de la population allemande a interprété les devoirs qu'imposait à l'Alle-

magne la signature du pacte de Locarno ? A qui m'adresser mieux qu'à l'homme qui est aujourd'hui le chancelier du Reich, c'est-à-dire le chef du gouvernement allemand ? M. Hermann Müller, parlant au nom de son parti à la tribune du Reichstag, a prononcé ces paroles, que je vous prie de méditer :

'La politique de Locarno et de Thoiry signifie le renoncement définitif à l'Alsace-Lorraine.'

Il s'agit là, messieurs, de l'une des parties les plus sensibles d'un traité qui fut, à l'origine, brutalement contesté par l'Allemagne comme ayant été signé dans des conditions de violence lui faisant un devoir de s'y opposer. Lorsqu'un homme politique de l'importance de M. Müller constate que, désormais, l'Allemagne renonce à l'Alsace-Lorraine, il reconnaît publiquement le traité de Versailles dans sa partie la plus essentielle, celle qui nous importe le plus. L'obtention d'une telle parole suffirait à justifier la conclusion du pacte de Locarno.

Mais ce n'est pas tout, messieurs.

On vous a rappelé une réunion récente entre les personnalités marquantes du centre catholique allemand et une délégation de catholiques français, parmi lesquels des membres du Parlement, présidée par M. François-Marsal — un homme avisé, prudent, circonspect, qui ne s'est jamais montré particulièrement passionné pour une politique de rapprochement avec l'Allemagne, et qui est allé là, par conséquent, avec le désir bien arrêté de mesurer sagement les choses, de sonder les hommes, de se faire une opinion précise sur la situation. On vous a dit qu'un certain prélat allemand avait prononcé des paroles graves sur la frontière de l'est. Eh bien, je vais vous rappeler aujourd'hui dans quelles conditions s'est faite la rencontre. Il a été entendu entre les deux délégations — je crois que l'ordre du jour a été établi par un Allemand, puis par un Français — que l'on se dirait de part et d'autre, en se regardant bien dans les yeux, tout ce qu'on avait à se dire.

M. Ernest Pezet. — C'est la vérité même.

Le ministre des affaires étrangères. — Il a été reconnu, de part et d'autre, que le vrai moyen de réaliser un rapprochement entre deux peuples longtemps dressés, au cours des siècles, l'un contre l'autre, qui se sont si souvent affrontés sur des champs de bataille, c'était de se voir, de se prêter, en toute franchise, à des entretiens dont ne seraient pas systématiquement exclues les choses désagréables qu'on aurait à se dire.

Tel est le programme qui a été suivi. Et voulez-vous que je vous cite textuellement les paroles prononcées par le comte Oberndorff,

l'orateur mandaté par la délégation allemande, à la séance du 21 décembre après-midi ?

Tout d'abord, sur la portée du pacte de Locarno concernant l'Alsace-Lorraine, il a dit :

'Le point de départ de notre collaboration est établi. Son nom est Locarno, où le grand problème politique qui a fait étrangers nos deux pays l'un à l'autre pendant des générations, la question d'Alsace-Lorraine, a été enterré une fois pour toutes.'

Et sur *l'Anschluss* ?

Oui, messieurs, *l'Anschluss*, dont on a plus d'une fois parlé dans ce débat.

Car j'ai entendu rappeler le grave avertissement qu'a fait entendre M. Benès, dans une circonstance importante, devant l'assemblée de la Société des Nations. Mais celui qui vous parle à cette tribune a également, du haut de la tribune de la Société des Nations, répondu à M. Müller au sujet de *l'Anschluss*. Et l'on sait dans quels termes il a dénoncé le danger d'une certaine politique des minorités. D'aucuns peuvent chercher à me représenter à l'opinion publique comme un pauvre diplomate honteux, qui se bornerait à enregistrer la volonté des autres sans avoir jamais son franc-parler. Ceux qui ont pu assister à ces assemblées de la Société des nations, réunissant cinquante-deux pays, y compris l'Allemagne, vous diront si celui qui est aujourd'hui devant vous, lorsqu'il parle du haut de la tribune de Genève, a l'habitude de mâcher ses mots.

Mais je reviens aux récents entretiens de Berlin. Qu'a dit sur *l'Anschluss* le porte-parole des catholiques allemands ? 'Voici maintenant le fameux *Anschluss* ! Le prélat Ulitzka nous a déjà dit hier que ce n'était pas pour nous une question actuelle, et je voudrais seulement ajouter cette pensée que, lorsque vous vous posez cette question d'une manière tout à fait académique, vous l'envisagez avec des yeux non pas étrangers, mais bien plutôt français. Je pourrai ainsi espérer que votre façon de voir en pourrait être modifiée à plusieurs égards.'

La veille, l'un des délégués français, le père Delattre, avait formulé des observations vigoureuses, exposant, dans toute sa netteté, la pensée française. Et il a été parfaitement reconnu que sur ce point jamais l'Allemagne n'essayerait de forcer les portes.

Mais, après tout, messieurs, *l'Anschluss*, ce n'est pas moi qui l'ai inventé. Là encore, il faut se reporter au traité de paix.

Dans un article, le traité affirme un état de fait ; puis, dans un autre, il ouvre la porte à une modification possible de cet état de fait. Il trace des frontières, il établit une situation déterminée dans

l'Europe entière. Puis, par l'article 19 du pacte, il donne à la Société des Nations la possibilité de provoquer un nouvel examen de cette situation. Alors, tout naturellement, ceux qui désirent de telles modifications sont encouragés à poursuivre leur propagande à cet effet. De même, les campagnes faites sur la question des minorités peuvent s'appuyer sur certaines articles des traités de paix.

Ces articles, ce n'est pas moi qui les y ai mis, mais ils s'y trouvent, et, tout naturellement, on en fait usage. C'est contre l'usage abusif qu'on en voudrait faire que le représentant de la France doit un jour s'élever. A Genève, il a dû monter à la tribune et s'écrier : 'Pardon ! Les droits des minorités sont sacrés. Mais vous, Allemands, vous n'avez pas le droit de vous en servir comme d'un levier pour porter atteinte à la souveraineté des nations. Même constituées malgré vous, ces nations doivent vivre maintenant, en vertu des traités, et vous n'avez pas le droit d'essayer de les miner dans leurs fondations, de les ébranler dans leur autorité souveraine.'

Ces paroles, je les ai prononcées à la tribune de la Société des nations, face aux représentants de plus de cinquante nations, parmi lesquels se trouvait le chancelier du Reich, auquel je répondais.

On me l'a même reproché, ce discours. Et je ne suis pas certain qu'il n'ait pas éveillé quelque inquiétude parmi ceux de nos collègues qui siègent de ce côté de la Chambre (l'extrême gauche) et même dans mon entourage, parmi les membres de notre propre délégation.

Mais j'avais considéré que l'heure était venue de faire entendre cette parole française et de dire avec fermeté : 'Nous pouvons aller jusque-là, mais nous n'irons pas au delà'.

Et, messieurs, je dois constater que la vigueur avec laquelle j'ai prononcé cette parole n'a nui en rien à la politique du rapprochement.

Tout au contraire. Nous nous sommes abordés ensuite avec une meilleure compréhension réciproque. Les conférences qui devaient se tenir le lendemain avaient dès lors meilleure chance d'aboutir. Jamais, d'ailleurs, à aucun moment, nous n'avons négligé de faire entendre les paroles nécessaires.

Enfin, messieurs, pour revenir une dernière fois à la réunion de Berlin entre catholiques français et allemands, le comte Oberndorff, orateur mandaté de la délégation allemande, a reconnu, dans la troisième partie de ses déclarations, l'engagement solennel pris par l'Allemagne de ne jamais rechercher par la force la solution de la question polonaise.

Notez, messieurs, que cela a été dit à Berlin, au cours d'une rencontre entre des Français et des Allemands qui, ni les uns ni les autres, ne sont des pacifistes systématiques. En effet, s'il importe assez peu

que deux pacifistes, un Français et un Allemand, se rencontrent pour parler cordialement d'une paix sur le principe de laquelle ils sont, par avance, d'accord, bien autrement intéressante est une prise de contact entre des milieux qui se méfient, qui ne sont pas acquis à l'idée de la paix, mais qui désirent et vont pouvoir en contrôler les possibilités. Voilà ce qui est intéressant. Ce qui l'est encore davantage, c'est qu'ils ne s'interdisent pas d'aborder les problèmes.

Eh bien, messieurs, si cela est possible, c'est grâce aux effets déjà produits par la politique de Locarno, si vilipendée. C'est parce que, déjà, un certain degré de compréhension et de rapprochement a pu s'établir entre les deux peuples. On se voit, on se rencontre, on se parle. L'on ne s'entend pas toujours sur tous les problèmes, mais du moins on échange des idées, on est obligé d'aborder l'étude de problèmes concernant des intérêts réciproques. Et, en donnant aux peuples des possibilités de ce genre, j'estime qu'on a fait contre la guerre un grand progrès.

Les peuples, ah ! je vois bien comment ils peuvent être entraînés dans la guerre, et je vois bien le degré de responsabilité qu'on voudrait leur faire supporter.

Il y a tant de moyens de les y conduire sans qu'ils s'en aperçoivent ; de les y faire glisser doucement, pas à pas, à leur insu, en leur enlevant peu à peu toute possibilité de l'éviter ! C'est là ce qu'il y a de terrible, c'est là ce qu'il y a d'effroyable. Mais si l'on a pu créer entre eux des possibilités de parler avant qu'intervienne la minute fatale, alors, tout peut être encore sauvé. Je ne dis pas que tout le sera certainement, mais je dis que tout peut l'être. L'intérêt d'une politique de paix, c'est précisément de faciliter cette possibilité.

Mais faut-il dénoncer ce qui se passe chez nous-mêmes ?

Messieurs, les discussions qui se sont engagées dans cette enceinte ne se poursuivent-elles pas au dehors dans les colonnes de certains journaux, dont quelques-uns, subitement, se sont ouverts à des campagnes que leur atticisme, il y a peu de temps encore, leur eût interdites ?

Oh ! je ne me fais pas d'illusion. La paix a besoin de confiance. La paix demande une grande foi. Eh bien, je dois en faire l'aveu, il y a en ce moment en France un réel ébranlement des esprits. Oui ! Ceux qui combattent cette politique ont déjà obtenu un résultat. Ils ont déjà fait naître des doutes à son égard.

Je reçois déjà des lettres de Français — car, en France, les vieux sentiments sont faciles à réveiller — je reçois déjà des lettres qui expriment le doute. Eh bien, ce n'est pas une grande victoire dans mon pays.

Certes, notre pays a l'ardent désir de sa sécurité. C'est bien naturel.

Il a trop souffert pendant la guerre pour ne pas redouter d'en voir une nouvelle. Et à s'entendre toujours répéter : 'Prenez garde ! il y a à la tête du gouvernement des hommes imprudents, des aveugles et des fous qui vous entraînent à la guerre sous prétexte de paix, qui ne prennent aucune précaution pour votre sécurité, qui vous livrent d'avance aux fléaux d'une nouvelle guerre', comment voulez-vous que les consciences ne soient pas troublées et que l'inquiétude ne pénètre pas jusqu'au cœur des hommes ?

Il paraît qu'il faut faire cela dans l'intérêt de notre pays et qu'il en ressentira du bien. Soit ! Je le voudrais, mais je ne le crois pas ! Je ne le crois pas ! C'est le point faible, c'est le point douloureux de ma situation, que les hommes qui ont parlé de paix dans le passé n'ont jamais été crus, n'ont jamais été considérés que comme de pauvres êtres incapables d'objectivité. Et, comme toutes les pages de l'histoire, malgré leurs paroles de paix, sont couvertes de taches de sang, on n'a gardé d'eux que le souvenir de pauvres fous. Pour être suivi des foules, il est plus facile d'éveiller en elles des sentiments héroïques, de leur faire entendre les appels du tambour et de la trompette, le cliquetis de l'acier. La politique de paix, c'est une politique de pauvre. Elle est fragile, messieurs ; elle ne se soutient pas aussi facilement que l'autre politique. Elle n'a pas les mêmes possibilités. Elle est à la merci de qui veut créer le trouble et l'inquiétude.

Eh bien, je le répète — et c'est un aveu que je fais sans crainte de me diminuer, parce que c'est la vérité — cette politique a déjà reçu un mauvais coup. Seulement, moi, tant que je le pourrai, je resterai à mon poste pour la soutenir ! Tant que je le pourrai, je ferai entendre ma voix et, le jour où je ne pourrais le faire ici, j'irais, moi aussi, comme un pèlerin, dans le pays et j'essayerais, malgré mon âge et ma fatigue, de trouver encore quelques accents pour lui communiquer ma foi.

Dussé-je être accompagné par des malédictions, dussé-je être dénoncé comme un être dangereux pour son pays, comme un homme peu soucieux de la sécurité de sa patrie, je ferai encore entendre ma voix jusqu'à ma dernière minute, jusqu'à mon dernier souffle, parce que j'ai la foi !

Certes, oui, je sais bien qu'à l'heure actuelle la sécurité n'est pas complète, en Europe, pas plus qu'elle ne l'est dans le monde. Je sais qu'on ne peut pas faire une politique de sécurité en levant des yeux extasiés vers le ciel, et qu'il faut regarder aussi vers la terre, à chaque pas, en prenant toutes précautions. Je sais qu'il faut s'organiser pour être hors d'atteinte. Mais je sais aussi que mon pays peut le faire sans avoir à abandonner pour cela une politique de paix.

Interpellé la semaine dernière au Sénat et répondant à des critiques comme celles que j'ai eu à subir ici, je disais : 'Oui ! je connais trop la vieille formule, elle est séduisante, elle est pénétrante, elle est profondément entrée dans l'esprit des peuples, qui l'ont appliquée à travers des siècles et des siècles : *Si vis pacem para bellum*. Oui, je conviens qu'à vouloir aujourd'hui modifier ainsi cette formule : *Si vis pacem para pacem*, si tu veux la paix, organise la paix, un homme court le risque de passer pour un aveugle et pour un fou, en tout cas d'être considéré comme un malfaiteur à l'égard de son pays. Eh bien, tant pis ! je crois que si on veut la paix, il faut parler de la paix.

Je crois que si on veut la paix, il faut organiser la paix. Et je crois aussi que tous les obstacles qu'on a dressés contre la guerre ont eu leur utilité. Les peuples semblent céder moins facilement à l'impulsion qui les appelle aux armes. Ils commencent parfois à se battre. Mais c'est là qu'il y a vraiment quelque chose de changé. Alors qu'autrefois cela n'eût pas été possible, il a suffi dans plusieurs circonstances récentes, qu'un appel leur fût adressé pour les détourner de la lutte et les ramener à la paix.

Oui, il y a quelque chose de nouveau, malgré tout. Peut-être n'est-ce encore que le fait d'une force mystique ou morale. Quand un pacte comme le pacte de Paris est lancé à travers l'humanité, il n'a qu'une valeur morale. Quand il prend la guerre à la gorge et lui arrache son masque de légalité pour la dénoncer comme une criminelle, eh bien, oui, c'est un geste, et qu'il n'est pas difficile de ridiculiser. Mais on ne peut tout de même pas méconnaître son importance, lorsque tant de nations se sont mises d'accord pour accomplir ce geste, pour mettre leur signature au bas d'un texte par lequel elles s'engagent solennellement à ne plus jamais recourir à la guerre pour assurer leurs desseins politiques. Sans doute peuvent-elles encore passer outre et déchirer le lendemain l'acte qui porte leur signature. Mais croyez-vous, messieurs, que cela leur soit facile ? Certains peuples ont su ce qu'il en coûte de déchirer les engagements solennels. Certains peuples ont su ce qu'est le poids de certaines responsabilités, sous lequel ils gémissent encore.

Effet moral, c'est entendu ! Barrière morale, c'est entendu ! Mais barrière tout de même.

Il s'est élevé, tout récemment, en Extrême-Orient, un conflit assez grave entre deux pays signataires du pacte. C'est un spectacle tragique — que d'autres le jugent comique ! — de voir s'affronter des peuples qui ont signé de pareils engagements.

Mais là encore, la situation ne s'est-elle pas peu à peu colmatée ; la guerre véritable n'a-t-elle pas été finalement évitée ?

Libre à certains amours-propres de se satisfaire en contestant toute portée aux déclarations publiées par des cosignataires du pacte. Ce qui nous importe, ce qui pour nous demeure l'essentiel, c'est que la guerre a fait place à la paix, la solution de force à la solution pacifique.

Est-ce à dire que nous devons nous en tenir là ? Dans son très beau discours sur la politique navale, mon ami M. Paul-Boncour s'est écrié : 'Protocole ! protocole ! des sanctions !'

M. Herriot, ce matin, dans un discours d'une rare éloquence, dont je regrette bien qu'il n'ait pu être entendu par une Assemblée aussi nombreuse que celle-ci, parlant de la nécessité d'une union fédérale entre peuples d'Europe, a exprimé avec une beauté d'expressions et une noblesse d'idées magnifiques des sentiments que je partage. Lui aussi a rappelé nos efforts pour l'adoption de ce protocole. Nous étions ensemble à Genève et il m'avait prié de prendre, en fait, la direction de la délégation française, au moment où la maladie empêchait notre très cher Léon Bourgeois de continuer à assumer cette tâche.

Nous y avons travaillé de tout notre cœur et je me rappelle nos espérances, qu'a partagées M. Paul-Boncour. Mais, un jour, nous avons dû cesser nos efforts, faute de pouvoir réaliser l'unanimité dans une Assemblée où cette condition, vous le savez, est indispensable.

Vous voyez donc combien sont fragiles les constructions de cette importance !

Mais jamais les représentants de la France à Genève n'ont voulu renoncer à leur espoir. Et s'il en est ici qui veuillent me croire capable de sacrifier jamais à mon rêve l'âpre réalité que je n'ai cessé de poursuivre, qu'ils me permettent de leur citer un passage du discours que j'ai prononcé devant la dernière Assemblée de la Société des Nations :

'Messieurs, quelques progrès qui aient été réalisés sur le chemin de la paix, il faut bien dire qu'il reste dans notre travail une lacune grave et, si j'aborde ce point avec quelque hésitation, je me dis à moi-même que c'est mon devoir, comme membre de la Société des Nations, de ne pas m'en détourner.

'Oui, messieurs, il y a dans l'œuvre de la Société des Nations pour l'organisation de la paix une lacune grave, qu'il nous faudra tôt ou tard combler.

'Nous avons condamné la guerre et elle est désormais considérée comme un crime, alors que jusqu'à ces dernières années, cette guerre, maudite de tous, demeurait encore, je ne dirai pas légale, mais licite. On a fini par la prendre à la gorge, par la clouer au pilori. Cela, c'est bien ; c'est une forte barrière morale. Mais qui oserait dire que cela

suffit ? Qui oserait dire que, lorsqu'une pareille condamnation est prononcée par une institution comme la Société des Nations, celle-ci a terminé son œuvre ?

‘Non, messieurs, tant que la Société des Nations, ayant condamné le crime, n’aura pas pris toutes les précautions possibles pour le prévenir et, s’il est commis, pour le réprimer, elle n’aura pas accompli tout son devoir.

‘Messieurs, ne nous y trompons pas, c’est une pensée qui hante l’esprit des peuples. Partout où l’on discute notre action, sans cesser de l’approuver et de reconnaître les réelles garanties de paix qu’elle apporte, se pose toujours le même point d’interrogation. Si malgré tout, parmi les peuples, il en était, ne fût-ce qu’un seul, pour passer outre ; si, tout de même, sous une provocation que nous ne voulons pas imaginer, mais qui peut cependant se produire, la guerre éclatait, qu’arriverait-il ? Que ferait cette formidable association de nations qui condamne la guerre ? Comment assisterait-elle à un pareil événement ? La force qui est entre ses mains, qu’en ferait-elle et comment pourrait-elle la laisser inerte ?’

Il me semble, messieurs, que cet appel au protocole de Genève montre bien que l’homme que je suis ne détournait pas ses regards de la réalité.

Donc, lorsque nous nous présentons devant vous, fermement attachés à la poursuite de notre œuvre et vous demandons toute la confiance qui nous est nécessaire pour nous permettre d’aller à la Haye, puis à Londres, avec le sentiment d’une pleine autorité, nous nous croyons en droit de nous réclamer auprès de vous d’un dévouement utile à notre pays.

On nous dit : vous allez approuver un plan qui n’est pas satisfaisant, puisqu’il consacre des sacrifices de la France sur sa créance. Sans doute, dans chaque négociation, a-t-il été impossible d’éviter quelques réductions de la créance de la France. Mais aussi, dans chacune d’elles, comme l’a fait observer avec tant de justesse M. Paul Reynaud, s’est-on approché davantage des possibilités. Par le plan Young, nous faisons disparaître la précarité résultant du jeu de l’article 234, précarité qui rendait impossible la mobilisation de la créance.

Ce matin, M. Dubois disait : ‘Vous aviez, avec le plan Dawes, tout ce qu’il vous fallait : vous aviez des titres de chemins de fer, vous aviez le droit de les négocier.’ Non ! cette opération avait été envisagée à Thoiry, avec M. Stresemann, il fallait pour cela l’autorisation de l’Allemagne. Il était surtout indispensable, pour la réussir, que ces titres ne fussent pas entachés de précarité. Or, ils n’étaient pas prati-

quement négociables tant que l'article 234 permettait de les remettre en cause à tout instant.

M. Louis Dubois. — C'est inexact.

Le ministre des affaires étrangères. — Je vois que M. Dubois persiste dans son idée première. Pour moi, je n'ai pas trouvé un seul financier à qui le problème ait été posé et qui ait répondu autre chose que ce que je viens d'affirmer.

Ainsi, le plan Young présente au moins un avantage. Il présente aussi, c'est exact, des inconvénients : ce sont les concessions. Mais je vous répète que le traité ne permet pas de ne pas envisager des concessions.

On nous demande — je ne voudrais pas abuser de votre patience mais je crois utile de vous donner ces explications — on nous demande : pourquoi évacuer la Rhénanie ? L'article 429 prévoit que, même à l'expiration de la période de quinze ans, si les garanties contre une agression non provoquée de la part de l'Allemagne n'étaient pas considérées comme suffisantes, vous pourriez prolonger l'occupation.

Je l'admets. Mais il y a l'article 431, accompagné d'une déclaration des alliés, qui dit que si, entre temps, l'Allemagne a fait montre de bonne volonté . . . (Mouvements à droite.)

Comment ? C'est absolument indiscutable. Je vois qu'il me faut vous lire le texte :

'Si l'Allemagne — dit la déclaration qui accompagne l'article 431 — à une date plus rapprochée, a fourni, pour assurer l'exécution de ses engagements, des preuves de bonne volonté et des garanties satisfaisantes, les puissances alliées et associées seront prêtes à se mettre d'accord pour fixer à une date plus rapprochée le terme de la période d'occupation.'

.

Mais quand vous venez me reprocher, à moi qui rencontre aujourd'hui de semblables difficultés, de ne pas vous apporter l'absolu de ce que vous pourriez désirer, je m'en explique et je vous réponds : Oui, l'article 428 fixe à quinze ans la durée de l'occupation de la Rhénanie ; mais l'article 431 prévoit que l'on peut partir avant. Dans quelle hypothèse ? Si l'Allemagne, à une date plus rapprochée, fournit, pour assurer l'exécution de ses engagements, des preuves de bonne volonté et des garanties suffisantes.

Je connais les conditions dans lesquelles ces dispositions ont été adoptées. Les travaux préparatoires en expliquent le texte. Et voici ce que dit lui-même le négociateur français :

‘Nous avons besoin d’une garantie pour l’exécution des clauses financières. Croyez bien que les considérations militaires n’ont rien à voir dans cette question. Il s’agit de rappeler à l’Allemagne qu’elle nous doit de l’argent et qu’elle doit payer. Le danger pour l’Europe, je ne le vois pas. L’armée française est disciplinée et nous la tenons en main.’ — ‘Et, qu’est-ce que vous entendez par ces garanties?’ dit un de ses interlocuteurs. — ‘J’entends par là des bons ou des gages financiers.’

Et, comme on insiste: ‘Vous me dites aujourd’hui: “Ces quinze ans représentent la période pendant laquelle il n’y aura aucun danger.”’ Je ne prétends pas que ce chiffre soit sacré. Mais la raison pour laquelle nous l’avons choisi, c’est que nous avons pensé que cette période suffirait pour obtenir de l’Allemagne toutes les preuves de bonne volonté et toutes les garanties dont nous avons besoin. Vous m’avez dit, ensuite: “Il serait absurde de stipuler cette période de quinze ans, quoi qu’il puisse arriver. Si tout se passe bien, pourquoi ne pas la réduire?” J’ai répondu: Certainement; et nous avons mis dans le traité un article dans ce sens.

‘Je suis prêt à faire un effort de plus. Il est évident que l’Allemagne ne peut pas remplir tous ses engagements en quinze ans. Mais quand elle nous aura persuadés qu’elle est vraiment disposée à les remplir et quand elle nous aura donné les garanties nécessaires, je serai prêt à évacuer la rive gauche du Rhin.

‘Vous me demandez ce que j’entends par ce mot de “garanties”. Si l’Allemagne nous donne des bons portant sa signature, si elle nous donne des gages financiers — que ce soit des banques, des douanes, des chemins de fer — je ne vois pas pourquoi nous laisserions là-bas des soldats sans nécessité.’

Messieurs, c’est l’article expliqué par son auteur lui-même.

Et alors, quand, en présence de cette demande de l’Allemagne: ‘J’ai réalisé les conditions du traité et je demande que vous anticipiez sur la date d’évacuation’, nos alliés viennent déclarer à leur tour: ‘C’est aussi notre avis; nous devons nous en aller’, vous voyez dans quelle situation se trouve le délégué de la France.

Vous, vous répondez ‘non’. Car, si à la tribune on ne formule pas la politique par laquelle on remplacerait éventuellement celle du gouvernement, dans les couloirs on ne s’en fait pas faute. On y envisage toutes les alternatives possibles.

J’entends bien qu’il en est une qu’il faudrait pousser jusqu’à cette conclusion: ‘C’est très bien, que nos alliés s’en aillent puisqu’ils croient devoir le faire: nous, nous resterons.’

Mais, là encore, messieurs, le traité de Versailles vous l'interdit en établissant la solidarité entre alliés.

Sur ce point encore je vais vous lire une déclaration du gouvernement français et vous me direz ce que vous en pensez.

Je m'excuse, messieurs, de toutes ces citations.

Je suis attaqué, dénoncé, comme un homme qui ne défend pas le point de vue de son pays, qui néglige les intérêts de la France. J'ai cependant le droit d'expliquer pour quelles raisons je suis amené à certaines solutions.

Cette solidarité est établie par le traité. Nous ne pouvons pas agir seuls. On l'a essayé, je l'ai rappelé, à un moment donné, et ce fut extrêmement grave. J'ai lu — je ne veux pas la relire — la note qui a été remise alors au quai d'Orsay par l'ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne à Paris, notre fidèle et sincère ami, lord Derby. A la conférence qui a suivi, il a fallu prendre des engagements et vous savez que ces engagements ne sont pas discutables. Les voici.

'Le gouvernement français n'hésite pas à déclarer que dans toutes les questions interalliées que soulève l'exécution du traité, il n'envisage aucun cas où il ne soit heureux, avant d'agir, de s'assurer l'assentiment de ses alliés.'

'Pour l'avenir, le gouvernement de la République répète que, dans toutes les questions interalliées que soulève l'exécution du traité, il n'entend agir que d'accord avec ses alliés.'

Vous pouvez me dire: 'Qu'importe tout cela?' Mais, voyons! messieurs. Peut-on méconnaître une pareille déclaration faite au lendemain d'une tentative à laquelle il a fallu renoncer?

Donc, le traité de Versailles nous interdit tout action isolée.

Sans doute, on peut passer outre à tout. Rien n'est plus facile. On peut dire: 'Nous vous avons bien dit cela hier, mais nous avons eu tort; tant pis pour vous. Cela, le traité de Versailles le dit, c'est entendu; mais nous, si exigeants quand il s'agit de réclamer son exécution, nous n'en exécuterons pas cette clause particulière. Nous avons fait, un jour, une tentative, en ce sens; vous l'avez considérée comme attentatoire à vos droits. Nous nous sommes inclinés devant votre thèse. Nous avons accepté de prendre l'engagement que vous nous demandiez, mais nous le déchirons dès lors qu'ils s'oppose . . .' — voyez cette ingéniosité — '. . . à un de nos intérêts vitaux.'

Il paraît que, pour une nation, dès qu'un intérêt devient vital — et il suffit, pour qu'il devienne tel, qu'un citoyen l'interprète ainsi — le droit est absolu de méconnaître tous ses engagements.

J'avais déjà entendu exposer la doctrine des deux signatures de la France : celle que l'on doit respecter, et celle que l'on peut déchirer.

Ce sont là des thèses que je n'admets point. Je considère que le jour où la France ferait des discriminations pareilles, du jour où, mise en présence d'engagements de cette nature, elle déclarerait qu'elle passe outre, elle aurait dès lors à se défier de toutes les conventions qu'on pourrait signer avec elle, et de toutes promesses qu'on pourrait lui faire ; elle devrait s'attendre qu'on n'ait pas plus de respect pour les engagements contractés envers elle qu'elle n'en aurait eu pour les signatures par elle données.

Heureusement, nous n'en sommes pas là. J'espère bien que les représentants du pays ne donneront pas à la politique extérieure de la France une pareille orientation.

En tout cas, tant que j'en aurai la charge, elle ne s'engagera pas dans cette voie, je vous le garantis.

Voilà la situation. Par la résolution de Genève du 16 Septembre 1928, nous avons été appelés à poser les trois problèmes que vous savez. Cette résolution, je ne l'ai pas acceptée à l'improviste. J'ai pris soin de quitter la conférence de Genève en demandant à mes collègues des autres pays de vouloir bien m'accorder cette suspension. Je suis revenu à Paris ; je suis allé à un conseil des ministres, à Rambouillet. J'ai exposé la situation à mes collègues. J'ai indiqué ce que j'allais proposer à la conférence, et j'y ai été encouragé par une approbation qui m'a paru n'être affaiblie par aucune contradiction.

Toutefois, j'avais indiqué que, par les mots 'complet et définitif' j'entendais qu'on imposât à l'Allemagne un règlement complet de toute sa dette. On m'a fait observer : 'Les pensions comprises ?' J'ai répondu : 'Je n'ai pas fait de réserves, par conséquent, "les pensions comprises".' On m'a dit : 'Vous savez bien que ce serait une chose impossible.' J'ai répliqué : 'En tout cas, je ne veux pas qu'on puisse me reprocher jamais d'avoir fait une nouvelle concession. C'est la consécration totale des droits de la France que je veux faire enregistrer. Ensuite, ce sera aux experts de tirer le meilleur parti de la situation.'

Et les experts ont été nommés, et ils ont accompli leur mission. Me voici dans le domaine de la finance. Il dépasse ma compétence. Les questions financières, je les examine, comme bien d'autres, avec mon simple bon sens. Il m'arrive quelquefois de les comprendre mais je ne peux pas dire que je sois un financier né, ni que l'expérience du gouvernement ait jamais fait de moi un expert possible.

J'aime mieux revenir sur mon terrain.

Comme vous le disait ce matin si fortement et si éloquemment M. le président du conseil, vous avez devant vous des hommes solidaires

d'une même politique. Je ne dis pas qu'ils n'auraient pas tous — et j'en suis — désiré pouvoir tirer de la victoire un meilleur parti. Mais il est évident qu'une victoire, obtenue après quatre ans de guerre, qui a mis tous les peuples aux prises, épuise les vainqueurs eux-mêmes, et qu'il est presque impossible d'en tirer les avantages qu'autrefois, après trois mois de campagne, on pouvait escompter.

Alors, que pouvions-nous faire ? Nous séparer de nos alliés ? Nous désolidariser d'eux ? Répudier le plan Young, et rester, seuls, en Rhénanie ?

C'est une politique, en effet. J'aurais aimé qu'un de nos collègues prît la responsabilité de la proposer, aussi clairement que je viens de l'énoncer. Aucun d'eux ne l'a fait. Et cela m'inquiète un peu pour la politique même à laquelle ils pensent, car quand on croit avoir une meilleure politique à mettre au service de son pays, avec quelle joie ne doit-on pas l'apporter à la tribune !

Faire des critiques, c'est relativement facile. Les présenter avec une certaine éloquence, c'est également possible. Tout dépend de l'orateur.

Je dois reconnaître, d'ailleurs, que, parmi mes contradicteurs, il en est avec lesquels il faut compter, et que la façon dont ils présentent leurs critiques est assez redoutable ; mais quel spectacle nous ont-ils donné ? Armés de leurs critiques, ils montaient allégrement à l'assaut avec une joie toute juvénile avec même une sorte de gaîté communicative.

Et puis, en haut de la montée, au bout de cette belle escalade, quand on a tout renversé sur son passage, où sont les matériaux pour construire ? Où est le maçon pour travailler ? Que va-t-il faire ? Où est son plan ? Quel est son travail ?

Il n'y a plus personne !

On cherche en vain sur la colline : les travailleurs n'y sont plus. Ils échafaudent ailleurs des combinaisons d'un autre genre.

Je ne dis pas que ce ne soit pas un travail constructif à certains points de vue. Mais qu'ils se méfient : dans ces constructions-là, on ne peut pas loger tous ceux qui ont travaillé avec vous.

En tout cas, il est impossible aux porte-parole du pays d'aller dans des réunions internationales comme celles qui vont se tenir prochainement, s'ils ne se sentent pas soutenus. Et je viens vous dire, avec M. le président du conseil : cessons ce jeu, qui n'a que trop duré ; il faut maintenant prendre ses responsabilités.

Il n'y a rien de fait encore, tout est à pied d'œuvre, la troisième zone est encore occupée, une action isolée, au mépris de certains

engagements, de certains articles du traité, reste toujours possible. Proposez-la!

Voilà le vrai débat. J'espère qu'il n'aura pas été inutile, qu'il n'aura pas été purement académique. Le train est là, en partance pour la Haye. Nous voulons bien y monter, mais nous voulons qu'il y ait dans notre bagage autre chose que des fagots d'épines. Nous voulons un peu de confiance. Si vous n'en avez pas à nous donner, dites-le-nous! N'hésitez pas, alors, à dire ici, tout haut: 'Cette politique est attentatoire à la sécurité française, à l'intérêt français. Il nous faut faire autre chose, ceci ou cela. Il n'est donc que temps d'enlever au gouvernement la possibilité de continuer son œuvre néfaste. Il est temps de s'engager sur la bonne voie. Il est temps de servir les intérêts de la France comme ils méritent de l'être.'

Voilà un langage que je comprendrais.

Et qu'on n'aille pas me dire: mais il ne s'agit pas d'une interpellation; il n'y a donc pas de sanction possible à ce débat.

Pardon! il peut toujours y avoir une sanction et il faut qu'il y en ait une.

Proposez, par exemple, une réduction de dix francs sur le chapitre premier de mon budget. Je la refuse et j'engage mon portefeuille sur ce refus. Prenez-le!

Cela, c'est clair, c'est net. Tout se passera ici au grand jour, à la tribune. J'aime mieux cela que ce qui se passe à côté, dans les petits coins.

Opérez devant tous vos collègues, devant le pays, en prenant la responsabilité d'une proposition constructive, dans un vote conforme à la doctrine, c'est-à-dire aux leçons de netteté et de droiture que nous a données M. Mandel.

III. GERMANY

The concurrence of the German Government in the agreement reached at the first Hague Conference produced fierce opposition in Germany from the Fascists and extreme Nationalists, who had hoped to make Germany's acceptance of the Young Plan dependent upon the cancellation of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles containing the war-guilt clause.

As a protest against the Young Plan, Herr Hugenberg, leader of the Nationalist Party, produced the 'Bill against the Enslavement of the German People' and submitted it to a referendum on November 3. Having received 4,133,812 votes (or 10.02 per cent. of the total electorate) in favour of the Bill, he secured the right, in accordance with the Constitution, to bring it before the Reichstag, which had then to accept or reject it by a simple majority. The Bill was considered by the Reichstag on November 30, and in the course of the debate, the acting Foreign Minister, Herr Curtius, attacked it in a speech in which he denounced it as an attack on the authority of the State, and founded on the dishonest

assertion that German foreign policy since the revolution had been based on the recognition of Germany's war-guilt, a charge which each successive President and Government had repudiated. The Reichstag rejected the Bill by an overwhelming majority, many of Herr Hugenberg's followers voting with the Government, thereby causing a split in the Nationalist ranks from which the party has not yet recovered.

Once more, in accordance with the Constitution, the Bill was submitted to a referendum of the people. If it secured over 50 per cent. of the votes of the total electorate of 41,278,897 persons, it could become law, despite its rejection by the Reichstag. On the day of polling, however, less than six million votes (or about 14 per cent. of the electorate) were registered in favour of the Bill, which was automatically dropped.¹

The Bill consists of a preamble and five articles. The preamble states that the Nationalists' 'foreign political demands are based on the fact that Germany does not bear the guilt for the war', and adds that 'the acknowledgment of this fact from the Powers signatory to the Versailles Treaty can and will be achieved'. Then follow explanations of the various paragraphs of the draft Bill, which are summarized in brackets in the following translation:

1. THE BILL AGAINST THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE²

1. The German Government shall immediately inform the foreign Powers in ceremonial form that the extorted acknowledgment of war-guilt in the Versailles Treaty conflicts with historical truth, rests on false presuppositions, and is invalid in international law. (The preamble states that this is the fundamental principle of future German foreign policy.)

2. The German Government shall aim at the formal abolition of the war-guilt acknowledgment in Article 231, and also of Articles 429 and 430 of the Versailles Treaty. It shall further aim at the immediate and unconditional evacuation of occupied territory, under exclusion of any form of control, independent of the acceptance or rejection of the decisions of The Hague Conference. (The preamble explains that the reference to Articles 429 and 430 is to render impossible future sanctions such as the re-occupation of German territory.)

3. New obligations and burdens resting on the war-guilt acknowledgment shall not be undertaken in regard to foreign Powers. This includes the burdens and obligations which Germany is expected to undertake as a result of the proposals of the Paris Experts' conference and the subsequent agreements. (This, says the preamble, is to prevent the acceptance of the Young Plan.)

4. The German Chancellor, German Ministers, or accredited repre-

¹ See *Information on the Reparations Settlement* by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and H. Latimer (Allen & Unwin, 1930), chap. 7, 'Germany and the Young Plan'.

² *Bulletin of International News*, vol. vi, no. 9, November 7, 1929.

sentatives of the Reich, who, in defiance of the stipulations of paragraph 3, conclude treaties with foreign Powers, are subject to the penalties defined in paragraph 92 of the Penal Code. (These penalties, as the preamble explains, are those relating to the laws covering treason.)

5. This Bill comes into force on its promulgation.

2. TEXT OF THE SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH,
DR. CURTIUS, NOVEMBER 29, 1919¹

The Election Committee of the Reich stated unanimously in its meeting of November 25 that 10·02 per cent. of the authorized voters to the last election of the Reichstag had registered validly for the referendum. In accordance with the Constitution the Government of the Reich thereupon immediately submitted the referendum draft Bill to the Reichstag. The Government of the Reich begs the Reichstag to pass judgment upon the Bill as soon as possible; it demands and expects its rejection. The plebiscite following thereupon is set for December 22. Economic disadvantages due to the choice of this date are no more to be feared than limitation of the number of voters. On account of the practical preparations for the plebiscite it is not possible to choose an earlier Sunday. Postponement of the date would mean undesirable aggravation of the political situation at home and abroad.

On the proposal of the Reich's Minister of the Interior I have undertaken the oral presentation of the standpoint of the Government of the Reich. The reason for this is that the impression should not be permitted to get about that the question at stake is only a battle of Hugenberg *versus* Severing, a so-called anti-Marxist front against a so-called Marxist front. The action of the Reich's Referendum Committee is apt to produce complete confusion in the constitutional order and organization of the political powers of the Reich.

The action of the Reich's Committee is an attack on the authority of the State. The Reich's Cabinet is in agreement *inter se* as well as with the Government parties in warding off this attack.

I have to undertake the presentation of the standpoint of the Government of the Reich also because the text of the claim for a referendum attacks the foreign policy conducted by the Government up to now, and demands a radical change of the methods of our foreign policy. I have taken over the policy of my predecessor in the office without the *beneficium inventarii*. I must defend it, continue it

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 30, 1929. Translation prepared for the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

and develop it further. In so far as the law claimed by the nation demands action against the war guilt paragraph it breaks through open doors, leads to the disillusionment of the people and endangers the means which alone lead to the goal. The whole referendum claim is built upon an openly recognized dishonesty. It is based, as the proclamation of the Government of the Reich states, on the nonsensical assertion that Germany's foreign policy up to now has been based on the acknowledgment of Germany's war guilt and that the German Government only needs to revoke the war guilt Article of the Treaty of Versailles in writing in order to liberate Germany from all burdens and shackles of the Treaty.

Germany has never acknowledged the unilateral sentence of guilt in the Treaty of Versailles.

Every German Government has protested against this injustice in solemn declarations. This was last done by the proclamation addressed by the present Government of the Reich in conjunction with the President of the Reich to the German nation on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. As Chancellor of the Reich and as Foreign Minister, Dr. Stresemann has repeatedly protested, in the most solemn way, against the war-guilt sentence. He has expressly adopted as his own the declaration of the President of the Reich, von Hindenburg, at the Tannenberg National Monument, to the effect that all classes of the German nation unanimously refute the accusation that Germany is guilty of this the greatest of all wars. I take the same stand as he did in regard to all these proclamations.

The Foreign Office has always considered, and treated, the war-guilt question as one of the most preponderant problems of its foreign policy. As every initiated person knows, it has done everything in its power to solve it.

According to the saying of Socrates truth must be liberated. That necessitates careful and tenacious, loyal and unselfish helpers. Truth must not be abused for party purposes. Truth cannot be determined by voting. And first of all: truth cannot be commanded. Truth is revealing itself. It will push through. The German Government will march on, following the road which all German Governments have taken. It is conscious that time works for it too.

If the majority of the Reichstag rejects the request for a referendum it must not be concluded that they therefore accept the war guilt Article. In rejecting the war-guilt Article, the Reichstag majority is in agreement with the Government of the Reich, the President of the Reich, and with the overwhelming majority of the German nation.

But not all of us will commit the error of cherishing the chimera that international treaties can be cancelled, and reparations burdens shaken off, by a mere German law and plebiscite.

We refuse to dazzle the German nation with possibilities which do not exist, as the authors of the claim for a plebiscite know themselves.

It can be said without exaggeration that those who have inserted the referendum and plebiscite provisions into the Weimar Constitution have never conceived that a nation could be called upon to take a decision like the one in question. In the democracies, whose forms of direct legislation by the people have been adopted by the Weimar Constitution—Switzerland and some of the States of the United States of America—foolish ideas have also sprung up and so-called referendum storms have taken place. But none of these States, no political party in them, has ever had the idea of wanting to conduct foreign policy by means of plebiscites.

The largest German newspaper in Switzerland, the oldest democracy in which direct legislation by the people exists, is right in its following judgment:

‘Not another word should be wasted on the primitive mental stage and lack of sense of political responsibility of persons who delude a nation living under hard conditions with such senseless means for shaking off the consequences of the War. If Germany could shake off the chains of Versailles in so simple a manner it would not have been necessary for Stresemann to sacrifice himself for this purpose.’

To submit a political decision like the one in question to the masses means abandoning all leadership.

The idea of leadership of which Herr Hugenberg and his group are so proud perishes thereby.

When large groups of his own party have not followed their leader, Hugenberg, the reason evidently is that they feel the nation will be abused and that with such methods Germany must sink into chaos.

According to Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Reich-Constitution budgets and tax laws are excepted from the referendum clause. The present Bill is strictly speaking neither a budget nor a tax law. But it is certain that the referendum claim is contrary to the ideas and methods of the Constitutional provision. Exceptions like those provided by Article 73, paragraph 4, exist in most Constitutions that contain clauses for direct legislation by the people. The purpose of these exceptions is always to prevent the people from voting on important laws of financial scope, as the naturally complicated construction and numberless individual provisions of such laws are difficult

for laymen to grasp, or vote on the question as to whether it will voluntarily accept charges or not. No one can deny that there is no question less adapted for reference to popular decision than this. It exceeds the capacity of understanding of the 'state citizen', who is not able to grasp the underlying association of things, and it imposes responsibilities on him which he cannot shoulder. The publication by the Young Nationalist Group, 'The decline of the national opposition', by a group of young conservatives, is certainly right when it rejects the referendum on 'tribute payments' in the following terms:

'It is nonsense to wish to state by plebiscite that a nation will not pay. Of course it will not pay. The only thing that matters is whether it *must* pay, or whether it *does not need* to pay. If Hugenberg were going to prepare a foreign political situation ridding Germany of tribute payments he would rise to the position of a *pater patriae*, but a plebiscite as to whether the German citizen or peasant will pay or not is, we repeat, pure nonsense.'

Concerning the Young Plan itself I can speak only with reservation at present. Rejection of the people's referendum Bill by the Reichstag does not signify acceptance of the Young Plan, just as non-voting for the national referendum and abstaining from the plebiscite are not caused by love of plebiscites. The German Delegation and the Government of the Reich who accepted the Young Plan in principle last August are not blind to the charges which will remain, nor to that which they failed to obtain. But in comparison with the Dawes Plan, the Young Plan will mean, on a new political basis, considerable alleviation of the burdens, from which Germany's economic life should profit. No tricks of arithmetic can conjure these considerable alleviations away. We must take care that the payments which are to be made once for all, remain within bearable limits. It is true that the creditor Powers will continue to keep certain guarantees, but the foreign influence on Germany's economic life and administration which could be exercised under the Dawes Plan through the strong foreign participation in the Board of the Railway of the Reich, in the General Council of the Reichsbank and in the Board of the Bank of Industrial Bonds, will be completely abolished by the Young Plan. The Reparation Commission has no task whatever to fulfil *vis à vis* Germany in the future. The Agent-General as well as all foreign commissioners and control organizations of the Dawes Plan will disappear. Above all, after the acceptance and the putting into effect of the Young Plan, the final and complete evacuation of the Rhineland, without Rhineland control, will be obtained. At The Hague a fixed final term for the evacuation has been guaranteed by convention.

No doubt can exist as to the international stability of this agreement, and there is no reason either to doubt the loyal execution by France of The Hague arrangements. The postponement of the final conference to January, which is not occasioned by Germany, is not a circumstance which could influence the act of evacuation according to contract.

Herr Hugenberg, in Kassel, put ten 'questions of principle' which no one can honestly answer in the affirmative, not even Dr. Schacht. Answers to these 'questions of principle' have been given by Dr. Schacht to a great extent, as well as by members of the Government of the Reich through public lectures, broadcasting of speeches and other means of publicity. At the deliberations on the ratification of the final protocol of The Hague further replies will be given. In the meantime I shall, on my part, address the following ten questions to Herr Hugenberg.

(1) According to paragraph 2 of the Bill in question the Government of the Reich has to work for the cancellation of the war guilt Articles and the Articles of sanctions in the Treaty of Versailles, and for the evacuation without conditions of the occupied territories quite independently of the Young Plan. That is a military staff order to the Government of the Reich, which is fighting in the first line. Whether it can be carried out depends, however, on the operative position. Have you, I ask, Herr Hugenberg, to start with, prepared a plan of operations concerning this military order? and would you not place that too at the disposal of the Government of the Reich to follow in its front-line battle?

(2) After having declined the Young Plan, the Dawes Plan remains in force with a normal annuity of 2.5 billion marks, plus prosperity index amounting to several hundred millions, and with all its international control organizations. In your speech at Kassel you said that fresh negotiations, which would be taken up next year after the Young Plan had been wrecked, would represent a political task rich in prospects. What guarantee have you that the creditor Powers would be willing to take up new negotiations next year after the Young Plan had been refused by Germany?

(3) In all proclamations concerning the referendum you have reckoned with an immediate transfer crisis of the Dawes Plan after the rejection of the Young Plan. When you base all your calculations on this Dawes crisis, have you any idea when it will set in?—it is the Agent-General, not we, who must stop the transfer—and what course will it take, as in view of the mechanism of the Dawes Plan it is a crisis which might last for years? Above all: Have you any

guarantee that, in the end, we shall be better off than if we accepted the Young Plan ?

(4) In your seventh 'question of principle' you depict the danger of a new currency débâcle, a thing which is periodically and frivolously repeated in the press. Do you not know that the independence of the Reichsbank, and its management, represent an *absolute* guarantee for the stability of the currency ? Did not the Reichsbank stand the test during the crisis in the spring of 1924 and again in the spring of 1929 ?

(5) According to your guiding principles in Kassel you will conduct a foreign policy aiming at wiping out the war debts of the world, and you will expect that all States and nations will be urged into this path the moment you open it up with your policy. Will you divulge to us by what political steps you plan to open up this path ?

(6) According to your guiding principles in Kassel you are sure that after the rejection of the Young Plan the people of the United States will acknowledge, like you, that the mutual cancellation of war debts is the only path leading to the real pacification of the world. What do you base this conviction on ? Should it perhaps be your letter of March 5, 1929, that has prepared the United States of America to wipe out the debts ?¹

(7) You will not start political work in Germany with guiding principles or professions of faith, but with a 'programme of great political work'. Are you at last prepared to bring out a programme that does not consist of catchwords but which comprises above all Germany's foreign policy in all its intricacies as to aims, ways and means ?

(8) As long as the Young Plan weighs on us there cannot, in your opinion, exist any order, nor liberty, nor reverence, nor healthy family life, nor taxation relief, nor right, nor welfare in Germany. But by eliminating the Young Plan, so you say, the way to all these boons will be cleared. We hear the message of this 'Power Key', but we lack faith. Will you show us the key which, after rejection of the Young Plan, a mere negation, will open the way to all those boons of life.

(9) If the Young Plan should be accepted you refuse to co-operate with other parties, which adhere to it, in carrying it out. After the rejection of the Young Plan you claim, as a permanent measure, formation of a front against the Social Democrats, not only in the Reich, but also in Prussia. As the civil parties of the Government

¹ This letter, published in the *Montagpost* of March 25, 1929, was addressed by Herr Hugenberg to some 3,000 prominent persons in the U.S.A. on the subject of a reparation settlement.

Coalition entirely refuse any coalition with you, will you please show us the political forces with which you will realize your aims in the future?

(10) Can anybody understand that, in spite of all, you will stick to a policy which exhausts itself in issuing orders from the green table, disregarding all political realities, which consumes itself in barren criticism, destroys and disorganizes, excites and divides the people, which brings your own party into a hopelessly isolated position and which, if it were carried out, would severely endanger the position which Germany has struggled to obtain with such trouble and pain.

It remains for me to make some remarks about paragraph 4 of the referendum law proposed.

It represents the climax of demagogy of the whole Bill. Juridically and technically, it is true that it is only another case of applying paragraph 93, number 3, of the penal code. In reality, judged from a political standpoint, there is no question of a legislative action, but of a sentence disguised as a law against certain private persons—foreign policy conducted like a criminal case. The entire nation will sit as a revolutionary tribunal and judge the members of the Government of the Reich who accepted the Young Plan in principle at the first Hague Conference, and sentence them to penal servitude. That is how the matter is interpreted abroad. That is also evident from the motives of the draft Bill. But what effect this procedure has on all decent thinking men has been characterized by the Reich's Committee of the German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei*) on September 30 in the following terms: 'To threaten the men who, staking their entire force and sacrificing their health, lead this struggle for liberation with the accusation of high treason, is an infamy for which not even the bitterest political battle can offer an excuse.' I have nothing to add to this statement.

Summarizing, I can say: The proposed law in no way fulfils the purpose it claims to pursue. If the plebiscite claim were at all intended by the groups behind it as a serious attempt to change foreign policy, it furnishes the best imaginable proof that any other policy than the hitherto conducted policy of understanding is not possible for Germany. If the Bill in question became law, not only would further pursuance of our political aims be made impossible, but what we have acquired by painful struggle would be completely ruined. It is therefore the task of the present hour, by unanimous rejection of the Bill, to show that the preponderant majority of Parliament and of the nation is determined to follow the Government of the Reich on the path hitherto taken in foreign policy. We can,

and must also in the future, base the development of our international relations upon the fact that an economically sound and a politically free Germany, on an equal footing with other nations, is an indispensable factor for European peace. But also our own future interest lies in simultaneously professing that we adhere to the policy of *rapprochement* and of peace.

For Germany has no higher interest and no other possibility than, protected by peace, to complete her reconstruction at home and abroad. It is not patriotism, but a fatal delusion to close one's eyes to the fact that we are not able to impose our will one-sidedly on other people. The time has past when the fate of nations could be determined through the political hegemony of single States or through a system of war alliances. At least it is Germany's interest, consciously, and in constantly growing measure, to substitute such methods by others.

Last year, too, it was a completely unjustified reproach that the leaders of our foreign policy were exclusively, or to a too great extent, concentrating on relations with one single foreign Power. All our efforts up to now have in reality served in general to regain our position in the world. In the future that must, of course, continue to remain our guiding principle. In addition, I would like to refer to the new developments which, although vaguely and gropingly to begin with, seem to be making their way in the general relations between States. The Government will have to see to it that in all such cases the German view and justified German interests are put into the balance with their full weight. But that is only possible through co-operation with other countries. The plan pursued by the authors of the referendum claim cuts off this possibility. Its realization would throw Germany back into an isolation which would entail incalculable damage for all of us.

Our attitude has not been, is not, and never will be that of a humiliated and defeated country.

We have not lost our pride through the honourable defeat. Upright, we will endeavour to fight our way through, with faith in our future, convinced of the European mission which precisely we, the centre of the Continent, have to fulfil. But we must have a foreign policy without illusions. Economic power is the decisive factor in the financial struggle of nations. The rule that obtains is: 'Help yourself and others will help you.' In spite of all reverses of former years, in spite of our being backward as compared with the pre-war period, or as compared with the capital power of other countries, we have become an appreciated buyer, a respected seller on the world market.

Germany has once more become an indispensable factor in the economic life of the world.

Only now, through the Dawes Plan experiment, is the possibility ripe for reaching a solution of the reparations question. We shall have to march on in that path. The loyal fulfilment of obligations which we have accepted and have to accept, demand the concentration of all our forces. But quite apart from the obligations, it is the only guarantee for our further progress. None of us have ever realized, or expressed, how wonderfully far we have pushed ahead. Passionate national will to action and eyes that look ahead press forward and only see the road before them and the obstacles it contains, but it is necessary to take stock of one's own capacities and one's own position in the international world and to look back from time to time. He who wishes to see, will see that the steepest part of the road has been overcome, and that the policy of the past has lifted Germany up to a point, which, compared with 1923, must appear high. Stresemann and his collaborators were no politicians of a chimera. What they have been and are is proved with sufficient plainness by the referendum claim. The policy they propose to us is anything but heroic, it is 'hero-strategical'. The life and work of Stresemann were heroic, he who struggled with death for the reward of freedom, and once he had convinced himself of his proper course, spared no effort to hold steadfastly along it. On the whole, heroism lies in action only, not in criticism; in the affirmation of life and not in pessimism, which is an act of despair.

NOTE. Scarcely had the Government secured the rejection of the Freedom Bill by the Reichstag, than it was faced by a second and much more serious crisis. On December 5, Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, and one of the German representatives on the Young Committee, published a memorandum attacking the Government's financial and reparations policy since the adoption of the Young Plan. The Schacht Memorandum had a profound effect throughout the country, and the Müller Cabinet were the more startled by its appearance since it came in the middle of conversations between Dr. Schacht and themselves on the very questions raised. Their reply was to publish, on December 11, their financial programme, of which the more important items were the following:

Progressive income-tax reductions during five years to a maximum decrease of 25 per cent.

Abolition of the property tax for amounts under 20,000 marks.

Reduction of the trading tax by 20 per cent. and of the ground tax by 10 per cent.

Progressive withdrawal of the industrial debentures, which contribute 300 million marks annually to the Dawes payments, until their disappearance in 1935.

Reduction of the company and security taxes by 50 per cent., and of the Stock Exchange turnover tax by $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent.
Abolition of the sugar tax.

These reductions were estimated to total some 800 million marks, a considerably larger sum than the saving effected by the substitution of the Young for the Dawes Plan.

So serious did the Government consider Dr. Schacht's attack that they decided to make it a question of confidence, and on December 12 the Chancellor himself made a speech in reply to the Memorandum. The debate which followed brought to light differences of opinion within the Coalition on which the Government depended for its support, and for some time a Cabinet crisis was threatened. Matters were further complicated by the general disapproval of the way in which the Finance Minister, Herr Hilferding, had conducted his policy. When, after four days of debate and negotiations, the Government on December 16 secured its vote of confidence by a majority of sixty-six, it was at the expense of the resignation of Herr Hilferding, the honours thus remaining easy.

3. MEMORANDUM¹ BY DR. HJALMAR SCHACHT, DECEMBER 5, 1929²

On January 9, 1929, the Reich Government appointed me a member of the Experts' Committee which was formed in execution of the Geneva decision of September 16, 1928, for the purpose of preparing proposals for a complete and final settlement of the reparation problem.

It is true that my activity in this matter came to an end with the signature of the Young Plan on June 7, 1929, but this does not remove the fact that I am made partly responsible in the eyes of the German people and of the world for the institution and execution of the Young Plan. For this institution and execution, however, decisions and measures have been taken by others, both inside and outside of Germany, which make it impossible for me to look on any longer while the intentions of the Young Plan are being upset and its prospects of success endangered.

The assumptions on which I recommended the acceptance of the Young Plan by affixing my signature to it were two. The first was that the joint recommendations and provisions contained in the Young Plan would be fully accepted and observed by all the Powers concerned. The second was—and as to this, long and repeated conversations have taken place between the Reich Government, on the one hand, and my German colleagues on the Experts' Committee and myself, on the other—that German financial and economic policy

¹ See *Information on the Reparations Settlement*, chap. 7, *op. cit.*

² English text issued by the Reichsbank Printing Press.

would be put on an orderly basis and directed towards the easier bearing of the burdens of the Young Plan. Although six months have passed since the signature of the Young Plan, I do not see that the foreign Governments or the Reich Government have given due regard to these two assumptions; on the contrary, that which has been done in that time, or that which seems about to be done, fills me with the very greatest anxiety.

I

In the first place, I turn to those measures which relate to the attitude of the creditor Governments and to the financial agreements with them which are demanded or proposed. In this connexion the following points of the Young Plan are of outstanding importance:

1. The Plan expressly describes as worthy of respect the determination of the German experts to accept no unconditional liability for an obligation which, in their opinion, does not under all circumstances lie within the limits of Germany's capacity to pay. For this reason, the amount of the total annuities is not described as bearable by the German experts, but only by the creditor experts, while the German experts, as the Plan expressly confirms, were led to recommend the acceptance of the Plan as a whole solely because of the measures of safeguard therein (paragraph 76). The fact that the German experts did not recognize the practicability of the Young figures reveals very clearly the magnitude of the responsibility which the creditor experts took upon themselves in declaring on their part that the figures were practicable. If now, in the negotiations with the foreign Governments on the institution of the Young Plan, further great sacrifices are demanded of Germany in excess of the Young Plan, namely, renunciation of justified property claims as well as payment of additional sums, it is at once clear that the practicability of the figures of the Young Plan is made much more doubtful and the responsibility of the creditor experts is still more heavily involved by the foreign Governments.

2. The Young Plan clearly states that the solution of the reparation problem is not only a German task, but that it is in the common interest of all the countries concerned and therefore requires the co-operation of all parties (paragraph 168). Inasmuch as almost every one of the creditor Governments is now trying to extort from Germany financial and economic concessions in excess of the Young Plan, the foreign Governments are acting contrary to the principle of co-operation expressly required of them in the Young Plan.

3. The reduction of the budget charge in the Young Plan as compared with the Dawes Plan is described in the Experts' Report as an

important factor for the future economic development of Germany and, particularly, for the accumulation of new capital necessary to carry out the Plan (paragraph 113). This financial relief is rendered illusory by the additional charges which Germany is expected to assume outside the Plan.

4. An immediate relief as compared with the Dawes payments is contemplated by the Young Plan, which fixes a low beginning figure and provides that the annuities of the first years shall rise slowly in order thus to provide security that the new system will function from the beginning without friction or disturbance (paragraph 114). In insisting upon further payments by Germany at a moment of grave financial weakness, the creditors are in particular violating this clause.

5. The Young Plan recommends that Germany's previous obligations shall be entirely replaced by the obligations fixed therein, and that any future disputes as to the extent of these previous obligations shall be submitted to the Court of Interpretation (paragraph 96). Germany must lay full claim to this provision, which is known as a so-called 'all inclusive amounts' clause. There is no ground whatsoever voluntarily to renounce the application of this clause in any point, or to make any payments or to undertake to surrender anything without full compensation.

6. The distribution of the German payments under the Young Plan (paragraph 97) is a recommendation to which the German Experts did not subscribe (Annex VII). One-sided recommendations of the creditor experts in the Young Plan have, however, just as little binding effect as the one-sided recommendations which the German experts have made. Moreover, they cannot affect in any way the legal character of the international relations which existed before the time of the Young Plan. If Germany declares itself prepared to carry out such one-sided recommendations, she is entitled, on the other hand, to demand that the recommendations of the German Experts contained in the Young Plan also be followed or that other compensation be offered her.

II

According to that which has so far been divulged, the following new financial demands have been made upon Germany since the signature of the Young Plan:

1. By the terms of The Hague Protocol, Germany is to renounce the 5 months' surplus of 400 million Reichmarks resulting from the fact that the Dawes payments were to continue until the end of August 1929, whereas the Young Plan was to begin on April 1, 1929.

2. By the terms at The Hague Protocol, Germany is to make an

increase in the unconditional annuity, in the very first years of the Young Plan when relief is of decisive importance for the success of the whole, which amounts in the first year to 40·5 million Reichmarks and then declines until the twentieth annuity and only thereafter becomes gradually balanced off.

3. According to the declaration of the British Finance Minister, Germany is to renounce about 300 million Reichmarks representing proceeds of liquidated German property.

4. By the terms of the draft treaty between Germany and Poland, Germany is to give up extraordinarily large property claims against Poland—a measure which must necessarily entail the full indemnification by the German Government of German individuals whose property has been confiscated.

5. According to the proposals of the Paris sub-committee on the liquidation of the past, Germany is to renounce a whole series of financial rights, the scope of which is still difficult to judge, but which are in any case of very considerable value.

6. The above list does not include the charges averaging 19·5 million Reichmarks annually under the Germano-Belgian mark agreement, which have been imposed upon Germany for thirty-seven years.

It is impossible as yet to foresee whether still further renunciations or obligations to pay will not be asked of us, for example, in connexion with the Saar settlement. The above-mentioned obligations, which taken together run into milliards, have been assumed without any compensation worth mentioning which has not been granted us already under the Young Plan.

III

The question immediately arises whether under the Young Plan there is any obligation whatsoever upon us to assume such payments and to make such renunciations. The only clauses of the Young Plan which can be concerned are found in Part 9 entitled 'Liquidation of the Past' (paragraphs 141–7). Paragraphs 145 and 146 are of no importance to our present discussion. Paragraph 144 relates to the liquidations of German property after the acceptance of the Young Plan.

Paragraph 141 recommends generally the clearing up of the past 'in a broad spirit of mutual concession'. This introductory sentence, which relates to the whole chapter on the liquidation of the past, very plainly says that any German concession must be balanced by a concession from the other side.

Paragraph 142 recommends the earliest possible closing of the accounts between the Reparation Commission and Germany relating to transactions prior to the period of the Dawes Plan 'on these lines', that is, again in the spirit of mutual concessions. From the fact that the closing of accounts is expressly restricted to transactions prior to the period of the Dawes Plan, it appears that Germany has a right to all property claims not credited on reparation account up to that time, since with the Dawes agreement the all inclusive amounts clause entered into effect. This relates particularly to the German property liquidated in England, the value of which has not yet been credited in reparation account.

Paragraph 147 supplements paragraph 142 by references to the States which are described as Succession States. Here it is recommended to the creditor Governments that they should find a final settlement for the claims against and the debts of the Succession States for ceded State properties and liberation bonds held in the hands of the Reparation Commission within one year after the putting into operation of the new Plan (that is, not before). Paragraphs 142 and 147 taken together show that in this settlement which the creditor Governments have to make, all credits, in so far as they relate to former German State property, belong to Germany. This question is of importance particularly in respect of former German State property in Poland. And therefore Germany will have something to say in this settlement.

Paragraph 143 expresses the one-sided expectation of the creditor Experts that Germany would waive claims arising out of past transactions. Since the German Experts in Paris emphatically opposed this expectation, paragraph 143 closes with the statement that the committee as a whole recognizes that the settlement of this question shall be left entirely to the Governments. This phraseology clearly shows that the German experts, who did not even think the figures of the Young Plan were practicable, were all the less willing to concede renunciations of German claims which would have made the practicability of the Young figures still more doubtful. If, in spite of this, the German Government should now renounce such claims, it would go beyond the clearly expressed intention of the German experts and assume a responsibility which these experts have expressly rejected. This responsibility would be all the heavier because the arguments of the German experts against the feasibility of the Young figures are simply being disregarded by undertakings on the part of the German Government to assume further burdens.

From the foregoing it is clear that there is not the slightest justi-

fication in the Young Plan for conceding the renunciations and payments listed under Section II above without counter-concessions of equal value.

IV

Aside from these assumptions in regard to foreign policy, a further indispensable premise of the German experts in Paris was the determination of the Reich Government to establish permanent order in the financial affairs of the Reich, the States and the Communes, and to make possible the carrying of the heavy burdens of the Young Plan through measures of internal policy to aid German production. Since the signature of the Young Plan not the slightest thing has been done in either of these respects. In spite of pressure, the Financial Administration of the Reich has declared again and again that it could not proceed to establish budgetary order and to lighten the burdens of the German economy until the Young Plan was accepted and the reduction of the annual reparation payments actually made.

This attitude may be comprehensible so far as the lightening of the burdens of the German economy is concerned. The German economy, suffering under the present pressure of its burdens, might be consoled with the statement that the acceptance of the Young Plan would bring it the necessary relief. But to this end a financial policy is necessary which clearly reveals that the reduction of payments under the Young Plan will be really available for lightening the pressure upon the German economy and not required for other purposes.

But in any event, quite apart from this promised lightening of burdens, an immediate beginning should have been made with the establishment of order in the budget and the finances. This, too, has not been done. The material equilibrium of the budget has not been restored; no steps for the organic removal of the present deficit have been taken; new deficits of constantly increasing amounts and new demands for expenditure are cropping up, although they cannot be covered substantially except by further taxes, that is, by increased burdens. Even now it may be foreseen with certainty that the savings under the Young Plan will not only not lead to a reduction in burdens, but will not even suffice to cover the deficits which it is already clear will be incurred. It is particularly threatening that the constantly rising deficits have led to a constantly rising short-term indebtedness of the public corporations, for the consolidation of which considerable time will be required.

The urgently necessary lightening of the burdens upon economic life is possible only if the expenditures of the Reich, the States and the

Communes are reduced. One such reduction in expenditure would have been the saving effected by the Young Plan if the use of this saving for other purposes had been avoided. But now the saving under the Young Plan has long since been disposed of, and the German economy faces not a reduction, but an increase of burdens.

V

Therefore the situation in which I find myself as one of the German signatories of the Young Plan is the following:

In good faith and with good will I helped to draw up the agreement of the Young Plan; while I did not assume any share of the responsibility for its entire practicability, I and all the others concerned in the drafting of the Plan considered it the only possibility of settling the reparations question and restoring peace to the world through mutual collaboration. This Plan is not a mere literary document; it is inspired by the full moral gravity and sense of responsibility of its authors not only towards their own nations, but towards the whole civilized world. It must be insisted that the Governments do not now endanger this work of peace by introducing selfish interests. For my part, I must decline most emphatically to be made responsible for the putting in force of the Young Plan if its intentions and assumptions are disregarded, as they seem to be disregarded judging by the present measures and demands.

The German people must insist that the foreign Governments finally abandon their attempts to extort from the German economy special payments and special renunciations in excess of the Young Plan. These Governments must know that by following such a false policy they are taking upon themselves the responsibility for a situation in which the Young Plan has to reckon with serious disturbances from the very start and in which the mobilization of the annuities is endangered.

But it must be demanded of the German Government that it undertake to grant no additional payments whatever. It must be further demanded, that before the Young Plan is finally accepted by the German Government, the budgets of the Reich, the States and the Communes be put in order and the burdens imposed upon the German people be reduced to a level commensurate with the productivity of the German economy.

The present disordered state of finances and the constant threat of the floating debt are putting German freedom of action on the Young Plan under a pressure which is intolerable if the conclusion is to be a favourable one.

Those who, like myself, believe that the Young Plan is a final instrument of peace, a plan which presupposes international collaboration and the welfare of the German economy and which cannot be executed without these two assumptions, must insist that everything be done to fulfil these assumptions.

I have fought the agitation against the Young Plan with all possible vigour; I consider the plebiscite undertaken in the interest of this agitation to be a grave mistake, because it undermines a far-sighted and energetic defence of our interests. But just because I am in favour of the acceptance of the Young Plan I do not wish to have any part in its falsification. It would be a self-deception of the world for it to believe that, in addition to the Young payments, we could pay an indefinite number of further millions or milliards or renounce property rights. It would be a self-deception of our own nation for us to believe that with the present burdens upon economic life, or with burdens which may possibly increase, the Young payments can be made, and possibly additional sums.

I will and shall not contribute to the creation of any such illusion.

4. TEXT OF SPEECH BY DR. MÜLLER, CHANCELLOR OF THE
REICH, IN THE REICHSTAG, DECEMBER 12, 1929 ¹

If, in what I have to say, I must deal repeatedly with the ideas advanced publicly by Dr. Schacht, I will, of course, in all loyalty take into account the fact that Dr. Schacht is not present at our discussions here to-day. I can, however, express my views on the questions which will come up for discussion the more openly as they deal with matters which have been discussed repeatedly with the President of the Reichsbank, and, as it happens, also on the days immediately preceding the publication of his memorandum. Although I shall be obliged to deal critically with the statements of President Schacht, that by no means implies any belittlement of the great merits acquired by the first German expert at the Experts' Conference in Paris. On the other hand I must repeat what the Government of the Reich has already stated in its official declaration of the 6th instant, namely, that it regards with astonishment the publication of the President of the Reichsbank. In this official declaration the Government of the Reich refused to enter into explanations concerning the memorandum, but stated at the same time that it intended to take it up before the Reichstag, the only body to which it is responsible.

¹ *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 13, 1929. Translation prepared for the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

When I now consider the questions of reparation policy dealt with in the Schacht memorandum I must first of all call attention to the fact that the Government of the Reich has recently expressed its views confidentially in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag in respect of reparations policy; for reasons which, in view of the preparations for the final Hague Conference must still be respected to-day, I must endeavour to impose a certain reserve upon myself in discussing a number of separate points. That will, however, only be the case in so far as the interests of the country make it urgently necessary. First, a general remark: Dr. Schacht's memorandum deals with points which have already claimed the attention of our experts during the Paris negotiations, on which occasion they themselves did not, however, succeed in reaching the result which would have been most favourable to the German cause and which they would have desired. As regards a number of these points it was not even possible to put forward the German arguments against the elaborately presented opinions of the other side. The Government of the Reich at the time deplored this fact just as much as the German experts, but did not use it as grounds for blaming the German experts, as they had certainly done their utmost to obtain a more favourable settlement.

In respect of reparations policy blame must be attributed particularly to two quarters. It is asserted that the Government of the Reich at the first Hague Conference and during the ensuing period abandoned privileges which according to the Young Plan were due to us and made concessions beyond the limits of the Young Plan. On a number of points the report of the experts left the decision to the Governments. The reason for this was that the experts had not succeeded in getting the German thesis accepted in regard to those points. The formulation of these points is partly ambiguous, and partly contains decisions clearly unfavourable to Germany.

In the matter of these points it was just as impossible to get the German point of view regarding them accepted at The Hague and later on, as it had been impossible to get it accepted at the Paris Conference. The Government of the Reich regrets that it is so, and I am the last to deny that during the negotiations of recent months the other side has not shown us all the kindness and understanding of our difficult position which we might have expected. You will remember the hard struggle which Dr. Stresemann and his colleagues of the Cabinet were obliged to carry on at The Hague.

What are now the alleged impairments of the Plan drawn up by the experts?

At the Hague Conference Germany is said to have given up a surplus amounting to four hundred million Reichsmarks; to have increased the unprotected annuities; and to have accepted, by the conclusion of the Germano-Belgian mark agreement, an increased charge of 19·5 millions.

As regards the surplus of four hundred million Reichsmarks derived from the fact that the term of payment of the Young Plan started on April 1 this year, while the Dawes payments were scheduled to continue to the end of August 1929, numbers 83 and 84 of the Young Plan and number 192 of the annexes provide that this surplus—I now cite textually—‘shall be regarded as necessary to meet the needs of the creditor countries during this period of transition’. ‘And’, says further number 84, ‘if after meeting these needs there remains a surplus the question of its application shall be settled by the Governments.’ According to the text of the Young Plan Germany, therefore, cannot just simply claim this surplus for herself.

The Government of the Reich shares the fate of the experts who did not succeed in obtaining a more favourable settlement for Germany in the question of the surplus.

This was the unavoidable result of the extra claims raised by England at The Hague, in order to meet which, sacrifices had also to be made by a number of creditor Governments. Failing that solution, the danger of wrecking the Hague Conference was self-evident, as everybody will still remember.

As to the assertion that the relief Germany will experience will be diminished during the first year through the increase in the unprotected part of the annuities, it must be stated that the yearly charge, in reality, remains exactly the same. Only in case of a transfer moratorium would the amount to be transferred be increased by a comparatively small sum. In a case like that it is of no decisive importance whether 660 or 700 millions must be transferred annually, for the question then is: the transfer or non-transfer of the much larger amount of the total payment.

Concerning the Germano-Belgian marks question, Germany has already been negotiating, with several interruptions, since 1919. All these discussions having ended without a result, the German Government promised the Belgian Government at Geneva in September 1928 to take up negotiations about this question parallel with the experts’ negotiations. The obligation to do this had, therefore, been undertaken before the experts’ conference started. In Annex 6 of the Young Plan all the experts, including the Germans, expressed the

opinion that the signing of the report by Belgium could, in all fairness, be expected only if agreement about the settlement of the marks question were reached. In conformity therewith the Belgian Government made its acceptance of the Young Plan dependent on this.¹

It is, therefore, hardly correct to speak of extra charges beyond the Young Plan.

Among the new unreasonable demands with which Germany is alleged to have complied after the Hague Conference, the claims of the Polish State are particularly mentioned, as well as eventual payments that may result from a later agreement between Germany and France about the Saar question. The Germano-Polish agreement is based on the recommendations of Chapter 9 of the Young Plan and forms at the same time the continuation of preceding negotiations with the Polish Government concerning liquidation and financial settlement.² By the agreement a number of financial claims are abandoned, both by Germany and Poland. It is right that one of the consequences of this renunciation will be domestic indemnification of German creditors. But the German Government has made these concessions to Poland only against valuable compensations. Poland abandons the right to claim further liquidation and to the repurchase of revenue estates which it had claimed. While Germany, therefore, in regard to the purely financial part of the settlement has undertaken certain obligations, they will be offset by important concessions made by Poland on other points. The Saar question, concerning which a Germano-French agreement is being sought at present, must be judged separately. Discussions on this point are not based on the Young Plan, but spring from the desire for a total liquidation of all pending political questions. As to the result of the discussions nothing can be said as yet.

I now turn to the questions of internal policy (in so far as they are of a financial nature), which are very closely connected with the international discussions on reparations policy.

The complete financial programme of the Government of the Reich, the main lines of which I submit to the Reichstag to-day, comprises measures for putting German finances on a sound basis and for alleviation of the situation of the Treasury, and, in particular, also measures for increase of the unemployment insurance and for a comprehensive tax reform. The drawing up of such a programme has been demanded very impatiently from many quarters. But what I said at the begin-

¹ For text of Belgo-German Marks Agreement, see above, p. 56.

² For text of the Agreement with Poland, see below, p. 153.

ning concerning the budget plan for 1930 also applies to this financial programme: when I submit to you to-day only the main lines, and not the draft-bills (more than a dozen of them) of which this reform work will consist, the reason is that the Government needs to keep, until the negotiations concerning the Young Plan have been terminated, the necessary capacity for negotiating and the requisite quorum. For one of the conditions of the acceptance of the Young Plan, to which the President of the Reichsbank also referred in his memorandum, is precisely that the joint recommendations and provisions contained in the Plan be accepted integrally and be observed by all participating Powers.

This imposes upon the Government of the Reich, until the above-mentioned aim has been attained, the duty of letting considerations of foreign policy precede reasons of interior policy, among which the Government also considers the immediate discussion of the draft-bills eminently desirable.

The Government of the Reich is entirely aware of its responsibility in making this declaration and maintains it in spite of all misinterpretations.

In his memorandum the President of the Reichsbank has emphasized strongly, and—as I must point out—in complete accordance with the Government of the Reich, the fact that one of the conditions for the acceptance of the Young Plan is the organization of Germany's financial and economic policy in such a way as to let German economic life share in the alleviations brought about by the Young Plan. The Government of the Reich's reform programme of measures for putting the finances of the Reich on a sound basis included, therefore, two important tasks: the creation of a real balance of the Reich's budget, and not only a balance on paper, both as regards the current fiscal year 1929 and the coming 1930 budget as well as future budgets; and further, the cleaning up of the uncovered extraordinary budget, with a view to improving the situation of the Reich Treasury. Before I deal with details, just one word about the 1929 budget. For the fiscal year 1929, after the Reichstag had undertaken modifications of the budget plan originally submitted by the Government of the Reich with proper proposals for cover, a real balance was not reached; revenue estimates were too high, expenditure estimates too low. The current fiscal year will therefore, in spite of all sharp cutting down of expenditure, close with a deficit more than twice that of the deficit for the fiscal year 1928, which amounted to about 150 millions. But now when the Young Plan has been accepted, the budget alleviation which will take effect with retro-

active force in regard to the fiscal year 1929, will just suffice to cover the deficits of 1928 and 1929.

Thus the way will be cleared for 1930—on condition, of course, that the Young Plan is accepted. But the erroneous estimates in the revenue and expenditure columns of the budget plan for 1929 will have their effect on the 1930 budget.

It will, therefore, be necessary to apply a considerable part of the money made available by the Young Plan for balancing the 1930 budget too. For no matter how justified and loud are the claims for economic relief and for cutting down tax burdens of the poorer classes, they will serve no useful purpose as long as the highest aim of financial reform, i.e. balancing the budget, has not been completely secured. Thus, in 1930, it will be necessary to put in higher amounts for the meritorious unemployment relief, to increase the emergency subventions so that the amounts spent really be covered, to bring the agricultural emergency programme up to the standard which was formerly envisaged, to suspend expenditure on a frontier programme in the West and in the East, and suspend the settlement with the (German) countries (Ländern) about their claims against the Reich based on the taking over of railways, water-ways, posts, &c., and also to work for the final budgetary balance by suspending a number of other expenditures. In drawing up the budget for 1930 the Government of the Reich has taken into consideration that higher expenditure estimates should be offset, as far as possible, by cutting down other expenses. But expenditure cannot be reduced automatically; only in so far as it fits in with the economic, cultural, and social tasks of the State. A really considerable and lasting reduction of expenditure will, on the whole, only be possible through a more practical administrative organization. The Government of the Reich entertains the confident hope that the tax reform planned will also mean a considerable relief, perceptible already, in the tax offices of the Reich, the States and the communes, and though the full effect will not be felt in 1930, there will be further considerable reduction of expenditure in the future. After carefully drafting the Reich's budget for 1930, in accordance with the fundamental ideas just explained, there will still be 350 millions available from the Young Plan for relief for all branches of economic life in the fiscal year 1930.

But in order to be able to effect the relief to the extent which is necessary for the alleviation of Germany's economic life, the Government of the Reich believes that a further amount of about 400 millions over and above these 350 millions will be needed. This sum

should be obtained by raising two taxes, namely, the beer tax by 180 millions, and the tobacco tax by 220 millions.

Judging superficially it might seem peculiar that, on the one hand, the Government of the Reich proposes to Parliament to reduce taxes and, on the other, to increase them. And, of course, there is no doubt that it will be taken very much amiss that two taxes which will weigh on the consumers have been selected for this purpose. The Government of the Reich has by no means overlooked these arguments. While, nevertheless, it has not found other measures to propose, weighty reasons exist for it. When the German tax system has then to undergo some reorganization on the occasion of the acceptance of the Young Plan we cannot pass over beer and tobacco which, in comparison with other tax sources, have admittedly remained very far behind in past years. A comparison with the taxation abroad further shows that practically nowhere are beer and tobacco as lightly taxed as in Germany. By adding the revenue derived from these two new taxes 750 millions will be available for economic relief measures. What reductions the Government of the Reich proposes to make for this purpose is stated in the financial programme of the Government already published in detail on the 9th instant. The Government of the Reich has adopted the policy of supplying Germany's ailing economic life with the requisite new and strong stimuli.

The above reforms are all calculated to stimulate the necessary building up of new capital.

In respect of income-tax, the majority of incomes will be exempt from taxation, the reductions in cases of children will be increased, and the percentage scale applied will be partly reduced and partly rearranged. Thus the tax-payer of small means will benefit by the reform in regard to income-tax. As to property tax, all capital up to twenty thousand marks will be exempt from taxation. The sugar tax, which even the poorest of the poor cannot avoid, will be completely abolished.

It is indisputable that the regular taxes in States and communes are charges felt more or less heavily. It is, therefore, planned to reduce the trade licences by 20 per cent. and land taxes by 10 per cent. This will be followed by further reductions after the entry into force of the tax-unification law. It is intended to abolish the promoters' tax by gradual reduction in the course of some years. The Rentenbank interest will likewise be abolished, a claim which has been raised by agriculturalists long ago.

If we reckon finally with a reduction of taxes on buying and selling of capital, i. e. company taxes, and bond taxes by half, and stock-

exchange turn-over tax by a third, I have presented to you, Ladies and Gentlemen, the main lines of a reduction programme for 1930 amounting to exactly 915 millions.

Of this reduction programme the Reich will bear the charges of the Rentenbank interest in the amount of 85 millions, and a portion of the industrial tax reduction amounting to 80 millions, the total of the effective tax reduction being 750 millions, as I mentioned above.

That a financial reform like this will necessitate modification of large parts of the Law on Financial Balance is self-evident. Details in this respect will be submitted to you by the Minister of Finance, particularly as regards the intended inclusion of the beer tax in the taxes for transfer, which will especially affect Bavaria as the country with the largest beer output, and, moreover, as regards the taking over by the Reich of tax-shortages on the part of the States and communes, as well as other matters.

Two points, however, still need special mention: (1) According to the unanimous opinion of the Government of the Reich, an urgent necessity of this reform is the introduction of a movable factor into the tax systems of the communes, whereby citizens of a commune are made to participate in the expenditure of the commune on social necessities. The introduction of a movable factor of this nature will increase the satisfaction of communes in shouldering responsibility when expenditure is decided on, and will further the idea of self-administration. It is well known that a number of proposals exist in respect of such a movable factor. You will also be aware that some of those proposals have been sharply opposed by a part of Parliament and equally strongly supported by another part, and vice versa. What form this movable factor will take is, therefore, yet to be most carefully examined by this House, according as precise draft bills are submitted to it. But the Government of the Reich considers it important to lay down, at once, the principle which has been unanimously acknowledged as correct, namely that such a movable factor must be created. The financial position of many communes is also serious. This is known in the leading political circles of the communes and is proved by the action already taken by the presidency of the German and Prussian Cities' Conference for turning pressing short-term debts into long-term loans.

The second point to which I still want to refer (with the remark that supplementary explanations will be furnished by the Reich Minister for Finance) is the question of putting the unemployment insurance on a sound and permanent basis. The new bill

passed a few months ago by the Reichstag in respect of employment-exchanges and unemployment insurance has not sufficed to cover even the greater part of the yearly deficit of the Reich's Institute. The reforms effected by this new law will result in an estimated saving of about 100 millions per year. Against this amount stands, however, a further annual deficit of about 180 millions. As it is not possible, in view of the hardships of the unemployed, to change this law fundamentally and thus save more, the Reich's Government has resolved, in connexion with the financial reform programme, to consent to increase the amount by $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The Government of the Reich has been unanimous in believing it could do so within the scope of the total reform programme submitted. As, moreover, the development of the employment market in the coming year cannot yet be foreseen, the new arrangement is to be valid only until March 31, 1931.

So much for the fundamental financial reform which, after the acceptance of the Young Plan, will be the basis on which the 1930 budget and later budgets will be built up. But this clearing of the ground for the future does not yet end the cares of the Government of the Reich. This brings me to the last, but also to the most important, part of my report to-day, namely, the question of overcoming the difficulties presented by lack of ready money.

I am naturally quite aware of the scruples against a candid discussion of this point at the present moment, standing as we do in the eye of the world. In spite of that, it seems to me that only complete candour about it will help us over the present difficult situation. Let me first of all cite some figures to you. We have at the moment an uncovered extraordinary budget of 800 millions. Added to that are the usual requirements at the end of each month, including loans and advances to the amount of 450 millions. Add to that the deficit of the fiscal year 1928, of 150 millions, and a probable deficit for 1929 of 300 millions and you arrive by December 31 at a cash deficit of 1,700 millions.

In the fourth quarter of the current budget year, that is, in the three months following the end of December, this will probably be increased by further credits of 150 millions for unemployment insurance. Leaving aside, for the moment, the 150 millions mentioned above, the need of 1,700 millions by the end of December is met by cover in the amount of 1,370 millions. These 1,370 millions are composed of 400 millions of Reich's treasury bills, 100 millions representing earnings by the Reichsbank, a foreign loan of 210 millions, loans of the Reichs-Railway and the Reichs-Post amounting to

225 millions, bills on banks: 205 millions, short-term bills by the Agent-General in the amount of 130 millions and miscellaneous credits altogether 100 millions. On the basis of this it is seen that the Reichs-Treasury needs a credit of 330 millions in order to meet its obligations on December 31. There can be no doubt, and I say it quite openly, that it is quite impossible for the German Reich to drag along on a treasury deficit like that from month to month. The present treasury situation will improve somewhat as soon as the 1928 and 1929 deficits which I have mentioned have been covered through the retroactive budget for 1928, and when other measures for wiping out the treasury deficit have been effected. Without in any way wishing to excuse the present state of affairs I must, in the interests of justice, refer to the fact that the present Government of the Reich took over a heavy treasury deficit. The Treasury deficit is in the first place due to the fact that during recent years it has not been possible to take over the extraordinary budgets on the loans granted by the budget, and that the ordinary budgets for recent years have also closed with deficits. The Government of the Reich has no intention of making any accusations in regard to measures taken in the past. But it endeavours honestly for the sake of the future to make clear as energetically as possible all the consequences of the present state of affairs. In this connexion I may mention that of the total deficit of 1,700 millions, about 500 millions will be offset by the Kreuger loan in connexion with the match monopoly, which, therefore, plays an essential part in the financial programme of the Government of the Reich. Among the reform laws of the Government of the Reich is, moreover, a bill which provides for gradual covering of the still remaining uncovered part of the extraordinary budget, through amortization instalments from the ordinary budget. Not only is this amortization to apply to extraordinary budgets which have either already been expended or not yet covered, but to all extraordinary expenditure required during the next year in order to realize the settlement, and to the canal programmes which have been inaugurated. By this law a long-term system governing the total of extraordinary expenditure will be fixed, and the necessity of availing ourselves of the capital market of the Reich will, moreover, be abolished for a number of years. It is further provided that a special law will regulate the scope, the time-limit and the manner of payment of all new, extraordinary expenditure.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I beg you to note from the foregoing remarks that the Government of the Reich will not just be satisfied with words, but has an honest and energetic desire to bring order

into the budget of the Reich, and not least in regard to the extraordinary budget and the Treasury requirements. But, in any case, the relief obtained by the measures we have in view, and the permanent safeguarding of the Treasury situation, will only be effected gradually. For a short transition period it will, therefore, still be necessary to find credits which will form a bridge between the present and the time when the relief measures have taken effect. In regard to this transition period the Government of the Reich has considered, within its programme of financial reform, two more special measures which are indispensable:

In view of the fact that one of the not inconsiderable reasons for the difficulties in regard to the treasury situation was the need last winter of paying very considerable contributions to the unemployment insurance, which increased the extraordinary budget, the Government of the Reich has unanimously resolved that the increase mentioned above of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to the unemployment insurance must enter into force immediately, that is, on January 1, 1930.

The Government of the Reich must, therefore, urgently beg the House to see that this bill, which is an indispensable feature of the total reform, really enters into force on January 1, 1930. For, taking into account the present situation of the treasury, it would not be justifiable to debit the treasury with the entire amount of the deficit which will result from the unemployment insurance, which already now exceeds the credits granted in the Reich's budget.

The second measure which the Government of the Reich considers absolutely indispensable, and which must enter into force on the same date, is the new law concerning the tobacco tax, which must be estimated at 220 millions per year. The monthly profit derived therefrom by the Treasury is not excessively high in comparison with the total requirements. But the Government of the Reich, nevertheless, attaches importance to this very measure which, by increasing a tax that will be far from popular, is calculated to show the public that the Government is serious in its endeavour to use the utmost possible energy to wipe out the treasury deficit.

Through these two measures of the so-called 'Immediate programme'—that is to say, an increase of the contribution to unemployment insurance and an increase of the tobacco tax—140 millions plus 220 millions (360 millions per year) will flow into the treasury. The Government of the Reich confidently hopes to succeed in raising, by this means, the necessary amount of the above-mentioned 330 millions for the requirements of December 31, 1929, in

the course of the next few days by way of special loan measures, details of which, for reasons which will be appreciated, I cannot for the moment disclose.

If this hope is realized I can express to the entire nation, in the name of the Government of the Reich, the confident expectation that the worst strain on the Reichs-Treasury will be overcome.

Relieving the Treasury situation is still more important than effecting the tax-reduction provided for. It is true that the latter too is urgently necessary in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, but it must be a question of the near future, while correcting the Treasury deficit is the decisive and burning question of the moment. Overcoming the Treasury deficit is also of importance to the country's economic interests. The situation on the money market is very unfavourably influenced by having to absorb State loans. The immediate measures which I have mentioned should serve to settle that also, but they alone are clearly not sufficient, and must, therefore, be regarded only as a part of the total programme presented.

It is for you, Ladies and Gentlemen, to support the Government of the Reich in carrying out the necessary measures. I have quite openly shown you the difficulties of our present financial situation, and I have on the other hand informed you of the carefully thought-out measures which the Government of the Reich have in view to overcome it. In the name of the Government of the Reich I therefore hereby ask the House to give its whole-hearted support to the main lines of the Government programme.

You are aware that the final conference will meet in the beginning of January at The Hague. If the Government of the Reich does not receive a clear vote of confidence from the Reichstag, there will arise serious doubt as to the meeting of the final conference of The Hague, unless the Government of the Reich is reconstructed extremely quickly. If it is not possible to overcome the difficulties of December 31 in December, it will involve a severe shock to the finances of the Reich which cannot but have a strong repercussion on private business, and cause suffering in all classes of the population. Crisis phenomena of this kind will endanger the continuation of our social policy and the cultural boons which the German nation has fought to obtain. I will not mention the further consequences and repercussions it might have on the reconstruction of our Fatherland, which we have begun with such infinite pains.

The hour is grave: it demands swift decisions. Although the details of the financial programme will, of course, be discussed when

the draft bills in question have been submitted, nevertheless the Government must demand that the majority of the Reichstag adhere to the basic principles of the financial programme.

IV. GREAT BRITAIN

12. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M.P., AT GUILDHALL, NOVEMBER 9, 1929¹

For some years British Governments have been engaged in overcoming the memories and the inheritances of war. In 1924 it was as it has been in 1929—when a Labour Government came into office it was called on to consider propositions for a substantial step in the final solution of Reparations. That was why, before we were well in office, the Chancellor of the Exchequer—not only a colleague of mine but a very old friend of mine—the Foreign Secretary, and the President of the Board of Trade went to The Hague. For the part which the Chancellor played, as you, my Lord Mayor, have just reminded this assembly, the City Corporation has already decided to honour him and thus voice the gratitude and admiration of the country for the services which he rendered to it at The Hague. Our nation during the War and since the War has abundantly proved its disinterested desire to help Europe on to its feet, to share with almost unbounded generosity the burdens of Europe, and to fulfil honourably and fully every obligation. We ask for no special favour. We are not weary of being helpful to the other nations but, supported by the whole nation, the Chancellor asked for equality of treatment.

Our troops are marching, marching home. Two-thirds have already come back, and they will all be back by December 15. The size of the French force has made it impossible for it to be moved with the same expedition, but when we have gone our French friends will have completely evacuated the Second Zone, and the Third Zone, if all goes well, will be free by the middle of next year. Thus one of the final chapters of the War record of 1914–18 will be closed. The prospect in front of us to-night is the prospect of established peace. There was another thing done at The Hague. The system of Reparations, especially in the way it has been devised and worked, was a serious handicap to certain portions of our foreign trade. It was unfair. Great Britain is prepared to bear burdens, heavy burdens, but not unfair ones. The President of the Board of Trade, after having put up, in that quiet Scots way of his, a magnifi-

¹ *The Times*, November 10, 1929.

cent fight, was able in the end to make arrangements which will restore, to a very considerable measure, at any rate, fair play to certain sections of British trade that have been hardly dealt with by the working of Reparations.

Alas! no one who served at The Hague, and who contemplates the future, can do so without being conscious of a shadow lying over its termination, for at the end of his work at The Hague Dr. Stresemann's public life came to an end. For some time he carried on a valiant struggle between a body weakening with disease and a spirit strengthened by devotion to his public duty. He cared for his country, he gave himself for it, he restored it, not only financially, not only politically—he restored it to the respect of the other nations of Europe. If he devoted himself to his country first and foremost, he nevertheless was also of great service to European pacification. His life once more enforces the truth that cannot be enforced too much, especially on our young men who are entering on politics—that service to the best of our national interests is service in fact given to the interests of the whole comity of civilized nations.

Happily, when we lay a wreath on the resting-place of the dead we may turn with a smile to the living. At The Hague my friend the Chancellor may have perturbed some of our French Allies, but before he finished they discovered the inner man and they appreciated the essential fairness of our position. If that is so, it was owing to the genius for understanding other people and to the passion for peace which has guided the policy of one whose name will be for ever associated with the healing of Europe—I refer to the French Prime Minister, M. Briand. Those of us who have for a space of time, the length of which is unknown to us and unknown to you, to carry on the foreign affairs of this country, ought to congratulate ourselves most heartily that in the coming negotiations, which we are now preparing for and looking forward to with hope, M. Briand is to be the custodian of French interests and a colleague with ourselves in pursuing a policy of international peace.

The field for that co-operation and good will will be shown and developed at the League of Nations. The League of Nations grows in moral courage. Its frown will soon be more dreaded than a nation's arms, and when that happens you and I shall have security and peace. The meeting of the Assembly of the League this year was marked by unity in the aim of the nations, and great steps were taken in peacemaking. We are still laying those foundations. If it ever becomes the privilege of any of you to attend a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations—the most wonderful meeting that assembles

from the rising of the sun to the setting of the sun—you will see it is a meeting which in its character and composition is almost the fulfilment of the prophecy that men will in time, and in the fullness of the wisdom which you, my Lord Mayor, have asked for us, beat their swords into pruning hooks and know neither the language nor the uses of war any more. Our contributions to the League and to peace were mainly the signing of the Optional Clause, and I am happy and proud to say that the signing was accompanied by the signature of the representatives of every one of our British Dominions. At the present moment there are only thirteen nations affiliated to the League of Nations who have not signed that Clause, and when that clause is signed and arbitration is established as the method of settlement of international disputes, then surely all those who have been looking for peace and praying for peace may turn and say that a chapter—nay, not only a chapter, but a great volume—recording the evolution of civilization has been closed and a new and better and more promising one has at last been opened.

In this connexion every one of us who are working in the front trenches of the peace army are always impressed by how the great public outside, instead of fearing war, fear peace. Such questions, for instance, as the freedom of the seas are raised, and at once the old feeling, the old habit of mind, the old point of view, is awakened, and back public opinion breaks to its old position. The thing we have got to do, the work that His Majesty's Government will strive with might and main to do, is to get the people to see in proper proportions and relations the meaning and the content of these problems. Put the problems before lawyers to define clauses that are watertight and you are putting before them a problem that is absolutely impossible; put it before those admirable men who can use their skill and knowledge—the expert and responsible leaders of our military departments—and they cannot solve it for you. But when you remember that the problems of the freedom of the seas, either naval or military, could only arise if the bugles have been blown, surely every man and woman of common sense sees that the swiftest and surest method of solving these problems is to see that the bugles of war are never to be blown again. That is the great work that His Majesty's Government are trying to perform. It may be convenient and pacifying, my Lord Mayor, if I assure you that a certain statement that appeared to-day that this most important question was to be raised at the Five-Power Conference has no basis of foundation whatever. No such question has been raised by any Government so far as I know—and I think I know what has been done. No such question has been raised in connexion with

the Five-Power Conference, and I venture to say it will not be raised at all.

I pass from that to record another piece of work that His Majesty's Government has done. As I understand it, it is a great tradition of this banquet that the Prime Minister, when he speaks, has to give as briefly as possible an account of his stewardship up to the time when he is addressing the assembly. The problems of relations with Russia have been exercising the thoughts of Government after Government, and I venture to say, although I never like to speak for political opponents, that no Government has been quite happy with regard to what has been done in that respect hitherto. His Majesty's Government's view has been this. Russia exists; Russia is active. If there is any blame to be put on any one for that, the blame lies not with any Government, but with the Creator Himself. It is self-delusion, when grappling with European problems, to assume that there is no Russia. That will lead us nowhere. By that just grievances cannot be settled and obligations cannot be enforced. The Government are acting, fully realizing the pitfalls and disappointments they may meet on the way, but they are convinced, after very thorough examination and with a very close knowledge of the elements of the situation, that their method promises the best results. We want to get Russia to help in the efforts to comprehend Europe in a unity of peace. We want to stop propaganda, which it is illegitimate that one country should countenance against another. We want a recognition of those problems which are of the essence of civilized relationships, including agreements regarding the payment of debts. We want a treaty of trade and commerce. We want markets. So the House of Commons has authorized recognition. On the other hand, we really would remind many good and excellent people that to recognize a Government diplomatically does not mean that we share its political and social and religious opinions, or that we are prepared to and must defend its administrative actions.

I cannot omit from a survey like this all mention of India—perhaps the most important issue before the Empire to-day. There has been enough of discussions and disputations in speech and writing in the last few days, and I feel that the path of wisdom is to say not a word to-night which would revive the embers of controversy. Let me just say this. His Majesty's Government have the fullest confidence in the Viceroy of India. The sole purpose underlying the actions of the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government which have evoked all this discussion was in no way to alter our existing policy, nor to anticipate the findings of the Commission, but to revive and foster that spirit

of trust, co-operation, and mutual understanding which is the essential condition to the attainment of the acknowledged goal. I hope and believe that this purpose is being fulfilled.

It is usual on this occasion to glance at Europe in a general way. The greatest thing that we see is the recovery from the past. We rejoice in the prosperity of France. We congratulate Italy on ending an old and troublesome disagreement with the Vatican which prevented the fullest consummation of Italian unity. We are happy that the States of the Central and Eastern South seem to be overcoming their great difficulties in establishing tranquillity, and in meeting the terrible problems inherent in their history. Wherever his Excellency the Spanish Ambassador, the *doyen* of our Diplomatic Corps, the master of felicitous speech, is, we cannot forget his country, which has shown in the two wonderful exhibitions recently held at Barcelona and Seville such splendid energy, enterprise, and progress.

Casting our eyes along these tables, we cross wide seas, and are reminded of those flourishing Latin nations of the American Continent, with whom our friendship is traditional and unshaken. We hope that the mission headed by Lord D'Abernon will bear abundant fruit, and we can assure them that we shall be responsible for no unnecessary delay in consummating their work.

Turning our eyes to the rising sun, they fall upon his Excellency the Japanese Ambassador. Our friendly relations with his country have been long enduring and will endure. He and we will be part and parcel of the great Conference, and I feel perfectly sure that the co-operation which has characterized our two nations in the past will be maintained when that occasion arises.

I regret the absence of the American Ambassador, for he has shared—I am not quite sure about taking the larger part in—what transactions have been conducted between his Government and the British Government during the past few months. I have nothing to add to what has been published—every newspaper has had so much of it. The Ambassador and I have been trying to remove difficulties that prevented not only agreement between America and ourselves but agreement amongst other nations. His Excellency and those whom he represents know perfectly well that until America and ourselves had removed our difficulties it was no use trying to get other nations to remove their difficulties. I crossed to see President Hoover because I believe in personal contact. By dispatches you can deliver a letter, but only by personal contact can you deliver the spirit, and if negotiations on delicate subjects are to be successfully conducted, both the letter and the spirit must be apparent to those conducting the negotia-

tions. I received, whilst his guest and the guest of his country, a welcome which was embarrassing in its volume and its warmth. We discussed much and we saw more. This is not the time, nor the place, for me to give any impressions of America. They are wonderful; they are thought-provoking. I want to say this—that America is more enthusiastic about the future than it is about the past, and its objective is good will and co-operation in promoting good objects, and there is no co-operator that it would welcome more than this country in pursuing these common objects which we have.

Now, as a result of it all, we are to meet in London at a naval conference which, I believe, will again mark a very substantial stage in the progress of universal disarmament. I have been informed that the City of London wishes to give a reception and banquet to the delegates attending the Five-Power Conference. Without consulting any of my colleagues, I think I may take upon myself on this occasion the privileges of a dictator, and say here and now that with the most heartfelt gratitude we accept that most generous invitation.

[Referring to the relations between Great Britain and the Dominions, Mr. MacDonald said:]

Young, growing, and virile, they and we together are facing one of the most intricate problems that politicians ever had to face—how to unite in the family unity two apparently diametrically opposed objects, that of independent nationhood and the object of a common allegiance. The time has come when people look back upon the Imperial Conference of 1926 as a critical conference. There is a committee representative of the experts of the Dominions and ourselves trying to hammer out in the language of constitutional law how the general declarations of the 1926 Conference can be carried out. I pray the delegates from the Dominions and I pray our own delegates to remember that, whatever temptation there may be to the contrary, the Commonwealth of the British nations must be kept together, and can be kept together, only in so far as it remembers the family spirit, only in so far as we subordinate the sense of individualism to the sense of community, and only in so far as we can find our pride in our common traditions greater than mere badges of independent authority. Community of the family is the most inspiring mode of expression of individuality. Man cannot live by bread alone, nor can the Commonwealth be bound by trade alone. There are common markets available for mutual trading, and in this business of mutual economic advantage, exchange of goods, and industrial helpfulness I hope that the Economic Conference which will meet next year will be very helpful in solving difficulties and suggesting ways of procedure. I hope

most sincerely that that Economic Conference will be held, as Mr. Mackenzie King wishes, in Ottawa; but if not it will be held, and I believe that the whole Empire will benefit substantially as a result.

2. ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

At the time of the British General Election in June 1929 it was fully understood, both in London and in Moscow, that a victory for the Labour Party would involve a renewal of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations which had been severed in May 1927. So confidently was it expected in Moscow that Mr. Macdonald would make this resumption of relations his first action, that, when it did not come about at once, there was great disappointment amongst the Soviet Government, and the press began to attack the 'bourgeois Menshevik Socialist Government' before it was a fortnight old.

But Mr. Macdonald moved more circumspectly than in 1924. His first intentions with regard to the U.S.S.R. were made public in the King's Speech at the opening of Parliament on July 2:

'My Government are examining the conditions under which diplomatic relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may be resumed, and are in communication with my Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India on the subject.'¹

Direct negotiations were opened between Mr. Henderson and M. Valerian Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, on July 29 and were termed a 'friendly exchange of opinions' on the 'present relationships of the two countries'. These discussions broke down after two days' duration as the result of the refusal of M. Dovgalevsky to agree that the exchange of Ambassadors should be accompanied by an agreement as to the setting up of the necessary machinery to deal with such outstanding subjects as debts, claims, and trade.

Negotiations were opened on September 24 and concluded on October 3 with the signature of the Protocol of Agreement. On the following day M. Litvinoff, Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued an official statement on the Agreement. The Soviet Government, he said, had expected the Labour Government to restore relations by a single act, but he was delighted to see that the British Government had at length adopted the Soviet Government's point of view.

(i) PROTOCOL RELATIVE TO THE PROCEDURE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SUCH PROCEDURE TO BECOME OPERATIVE IMMEDIATELY ON THE RESUMPTION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES, INCLUDING THE EXCHANGE OF AMBASSADORS.²

¹ See *The Times*, July 3, 1929, also *Bulletin of International News*, vol. v, no. 26, July 6, 1929.

² Cmd. 3418.

The undersigned, the Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M.P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and M. Valerian Dvlgalevsky, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the French Republic, having, on instructions from their respective Governments, entered into an exchange of views on questions connected with the above-mentioned subject, have reached the following agreement:

1. The following questions shall be settled by negotiation between the two Governments:

- (1) Definition of the attitude of both Governments towards the Treaties of 1924.
- (2) Commercial treaty and allied questions.
- (3) Claims and counter-claims, intergovernmental and private; debts, claims arising out of intervention and otherwise, and financial questions connected with such claims and counter-claims.
- (4) Fisheries.
- (5) Application of previous treaties and conventions.

2. Negotiations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to the settlement of the above-mentioned questions shall take place immediately on the resumption of full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of Ambassadors.

3. The aforesaid negotiations shall be conducted on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Soviet Ambassador in London, and on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. The plenipotentiaries of the two Governments shall, if necessary, be assisted by joint committees, the members of which shall be appointed in equal number by each Government from among their nationals, whether official or not, specially acquainted with the matters under discussion.

5. These experts shall report to each of the plenipotentiaries on the results reached in their joint examination of the respective questions and on the solution thereof which they suggest.

6. All agreements resulting from the negotiations between the plenipotentiaries shall take the form of a treaty or treaties between the two Governments.

7. Immediately on the actual exchange of Ambassadors, and not later than the same day as that on which the respective Ambassadors

present their credentials, both Governments will reciprocally confirm the pledge with regard to propaganda contained in Article 16 of the Treaty signed on August 8, 1924, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.¹

8. Simultaneously with the approval by both Governments of the procedure laid down in paragraphs 1-7, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will take the decision to resume normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the exchange of Ambassadors.

9. The steps to be taken, as set out in the preceding paragraphs, including the decision concerning the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, will be brought for approval before Parliament early at the beginning of the next session. Immediately after this question shall have been discussed in Parliament, each of the two Governments will take the usual steps for the appointment of their respective Ambassadors.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.
V. DOVGALEVSKY.

LONDON, *October 3, 1929.*

(ii) SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,²
November 5, 1929
(Mr. Arthur Henderson)

I beg to move,

'That the House is of the opinion that the resumption of full diplomatic relations between this country and Russia is desirable, and approves the procedure for the settlement of questions outstanding between the two countries, including those relating to propaganda and debts, as set out in the Protocol of October 3, 1929, and published in Command Paper 3418.'

In initiating this Debate I make this submission to the House, that no part of the policy of this Government has been so much misrepresented or made the subject of so many misconceptions as that which deals with Anglo-Russian relations. Charges of breaches of faith, of repudiation of pledges, and breaches of trust have been freely made,

¹ For text of Article 16 see the succeeding Note from M. Sokolnikoff to Mr. Henderson, p. 127.

² Hansard, November 5, 1929, cols. 895-904.

This speech should be read in conjunction with that section of M. Litvinoff's Report on Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1929, dealing with the same subject, see below, pp. 198-204.

and the Foreign Secretary, so the public are assured, has been guilty of a hideous humiliation and a miserable, ignoble, and abject surrender. Members and ex-members of the party opposite have been vying with each other in their criticisms of the Government's Russian policy, and I should like to give the House instances of the informing statements that have been put into circulation. The hon. and gallant Member for Chippenham (Captain Cazalet), writing in order to enlighten the readers of the *Morning Post*, said this:

'Whatever "kudos" the Socialist party have acquired by their conduct at The Hague has been completely offset by the obvious lack of backbone, courage and conviction displayed by their leaders over this question.'

Then the Financial Secretary to the War Office in the late Government, addressing an audience, said:

'Mr. Henderson falls flat upon his face and licks the dust from the boots of the Russian gentlemen without getting anything in return. I am awaiting with interest the kind of explanation that Mr. MacDonald will give on his return for the latest development in foreign affairs, and I should imagine that Mr. Henderson is also awaiting that return with no little trepidation.'

The astonishing thing in connexion with all these statements, and I want to impress this point upon the House, is that they are based on Russian propaganda—propaganda that is so objectionable and yet so useful when a charge has to be made against the present Government. They are a consequence of Russian representatives and of Russian newspapers serving up descriptions of the negotiations for home consumption. One of the points freely made, at the time when we resumed our negotiations on procedure in September, was that the Soviet Government's position remained absolutely unchanged. Because in the Russian propaganda it had been said that the Soviet Government's position remained absolutely unchanged, it must be assumed that the Foreign Secretary had surrendered.

May I briefly state the facts? When we first of all opened our conversations on procedure at the end of July, the Soviet representative made it plain that, in the opinion of his Government at any rate, the first point of procedure to be settled was the immediate exchange of ambassadors. That was the very first point upon which he insisted. What was my reply? I replied that, in view of the Government's commitment to this House there could be no exchange of ambassadors until a report had been made to Parliament after the House re-assembled in October. M. Dovgalevsky then intimated that it was necessary for him to consult his Government on this point. After

doing so, he came to see me again, and he intimated to me that his instructions were to return to Paris, which he did on August 1. Moreover, throughout the whole of the negotiations—and I want to make this clear to the House—M. Dovgalevsky stated that his Government was unwilling to negotiate any question, including that of propaganda, until the ambassadors had been exchanged and had taken up their duties. The House knows that ambassadors have not yet been appointed, and the House knows, from the issue of the Command Paper, that an arrangement has already been made on the question of propaganda. Surely, these two last statements which I have made to the House show what a small amount of substance was contained in the charges which have been so freely made about this humiliating surrender to which I have referred.

I would also point out, before I go further, that the Amendment standing on the Order Paper in the names of Right Hon. Gentlemen opposite seems to me—I will deal with it more fully later—to represent a similar attitude of mind to that to which I have already referred, and I welcome, in view of its character, this opportunity of responding to the challenge. May I first deal with the Motion standing in my name? That Motion, I may remind the House, declared in favour of the desirability of resuming diplomatic relations; and, in support of the Motion, I would venture to call the attention of the House to the fact that for more than ten years organized labour in this country has fearlessly, consistently and definitely urged the importance of proper relations with the Russian Government. Moreover, in the last Parliament, Labour, then the official Opposition, protested more emphatically and strenuously against the fruitless and futile policy of rupture with Russia, believing that it would have serious economic consequences and would be a wanton act of self-injury to British trade. I also claim that proper Russian relations were a very outstanding issue at the recent General Election; I do not think that that can possibly be disputed. The result is that this Parliament has a large majority, in my opinion, who are definitely pledged on this Russian issue. In order to emphasize that point, I should like to quote—I know that right hon. Gentlemen opposite are very anxious that we should strongly adhere to our election pledges, and, in order that there need be no doubt on this point, I want to quote, first of all, from the Labour party's Election statement, which said:

‘A Labour Government, while opposed to the interference of the Russian Government with the domestic politics of other nations, would at once take steps to establish relations and . . . settle by

treaty or otherwise any outstanding differences, and would make every effort to encourage a revival of trade with Soviet Russia.'

But that was not the only election statement that was made. May I now quote from the statement issued over the signature of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), and, I believe, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Darwen (Sir H. Samuel):

'The policy of the Liberal party is to re-establish normal political and economic relations with Russia at the earliest possible date, on the basis of the non-interference of each country in the domestic affairs of the other.'

I claim that these two quotations show very clearly the General Election position of both the Government party and the Liberal party. I now want to advance very briefly one or two general reasons in support of an immediate return to normal relations with Russia. Doubtless we shall hear during this Debate that many Britishers distrust the Soviet Government, and, on the other hand, I would say that the Soviet Government are very suspicious of British policy. They have their apprehensions of our alleged anti-Soviet activities; some of them even believe to-day in an eventual armed attack. However fantastic these apprehensions may appear to us, they seem to many Russians to be absolutely genuine. Moreover, I would point out that the younger sections of the Russian population are, it is well known, coming more and more to regard England as the enemy. Surely, then, a continuance of the present state of affairs can only encourage the growth of this unfortunate opinion.

Take the question of trade, so vital and important at this juncture, as we heard yesterday. It is true, I admit, that the Soviet Union can buy here without the existence of diplomatic relations. It is true also that the Soviet Union continues to buy in the United States. I am quite prepared to make these admissions. But it is quite equally true that Russia has very largely reduced her purchases in this country since relations were broken off. The exports of British produce and manufactures were, in 1925, £6,240,000, and in 1926, £5,858,000, a figure which fell in 1928 to £2,716,000. The fall in our re-exports is even more striking. In 1925, these were £13,017,000, in 1926, £8,543,000, and, in 1928, £2,089,000. There can be no doubt that the absence of diplomatic relations does impose a very serious handicap upon our trade. For instance, the recently issued report of a very important trade delegation which visited Russia. . . . Hon. Members may sneer at the delegation, but that is their responsibility. That

report, which I am entitled to quote, indicates that the committee is satisfied that there is a great volume of business available for Great Britain, subject to diplomatic recognition being afforded . . .

‘if arrangements be made for the financing of the business on long-term credit.’

What is wrong with that ? I am now going to quote another interesting statement which I think has a very important bearing upon this subject. The City Editor of *The Times* newspaper wrote, on July 23, 1927 :

‘In no small part, the abnormal amount of unemployment in this country is to be attributed to the absence of Russia from the economy and comity of nations. . . . The direct trade may not be important, but the indirect trade is just as important to this country as to those immediately concerned.’

Surely a more cogent justification of Labour’s attitude, and of those who support the return to normal conditions towards Russia from the standpoint of Great Britain’s trade, has never been written. There has been a great deal of misapprehension on one point, and here I want to say very emphatically to the House that the Government do not intend to recommend Parliament to pledge the credit of the British tax-payer to any loan raised by the Soviet Government.

I want to give one more general reason. It is inevitable, so it appears to me, in the case of two countries such as the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that questions of many kinds apart from special problems, such as those of propaganda and debts, should continually present themselves for solution. Some of these more important questions are referred to in the Protocol. Those who have followed the Protocol will see references there to fisheries, to commercial relations and to the validity of existing treaties, but minor matters must, of course, continually crop up, as any of us who have had responsibilities in Government Departments know. At present it has to be admitted that all these questions, whether they be of minor or major importance, can only be dealt with in a roundabout way and without the opportunity of that personal discussion which is so essential often to an amicable arrangement. Then it should be clearly stated that it is to the advantage of both parties to have at their disposal a universally recognized machinery for dealing with the ordinary routine of international intercourse. Moreover, the absence of normal relations between the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics necessarily has a most unsettling effect, not only on the two States concerned, but even upon third parties. It introduces, in fact, those political uncertainties

and a sense of political insecurity which the late Foreign Secretary deprecated so strongly in his speech in the House on June 25, 1926. Furthermore, the fact that the relations between the two countries are difficult, are unsatisfactory if you like, is in no way an argument for abolishing the normal machinery of diplomatic relations, but in my judgment the very reverse.

The second part of the Motion invites the House to give its approval to the procedure that has been adopted in the hope of reaching a friendly and mutually satisfactory settlement between the two countries. This procedure is set out in the Protocol signed on October 3 of this year. Under the Protocol the condition of the resumption of relations is the exchange of reciprocal guarantees relative to propaganda. This is provided for in paragraph 7, which reads:

‘Immediately on the actual exchange of Ambassadors and not later than the same day as that on which the respective Ambassadors present their credentials, both Governments will reciprocally confirm the pledge with regard to propaganda contained in Article 16 of the Treaty signed on August 8th, 1924.’

Article 16 of the 1924 Treaty read as follows:

‘The contracting parties solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a State to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and to restrain all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them, from any act, overt or other, liable in any way whatsoever to endanger the tranquillity or prosperity of any part of the territory of the British Empire or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or intended to embitter the relations of the British Empire or the Union with their neighbours or any other countries.’

May I say how we interpret the obligations of Article 7 to which I have just referred. Our position with regard to propaganda may be stated thus. This is very important in regard to the questions which have been asked. We stand by the declaration we made in 1924 to the effect that we could not allow any direct interference from outside in British domestic affairs and would insist that the promise given by the Soviet Government to refrain from any act liable to endanger the tranquillity or prosperity of the British Empire, and to restrain from such acts all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance

from them, such as the Communist International, which is organically connected with the Soviet Government, should be carried out both in the letter and in the spirit. This is, in fact, an undertaking that Soviet propaganda will not be tolerated in any form or at any time.

Having stated our position with regard to Soviet propaganda, I should like to remind the House that this position of ours has been described in the Press by the late Home Secretary as a breach of trust and a broken promise. Let me give you his words:

‘We are to appoint Ambassadors, which means full diplomatic relations, and then we are to discuss all the subjects that are in dispute, including the cessation of propaganda.’

I claim whatever else it may be said we have not provided for before an exchange of Ambassadors takes place, it is not on the question of propaganda. As I have shown—and I am convinced of it—the position of His Majesty’s Government in this matter has been definitely strengthened by what has taken place since the House rose in July and under the negotiations which I have had the responsibility of conducting. After 1924 it has been plainly stated to the Soviet representatives, and stated again twice by myself, that the Communist International will be regarded by His Majesty’s Government as an organ of the Soviet Government. In order to strengthen my case on this point, may I ask the House to note the list of subjects left for settlement by negotiation between the two Governments. The list of subjects which have been reserved for negotiations is as follows:

Definition of the attitude of both Governments towards the Treaties of 1924, commercial treaty and allied questions, claims and counter-claims of inter-governmental and private debts and claims arising out of intervention and otherwise and financial questions connected with such claims and counter-claims, fisheries, and the application of previous treaties and conventions. In view of what I have said, I want to ask this question. Why, if nothing has been settled, is propaganda not included in the list of subjects yet to be negotiated? The answer is quite simple. Because an agreement has already been reached, and the guarantee must be exchanged not later than the date upon which each of the Ambassadors presents his credentials. Hon. Members may say, if they care, that Article 16 is insufficient. They may say it is not drawn sufficiently tight. They may say that as an undertaking it is not quite definite enough. That is an understandable position, but it does not warrant the charges which have been made, especially against myself, of breach of trust or ignoble surrender. Then it must be obvious to every one that the absence

of normal relations does nothing to prevent propaganda, but in my judgment rather facilitates the opportunities for such propaganda.

Another important point on which I should like to say a word is the position of the Dominions. The King's Speech contained an intimation that the Government was in communication with the Governments of the Dominions on the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia. His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions have all been kept fully informed of the policy proposed, and the replies received indicate that it is generally recognized that the renewal of relations was sooner or later inevitable. Several have emphasized the importance of safeguards against the possibility of subversive propaganda. I claim that we have made provision for it—but not a single Dominion has expressed dissent from the general policy which has been pursued. All the Dominions except one, whose views have not yet been received, have requested that the guarantee against propaganda, the guarantee which I have given to the House to-day, should be made applicable to them.

The official Opposition Amendment is a direct challenge to the Government on two points. It is not very bold. It is, I think, a sort of bridge to enable the more moderate and the die-hards to come together. It raises two points. It deplores the failure to maintain the conditions which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary laid down for the resumption of diplomatic relations, and in the second place it condemns the resumption of such relations until these conditions are satisfied. It is interesting to notice from the Amendment that it is not the Soviet Government which is to-day on its trial; it is not even the British Government on its trial for running away from its election pledges; it is not even the Government on its trial for failing to give effect to the declarations contained in the Gracious Speech from the Throne. If you examine the position there is apparently only one point at issue between the Front Bench opposite and ourselves, and that is the alleged failure—I say advisedly 'the alleged failure'—on our part to maintain the conditions laid down last July. I think I have said sufficient to dispose of that charge. I think I have pricked that bubble quite successfully.

Let me put the House in mind of the two conditions which were laid down last July; they seem to have been overlooked. What were those conditions? First, the Government declared that an agreement embodying a definite undertaking with regard to propaganda was necessary, and secondly the Government undertook to report to the House before recognition became effective. With all due deference to our friends opposite I claim that both those conditions have been

fulfilled. The first has been fulfilled in the restoration of Article 16, and the interpretation which I placed upon that Article in the negotiations with Mr. Dovgalevsky; and the second condition laid down by the Prime Minister in July is being fulfilled to-day, within a week of the reassembling of Parliament.

The Amendment says that we have failed to maintain those conditions. I claim that we have fully and completely fulfilled those conditions.

I will say only one word in conclusion. I am content to take the decision of this newly elected House on the Russian policy of the Government. I believe that this House had a very definite mandate for the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In seeking to give effect to that mandate the Government has honoured the conditions relating to propaganda and other matters. The Government asks the House to declare that it is not prepared to continue a policy of wasted economic opportunities, a policy which is injurious, in our judgment, to British trade, which is a disturbing and even a menacing factor in European affairs, a policy which has failed to produce a single substantial advantage or any worth-while consequence to recommend it to any section of the House. On the other hand the policy which I am inviting the House to support is conceived in the interests of European peace, co-operation and confidence, upon which the prosperity and well-being of the nation so largely depend. In my judgment it is a wise policy, and it is as sound as it is necessary. I therefore leave our action, with all that has been said against us and our policy, to the judgment of the House, in the confident belief that the decision will be to approve what we have done, and to encourage us to go on with the negotiations in the hope of solving the issues still outstanding between the two Governments.

NOTE. The Protocol of October 3 was ratified by the Soviet Union Council of People's Commissars on October 11 and by the British House of Commons on November 5.¹ The British Government on November 13 appointed Sir Esmond Ovey as Ambassador in Moscow, and on November 17 it was announced that M. Gregorii Sokolnikoff was to be Soviet Ambassador in London. The ambassadors presented their credentials on December 21 and 20 respectively, and at the same time Notes were exchanged on the subject of propaganda in accordance with Article 7 of the Protocol. M. Sokolnikoff also took the opportunity of making a statement to the Press on the subject of trade and financial claims.

¹ A motion brought forward in the House of Lords by Lord Birkenhead against the resumption of diplomatic relations was carried on December 4 by 43 votes to 21.

(iii) TEXT OF LETTER FROM M. GREGORII SOKOLNIKOFF TO
MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON¹

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, December 20, 1929.

Sir,

By clause 7 of the Protocol signed on October 3 last by the Soviet Ambassador in Paris on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, both Governments engaged themselves to confirm the pledge with regard to propaganda contained in Article 16 of the General Treaty signed on August 8, 1924, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The terms of that Article were as follows:

'The contracting parties solemnly affirm their desire and intention to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a State to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and to restrain all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of financial assistance from them, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to endanger the tranquillity or prosperity of any part of the territory of the British Empire or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or intended to embitter the relations of the British Empire or the Union with their neighbours or any other countries.'

It was further agreed that effect should be given to this clause of the aforesaid protocol not later than the day on which the respective Ambassadors presented their credentials.

Having this day presented to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales the letters accrediting me as Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to His Majesty the King, I have the honour, by the direction of the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs and on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to confirm the undertaking contained in the Article quoted above, and to inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regard that undertaking as having full force and effect as between themselves and His Majesty's

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3467.

Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of India.

I am instructed to add that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be happy to receive, in accordance with clause 7 of the Protocol of October 3, a corresponding declaration from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of India.¹

I have, &c.

G. SOKOLNIKOFF.

(iv) STATEMENT BY M. SOKOLNIKOFF

The following statement by the Soviet Ambassador was issued to the Press on December 20, 1929:²

The full renewal of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain is a step undoubtedly based on sound economic and political necessities. The absence of normal relations between the two Governments rendered the international situation more acute and was a constant menace to the maintenance of peace, in which the working masses are vitally interested. On the other hand, under such conditions it was impossible to develop stable trading relations, founded on mutual confidence, and the well-known figures for the trade turn-over between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. confirm this.

I hope that the renewal of relations and their further consolidation, by taking into account the interests of both countries, will be followed in the coming year by favourable results and will induce a movement of the trade turn-over in an opposite direction. It is a favourable sign that already the orders of Soviet organizations in London amounted in October and November, 1929, to £3,687,000, as against £1,195,000 in the corresponding months of 1928.

However, it does not follow from this that it would be advisable to shut our eyes to the difficulties which have to be overcome before trade between the two countries will reach the proportions corresponding to their economic possibilities and requirements.

At the present time nobody can deny the extraordinary rapid growth in the national economy of the U.S.S.R. The five years' plan of economic development has already, in the first year, not only been fulfilled, but the estimates provided in the five years' plan for 1928-9 have been exceeded. The increase in the output of industry in 1928-9

¹ This declaration was made in a Note of the same date addressed by Mr. Henderson to M. Sokolnikoff.

² *The Times*, December 21, 1929.

was 24 per cent. over that in 1927-8, and in 1929-30 it is estimated to increase the output by 32 per cent. over that in the previous year (the calculations are made throughout in unchanging values), whereas the annual increase was put down in the five years' plan at 20-1 per cent. The capital investments in industry and the construction of electrical power-stations in 1929-30 are estimated at nearly £450,000,000. The greater part of this capital expenditure is to be used for the construction of new factories and the re-equipment of old ones. This, in its turn, will make it necessary to import large quantities of machinery and all kinds of equipment.

Consequently, and this is particularly important for the prospect of Anglo-Soviet trading relations, the demand on the part of the U.S.S.R. is growing, particularly for metallurgical products, machinery and tools, products of the electrical and chemical industries, means of transport (ships), &c. The very rapid development of State and co-operative large-scale agricultural enterprises is creating an enormous demand for tractors and combines and other complex agricultural machinery. The demand of the Soviet market will make it desirable for British industry to study seriously the question of adaptation to the peculiarities of that market, and at the same time it may lead to the expansion of those branches of industry the products of which can find a large sale in the U.S.S.R.

Financial Claims

Another problem to be faced is that connected with finance. Without the necessary financial arrangements for the purpose of establishing stable and rapid extension of trade between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., the development of economic relations is bound to proceed more slowly. Endeavouring to carry out more rapidly and successfully its plans of socialist reconstruction, the Government of the U.S.S.R., on its side, will be ready to take steps towards a settlement of the financial claims which are being made upon it, taking into account our counterclaims.

But whatever steps the Soviet Government may take for this purpose, they must be directly connected with measures favourable to the further development and consolidation of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.

I hope that these questions will be investigated very thoroughly in the coming negotiations, and that every effort will be made to find a solution to the problems confronting us. I should at the same time add that the Soviet Union, i.e. the wide, toiling masses, who welcome the restoration and development of Anglo-Soviet economic

relations are at the same time fully conscious of the important successes achieved by the Soviet economy, in spite of the almost complete foreign financial isolation.

We have every intention of fulfilling loyally any obligations which we undertake, and at the same time rely on countries in friendly relations with us taking into account, on their side, the unalterable basis of our political and economic system. Under such circumstances it will be possible to consolidate the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, founded, as they will be, on mutual benefit, and to lay the foundation of a lasting and peaceful co-operation between the peoples of the two countries.

V. GREECE

The negotiations between Greece and Yugoslavia with regard to a Free Zone in the Port of Salonica, which had led a desultory existence since 1922, were brought to a conclusion on March 17, 1929, by the signing of a series of Agreements.¹

Ten days later, on March 27, a Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlement was signed between the two countries, further cementing friendly relations between them.

Speaking before the Chamber of Deputies on April 1, 1929, M. Venizelos, the Prime Minister, gave a survey of the foreign relations of Greece with her immediate neighbours.

1. TEXT OF TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CONCILIATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, BETWEEN GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA, MARCH 27, 1929²

Sa Majesté le roi des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et le président de la République hellénique,

Tenant compte des liens de sincère amitié et de confiance mutuelle qui unissent si heureusement les deux pays et voulant affirmer par un acte solennel leur désir de collaboration dans le but de contribuer à l'œuvre de la paix générale,

Ayant un souci égal du maintien de l'état de paix et de stabilité politique conformément aux principes établis par le Pacte de la Société des Nations,

Considérant que la sincère observation des procédés de règlement pacifique des différends internationaux permet de résoudre sans recourir à la force les questions qui viendraient à diviser les États,

¹ For the past history of these negotiations see *Survey* for 1920-3, Part III (iii), 9; *Survey* for 1926, Part II, B (ii); *Survey* for 1928, Part II (iv).

The text of these documents will be found in *L'Europe Nouvelle* for April 20, 1929.

² *Messenger d'Athènes*, April 2, 1929. Ratifications were exchanged on February 19, 1930.

Ont résolu de conclure à ces fins un pacte d'amitié, de conciliation et de règlement judiciaire, et ont nommé pour les plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté le roi des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes: le Dr. Kosta Koumanoudi, ministre des affaires étrangères p. i. ;

Le président de la République hellénique: M. Alexandre Carapanos, ministre des affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leur pleins pouvoirs reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes:

Article premier. Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à se prêter leur appui mutuel et leur collaboration cordiale pour le maintien de l'ordre établi par les traités de paix dont elles sont toutes deux signataires, ainsi que pour le respect et l'exécution des obligations stipulées dans les dits traités.

En cas de complications internationales, si les deux hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord que leurs intérêts communs sont ou pourront être menacés elles s'engagent à se concerter sur les mesures à prendre en commun pour les sauvegarder.

Article 2. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent réciproquement à ne se livrer de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre.

Toutefois cette stipulation ne s'applique pas s'il s'agit:

(1) De l'exercice du droit de légitime défense, c'est-à-dire de s'opposer à la violation de l'engagement pris dans l'alinéa premier ;

(2) D'une action en application de l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations ;

(3) D'une action en raison d'une décision prise par l'Assemblée ou par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, en application de l'article 15, alinéa 7, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, pourvu que, dans ce dernier cas, cette action soit dirigée contre un État qui, le premier, s'est livré à une attaque.

Article 3. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à régler par voie pacifique et de la manière stipulée au présent traité toutes questions, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, qui viendraient à les diviser et qui n'auraient pu être résolues par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires.

Article 4. Cet engagement ne s'applique pas:

(1) Aux différends nés antérieurement à la conclusion du présent Pacte ;

(2) Aux différends portant sur des questions que le droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive des États ;

(3) Aux différends ayant trait au statut territorial des parties.

S'il s'élève une contestation entre les parties sur la question de savoir si un différend rentre dans une des trois exceptions susmentionnées, cette question préjudicielle sera, sans toucher au fond, sur la requête de l'une des deux parties, soumise à l'arbitrage de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 5. Les différends pour la solution desquels une procédure spéciale serait prévue par d'autres conventions seront réglés conformément aux dispositions de ces conventions.

Article 6. Le présent Pacte ne porte pas atteinte aux accords en vigueur établissant pour les hautes parties contractantes une procédure de conciliation ou, en matière d'arbitrage et de règlement judiciaire, des engagements assurant la solution du différend. Toutefois, si ces accords ne prévoient qu'une procédure de conciliation après que cette procédure aura échoué, les dispositions du présent Pacte relatives au règlement judiciaire ou arbitral recevront application.

Article 7. (1) S'il s'agit d'un différend dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des parties, relève de la compétence des autorités judiciaires ou administratives, cette partie pourra s'opposer à ce que ce différend soit soumis aux diverses procédures prévues par le présent Pacte avant qu'une décision définitive ait été rendue dans les délais raisonnables par l'autorité compétente.

(2) La partie qui, dans ce cas, voudra recourir aux procédures prévues par le présent Pacte, devra notifier à l'autre partie son intention dans un délai d'un an, à partir de la décision susvisée.

Article 8. Tous différends au sujet desquels les parties se contesteront réciproquement un droit seront soumis pour jugement à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, à moins que les parties ne tombent d'accord dans les termes prévus ci-après pour recourir à un tribunal arbitral.

Il est entendu que les différends ci-dessus visés comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 9. Si les parties sont d'accord pour soumettre les différends visés à l'article précédent à un Tribunal arbitral, elles rédigeront un compromis dans lequel elles fixeront l'objet du litige, le choix des arbitres et la procédure à suivre. A défaut d'indications ou de précisions suffisantes dans le compromis, il sera fait application dans la mesure nécessaire des dispositions de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Dans le silence du compromis quant aux règles de fond à appliquer par les arbitres, le Tribunal appliquera les règles de fond

énumérées dans l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 10. A défaut d'accord entre les parties sur le compromis visé à l'article précédent ou à défaut de désignation d'arbitres et après un préavis de trois mois, l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles aura la faculté de porter directement, par voie de requête, le différend devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 11. (1) Pour les différends prévus à l'article 8 avant toute procédure devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ou avant toute procédure arbitrale, les parties pourront, d'un commun accord, recourir à la procédure de conciliation prévue par le présent Pacte.

(2) En cas de recours à la conciliation et d'échec de cette procédure, aucune des parties ne pourra porter le différend devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ou demander la constitution du Tribunal arbitral visé à l'article 9, avant l'expiration du délai d'un mois à compter de la clôture des travaux de la commission de conciliation.

Article 12. Tous différends entre les parties, autres que ceux prévus à l'article 8, seront soumis obligatoirement à une procédure de conciliation.

Article 13. Les différends visés à l'article précédent seront portés devant une commission de conciliation permanente ou spéciale constituée par les parties.

Article 14. Sur la demande adressée par une partie contractante à l'autre partie, il devra être constitué, dans les six mois, une commission permanente de conciliation.

Article 15. Sauf accord contraire des parties, la commission de conciliation sera constituée comme suit :

(1) La commission comprendra cinq membres. Les parties en nommeront chacune un qui pourra être choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs. Les trois autres commissaires seront choisis d'un commun accord parmi les ressortissants de tierces puissances. Ces derniers devront être de nationalités différentes, ne pas avoir leur résidence habituelle sur le territoire des parties, ni se trouver à leur service. Parmi eux, les parties désigneront le président de la commission.

(2) Les commissaires seront nommés pour trois ans. Ils seront rééligibles. Les commissaires nommés en commun pourront être remplacés au cours de leur mandat, de l'accord des parties. Chaque partie pourra toujours, d'autre part, procéder au remplacement du commissaire nommé par elle. Nonobstant leur remplacement, les

commissaires resteront en fonctions pour l'achèvement de leurs travaux en cours.

(3) Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès ou de démission ou de quelque autre empêchement en suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

Article 16. Si, lorsqu'il s'élève un différend, il n'existe pas une commission permanente de conciliation nommée par les parties, une commission spéciale sera constituée pour l'examen du différend dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la demande adressée par l'une des parties à l'autre. Les nominations se feront conformément aux dispositions de l'article précédent, à moins que les parties n'en décident autrement.

Article 17. (1) Si la nomination des commissaires à désigner en commun n'intervient pas dans les délais prévus aux articles 14 et 15, le soin de procéder aux nominations nécessaires sera confié à une tierce puissance choisie d'un commun accord par les parties ou, si celles-ci le demandent, au président en exercice du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

(2) Si l'accord ne s'établit pas au sujet d'aucun de ces procédés, chaque partie désignera une puissance différente et les nominations seront faites de concert par les puissances ainsi choisies.

(3) Si, dans un délai de trois mois, ces deux puissances n'ont pu tomber d'accord, chacune d'elles présentera des candidats en nombre égal à celui des membres à désigner. Le sort déterminera lesquels des candidats ainsi présentés seront admis.

Article 18. (1) La commission de conciliation sera saisie par voie de requête adressée au président, par les deux parties agissant d'un commun accord, ou, à défaut, par l'une ou l'autre des parties.

(2) La requête, après avoir exposé sommairement l'objet du litige, contiendra l'invitation à la commission de procéder à toutes mesures propres à conduire à une conciliation.

(3) Si la requête émane d'une seule des parties, elle sera notifiée par celle-ci sans délai à l'autre partie.

Article 19. (1) Dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la date où l'une des parties aura porté un différend devant une commission permanente de conciliation, chacune des parties pourra, pour l'examen de ce différend, remplacer son commissaire par une personne possédant une compétence spéciale dans la matière.

(2) La partie qui usera de ce droit en fera immédiatement la notification à l'autre partie; celle-ci aura, dans ce cas, la faculté d'agir de même dans un délai de quinze jours à compter de la date où la notification lui sera parvenue.

Article 20. (1) La commission de conciliation se réunira, sauf accord contraire des parties, au siège de la Société des Nations ou en tout autre lieu désigné par son président.

(2) La commission pourra, en toute circonstance, demander au secrétaire général de la Société des Nations de prêter son assistance à ses travaux.

Article 21. Les travaux de la commission de conciliation ne seront publiés qu'en vertu d'une décision prise par la commission avec l'assentiment des parties.

Article 22. (1) Sauf accord contraire des parties, la commission de conciliation réglera elle-même sa procédure, qui dans tous les cas, devra être contradictoire. En matière d'enquête, la commission, si elle n'en décide autrement à l'unanimité, se conformera aux dispositions du titre III de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

(2) Les parties seront représentées auprès de la commission de conciliation par des agents ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaire entre elles et la commission ; elles pourront, en outre, se faire assister par des conseils et experts nommés par elles à cet effet et demander l'audition de toutes personnes dont le témoignage leur paraîtrait utile.

(3) La commission aura, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents, conseils et experts des deux parties, ainsi qu'à toutes personnes qu'elle jugerait utile de faire comparaître avec l'assentiment de leurs gouvernements.

Article 23. Sauf accord contraire des parties, les décisions de la commission de conciliation seront prises à la majorité des voix et la commission ne pourra se prononcer sur le fond du différend que si tous ses membres sont présents.

Article 24. Les parties s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la commission de conciliation et, en particulier, à lui fournir dans la plus large mesure possible tous documents et informations utiles, ainsi qu'à user des moyens dont elles disposent pour lui permettre de procéder sur leur territoire et selon leur législation à la citation et à l'audition de témoins ou d'experts et à des transports sur les lieux.

Article 25. (1) Pendant la durée de leurs travaux, chacun des commissaires recevra une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté d'un commun accord des parties, qui en supporteront chacune une part égale.

(2) Les frais généraux occasionés par le fonctionnement de la commission seront répartis de la même façon.

Article 26. (1) La commission de conciliation aura pour tâche d'élucider les questions en litige, de recueillir à cette fin toutes les informations utiles, par voie d'enquête ou autrement, et de s'efforcer de concilier les parties. Elle pourra, après examen de l'affaire, exposer aux parties les termes de l'arrangement qui lui paraîtrait convenable et leur impartir un délai pour se prononcer.

(2) A la fin de ses travaux, la commission dressera un procès-verbal constatant, suivant le cas, soit que les parties se sont arrangées et, s'il y a lieu, les conditions de l'arrangement, soit que les parties n'ont pu être conciliées. Le procès-verbal ne mentionnera pas si les décisions de la commission ont été prises à l'unanimité ou à la majorité.

(3) Les travaux de la commission devront, à moins que les parties n'en conviennent autrement, être terminés dans un délai de six mois à compter du jour où la commission aura été saisie du différend.

Article 27. Le procès-verbal de la commission sera porté, sans délai, à la connaissance des parties. Il appartient aux parties d'en décider la publication.

Article 28. Si, dans le mois qui suivra la clôture des travaux de la commission de conciliation, les parties ne se sont pas entendues, la question, si les deux parties se mettent d'accord, pourra être portée devant un tribunal arbitral. (La présente disposition ne s'applique pas dans l'hypothèse prévue aux articles 8 et 11).

Dans ce cas, sauf accord contraire des parties, le tribunal arbitral sera constitué de la manière suivante :

Article 29. (a) Le tribunal arbitral comprendra cinq membres. Les parties en nommeront chacune un qui pourra être choisi parmi les nationaux respectifs. Les deux autres arbitres et les surarbitres seront choisis d'un commun accord parmi les ressortissants de la tierce puissance. Ces derniers devront être de nationalité différente, ne pas avoir leur résidence habituelle sur le territoire des parties ni se trouver à leur service.

(b) 1. Si la nomination des membres du tribunal arbitral n'intervient pas dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la demande adressée par l'une des parties à l'autre de constituer un tribunal arbitral, le soin de procéder aux nominations nécessaires sera confié à une tierce puissance choisie d'un commun accord par les parties ;

2. Si l'accord ne s'établit pas à ce sujet, chaque partie désignera une puissance différente et les nominations seront faites de concert par les puissances ainsi choisies ;

3. Si, dans un délai de trois mois, les puissances ainsi désignées n'ont pu tomber d'accord, les nominations nécessaires seront faites par le président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. Si

celui-ci est empêché ou s'il est ressortissant de l'une des parties, les nominations seront faites par le membre le plus âgé de la Cour qui n'est ressortissant d'aucune des parties.

(c) Il sera pourvu dans le plus bref délai aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès ou de démission ou de quelque autre empêchement, en suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

Dans le cas où les deux hautes parties contractantes conviendraient de porter le litige devant un tribunal arbitral, elles rédigeront en même temps un compromis qui devra déterminer l'objet du litige et la procédure à suivre.

A défaut d'indications ou de précisions suffisantes dans le compromis, relativement aux points indiqués dans le paragraphe précédent, il sera fait application dans la mesure nécessaire, des dispositions de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Dans le silence du compromis, le tribunal appliquera les règles de fond énumérées dans l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. En tant qu'il n'existe pas de pareilles règles applicables au différend, le tribunal jugera *ex æquo et bono*.

Article 30. Si, à l'expiration du mois qui suivra la clôture des travaux de la commission de conciliation, les parties ne se sont pas mises d'accord, conformément à l'article 28 ci-dessus, pour porter le différend devant un tribunal arbitral, le différend sera régi par l'article 15 du Pacte de la Société des Nations.

Article 31. (1) Dans tous les cas où le différend fait l'objet d'une procédure arbitrale ou judiciaire, notamment si la question au sujet de laquelle les parties sont divisées résulte d'actes déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être, la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, statuant conformément à l'article 41 de son Statut, ou le tribunal arbitral, indiquera, dans le plus bref délai possible, quelles mesures provisoires doivent être prises. Les parties seront tenues de s'y conformer.

(2) Si la commission de conciliation se trouve saisie du différend, elle pourra recommander aux parties les mesures provisoires qu'elle estimera utiles.

(3) Les parties s'engagent à s'abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à l'exécution de la décision judiciaire ou arbitrale ou aux arrangements proposés par la commission de conciliation et, en général, à ne procéder à aucun acte, de quelque nature qu'il soit, susceptible d'aggraver ou d'étendre le différend.

Article 32. Si la sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale déclarait qu'une

décision prise ou une mesure ordonnée par une autorité judiciaire ou toute autre autorité de l'une des parties en litige se trouve entièrement ou partiellement en opposition avec le droit international, et si le droit constitutionnel de la dite partie ne permettait pas ou ne permettait qu'imparfaitement d'effacer les conséquences de cette décision ou de cette mesure, les parties conviennent qu'il devra être accordé, par la sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale à la partie lésée, une satisfaction équitable.

Article 33. (1) Le présent Pacte sera applicable entre les hautes parties contractantes, encore qu'une tierce puissance ait un intérêt dans le différend.

Article 34. Les différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou à l'application du présent Pacte, y compris ceux relatifs à la qualification des litiges et la portée des réserves, seront soumis à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 35. Le présent Pacte, dont l'interprétation et l'application ne pourront porter aucune atteinte aux droits et obligations des hautes parties contractantes en vertu du Pacte de la Société des Nations, ainsi qu'en vertu des dispositions des traités conclus antérieurement par les hautes parties contractantes, et communiqués pour l'enregistrement à la Société des Nations, sera enregistré conformément à l'article 18 du Pacte.

Article 36. Le Pacte sera ratifié dans le plus bref délai possible et entrera en vigueur immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications qui aura lieu à Athènes. Il aura une durée de 5 (cinq) ans, à partir de la date de l'échéance des instruments de ratification. S'il n'est pas dénoncé six mois avant l'expiration de ce délai, il restera en vigueur pour une période de 5 ans encore.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent Pacte.

Fait à Belgrade, le vingt-sept mars mil neuf cent vingt-neuf.

2. SPEECH BY M. VENIZELOS IN THE GREEK CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, April 1, 1929¹

Le gouvernement est heureux, Messieurs les députés, de se trouver en situation de demander à la Représentation Nationale la ratification du pacte d'amitié qui a été signé, il y a peu de jours, à Belgrade par le représentant de la Grèce d'une part et le représentant du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes d'autre part. Ce pacte vient couronner la signature des protocoles qui complètent et expliquent la convention de 1923, assurant la libre

¹ *Messenger d'Athènes*, April 2, 1929.

importation et exportation du commerce serbe par Salonique que la Grèce avait promises par le traité d'alliance de 1913. Les protocoles seront publiés demain. Vous pourrez ainsi vous assurer que, par l'entente réalisée, pendant que toute garantie est assurée à la libre importation et exportation du commerce serbe, les droits de la souveraineté hellénique demeurent inviolés.

Par la signature de ces protocoles et du pacte d'amitié qui est soumis à la ratification de la Chambre, nos rapports avec le Royaume des S.C.S. sont ramenés au point de cordialité où ils se trouvaient avant la dénonciation en 1924 de notre traité d'alliance avec la Serbie. Cette dénonciation avait créé une atmosphère de défiance qui empêchait ces deux États, que lient des liens d'amitié traditionnelle, de s'entendre sur la question du libre transit du commerce serbe par le port de Salonique. Et quand, aux derniers jours de la dictature, une entente fut réalisée, cette entente malheureuse aurait empoisonné définitivement et irrévocablement les rapports entre les deux pays, si le renversement de la dictature n'était survenu à temps pour empêcher l'accord en question de devenir internationalement obligatoire pour la Grèce.

Heureusement, avec le cours du temps, les malentendus se sont dissipés. L'accord devint possible sur la base du principe reconnu que la Grèce devait céder au Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes toute facilité possible pour le libre transit de son commerce, par le port de Salonique et le territoire grec, et le Royaume des S.C.S. devait de son côté renoncer à toute prétention touchant la souveraineté grecque ou simplement la susceptibilité grecque.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire avec quelle joie particulière cet accord est salué par le chef du gouvernement actuel. On connaît, même au delà des frontières grecques, ses sentiments de sincère amitié, d'affection et d'estime envers la Serbie d'hier, le Royaume actuel des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. Ce qui est cause d'ailleurs que cette entente est saluée en parfaite unanimité par l'opinion publique est le fait que, si, durant la guerre mondiale les Grecs se sont trouvés en divergence fort aiguë quant à l'interprétation de l'alliance gréco-serbe, après la guerre il s'est manifesté chez le peuple grec le désir unanime de renouer et continuer dans l'avenir les liens d'amitié qui ont uni presque sans interruption les deux pays depuis qu'il y a une centaine d'années, ils ont repris leur libre vie nationale.

Ce qui nous rend particulièrement heureux c'est que, de même que tous les États intéressés ont reconnu que le pacte d'amitié gréco-italien ne renfermait de pointe contre aucun tiers, de même l'on reconnaît aujourd'hui que le pacte entre la Grèce et la Yugo-

slavie ne se tourne contre personne. Ils servent tous les deux efficacement les intérêts de la paix dans le Proche-Orient et, je peux dire sans exagération, de la paix européenne en général. Nous nous estimons heureux si nous arrivons à compléter le règlement de nos rapports avec nos autres voisins par la signature de pactes d'amitié, d'abord avec la République Turque et ensuite avec le Royaume de Bulgarie.

La signature d'un pacte d'amitié gréco-turc fut entravée jusqu'ici non par les mauvaises dispositions des deux gouvernements ni par leur indifférence. Je suis convaincu, qu'à Angora autant qu'à Athènes, on recherche sincèrement le rapprochement amical des deux pays. Mais les parties ont reconnu que, pour être solide, ce rapprochement devait être précédé du règlement des grands problèmes économiques nés de l'échange obligatoire des populations et qui concernent les intérêts de centaines de milliers de citoyens d'un pays comme de l'autre. Les deux gouvernements voient plus loin que les particuliers directement intéressés et ils sont disposés, j'en suis sûr, à faire de part et d'autre toutes les concessions nécessaires pour le règlement de ces questions financières. Mais tous les deux sont des pays démocratiques, et ne peuvent faire autrement que prendre en considération les conceptions des intéressés sans que cela veuille dire qu'ils seront menés absolument par elles.

C'est pourquoi je me tourne vers la presse grecque pour l'assurer qu'elle commet une injustice en soutenant que la difficulté d'un accord provient du manque de bonne volonté de la part du gouvernement d'Angora. La presse turque commet également une injustice lorsqu'elle attribue les difficultés de l'entente au manque de bonne volonté du cabinet d'Athènes. Heureusement le gouvernement turc vient de nous soumettre un nouveau projet de règlement définitif de ces complexes questions économiques. Nous examinerons ce projet avec toute l'attention qu'il comporte et le vif désir d'arriver, si possible, à une solution satisfaisante pour les deux parties, une solution permettant de conclure immédiatement un pacte d'amitié gréco-turc. Ce pacte, mettant définitivement terme à un antagonisme séculaire entre les deux nations, leur permettra de collaborer sincèrement pour sauvegarder la paix dans le Proche-Orient et de se consacrer à leur œuvre de reconstitution intérieure, à laquelle l'une et l'autre sont également intéressées.¹

Notre entente avec la Bulgarie avait commencé sous de bons auspices, lorsque par malheur a surgi la question d'un nouvel ajournement du paiement des réparations bulgares ; il a réduit les espérances

¹ The Greco-Turkish Agreement was finally signed on June 9, 1930, and the text will be included in *Documents on International Affairs*, 1930.

d'une heureuse issue de ces négociations. La Grèce est décidée à remplir intégralement les obligations qu'elle a assumées par l'accord Caphandaris-Molloff. Mais elle ne peut pas admettre qu'elle exécute, quant à elle, les engagements qu'elle a pris vis-à-vis de la Bulgarie par cet accord, découlant de la convention sur l'émigration volontaire des populations grecques et bulgares, qui fut signée en même temps que le traité de Neuilly et en forme d'une annexe, tandis qu'elle ne recevra pas d'autre part les réparations qui lui furent adjugées par ce même traité de Neuilly. Du reste, pour faciliter le règlement de cette difficulté, nous avons proposé récemment que la somme qui nous est due par la Bulgarie en vertu du traité de Neuilly et de l'accord de Spa, nous soit payée sur le montant des réparations allemandes. Ainsi sera supprimée une des raisons qui entravent l'établissement de rapports absolument harmonieux entre tous les peuples balkaniques.

De toute façon, la conclusion du pacte d'amitié avec l'Italie d'une part, avec la Yougoslavie¹ de l'autre, venant après la signature du pacte gréco-roumain,² nous donne, à elle seule, le sentiment de la sécurité extérieure. Lorsqu'à ce sentiment l'on ajoutera celui de la sûreté intérieure qu'a procurée au pays l'avènement d'un gouvernement appelé à appliquer un programme politique intégral qui fut approuvé par la grande majorité du peuple hellène, nous pouvons être sûrs que, malgré les difficultés qui se présentent encore, le temps n'est pas loin où notre pays verra des jours meilleurs.

VI. LITTLE ENTENTE

The Little Entente was formed immediately after the war for the purpose of preserving the *status quo* in Central Europe created by the treaties of peace, more particularly those of St. Germain and the Trianon.

The treaties establishing the Little Entente are as follows:

CZECHOSLOVAKIA and YUGOSLAVIA. August 14, 1920

CZECHOSLOVAKIA and RUMANIA. April 23, 1921.

RUMANIA and YUGOSLAVIA. June 7, 1921.

This Treaty of Conciliation, Arbitration and Judicial Settlement places the Little Entente on a more permanent basis.³

Ratifications were exchanged on November 16, 1929, during the Conference of the Little Entente at Bucharest.

¹ For text see above, p. 130.

² For text see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, p. 113.

³ See *Survey of International Affairs* for 1920-3, Part III, section (iii) 2; also see *Information on the Problem of Security*, by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett and F. E. Langermann, pp. 187-99.

TEXT OF THE GENERAL ACT OF CONCILIATION, ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RUMANIA
AND YUGOSLAVIA; SIGNED AT BELGRADE, May 21, 1929.¹

*Sa Majesté le Roi des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes,
Sa Majesté le Roi de Roumanie*

et

Le Président de la République Tchèqueoslovaque

S'inspirant des heureuses relations d'amitié qui unissent leurs nations respectives et pénétrés de l'esprit de confiante cordialité qui caractérise leurs rapports réciproques;

Sincèrement désireux d'assurer, par des procédures pacifiques, le règlement des différends qui viendraient à surgir entre leurs pays;

Constatant que le respect des droits établis par les traités ou résultant du droit des gens est obligatoire pour les tribunaux internationaux;

Reconnaissant que les droits appartenant à chaque État ne sauraient être modifiés que de son consentement;

Considérant que la sincère observation, sous les auspices de la Société des Nations, des procédures pacifiques permet d'arriver au règlement de tous les différends internationaux;

Appréciant hautement la recommandation faite par l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, dans sa résolution en date du 26 septembre 1928, à tous les États de conclure des conventions de règlement pacifique des différends internationaux;

Ont décidé de réaliser dans une convention leur intention commune et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires:

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DES SERBES, CROATES ET SLOVÈNES:

Monsieur KOSTA KOUMANOUDI, Docteur en Droit, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères p.i. du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes;

SA MAJESTÉ LE ROI DE ROUMANIE:

Monsieur GEORGES MIRONESCU, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Royaume de Roumanie;

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE TCHÉCOSLOVAQUE:

Monsieur le Docteur ÉDOUARD BENÈS, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la République Tchèqueoslovaque;

¹ Official French Text issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Belgrade.

Lesquels, après avoir déposé leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Chapitre I.—Du Règlement Pacifique en Général

Article 1

Les différends de toute nature qui viendraient à s'élever entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes ou entre deux d'entre Elles et qui n'auraient pu être résolus par la voie diplomatique seront soumis, dans les conditions fixées par la présente Convention, à un règlement judiciaire ou arbitral, précédé, selon les cas, obligatoirement ou facultativement, d'un recours à la procédure de conciliation.

Cette disposition ne s'applique pas aux différends nés de faits qui sont antérieurs à la présente Convention et qui appartiennent au passé ainsi qu'aux différends portant sur des questions que le droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive des États.

Article 2

1. Les différends pour la solution desquels une procédure spéciale serait prévue par d'autres conventions en vigueur entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes seront réglés conformément aux dispositions de ces conventions.

2. La présente Convention ne porte pas atteinte aux accords en vigueur établissant pour les Hautes Parties Contractantes une procédure de conciliation ou, en matière d'arbitrage et de règlement judiciaire, des engagements assurant la solution du différend. Toutefois, si ces accords ne prévoient qu'une procédure de conciliation, après que cette procédure aura échoué, les dispositions de la présente Convention relatives au règlement judiciaire ou arbitral recevront application.

Article 3

1. S'il s'agit d'un différend dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes, relève de la compétence des instances judiciaires, cette Partie pourra s'opposer à ce que ce différend soit soumis aux diverses procédures prévues par la présente Convention.

2. S'il s'agit d'un différend qui relève de la compétence des autorités administratives, le différend ne pourra être soumis aux diverses procédures prévues par la présente Convention avant qu'une décision définitive ait été rendue dans les délais raisonnables par l'autorité compétente.

La Partie qui, dans ce sens, voudra recourir aux procédures prévues par la présente Convention, devra notifier à l'autre Partie son intention dans un délai d'un an, à partir de la décision susvisée.

Chapitre II.—Du Règlement Judiciaire

Article 4

Tous différends au sujet desquels les Parties se contesteraient réciproquement un droit seront soumis pour jugement à la Cour permanente de Justice Internationale, à moins que les Parties ne tombent d'accord, dans les termes prévus ci-après, pour recourir à un Tribunal arbitral.

Il est entendu que les différends ci-dessus visés comprennent notamment ceux que mentionne l'article 36 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 5

Si les Parties sont d'accord pour soumettre les différends visés à l'article précédent à un tribunal arbitral, Elles rédigeront un compromis dans lequel Elles fixeront l'objet du litige, le choix des arbitres et la procédure à suivre. A défaut d'indications ou de précisions suffisantes dans le compromis, il sera fait application dans la mesure nécessaire des dispositions de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux. Dans le silence du compromis quant aux règles de fond à appliquer par les arbitres, le Tribunal appliquera les règles de fond énumérées dans l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 6

A défaut d'accord entre les Parties sur le compromis visé à l'article précédent ou à défaut de désignation d'arbitres et après un préavis de trois mois, l'une ou l'autre d'entre Elles aura la faculté de porter directement, par voie de requête, le différend devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 7

1. Pour les différends prévus à l'article 4, avant toute procédure devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, ou avant toute procédure arbitrale, les Parties pourront, d'un commun accord, recourir à la procédure de conciliation prévue par la présente Convention.

2. En cas de recours à la conciliation et d'échec de cette procédure,

aucune des Parties ne pourra porter le différend devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ou demander la constitution du Tribunal arbitral visé à l'article 5 avant l'expiration du délai d'un mois à compter de la clôture des travaux de la Commission de Conciliation.

Chapitre III.—De la Conciliation

Article 8

Tous différends entre les Parties, autres que ceux prévus à l'article 4, seront soumis obligatoirement à une procédure de conciliation avant de pouvoir faire l'objet d'un règlement arbitral.

Article 9

Les différends visés à l'article précédent seront portés devant une Commission de Conciliation permanente ou spéciale constituée par les Hautes Parties Contractantes.

Article 10

Sur la demande, adressée par une Partie Contractante à l'autre Partie, il devra être constitué, dans les six mois, une Commission permanente de Conciliation.

Article 11

Sauf accord contraire des Parties, la Commission de Conciliation sera constituée comme suit :

1. La Commission comprendra cinq membres. Les Parties en nommeront chacune un qui pourra être choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs. Les trois autres Commissaires seront choisis d'un commun accord parmi les ressortissants de tierces Puissances. Ces derniers devront être de nationalités différentes, ne pas avoir leur résidence habituelle sur le territoire des Parties intéressées, ni se trouver à leur service. Parmi eux, les Hautes Parties Contractantes désigneront le Président de la Commission.

2. Les Commissaires seront nommés pour trois ans. Ils seront ré-éligibles. Les Commissaires nommés en commun pourront être remplacés au cours de leur mandat, de l'accord des Parties. Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes pourra toujours procéder au remplacement du Commissaire nommé par Elle. Nonobstant leur remplacement, les Commissaires resteront en fonctions pour l'achèvement de leurs travaux en cours.

3. Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès ou de démission ou de quelque autre empêchement, ensuivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

Article 12

Si, lorsqu'il s'élève un différend, il n'existe pas une Commission permanente de Conciliation nommée par les Parties, une Commission spéciale sera constituée pour l'examen du différend dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la demande adressée par l'une des Parties à l'autre. Les nominations se feront conformément aux dispositions de l'article précédent, à moins que les Parties n'en décident autrement.

Article 13

1. Si la nomination des Commissaires à désigner en commun n'intervient pas dans les délais prévus aux articles 10 et 12, le soin de procéder aux nominations nécessaires sera confié à une tierce Puissance choisie d'un commun accord par les Parties ou, si celles-ci le demandent, au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

2. Si l'accord ne s'établit pas au sujet d'aucun de ces procédés, chaque Partie désignera une Puissance différente et les nominations seront faites de concert par les Puissances ainsi choisies.

3. Si, dans un délai de trois mois, ces deux Puissances n'ont pu tomber d'accord, chacune d'Elles présentera des candidats en nombre égal à celui des membres à désigner. Le sort déterminera lesquels des candidats ainsi présentés seront admis.

Article 14

1. La Commission de Conciliation sera saisie par voie de requête adressée au Président, par les deux Parties agissant d'un commun accord ou, à défaut, par l'une ou l'autre des Parties.

2. La requête, après avoir exposé sommairement l'objet du litige, contiendra l'invitation à la Commission de procéder à toutes mesures propres à conduire à une conciliation.

3. Si la requête émane d'une seule des Parties, elle sera notifiée par celle-ci sans délai à l'autre Partie.

Article 15

1. Dans un délai de quinze jours, à partir de la date où l'une des Parties aura porté un différend devant une Commission permanente de Conciliation chacune des Parties pourra, pour l'examen de ce différend, remplacer son Commissaire par une personne possédant une compétence spéciale dans la matière.

2. La Partie qui usera de ce droit en fera immédiatement la noti-

fication à l'autre Partie ; celle-ci aura, dans ce cas, la faculté d'agir de même dans un délai de quinze jours à compter de la date où la notification lui sera parvenue.

Article 16

La Commission de Conciliation se réunira; sauf accord contraire des Parties, au lieu désigné par son Président.

Article 17

Les travaux de la Commission de Conciliation ne seront publics qu'en vertu d'une décision prise par la Commission avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Article 18

1. Sauf accord contraire des Parties, la Commission de Conciliation réglera elle-même sa procédure qui, dans tous les cas, devra être contradictoire. En matière d'enquête, la Commission, si elle n'en décide autrement à l'unanimité, se conformera aux dispositions du titre III de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

2. Les Parties seront représentées auprès de la Commission de Conciliation par des agents ayant mission de servir d'intermédiaires entre Elles et la Commission: Elles pourront, en outre, se faire assister par des conseils et experts nommés par Elles à cet effet et demander l'audition de toutes personnes dont le témoignage leur paraîtrait utile.

3. La Commission aura, de son côté, la faculté de demander des explications orales aux agents, conseils et experts des deux Parties, ainsi qu'à toutes personnes qu'elle jugerait utile de faire comparaître avec l'assentiment de leur gouvernement.

Article 19

Sauf accord contraire des Parties, les décisions de la Commission de Conciliation seront prises à la majorité des voix et la Commission ne pourra se prononcer sur le fond du différend que si tous ses membres sont présents.

Article 20

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à faciliter les travaux de la Commission de Conciliation et, en particulier, à lui fournir, dans la plus large mesure possible, tous documents et informations utiles, ainsi qu'à user des moyens dont Elles disposent pour lui permettre de procéder sur leur territoire et selon leur législation à la citation et à l'audition de témoins ou d'experts et à des transports sur les lieux.

Article 21

1. Pendant la durée de leurs travaux, chacun des Commissaires recevra une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté du commun accord des Parties, qui en supporteront chacune une part égale.

2. Les frais généraux occasionnés par le fonctionnement de la Commission seront répartis de la même façon.

Article 22

1. La Commission de Conciliation aura pour tâche d'élucider les questions en litige, de recueillir à cette fin toutes les informations utiles, par voie d'enquête ou autrement, et de s'efforcer de concilier les Parties. Elle pourra, après examen de l'affaire, exposer aux Parties les termes de l'arrangement qui lui paraîtrait convenable et leur impartir un délai pour se prononcer.

2. A la fin de ses travaux, la Commission dressera un procès-verbal constatant, suivant le cas, soit que les Parties se sont arrangées et, s'il y a lieu, les conditions de l'arrangement, soit que les Parties n'ont pu être conciliées. Le procès-verbal ne mentionnera pas si les décisions de la Commission ont été prises à l'unanimité ou à la majorité.

3. Les travaux de la Commission devront, à moins que les Parties n'en conviennent autrement, être terminés dans un délai de six mois à compter du jour où la Commission aura été saisie du différend.

Article 23

Le procès-verbal de la Commission sera porté sans délai à la connaissance des Parties. Il appartient aux Parties d'en décider la publication.

Chapitre IV.—Du Règlement Arbitral

Article 24

Si, dans le mois qui suivra la clôture des travaux de la Commission de Conciliation visée dans les articles précédents, les Parties ne se sont pas entendues, la question sera portée devant un tribunal arbitral constitué, sauf accord contraire des Parties, de la manière indiquée ci-après.

Si, toutefois, les deux Parties sont d'accord, la question si elle est d'ordre politique pourra être soumise au Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui statuera conformément à l'article 15 du Pacte.

Article 25

Le tribunal arbitral comprendra cinq membres. Les Parties en nommeront chacune un qui pourra être choisi parmi leurs nationaux respectifs. Les deux autres arbitres et le surarbitre seront choisis d'un commun accord parmi les ressortissants de tierces Puissances. Ces derniers devront être de nationalités différentes, ne pas avoir leur résidence habituelle sur le territoire des Parties intéressées, ni se trouver à leur service.

Article 26

1. Si la nomination des membres du tribunal arbitral n'intervient pas dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la demande adressée par l'une des Parties à l'autre de constituer un tribunal arbitral, le soin de procéder aux nominations nécessaires sera confié à une tierce Puissance choisie d'un commun accord par les Parties.

2. Si l'accord ne s'établit pas à ce sujet, chaque Partie désignera une Puissance différente et les nominations seront faites de concert par les Puissances ainsi choisies.

3. Si, dans un délai de trois mois, les Puissances ainsi désignées n'ont pu tomber d'accord, les nominations nécessaires seront faites par le Président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. Si celui-ci est empêché, ou, s'il est ressortissant de l'une des Parties, les nominations seront faites par le vice-président. Si celui-ci est empêché ou s'il est ressortissant de l'une des Parties, les nominations seront faites par le membre le plus âgé de la Cour qui n'est ressortissant d'aucune des Parties.

Article 27

Il sera pourvu, dans le plus bref délai, aux vacances qui viendraient à se produire par suite de décès ou de démission, ou de quelque autre empêchement, en suivant le mode fixé pour les nominations.

Article 28

Les Parties rédigeront un compromis déterminant l'objet du litige et la procédure à suivre.

Article 29

A défaut d'indication ou de précisions suffisantes dans le compromis, relativement aux points indiqués dans l'article précédent, il sera fait application, dans la mesure nécessaire, des dispositions de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour le règlement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

Article 30

Faute de conclusion d'un compromis dans un délai de trois mois à partir de la constitution du tribunal, celui-ci sera saisi par requête de l'une ou l'autre des Parties.

Article 31

Dans le silence du compromis ou à défaut de compromis, le tribunal appliquera les règles de fond énumérées dans l'article 38 du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale. En tant qu'il n'existe pas de pareilles règles applicables au différend, le tribunal jugera *ex æquo et bono*.

Chapitre V.—Des Différends Entre les Trois Parties Contractantes

Article 32

Au cas où il s'élève un différend entre toutes les Hautes Parties Contractantes, les modalités suivantes seront observées pour l'application des procédures décrites dans les dispositions qui précèdent :

Pour la procédure de conciliation, il sera toujours constitué une Commission spéciale. Sa composition variera suivant que les Parties auront toutes des intérêts distincts ou que deux d'entre Elles feront cause commune.

Dans le premier cas, les Parties nommeront chacune un Commissaire et désigneront en commun des Commissaires ressortissants de tierces Puissances, dont le nombre sera supérieur d'un à celui des Commissaires nommés séparément par les Parties.

Dans le second cas, les Parties faisant cause commune se mettront d'accord pour nommer en commun leur propre Commissaire et concurremment avec l'autre Partie pour la désignation des Commissaires tiers.

Dans l'une et l'autre hypothèse, les Parties, à moins qu'Elles n'en conviennent autrement, appliqueront les articles 12 et suivants de la présente Convention dans la mesure où ils sont compatibles avec les dispositions du présent article.

Pour la procédure judiciaire, il sera fait application du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Pour la procédure arbitrale, à défaut d'accord des Parties sur la composition du tribunal, s'il s'agit de différends visés à l'article 4, chacune d'Elles aura la faculté de porter directement, par voie de requête, le différend devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ; s'il s'agit de différends visés à l'article 8, il sera fait applica-

tion des articles 25 et suivants, mais chacune des Parties ayant des intérêts distincts nommera un arbitre et le nombre des arbitres nommés séparément par les Parties sera toujours inférieur d'un à celui des autres arbitres.

Chaptire VI.—Dispositions Générales

Article 33

1. Dans tous les cas où le différend fait l'objet d'une procédure arbitrale ou judiciaire, notamment, si la question au sujet de laquelle les Parties sont divisées résulte d'actes déjà effectués ou sur le point de l'être, la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, statuant conformément à l'article 41 de son Statut, ou le tribunal arbitral, indiquera dans le plus bref délai possible les mesures provisoires qui doivent être prises. Les Parties seront tenues de s'y conformer.

2. Si la Commission de Conciliation se trouve saisie du différend, elle pourra recommander aux Parties les mesures provisoires qu'elle estimera utiles.

3. Les Parties s'engagent à s'abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d'avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à l'exécution de la décision judiciaire ou arbitrale ou aux arrangements proposés par la Commission de Conciliation et, en général, à ne procéder à aucun acte, de quelque nature qu'il soit, susceptible d'aggraver ou d'étendre le différend.

Article 34

Si la sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale déclarait qu'une décision prise ou une mesure ordonnée par une autorité judiciaire ou toute autre autorité de l'une des Parties en litige se trouve entièrement ou partiellement en opposition avec le droit international, et si le droit constitutionnel de la dite Partie ne permettait pas ou ne permettait qu'imparfaitement d'effacer les conséquences de cette décision ou de cette mesure, les Parties conviennent qu'il devra être accordé par la sentence judiciaire ou arbitrale, à la Partie lésée, une satisfaction équitable.

Article 35

1. La présente Convention sera applicable entre les Hautes Parties Contractantes encore qu'une tierce Puissance ait un intérêt dans le différend.

2. Dans la procédure de conciliation, les Parties pourront d'un commun accord inviter une tierce Puissance.

3. Dans la procédure judiciaire ou arbitrale, si une tierce Puissance estime que, dans un différend, un intérêt d'ordre juridique est pour

elle en cause, elle peut adresser à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ou au tribunal arbitral une requête à fin d'intervention.

La Cour ou le tribunal décide.

4. Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'interprétation d'une convention à laquelle auront à participer d'autres États que les Parties en cause, le Greffe de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale ou le tribunal arbitral les avertit dans délai.

Chacun d'eux aura le droit d'intervenir et, s'il exerce cette faculté, l'interprétation contenue dans la sentence est obligatoire à son égard.

Article 36

Les différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou à l'application de la présente Convention, y compris ceux relatifs à la qualification des litiges, seront soumis à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Article 37

La présente Convention, conforme au Pacte de la Société des Nations, ne sera pas interprétée comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre, à tout moment, les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

Article 38

1. La présente Convention sera ratifiée et l'échange des ratifications aura lieu . . . à

Elle sera enregistrée au Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

2. La présente Convention est conclue pour une durée de cinq ans à compter de la date de l'échange des ratifications.

3. Si elle n'est pas dénoncée six mois au moins avant l'expiration de ce terme, elle demeurera en vigueur pour une nouvelle période de cinq ans et ainsi de suite.

4. Nonobstant la dénonciation par l'une des Parties Contractantes, les procédures engagées au moment de l'expiration du terme de la Convention continueront jusqu'à leur achèvement normal.

EN FOI DE QUOI les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé la présente Convention.

Fait à BELGRADE le 21 mai mil neuf cent vingt-neuf, en trois exemplaires identiques.

DR. K. KOUMANOUDI, m.p. L.S.
G. MIRONESCU, m.p. L.S.
É. BENÈS, m.p. L.S.

VII. POLAND

TEXT OF THE GERMAN-POLISH AGREEMENT SIGNED AT WARSAW,
OCTOBER 31, 1929¹

I

Le Gouvernement de la République de Pologne et le Gouvernement du Reich font les déclarations ci-après qui seront déposées à la Conférence de La Haye et prendront effet avec la mise en vigueur du Plan Young.

II

Le Gouvernement allemand déclare renoncer à toutes réclamations de caractère financier ou concernant les biens ayant trait à la guerre ou au Traité de Paix soit de l'État, soit de ses ressortissants (personnes physiques et morales) qui auraient été, ou qui pourraient être, adressées directement ou indirectement à la Pologne pour quelque opération que ce soit, exécutée avant la mise en vigueur du Plan Young, y compris les réclamations reconnues par des accords spéciaux se rapportant à ces opérations.

En ce qui concerne les réclamations de caractère financier ou concernant les biens présentées par la Pologne et provenant soit de l'État, soit de ses ressortissants (personnes physiques et morales) ayant trait à la guerre ou au Traité de Paix, réclamations qui auraient été, ou qui pourraient être, adressées directement ou indirectement à l'Allemagne pour quelque opération que ce soit, exécutée avant la mise en vigueur du Plan Young, y compris les réclamations reconnues par des accords spéciaux se rapportant à ces opérations, le Gouvernement polonais reconnaît les dispositions du paragraphe 143, chapitre IX, du Plan Young.

Sans préjudice des dispositions de l'art. V de cet Arrangement, les présentes déclarations constituent un désistement complet et définitif des réclamations susvisées quels qu'en soient les intéressés.

III

Le Gouvernement polonais déclare renoncer à toute liquidation que le Gouvernement polonais avait exécutée ou pourrait exécuter en

¹ This agreement was drawn up in the German language and its official text may be found in the *Reichsgesetzblatt* (Teil 11), March 19, 1930, no. 7. The above French translation was made for the Second Hague Conference and is reprinted here from the *Bulletin* of the International Intermediary Institute for January 1930. For comments of the German Chancellor on this agreement see p. 101.

se prévalant ou en se conformant aux dispositions de l'art. 92 et 297b du Traité de Paix des biens, droits et intérêts allemands en Pologne se trouvant encore entre les mains de leurs propriétaires ou anciens propriétaires en date du 1er septembre 1929.

Toutes les mesures de conservation appliquées conjointement avec la procédure de liquidation susvisée perdront leur efficacité au moment de la mise en vigueur du présent Arrangement.

Les biens en question seront livrés dans l'état de fait et de droit où ils se trouvent, avec les droits et avantages qui y sont attachés et les charges qui les grèvent, mais sans qu'il puisse être fait de retenues sur ces biens pour les frais et indemnités de séquestre et de liquidation.

IV

Les différends qui viendraient à s'élever au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'application du présent Arrangement, et qui ne pourraient pas être réglés par voie diplomatique, seront soumis, sur la demande d'une des Parties contractantes, à un tribunal arbitral.

A cette fin chaque Partie nommera un arbitre. Les deux arbitres choisiront un président neutre. A défaut d'une entente sur la personne du dit président neutre, le président de la Confédération helvétique sera prié de le nommer.

V

Les deux Gouvernements, immédiatement après la signature du présent Arrangement, s'entendront pour déterminer les mesures à prendre en ce qui concerne le fonctionnement ultérieur du Tribunal mixte polono-allemand.

VI

En exécution de l'article 1er, le présent Arrangement ainsi que son protocole final seront ratifiés et mis en vigueur par les Parties simultanément avec la mise en vigueur du Plan Young.

Fait à Varsovie, en double exemplaire, le trente-et-un octobre mil neuf cent vingt-neuf.

(signé) RAUSCHER.

(signé) AUGUST ZALESKI.

PROTOCÔLE FINAL AD. II DE L'ARRANGEMENT POLONO-ALLEMAND DU 31 OCTOBRE 1929

1. La déclaration allemande visée à l'art. II du dit Arrangement comprend également toutes les réclamations des ressortissants alle-

mands contre le Gouvernement polonais et basées sur les articles 92 al. 4, 297 h., 304 et 305 du Traité de Versailles aussi bien celles qui sont déjà portées devant le Tribunal arbitral mixte polono-allemand que celles qui pourraient l'être et qui résultent du passé.

2. La déclaration polonaise contenue dans l'art. II de l'Arrangement comprend également toutes les réclamations des ressortissants polonais introduites devant le même Tribunal contre le Gouvernement allemand et basées sur les articles 297, 298, 300, 302, 304 et 305 du Traité de Versailles aussi bien celles qui sont déjà portées devant le dit Tribunal que celles qui pourraient l'être et qui résultent du passé.

3. Les demandes résultant du régime transitoire de la Convention de Genève du 15 mai 1922 et pour lesquelles sont compétents le Tribunal arbitral à Beuthen ou la Commission mixte à Katowice ne sont pas comprises dans le désistement réciproque.

4. Les déclarations réciproques visées à l'art. II du dit Arrangement comprennent non seulement les demandes des ressortissants (personnes physiques et morales) envers les Gouvernements respectifs, mais aussi les demandes d'ordre financier d'un Gouvernement envers l'autre Gouvernement, pour leur propre compte, quelle qu'en soit la base en droit ou en fait.

Varsovie, 31 octobre 1929.

(signé) AUGUST ZALESKI.

(signé) ULRICH RAUSCHER.

VIII. U.S.S.R.

When the Soviet-German Treaty of Non-Aggression was signed at Berlin on April 24, 1926, it was accompanied by an exchange of Notes to the effect that the High Contracting Parties would at once embark upon negotiations for a general treaty for the peaceful solution of any conflicts arising between them, special attention being given to the principle of arbitration.

The present Treaty of Conciliation signed on January 24, 1929, is the outcome of these Notes. It should be noted that the Agreement is one of *conciliation* and that the principle of arbitration upon which emphasis was laid in the original notes has been ignored.

The Treaty, having been ratified on April 12, 1929, was called into operation in June 1930 as a result of the disputes arising between the two States regarding commercial concessions in general, and the Soviet action in the Lena gold-fields in particular. The Commission met for the first time on June 16, and, whereas the Treaty provided (Article 2) that the place of the first meeting should be decided by lot, the German Government waived this provision and accepted the Soviet proposal that the Commission should sit in Moscow.

1. TEXT OF TREATY OF CONCILIATION BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND GERMANY. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, JANUARY 24, 1929 ¹

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the German Reich, animated by a desire further to strengthen the friendly relations which exist between the two countries, have decided, in execution of the Agreement reached in the exchange of Notes of April 24, 1926, to conclude an agreement for a procedure of conciliation, and with this object have appointed their plenipotentiaries.

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Herr Maxim Litvinov, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Commissar *ad interim* for Foreign Affairs, and

The President of the German Reich:

The German Ambassador in Moscow;

Dr. Herbert von Dirksen;

who after communicating their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following terms:

Article 1

Disputes of all kinds, particularly differences of opinion which arise regarding the interpretation of the bilateral treaties which exist between the two Contracting Parties or regarding past or future agreements concerning their elucidation or execution, shall, in the event of difficulties arising over their solution through diplomatic channels, be submitted to a procedure of conciliation in accordance with the following provisions.

Article 2

The procedure of conciliation shall be before a Commission of Conciliation.

The Commission of Conciliation shall not be permanent, but shall be formed expressly for each meeting. It shall meet once a year in the middle of the year, in ordinary session, the exact date of which shall be arranged each year by agreement between the two Governments.

¹ This Treaty was originally drawn up in German and Russian, and the above translation has been made from the German by the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

There shall be extraordinary sessions whenever in the opinion of the two Governments special need arises.

The meetings of the Commission of Conciliation shall be held alternately in Moscow and Berlin. The place of the first meeting shall be decided by lot.

A session shall ordinarily last not longer than fourteen days.

Article 3

For each meeting each Government shall appoint two members of the Commission of Conciliation.

At each meeting the chair shall be taken by one of the members of that country in whose territory the meeting is taking place.

Either Party shall have the right on occasion to send experts to discuss one or other of the questions on the Agenda, who shall be empowered to speak during the session of the Commission of Conciliation.

Article 4

Not later than fourteen days before the date of the meeting of the ordinary session of the Commission of Conciliation, each of the two Parties shall communicate to the other, through the ordinary diplomatic channels, a list of the questions which it wishes to discuss at that session.

In the event of a proposal to convene an extraordinary session, the Government which shall have made the proposal shall explain to the other Government the special circumstances underlying the proposal. The Commission shall meet at the latest within one month of the communication of the proposal.

Article 5

The task of the Commission of Conciliation shall be to submit to the two Governments a solution of the questions laid before it which shall be fair and acceptable to both Parties, with special regard to the avoidance of possible future differences of opinion between the two Parties on the same questions.

Should the Commission of Conciliation in the course of a session fail to agree upon a recommendation regarding any question on the Agenda, the question shall be laid before an extraordinary Session of the Commission of Conciliation, which must, however, meet not later than four months after the first meeting. Otherwise the matter shall be dealt with through diplomatic channels.

The results of each session of the Commission of Conciliation shall

be submitted to the two Governments for approval in the form of a Report.

The Report, or parts of it, shall be published only by agreement between the two Governments.

Article 6

Further details of procedure shall be settled, as required, by the Commission of Conciliation itself.

Article 7

Both Parties undertake to provide the Commission with all the necessary material, and to further and facilitate in every way the fulfilment of its task.

Article 8

Both Parties undertake to refrain from any act which may unfavourably prejudice the work of the Commission of Conciliation upon a particular question. They declare themselves expressly prepared to consider the adoption of special measures to further this object.

Article 9

This Agreement shall be ratified. The exchange of ratifications shall take place in Berlin.¹

This Agreement shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. It shall remain in operation for a period of three years.

Article 10

This Agreement shall be drawn up in Russian and German. Both texts shall have the same force.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Agreement and have attached their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow in two copies on the twenty-fifth day of January, Nineteen hundred and twenty-nine.

L.S. M. LITVINOV.

L.S. VON DIRKSEN.

Protocol of Signature

The undersigned met in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to sign an agreement for a procedure of conciliation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany.

¹ Ratifications were exchanged on April 12, 1929.

It was declared that, at the time of the negotiation for the conclusion of the agreement, with regard to the formation of the Conciliation Commission, the question of the appointment of a Chairman of the work of the Commission was carefully discussed.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at that time clearly explained his point of view, namely, that he did not consider possible the acceptance of a provision in the agreement concerning the appointment of a Chairman. He was, further, of the opinion that between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, and in view of the state of the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Germany, he did not consider the appointment of a Chairman necessary.

The two Contracting Parties were, however, agreed at the time of the preliminary negotiations that the omission from the text of the Agreement did not exclude the possibility of the appointment of a Chairman in special cases, and that in special cases they would submit proposals on this question from the Conciliation Commission to careful consideration.

Whereupon the two plenipotentiaries signed the aforesaid Agreement.

Done at Moscow in two copies in Russian and German on the twenty-fifth day of January, Nineteen hundred and twenty-nine.

L.S. M. LITVINOV.

L.S. VON DIRKSEN.

2. TEXT OF REPORT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY RYKOFF,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF COMMISSARS, TO THE
5TH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, MAY 22, 1929¹

Comrades,

The theme of the first part of my report is the international policy of the Soviet Government. In my report to the preceding Congress I pointed out that the international relationship of the U.S.S.R. with the capitalist world is characterized by its duality. Among bourgeois Governments two tendencies fight for mastery—one is aggressive, self-assertive and hostile towards the first Government by a working-class dictatorship and has for its aim the destruction of the proletarian dictatorship. The other tolerates under stipulated conditions the coexistence of the two economic systems—the Soviet system and the capitalist system.

¹ Translation from *Izvestia*, prepared for the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The work of the preceding fourth Congress in April 1927 exactly coincided with the period when the tendency of the aggressive type was especially in the ascendant. I have only to recall to your minds the fact that immediately after the session of the preceding Congress occurred the rupture of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations.

To outline briefly this phase of international relations which was uppermost at the time of the last Congress and immediately thereafter, it must be emphasized that it was fundamentally characterized by two phenomena: firstly, the extreme tension of Anglo-Soviet relations, and secondly, the great advance of the revolutionary movement. Between these two phenomena there was, of course, a connexion not only in time but in essence. For what did the advance and the near approach to victory of the revolution in China indicate? The strengthening of the revolutionary position throughout the world, the weakening of the imperialist authorities and the remarkable consolidation of the position of our Union in a capitalist stronghold.

The tension in international circles in connexion with the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations reached a remarkable pitch. This was made clear if only by such incidents as the murder of our representative at Warsaw—Comrade Voikoff. Hard on this followed the complications which caused the French Government to demand that our Ambassador to Paris, Comrade Rakovsky, should be withdrawn and replaced by another. In December of this year there took place in Canton the notorious events which culminated in the brutal treatment of members of the Soviet Consulate in Canton. At the same time concurrently with the Chinese revolution the advance of the world-wide revolutionary movement was manifested by such phenomena as the strike of English miners and the strengthening of the national revolutionary movement in a number of Colonial territories.

The advance of the revolutionary movement in the East could not, of course, fail to have its effect upon the activities of the English Conservatives in connexion with the Soviet Union. The rupture of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and England in May 1927 was not unheralded. Already, at the March session of the League of Nations that same year, there had been canvassed in the lobbies in all seriousness, on the part of the English, concrete plans for the formation of an anti-Soviet block.

In this way, the fundamental problem of international politics round which as round an axis revolved all international incidents was the tension between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world. And the centre of this tension was the ever-growing strain in the relations between our Union and the Conservative Government of England.

The Government of Great Britain aspired to get into their own hands the control of all the influences hostile to the Soviet Union.

All the English political agents pointed out that the downfall of the Soviet Union would in a great measure relieve the necessity for repression even in the Colonies. In this way the hostility towards us in this period was not only an open hostility to the class enemy, to the rule of the proletariat and the proletariat State, but was bound up with the hope of getting by these means the improvement of Britain's position in the Colonies in the face of the rising tide of the revolutionary movement.

It is hard to tell what part in this aggression was played by the hope of an immediate armed attack, although those actions which preceded the rupture surpassed in their violence anything that the history of diplomatic relations can show up to the present time. You will all remember that the raid upon Arcos was accompanied by the breaking open of safes, wholesale robbery, the seizure of all documents, &c. Before this the English Government had not scrupled openly to make use of faked documents like that known as the 'Zinovieff letter', which has now been clearly shown to be a crude forgery.

The extreme policy of the English Cabinet and of those sections of the English Conservatives who appear to be the organizers of this aggression began to lead to methods of economic pressure on our Union. All speculation as to how we are sustaining these economic troubles which threaten our ruin, all predictions of such ruin emanate from those circles, and serve as an additional means of rallying to their standard all those forces which go to make this anti-Soviet movement possible.

At the present time there are again appearing in the foreign newspapers statements of the same kind about a crisis, ruin, bankruptcy, &c. To-day they are no longer dangerous, as when, over a series of years, people have been fed on predictions not one of which has ever been fulfilled, they cease to believe them. So exactly it has fallen out with regard to the predictions of our 'ruin'.

The idea behind all this was that the English Government planned to become the organizer of all the anti-Soviet forces. What was the result of this? As you know, even the bourgeois press have now come to the conclusion that it was not we who suffered a defeat but the English Government, inasmuch as not one single State followed their lead. In spite of the financial-economic method of warfare employed against us by England our trade and our economic connexions with the capitalist world are continually developing. This shows that the attempt to organize a single united front against us, an attempt

which two years ago seemed a fundamental part of the entire international situation, ended in failure.

The British Conservative Government broke off relations with us and began their attempt to organize an international anti-Soviet group, leading the talk if not of war at least of a blockade. The failure of the English Conservatives' attempt to unite an anti-Soviet group and to place us in an exceedingly difficult position is explained firstly by the fact that they had not learnt that they had to deal with a Government and a State which forms an indivisible whole with the people, and which because of its very essence and because of its class foundation cannot change its policy even under the threat of war. The firmness, durability, and steadfastness of our international policy come from the development of the Socialist principles of the U.S.S.R. and the firm determination of all the peoples living in our country to guard the fruits of the October revolution.

The second reason is that in the bourgeois States themselves there had grown up a sufficiently large number of opponents to secure a different attitude on the part of the various Governments to the task of the English Government in organizing a united opposition to the U.S.S.R. and by the same token to secure a different attitude to the Soviet Union itself.

It would call for a high degree of simplicity scarcely pardonable even in the English Conservatives to organize the world on the basis of the Versailles Treaty by means of the oppression of certain countries by others and then to expect a united front from those same countries and an absence among them of any opposing elements. Excessive if touching simplicity of this kind had already predestined to failure any attempt at a solid anti-Soviet block. Moreover, there were among the bourgeois Governments so many opposing elements arising out of the complexity of their interests and their policies that to create a united front appeared impossible for the English Government even if they did not rely on the Versailles system. That is why in the course of time the English Government realized the necessity for retreat.

Consequently, as a formula of retreat from the occupied position, there appeared the resolution, which was adopted by the Council of the League of Nations in June 1927 and which announced a 'moral front against communism'. This proclamation appears to be a retreat, as it postulates very feebly those aims for the realization of which the British Conservative Government had striven. The formula is a reflection of the aggressive tendency against our Union, as ours is a State in which the Communist Party is in authority. But there

is in it no frank admission and no open declaration of the necessity for the creation of an anti-Soviet group to combat communism. It is saturated in an extraordinary way with a hypocritical spirit characterized by the words 'moral front'. It is clear, however, that people referred to a 'moral' front simply because there was no other kind to refer to.

As regards morality, I must say that we are not especially bothered by the moral relationship to us of those people who accepted this resolution about communism and a State which builds up a communist organization. In building up that organization we never counted upon the moral sympathy of Churchill, Joynson-Hicks and their party. We were always sure of the opposite. At the same time we have always been able to count upon not only moral but every other kind of support from those hundreds of millions of workers, peasants, and oppressed peoples in the Colonies whose sympathy and support are so immeasurably more valuable to us, seeming as it does to be the direct expression of the interest of hundreds of millions of striving humanity.

In the background of the increasing aggression against the U.S.S.R. on the part of the capitalist world there are a whole series of new phenomena which illustrate a work of organization of the anti-Soviet front. In France in the role of an idealist in the organization of an anti-Soviet group there came into prominence Senator de Monsy, who proposed to organize a special Western European combine of capital to force the Soviet Union to make large concessions, in spite of which the Senator used to explain that he was not concerned with politics; so far as he was concerned the organization of such a combine was a 'business transaction' and not politics.

Thereupon his colleague de Juvenal disclosed the true meaning of this campaign. He rushed into print within a few days after the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations with a whole series of articles in which he wrote the following:

'At last has arisen the opportunity for the unification of Europe about which so much has been said but so little done. The rupture of anti-Soviet relations has presented a unique opportunity for this. It is doubtful whether a like opportunity will ever occur again if we fail to take advantage of it.'

What was it de Juvenal proposed to accomplish by the aid of this unified Europe? He goes on to say: '*It is impossible to fight communism, and simultaneously both to enter into financial negotiations with the Soviets and to keep up political relations with them which up to now have led to no concrete results.* England was the first

Power to strive for agreement with Russia. She was also the first to break off relations with Russia. It is desirable and essential to establish serious agreement between Europe and Russia; *but it must be an agreement with the whole of Europe.*'

De Juvenal advocates the agreement of the whole of Europe with Russia meaning, of course, by this agreement the organization of a single European front which could dictate its own conditions to the Soviet Union. De Juvenal goes on: 'The economic salvation of Soviet Russia cannot be accomplished by France or Germany, Italy or England, but only by the efforts of a united Europe. *This salvation must be attained by the same methods as in the case of Austria and Hungary, i.e. by means of the League of Nations. There is no other way.*'

This idea of the intervention of the League of Nations in the guise of the deciding factor in regulating the relations of the Soviet Union and the capitalist Powers which surround it is emphasized yet again by de Juvenal in so many words in this article of his. He explains:

'It is necessary to go even farther, to say definitely that the relations between Europe and Bolshevik Russia *must be organized by the League of Nations.*'

Thereupon, other people as well began to echo the idea.

It must be remarked that these tendencies and this agitation which began to have repercussions in other countries found an echo even in a portion of the German press, which represented the projects of de Monsy and de Juvenal as a means of 'self-preservation' from the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade; pretending that the question at issue was an agreement with the U.S.S.R., while in fact the plans of de Monsy and company were directed towards the subjugation of the U.S.S.R. by means of a united front on the part of Capitalist Europe.

Even during the current year, in an organ of the German heavy industry, there was an article by this same de Juvenal in which he repeated the proposals and arguments which he had produced at the time of the Anglo-Soviet rupture.

Every promoter of the campaign entertained the hope that we might be forced to give up our monopoly of foreign trade and that we should then be a prey to every speculative imperialist robber. In the Paris newspaper, *Pax* (the name is evidently ironical: 'Pax' translated into Russian being 'Peace'), some author or other wrote:

'Only the Soviets can fear the creation of this economic group, for if they have still any chance of success in the struggle in the political field their chances in the economic field are getting steadily fainter

and fainter. In the result they will soon be unable to resist the inexorable pressure of reality.'

From all this it is clear what energy was expended in connexion with the Anglo-Soviet rupture in order to utilize it for the formation of an anti-Soviet group. Closely bound up with this were such facts as the policy of the French Bank of appropriating our gold exported to the United States, the entrance of the German banks into the ranks of Russia's creditors; an entrance which indubitably constituted, in diplomatic parlance, a moral contravention of the Treaty of Rapallo.

Alongside these hostile tendencies in the international situation there were developing tendencies of another kind, towards the restoration of peace between the Soviets and the capitalist world. Of these tendencies I will speak more fully in another part of my report.

Under these conditions our policy consisted in overcoming and avoiding by every means the activities of the powers and elements hostile to us while striving for the maintenance of peace as the essential precursor to the establishment of socialism in the U.S.S.R.

(ii) *The Struggle for Peace*

The Soviet Government have repeatedly affirmed that the struggle for peace is an organic part of its foreign policy. It is the outcome of the interest of our Union and of its economic development, and of the building up of the socialistic State in which the working classes of the whole world are interested. In the struggle for peace we realize the policy which expresses the interests of the whole habitable globe, because in war and from war it is clear that it is not the purveyors of munitions who suffer but those who go to make up the armies, i.e. the workers and peasants. This gives us a solid foundation for the resolute struggle for peace.

The fourth meeting of the Soviets two years ago laid down for us the following instructions as a guiding principle in the domain of foreign politics: 'The meeting invites the attention of the whole world to the indisputable fact that the U.S.S.R. is the only State in the world pursuing a direct and open policy of logical pacifism corresponding to the interests of all mankind. Fully endorsing this policy of peace the meeting charges the Soviet Government both steadfastly to pursue that policy in the future and to strive for the establishment and consolidation of friendly relations with foreign Powers. The meeting notes with pleasure that those efforts of the Union have

found an echo in certain countries, the development of economic relations with which is good evidence of the soundness of the policy.' To the realization of this most important duty with which we have been charged by the fourth meeting of Soviets our work in the realm of international politics has been devoted.

At the moment when the English Conservative Government in preparation for the rupture of diplomatic relations had decided upon a violent raid on the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London, at the moment when the English political bosses were working for the preparation of the financial and economic blockade of the Union, the Soviet delegate at the International Economic Conference at Geneva in May 1927 came forward with a programme which declared the possibility of the 'peaceful co-existence of the two systems of national economics—the capitalistic and the socialistic'. This programme of 'peaceful co-existence' of the two national economic systems, as being a *sine qua non* for the development of socialism in Russia, was steadily carried out by the Soviet Government between the fourth and fifth meetings of the Soviets.

Our policy of the struggle for peace appeared particularly clearly in recent times in the activities of our delegation to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, in our attitude to the Kellogg Pact, and in the so-called Moscow Protocol which was signed on our initiative together with our neighbouring States.

As is well known the League of Nations has already occupied itself continuously for eight years with the question of disarmament. Our delegation at the Fifth Session made inquiries of every member, from which it appeared that during this period the different organizations of the League held 121 Sessions on the question of the reduction of armaments and passed altogether 111 resolutions. The results of the labours of these organs on the question of disarmament are printed on 14,000 pages. When I have read that the armaments of all nations are increasing I have thought: does not this water the soil on which grow guns, machine guns, and poison gas? Into such a Commission then came our delegates for the struggle for peace. I fancy that few of you here will envy them their job in those surroundings. Up to the present time they have not succeeded in cutting down a single soldier, gun, cruiser, or cartridge, but they have used up 14,000 pages with writing, they have ruined a huge mass of paper with colossal efficiency.

The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission as early as 1925. We then replied that we would not refuse any examination of the question of disarmament,

that we were ready also to take part in the work of the Commission.

But we could only do this if the work were to be carried out in a place to which we could go. We pointed out that we could not participate in the work of a Commission set up in Switzerland as it was there that in the most unprecedented circumstances our Ambassador to Italy, Comrade Vorovsky, was murdered, who was sent with the knowledge of the Swiss Government to take part in the Lausanne Conference. We did not wish to send to their deaths any more sons of the October revolution.

The prolongation of this dispute with the Swiss Government caused by the murder of Comrade Vorovsky was not our doing. It was at length settled in April 1927, and this circumstance enabled the U.S.S.R. to take part from November to December 1927 in both the International Economic Conference and the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament.

At the fourth Session at the end of 1927 Comrade Litvinoff put forward a proposal in the name of the Soviet Government for 'universal and complete' disarmament in which occurred the following:

'The contracting States solemnly acknowledge that the only true method which can contribute to the safeguarding of peace is the general and complete abolition of all armed forces, and conclude the present Convention, having for this purpose appointed their Plenipotentiaries who, having communicated their full powers in good and due form, have agreed that complete disarmament shall be undertaken as from the date of entry into force of the present Convention and shall be terminated within a period of four years so as to restrict the possibility of armed conflicts from the first year onwards.'

That is the proposal which we submitted. Both now and at the time when we submitted it, we have been accused of bringing forward a frivolous proposal; one which we knew the bourgeois Governments were unable to accept. Our reply is that if any one wants to bring forward a proposal which they *can* accept without difficulty, then let him bring forward one not for disarmament but for additional armaments—this will correspond to the actual facts. But our task is to fight this spirit.

The Soviet Government has clearly satisfied itself that the Imperialist Governments will not proceed with this very rough, but at the same time ready, method of solving the problem of disarmament.

None the less we hold to our proposal, as we are fully convinced that the people will fight against war and for disarmament, and that sooner or later they will set up Governments which will carry it out. To us it is completely evident that the attainment of universal disarmament will come about after a prolonged and bitter struggle, that it will mark the close of a long period in history. It is certain that such events do not come suddenly, but as the result of powerful movements and of gigantic upheavals on the part of peoples, nations, and Governments. But all this will come the sooner, the sooner the struggle for it begins and the intenser and more continuous it becomes.

In their reply to Comrade Litvinoff the representatives of the Governments who directed the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament of the League of Nations were unable to bring forward one single argument against immediate and complete disarmament which reflected the interests of the working classes or masses, but their tactics, as might be expected, were really dictated by the interests of those imperialist groups in whose hands the government of the bourgeois States is vested.

By making their demand for simultaneous, complete, and universal disarmament, the Soviet Government unmasked the imperialist and warlike tendencies of the Governments of the capitalist countries and tore the veil from the secrets of the Council of the League of Nations, which is just a place where negotiations are entered into and treaties and agreements concluded which have for their object anything but the security of peace. The Soviet delegation demonstrated that our country, our proletariat Government, waged an honourable and logical struggle for peace.

Massed millions of workers in all countries saw in the Soviet proposal the reflection of their own peace aspirations.

The Preparatory Commission rejected the Soviet proposal for universal disarmament, quoting the eighth paragraph of the League Covenant which says:

‘The members of the League acknowledge that the preservation of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.’

The members of the League of Nations look upon this paragraph of the Covenant as a prohibition against disarmament. They evidently think that even if the thing were possible, even if there were no insuperable obstacles to general disarmament, the observance of the letter of the Covenant should, just as though it emanated from some

'authority on high', outweigh everything. Thus purely for formal reasons they refused to submit for examination our proposal for general disarmament.

Nevertheless it found a wide response not only among the workers and peasant masses but among those intellectual elements which can be reckoned upon among sincere pacifists. When our project for general disarmament was rejected we instructed our delegation to make fresh attempts for a practical solution of the problem of disarmament, and they submitted a plan for gradual disarmament which appeared in our first proposal as the first stage of total disarmament.

This second proposition of ours said: 'The Contracting States recognize that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the weakest States which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.'

We proposed that the process of reduction should begin at a greater rate for those States which possessed huge armies and huge technical equipment, and at a slower rate for the weaker States whose armies were small and whose equipment was inconsiderable. This proposal could not be rejected on the purely formal grounds that the League had voted disarmament by its own Covenant. By proposing partial disarmament, i.e. a progressive reduction of armaments, we had not, either in the formal sense or from the point of view of the League of Nations Covenant, committed any 'statutory' indiscretion, and the Commission was bound to consider our proposal. Then there occurred a delay. The consideration of our proposal was postponed for thirteen months. Twice Comrade Litvinoff reminded the President of the Commission, Loudon, with commendable persistence, of the necessity for summoning the Commission for the examination of this proposal. Only after thirteen months was it summoned. Comrade Litvinoff has just recently returned from the last session of the Preparatory Commission which rejected this project of ours also, rejected it on principle, not under a Covenant of the League of Nations. They rejected it because they said the work of the Preparatory Commission only comprised the compilation of a list of the war material which is susceptible of reduction. Everything else must be left to the International Conference.

You are, however, wrong if you think that the work of the International Conference consists in fixing a level to which armaments can be reduced. Not at all! The International Conference is equally

unable to fix a definite rate of disarmament; it has only to register the representations of each State regarding its own security. Each State itself decides whether it can or cannot reduce its armaments. That is the work they aspire to perform in the name of reduction of armaments.

The laughter which greets my recital of the facts shows that the Union of Soviets is fully alive to the diplomatic game which is being played by the bourgeois Governments.

All the conversations of the bourgeois Governments' representatives about disarmament, reduction of armaments, the appointment of commissions, special organs, &c., serve merely as a cloak for the increase of armaments and the preparation for another war. Look how the Preparatory Commission rejected even the elementary proposals of our delegation for the prohibition of aerial bombardments of peaceful populations, and the preparation of chemical methods of warfare in times of peace, &c.

The Sixth Session of the Preparatory Commission which has just been concluded was peculiar in one connexion. To a great extent they refused to employ, as formerly, the methods of pacifist speech in playing out their little comedy. At the Sixth Session the military Governments who controlled it threw off the mask. The Preparatory Commission excluded from the number of warlike implements susceptible of reduction, trained military establishments, mobilization stores, air force junior officers cadres, aerial war fleets, &c. Thus the Preparatory Commission excluded from the number of the items susceptible of reduction all the essential elements of power for a modern army. The Preparatory Commission rejected not only our proposals but also a number of their own proposals which had been included at the last Session in their draft Convention. They removed from the draft Convention such essential items of armed forces as for instance military reserves and mobilization stores, so that the draft was not worth the paper it was written on.

So ended, Comrades, our struggle for peace and disarmament at the Preparatory Commission. If one tries to explain the origin of this Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, it would appear to me to be the child of that great campaign which was started in the second half of the last imperialist war when men under fire in the trenches began to lose the last shreds of patience, when the sparks of the revolutionary movement began to fly along the whole of the imperialist battle front. Then they produced the slogan that this war would be the last war. This slogan was taken up by the then Prime Minister of England, Mr. Lloyd George. Among ourselves, it

was taken up by Milyokoff and Kerensky, as well as by the Government representatives of other countries. With the help of this slogan they aimed at keeping the soldiers in the trenches. 'Finish off this war,' they said, 'gain the victory and thus free mankind from the threat of more war.'

This pacifist illusion even enters into the Covenant of the League of Nations. It led to that mockery which I have described to you as the work of the Preparatory Commission. I am afraid that the further we get from the imperialist war the more they forget the horrors with which it was connected, and the easier it becomes to spin this web of illusions. Therefore, faced with these phenomena in the international situation which I have described to you, with this burden with which up to now our policy of disarmament has laboured, I think it is well to remember what it was that forced the most violent imperialists to talk about 'the war to end war' and the prohibiting of war. They were forced to this step by the horrors and the sufferings which hundreds of millions of people underwent and which were inseparable from the last war. The principal figures are: killed and died of wounds, 10 million; wounded 20 million, out of which there remain $3\frac{1}{2}$ million wholly disabled persons. That is what the war cost if you count only the losses at the front, and not counting those who, as a result of want caused by the war, died or suffered behind the lines. Ten million killed and 20 million wounded! This is what inspired their declaration that this was the last war!

These are the facts which the Preparatory Commission use in playing their game of disarmament! The cost of four years' war to the eleven warring States was 295 milliards of dollars out of a common total of national wealth amounting to 567 milliards. There was lost more than half the wealth possessed at that time by the eleven richest nations in the world!

To these losses directly due to the War must be added indirect material losses.

The loss of tonnage amounted to one-third of the pre-war tonnage. In terms of money this represents 7 milliards of dollars.

I could produce still more statistics to show what the last imperialist war did for mankind. A fresh war would entail losses many times greater. A new world war would entail not 10 million killed but several tens of million, since the greatest progress in all the bourgeois States during the post-war period has been progress in the direction of perfecting arms for the annihilation of mankind.

Even representatives of the bourgeois Governments, for instance,

Mr. Lloyd George, recognize all the horrors of a future war. Here is what he said at an interview on April 12 this year:

‘I wish that science would devote itself to work in the cause of peaceful progress because I am convinced that if there is another war Europe will collapse in ruins.

‘If it required a whole generation to build up Europe again after the last war, after another one it will require a hundred years. What this impending war will produce no man can even imagine. Those who talk about “humanizing” war do but deceive themselves. War cannot be “humanized”.’

This was said not by a Bolshevik but by a genuine bourgeois representative, one of the organizers of the last war. He said that if it occurred again a hundred years would be required to re-establish Europe. There have appeared in the papers statements about the discovery of methods for controlling warships and aeroplanes from a distance, and if we add to these the exceptional inventions as regards artillery and gas warfare by the aid of which whole districts can be deprived of all human life, you can clearly visualize the vital questions around which the controversy now rages and why it is essential to strain every nerve to face and to settle the question of disarmament. Ten million killed, and 20 million wounded in the last war, and tens of millions killed, if it is repeated; these are the figures which must be engraved on the mind of every worker and every peasant. It is essential that every one should realize that a new war will bring in its train such losses, ruin, and destruction of tens of millions of people, that many many decades will not repair the damage.

That is why it is our rooted conviction that in the face of such a threat nations are bound to form governments which will make disarmament an accomplished fact.

(iii) *The Kellogg Pact and the Moscow Protocol.*

Mankind and the working class must understand the significance of the fact that in these conditions, in face of the threat of such a war, all our proposals for peace, disarmament, and reduction of armaments were rejected. This fact is sufficient proof of the idleness of our hopes and of the frank hypocrisy of the League of Nations which under a cloak of pacifist phrases assists the Imperialist Governments to arm and prepare for war.

In such surroundings, composed of the efforts for peace and the preparation for war, there developed the campaign in connexion with the Kellogg Pact. Confronted with our numerous proposals for disarmament and the increasing wave of sympathy for us which was

making itself felt in every country, the bourgeois world could not, as a matter of course, avoid making some kind of pacifist gesture. There was, therefore, nothing unexpected in the appearance of the Pact.

The Kellogg Pact says:

‘The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement and solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature and of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means . . .’

The Kellogg Pact, signed in Paris on August 28, 1928, was devised in opposition to the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. and our proposals for disarmament, and was at the same time the *first attempt of American diplomacy to assume control of the international situation and to create its own peace system in opposition to the League of Nations.*

The fact that the European States were compelled, whether they wanted to or not, to accept Kellogg’s proposal, is evidence of the considerably increased status of the United States.

The Kellogg Pact cannot be regarded as a factor in the prevention of war as it contains no single real guarantee against war; in particular it says nothing about disarmament or even about limitation of armaments. It would, therefore, be a mistake to associate with the Kellogg Pact any question of real prevention of wars.

It contains no single guarantee that war will not break out. War consists in the tearing up of all treaties, since they all deal with peace between the treaty parties. Consequently it would be wrong to associate with the Kellogg Pact any question of real practical measures for the prevention of wars, and we from the very beginning refrained from attaching any such value to the Kellogg Pact.

While criticizing and unmasking the real meaning of the Pact the Soviet Government none the less had no intention of giving any formal cause to the controllers of the anti-Soviet block to attack the U.S.S.R. Equally it took into consideration the fact that, with all its deficiencies, the Kellogg Pact, imposing as it does ‘moral obligations’, in this way alone impeded, in however slight a degree, the psychological preparation for war. As a result of these considerations the Union Government decided to adhere to the Kellogg Pact, which was accomplished in September 1928 by a note addressed to the French Ambassador in which the Soviet Government declared that

‘. . . inasmuch as the Pact of Paris objectively imposes certain obligations on the Powers before public opinion, and gives the Soviet Government a new chance to put before all the participants of the compact a question most important for peace, that is the question of disarmament, the solution of which is the only guarantee of prevention of war—the Soviet Government expresses its willingness to sign the Pact.’¹

The imperialist Governments which had signed the Pact had no real intention of renouncing war, which is proved not only by the actual increase of armaments but by the formal reservations to the Pact made by the big European States, reservations which in essence nullify their adherence to it.

I have in mind the reservations of England and France.

The English make the following reservation to the Pact:

‘The welfare and integrity of certain regions of the world constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty’s Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that any interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence.’

It is quite clear that the English Government has in mind, not her Colonies, because she would in that case have referred to the British Colonies, but here it simply says ‘certain regions of the world’, i.e. those which it may please the English Government to indicate, such as China or some district of China. The meaning of this reservation amounts to the fact that the English Government reserves to itself the right of breaking the Kellogg Pact whenever it thinks it will.

The reservations of France consisted in their saying:

‘Nothing in the new Treaty restrains or compromises in any manner whatsoever the right of self-defence. Each nation in this respect will always remain free to defend its territory against attack or invasion; it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence.’

She alone is competent to decide whether the circumstances demand a recourse to war for her own self-defence. This means that the French Government asserts its right to go to war with any other State without breaking the Kellogg Pact. In such a case it would clearly be sufficient for them to inform Washington that they had recourse to warlike measures for their own self-defence. In essence

¹ For text of Note see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, p. 8.

this reservation renders her signing of the Kellogg Pact utterly useless. Up till now even the most competent and unbiased investigators and members of Commissions have been unable to decide which of two combatant nations was the instigator of a war. But France declares beforehand that she alone is competent to decide whether she is the aggressor or the attacked. In this way these two reservations, the English and the French, formally nullify any effect of the adherence of the two countries to the Pact, in the very moment of signing it.

The U.S.S.R. also made reservations to the Pact. In our note about our adherence, we specially remarked upon the absence in the Pact of any obligations regarding disarmament. So we made the following reservations:

‘ . . . international war of every kind must be forbidden not only as an instrument of so-called “national policy” but also as a method serving other purposes (for instance the suppression of liberative movements, &c. . . .), ‘but also such military actions, as for instance intervention, blockades, military occupation of foreign territory, foreign ports, &c. . . . ’

‘ Among the unpeaceful means forbidden by the Pact must also be included such things as the refusal to establish peaceful and normal relations or the rupture of these relations between peoples, because such actions mean the suspension of peaceful methods in solution of disputes and by their very existence contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the breaking out of wars.’

‘ . . . The Soviet Government also cannot agree with any other reservations which can serve as a justification for war, particularly with reservations which are made in the correspondence referred to, which entail the withdrawal from the scope of the Pact of those decisions which are the result of the Statute of the League of Nations and of the Locarno Agreement.’

The most superficial comparison of these reservations shows with the utmost clearness the deep difference in principle which divides the policies of the Soviet Government and the bourgeois Governments on this question. That, Comrades, is the tawdry history of the Kellogg Pact which was put up in opposition to our fight for peace. We not only signed and ratified the Kellogg Pact earlier than others, but we considered it essential to use it for the consolidation of peaceful relations between the U.S.S.R. and its neighbouring countries. As we were quite convinced that the ratification of the Pact would be delayed an unconscionable time (our expectation was justified—the Pact has not yet been put into effect), but that every

step in the direction of improving peaceful relations was a distinct success for our policy, and the security of our interests, we suggested to our neighbours that the Pact should be signed without waiting for it to be brought into force, i. e. for its ratification by all its original instigators. We needed much effort and time to realize this peace plan of ours and to overcome the resistance of certain States. But eventually the Moscow Protocol was signed on February 9, 1929, by the U.S.S.R., Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania. Later Turkey, Persia, Lithuania, and the Free City of Danzig adhered to it.¹

In estimating the sum total of the results of our foreign policy during the years since the 4th Congress of Soviets it is necessary to note the failure of the work of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. At the same time one must point out how absolutely unfounded are the hopes of those politicians and publicists who assume that on the rejection of the Soviet proposals by the Preparatory Commission of the League of Nations we should abandon our struggle for peace. Our struggle for peace, waxing ever more and more vigorous, will be continued as strenuously as before. It is, however, necessary for us as Marxists to remember that the guiding principle in all diplomatic relations, as in the matter of armaments, peace propositions, and all questions of international policy, is to be found in the over-riding economic interests of the world at large.

(iv) *The Principal Features of the Contemporary International Situation*

The principal features of the contemporary structure of world capitalism are, on the one hand, the huge and swift growth of large economic combines, of a monopolist character, sometimes within the limits of one State, sometimes in the international arena, on the basis of the exceptional growth in technique and the great successes of the rationalizers, and on the other hand, the increase of competition among countries in the fight for markets and the aggravation of class distinctions in every State.

Recently among the agents of the Second International in Europe a theory has begun to be formed which is more than anything else a clear sign of the desertion of the Second International to the bourgeois camp. In essence the theory is that the creation of powerful groupings of individual enterprises into huge trusts, mergers, &c., is evidence of the *pacifist nature* of post-war capitalism. As a matter of fact the opposite is the case. The increasing power of all these

¹ See above, p. 51.

cartels and trusts, the growth of capitalist organizations within the State, by generating and organizing an accumulation of forces, merely serve to aggravate strife between States and to nourish class warfare within those States. The social-democratic organization of capital brings in its train not peace but a sword of exceptional sharpness.

All changes in the matter of technique, of rationalization or organized forms of capital, weigh most heavily on the shoulders of the workers and peasants. I will quote you just a few examples of technical progress which seriously worsen the conditions of the working classes and inevitably call forth aggravated class distinctions in a bourgeois society.

For instance, the mechanization of power-plant enables the Brooklyn Electric Station, which consumes 20,000 poods of coal an hour, to do without a single stoker, as it requires only an insignificant personnel to tend it. One of the Niagara stations with a power of millions of kilowatts is run on shifts of eight workmen each. In some weaving establishments, with the change to automatic looms, one weaver operates 24 looms, whereas quite recently one weaver operated 4 or 6 looms. In the workshops of one steel trust in the U.S.A. from the moment of the arrival of the ore to the production of the finished rails the time expended is less than forty-eight hours.

This technical progress enabled one huge industrial concern in America to announce that, in view of the effectiveness of the perfected machines for the manufacture of buttons which required no intelligence from their work-people, it was engaging the weak-minded and defective people from all the hospitals and lunatic asylums.

Another company (textile) stated that as the textile industry had for a long time been suitable for child labour, which in intellectual level is not far removed from poorly developed adults, they had no need not only of skilled workers but of normal adult labour.

Industrialization with the aid of the weak-minded! That is the evident meaning of this capitalist rationalization. With colossal strength it crushes, cripples, discards, and exploits with unexampled rapacity millions and millions of people at home and in colonial territories, and enormously increases unemployment.

Unemployment has increased and reached at the beginning of this year 3 millions in Germany, about 2 millions in England, and 4 millions in the United States. At the same time we see a decrease in wages, a great increase in activity in the labour movement, and an intensification of the bourgeois fight against the working classes.

Quite recently in the foreign press they again started the campaign

about our being the instigators and organizers of the celebration of May 1 all over the world. Apropos of this, one should note the absence in the authors of this statement of the most elementary knowledge of the history of the workers' movement. Every lad at a Soviet school knows that the working class in every capitalist country celebrated May 1 long before the October revolution. There are without a doubt sitting in this very hall many comrades who were even compelled to remain in prison for celebrating May 1 in Tsarist times at the summons of the Second International, which has now betrayed the cause of the class warfare of the proletariat. The festival of May 1 in the capitalist countries has now assumed an accentuated form, thanks, not to us, but to the force of the logical development of class distinctions, and it calls for an immense stupidity to attribute it to 'Moscow intrigues'. For many years after its inception the Second International agitated for the celebration of May 1. Why not, then, attribute some blame to them in this connexion?

The Festival of May 1 is one of the expressions of the great class war. As a result of the straitened circumstances and the conditions of the greatest want in which the great mass of workers exist, the class war is bound to develop both in the capitalist countries and the colonies. The capitalist world wages a desperate war with the working classes, wishing to build up its own prosperity at their expense and at the same time to avoid an acute crisis. But this crisis is unavoidable, since already here in Europe only two-thirds of the productive power of industrial equipment is used and in America even less, not much more than a half being used.

Before this threat of a crisis a keen competition is growing among the capitalists in which it is not a question of the competition of individual manufacturers, but competition among the giant producing organizations which unite particular branches of industry in different countries.

The collision between these growing and powerful organizations, the unavoidable increase of squabbles among themselves, serves as an explanation of the fact that the capitalist Governments will not, cannot disarm. On the contrary, all this predetermines an increase in armaments and a greater danger of a war. The beginning of a conflict between two giants of the capitalist world, America and England, is more than anything the clear and decisive evidence of the contradiction in this 'capitalist peace'.

I would call your attention to the effusions on this subject both in the papers and on Parliamentary platforms of a number of politicians and journalists.

The keenness of the competition between England and America is now acknowledged by statesmen of both countries. This is evident from the following quotations. In one of his speeches the well-known Senator Borah said:

‘If the United States cannot guarantee the security of her trade by means of an agreement, a treaty, or a law, she will attain it by the excellence of her fleet. Great Britain must either renounce her mastery of the seas or come to an agreement about disarmament or build her fleet to conform to that of the U.S.A.; but that latter England will not do, as she knows well that it is not in her power to do so. She knows our shipbuilding programme perfectly well, she knows full well that we can build as many cruisers as we want.’

The following passage in Senator Borah’s speech is characteristic of the situation which had been created. He said:

‘We are living to see the beginning of an Anglo-American rivalry on the sea. The present position is no whit different from that obtaining between Germany and Great Britain during the period 1905–14. Of course, so far as the Governments are concerned, as usual, there will be mutual assurances of boundless friendship and of the absence of any intention whatever to plunge into rivalry on the seas. Exactly the same were the pronouncements of the English and German Governments during the period 1905–14.’

And in exactly the same way the situation is estimated in England by moderate politicians.

The innermost thoughts of the English were expressed by an influential English paper, *The Economist*, in the following terms:

‘The same history ought to convince the Americans that, if it were a question of “sea-power” being wrested from us by force, we should be most unlikely to yield it up without a desperate struggle. On the other hand, it is just as unlikely that the United States should refrain from attempting to wrest it from us as it would have been that we, in our day, should have been content to leave it in the hands of the Spaniards.’

In recalling the period 1905–14 one recalls a period of ceaseless preparation for the imperialist war.

The rivalries existing among the capitalist States, both great and small, are being forced into the background. The forces of the majority of capitalist States are distributed according to an underlying principle, the principle of the relations between England and America. This does not mean that the rivalries between, for instance, France and Germany or France and Italy have disappeared, but they must carry on their bickerings with one eye all the time on the

fundamental distribution of strength, which is making itself felt throughout the world.

The present mutual relations between the capitalist countries was well summarized by some writer in *The Economist* of December 1, 1928. This writer draws an imaginary picture of what would happen if the present position of affairs was allowed to develop untrammelled and to drift with the stream. He expounds as follows:

‘If things were to take their traditional course, the Powers which were jointly victorious in the War of 1914–18 would proceed in due course to range themselves into two camps in order to become the protagonists in the war which the year 1945 or the year 1950 was to bring forth. In one scale the strongest of them—that is, the United States—would stand by herself; in the other scale the next strongest—that is, Great Britain—would seek to maintain the balance by embracing France in a new *entente*; and then, with France and Great Britain combined in the anti-American scale, the United States would eventually seek to right the balance on her side by taking to her bosom the opponents of France in Europe—that is, Italy and Germany. (A fine end to Locarno!) Thus Western Europe, as well as the overseas world, would be divided once more against itself; and next Eastern Europe would be drawn into the arena—the Little Entente and Poland ranging themselves in the Anglo-French camp, Hungary and Bulgaria and Albania and Lithuania in the German-Italian-American camp. In fact, the whole world might become involved except the U.S.S.R., which would assist as *tertius gaudens* at the welcome spectacle of the final war of annihilation between the capitalist Powers!’

It seems to me that the whole of this prognosis is like a picture which can in actual fact come to life. But we are faced with two errors. Firstly, the war against the U.S.S.R. is very, very probable; secondly, the role of *tertius gaudens* is in itself not an evil one, but we would assume it not for the mere pleasure of it, but in order to help turn this fresh war into the last war between human beings.

On this military-political basis all the political and military alliances spring up. The most important of them is the Anglo-French agreement, which as far as one can judge is directed against the Soviet Union, and against the North-American United States; while the military alliance between Poland and Rumania is well known to all of you.

In capitalist Europe at the present moment we are face to face with a number of other alliances, which in reality indicate the dis-

tribution of the forces of the possible antagonists in the impending world war.

A few years ago a well-known Pan-European idealist pointed out that as a result of the Versailles Treaty there were in Europe twelve Alsace-Lorraines, each of which was sufficient to cause a new imperialist war. Twelve Alsace-Lorraines! Little countries make a great mistake when they think that they can remain unnoticed even for a moment in the game which is being played by the big countries, and that a small war can be waged without interference from the 'bosses' of present-day Europe. In a big war nobody can reckon that the position of the small States will not be ten times worse than the position of Belgium in the recent war; and every small war, in the state of tension which is apparent at present, could in a moment be changed into a great imperialist war and could not be waged without the great 'bosses'.

In any collision between the 'heavies' these small countries would, by the force of their strategical position and the methods of modern warfare, find themselves ringed with cannon.

That is why the instinct of self-preservation must dictate an orientation not to the Powers that will wage the wars of the future, but to the upholders of peace. Their policy must be specially directed towards the side of peace and not towards this or that warring camp. Only by a steadfast policy of peace can they guarantee their national independence or their independent existence, and preserve their population from the horrors of a capitalist war.

The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.

Comrades, the accomplishment of the five years' plan is intimately related to an extensive development of our exports and our imports, huge imports of implements for our industry, our rural husbandry, and our transport. We must, therefore, take more and not less interest in the extension of our peaceful relations and trade treaties. The accomplishment of the five years' plan calls for logical and systematic work for a number of years. In the international field, therefore, it will be our aim to establish such strong and lasting relations with individual countries that on this score we can suffer no set-back in carrying out the huge programme of work demanded by the five years' plan.

In our international relations we quite recently, with conspicuous success and profit to both countries, concluded treaties with Germany, and on December 21, 1928, signed a protocol which developed and extended the scheme of economic-trade relations with Germany,

which were initiated by the trade Treaty of 1925. As regards Germany, she was the first to enter into trade relations with us, by means of financial and credit agreements which in a great measure facilitated imports from Germany into the U.S.S.R., and loaded German industry with orders. For the practical implementing of this Treaty, German agricultural circles must be convinced that as regards punctuality we shall be, if I may so express myself, more punctual than the punctual Germans, and we have made a number of payments even before the fixed date. This *rapprochement* with German agricultural circles is in the best interests of both countries. With Germany, too, we recently signed a Convention regarding the agreed procedure for examining disputed questions.¹ It is founded on the principle of the right of equal representation of each country, and guarantees a speedy solution of differences by peaceful means. Of course, even with Germany we have had misunderstandings, but each time they have been satisfactorily adjusted. At the present moment we are not quite satisfied with the attitude of the German authorities in connexion with the discovery of the activities of the White Guards who were manufacturing in Berlin political documents directed against the Soviet régime. Our grievance in this case is not caused by our desire to punish the guilty, but from our desire to clear up completely a matter which has international significance and is closely related to the U.S.S.R. The spurious documents of these and other gangs of rascals like them sometimes have a considerable effect, as happened in the case of the Zinoviev letter at the last election in England. They have complicated diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and other States, and have reacted upon peaceful diplomacy. This is not a mere organization of scallywags but a political organization of criminals, an organization which has effected an entry into the respectable homes of the bourgeois and of bourgeois diplomacy.

The all-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1922 recommended the Rapallo Treaty as a model of what the treaty relations between the U.S.S.R. and their capitalist neighbours should be. Now, after nearly eight years of normal relations with Germany, we can affirm how correct and how mutually advantageous are the foundations on which these relations were established, and on which they must be developed in the future also.

About our relations with Great Britain I have already spoken in my report at sufficient length. Up to the present time diplomatic relations with Great Britain have not been resumed. You also know that by breaking off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. the

¹ See above, p. 156.

English Conservatives did not attain the end which they had in view when they took that step. On the contrary, objective data prove the losses which the essential branches of England's agriculture suffered, especially the English export trade, in consequence of the absence for two years of the normal amount of trade with us. This especially explains the healthy tendency among the ranks of the English agriculturalists towards the realization of the need for re-establishing the ruptured relations. This tendency also inspired the recent visit to the U.S.S.R. of some 100 representatives of the English business world.

But even now, although you will not find such outbursts against the Soviet Union as occurred at the last English elections, the Prime Minister, Baldwin, in a speech of his, while demonstrating the unprofitable and insecure nature of the relations with the Soviet Union, said that he would not advocate any development of trade with our Union.

In his speech Mr. Baldwin produced a new thesis, which up till now has not been propounded by any of the leaders of the Conservative Government. For two years the Conservative agents have obstinately asserted the possibility of developing trade relations with the Soviet Union without re-establishing normal diplomatic relations, and have not disputed the advantage of trade relations with us. Now the head of the Conservative Cabinet attempts to prove the uselessness of these same trade relations. I will not refute this, as the facts themselves so clearly prove the opposite, that it is impossible to cite one single occasion when trade with us has been unprofitable for the other party concerned, or when our trade organizations have failed to honour any trade obligation which they have undertaken. The dimensions of our trade agreements are, of course, defined by the juridical, legal, and financial conditions which are imposed on our trade in this or that country.

As to our position in the question of relations with England, this was clearly explained in the recently published statement of Comrade Pyatakoff, the representative of the Government Commission, on the conversations with the English business representatives. We think that there is a big possibility of adjusting all the disputed points on the basis of the Treaty with the MacDonald Government in 1924.

Another of the most powerful countries is the United States of America. Our relations with them, both as regards trade and the settlement of such questions as technical help for the development of our agriculture by American agriculture which has been brought to a high technical level, develop apace. Not only has Engineer

Cooper, to the great benefit of the concern, become the consulting engineer for the construction of the Dnieper Hydro-electric Station, but a large number of other important and skilled American engineers render us technical assistance in our construction works, and enable our skilled workers and engineers to become familiar with the industry and methods of production of the United States themselves. At this moment negotiations are being conducted with very big American firms with a view to concluding new agreements for technical assistance. While this kind of development in our mutual relations is proceeding, the absence of diplomatic relations is not only a hindrance but an evident absurdity. Further developments of these relations will, of course, meet with the difficulty that the conclusion of large agricultural and trade agreements, without the possibility of any diplomatic or juridical support behind them, would be for us not only merely inconvenient, but too great a risk.

The situation with France has been stagnant since the return of Rakovsky. One of our scientists, Bachmeteff, discovered a method of preserving live animals in a state of semi-animation, a kind of prolonged sleep. In such a condition, through no fault of ours, remain our relations with France. After the proposals which were handed in by Rakovsky as a result of the work of the Commission for the examination of all the problems connected with debts and credits, no sign of movement has taken place. We have received no reply either to these proposals or to our proposal for the conclusion of a political treaty for mutual non-aggression.

Apart from this the policy of the French Government as regards ourselves in the last two years has been responsible for several actions which can hardly be termed acts expressing a burning desire to establish more friendly relations.

With Italy our relations continue to be fairly normal, with the exception of that occasion in 1927 when she ratified the protocol confirming Rumania's supposed rights in Bessarabia. But this, of course, cannot affect our position in regard to the latter country which was seized from us by force.

The Baltic countries. I have already spoken about these in connexion with the signing of the Moscow Protocol which has undoubtedly effected a remarkable improvement in our relations with our neighbours. But we think that as a result of the signing of this Protocol there should ensue actions designated to strengthen and secure it. In so far as the countries which I named earlier have signed a Protocol forswearing war between themselves, it is only natural to expect an effective desire not only to renounce war but

in every way to consolidate friendly relations among themselves. From this the aspiration towards a further realization of those peaceful intentions which are expressed in the Protocol would be quite intelligible. These intentions would have to be expressed by every possible stimulation of peaceful relations between the individual participators in the Protocol. In order that the Protocol may not remain an empty declaration but may be infused with life it must be accompanied by corresponding measures for the strengthening and extension of peaceful co-operation between the participators. Such an aspiration exists—I say this with the utmost seriousness and the gravest sense of responsibility—in the Government of the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, among certain other participators in the Moscow Protocol a like aspiration as regards relations with the U.S.S.R. is not noticeable, at least in their actions. It will be sufficient to dwell on the last incidents which occurred in Warsaw. The remission of the sentence on the White Guardsman, Voitsechovski, for attempting the life of our trade representative in Poland, Comrade Lisareff, the vituperative and merciless speeches of those who were conducting Voitsechovski's defence, which were not once interrupted by the President of the Court, the scurrilous campaign of the Polish press against the U.S.S.R., all these things go to prove that the new Polish Government are departing from the spirit of the Moscow Protocol.

We think it necessary to invite the special attention of public opinion in both countries to the great importance of establishing in actual fact and not only as a formality, normal relations between the two countries, not only in their own interests but in those of general peace. We have constantly declared—and I do so again now—our heartfelt desire for lasting peaceful relations with Poland. We have offered to conclude a pact of non-aggression with them, we have offered to undertake the most serious steps to ensure the security of her nationals, and in doing this they know in Poland that we are not actuated by fear. It is well known to every one that if they attack us and force us to fight, we can and will fight at a moment's notice. The starting-point of our whole policy in respect of Poland has always been, and still is, the fact that the consolidation of peaceful relations is profitable to both peoples and both States.

A few days ago we signed a trade agreement with Estonia. This Treaty could and should play a big part in stimulating the economic relations between the two countries and strengthening their political relations.

As regards Finland, she has up to the present not adhered to the Moscow Protocol, but only recently we received an intimation that although she had not formally adhered to the Protocol, she nevertheless now regarded herself as bound to a certain extent by its provisions. This means that the last of our neighbours will in the near future adhere to the Moscow Protocol.

Our relations with Rumania stand quite alone.

They are based on the question of Bessarabia. In Rumania they have tried to interpret the fact of our signing the Moscow Protocol, which refers to the renunciation of war as an implement of national policy, as a renunciation of Bessarabia, and a recognition of the legality and equity of the unlawful occupation which at present lords it in Bessarabia. Our reply to that is that we still take our stand on our former position. Let the Bessarabians themselves—those who live in Bessarabia—let them by the aid of a plebiscite decide with whom they want to live—the Rumanians or us. We ask nothing more of Rumania than a fair and impartial plebiscite, conducted under conditions excluding the possibility of intimidation from one side or the other, in order to ascertain the will of the Bessarabian people.

Our relations with Japan continue to develop fairly normally. During the current year for the first time the Soviet-Japanese fishing Convention, which was signed in 1928, was brought into full effect. It is the basis on which a just settlement of the various disputed points which arise on fishing matters can be secured. We hope that with the co-operation of the Japanese Government further progress will be made in the strengthening and extension of the political and economic connexions between the two countries.

Relations with Persia continue normal. The adherence of Persia to the Moscow Protocol, together with the existing Soviet-Persian Treaty of Non-Aggression and Neutrality as well as the Trade Treaty, has been a fresh step towards strengthening our relations with this State. The declaration of the Persian Government about non-interference in Afghan affairs is a proof of the unity of the Soviet and Persian Governments in regard to the national independence of Afghanistan.

Our relations with Turkey are founded not only on the principle of the necessity for improving mutual relations but also the consolidation of peace in the Near East. The adherence of Turkey to the Moscow Protocol is another proof of these good relations and of our co-operation in the matter of maintaining peace and developing our political and economic relations.

Turning to Afghanistan. I have regretfully to record that the domestic crisis which the Afghans are experiencing still continues, a crisis which is complicated by the antagonism of the mixed nationalities, races, and social orders which exist in the country. Here you have a country which during the ten years of its existence as an independent State has, notwithstanding great internal difficulties, succeeded so well in re-establishing its national agriculture, but now, as a result of the resistance of the forces of reaction actively supported from without, is in the course of a short half-year faced with a serious crisis. I must also call attention to the delicate situation created on certain portions of the Soviet-Afghan frontier adjoining territory where Amanullah's governmental system has been superseded. I have in mind the growth of brigandage, which is being fostered in these districts of Afghanistan, the administration of which, if not taking a hand in forming and supplying the bands of brigands, nevertheless takes no steps to prevent them crossing into Soviet territory. We are continuing our policy of complete non-interference in the internal affairs of the Afghan people.

I hope that the progressive forces of the country created by a ten years' régime of Afghan independence will defeat the reactionary elements and preserve their hardly won independence and influence.

As a result of the frank unwillingness on the part of the Czechoslovakian Government, normal political relations between them and us do not exist. Naturally, the result of this is that economic relations between the two countries cannot be properly developed either. The communication which we have just received regarding the intention of Czechoslovakia to order her relations with the U.S.S.R. in consonance with the whole of the Little Entente, in which is numbered Rumania, who is occupying Bessarabia, goes to prove that they have inclinations and pretensions which will have no good consequences.

The political and financial-economic machinery which the anti-Soviet forces have set in motion has not yielded the results which the instigators of the movement had bargained for. The measures for economic pressure on the U.S.S.R. have not affected the rate of development or the magnitude of our socialist structure. The plans for an anti-Soviet economic group have failed.

Lately we have noticed a number of events which have demonstrated that the tendency to build up peaceful economic relations with us has become stronger.

From what I have told you it is, I think, clear that the elements of aggression against our State and the possibility of an attack on

us, do really exist, but that our policy of the struggle for peace and for the continuation of this respite from war will not always suffer defeat. Our policy must, on the whole, consist in striving with all our might and with all the means at our disposal for peace, and for the development of business relations with every State. But in view of the aggressive tendencies abroad, the danger of war and of the cessation of the present respite, we must never forget for one instant to strengthen the defences of our State and of our country.

3. TEXT OF REPORT BY LITVINOFF, COMMISSAR AD INTERIM FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE CENTRAL COMMISSARIAT OF
THE U.S.S.R., DECEMBER 4, 1929¹

Comrades, members of the Central Executive Committee, unlike the other economic National Commissariats, the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs is unfortunately unable to submit a 'five years' plan' for their work, or a plan for the development of foreign policy. Why this is so can be easily explained. While compiling explanatory figures and submitting plans of the economic development of the Union we have only to contend with our own particular aspirations and hopes, with our own particular capabilities and needs, and with our own firm principles of policy, but in order to examine the development of our international policy we are forced to deal with a mass of facts which admit of no tabulation and a large number of elements outside our control or influence. International activities have their birth not alone in our own aspirations and actions but in those of a host of countries, organized on systems other than our own Union, pursuing other aims than ours and employing other means for the attainment of those aims than are permitted by us. In those countries the capitalist order still holds sway with no less violence and with no less confusion in the international than in the economic sphere. The existing economic antagonisms between those countries create political antagonisms. The disruptions and upheavals termed the 'imperialist war' have still more enhanced and deepened them. If, by means of political agreements and combinations, they have succeeded in smoothing out temporarily one or other of those antagonisms among groups of States, it has only been to form at once fresh antagonisms between that group of States and others. The geographical disposition of these antagonisms has changed, but their magnitude, their number, and their nature has not changed.

¹ Translation from *Pravda* prepared for the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

If to this you add the increasing post-war instability of the internal political systems in the majority of these States, the sudden change from so-called democratic parliamentarianism to government by fascism, semi-fascism, and to those forms of government which have not been given definite shape, the continued internal struggle of the classes and of the parties which represent their interests, the kaleidoscopic and frequent falling and changing of governments on which each government produces a policy in direct opposition to its predecessor, then it will begin to be clear why it is impossible to talk about a plan in connexion with international politics. In such a state of affairs one need not wonder at the fruitlessness and failure of all the international economic and political conferences which have taken place in recent years.

Without excessive modesty we can, as opposed to the general picture of international activities which I have drawn, note the unchanging, steadfast, and methodical foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The root of this policy now, as it was twelve years ago at the inception of the Soviet régime, is the preservation of the fruits of the October revolution from outside aggression, the effort to secure peaceful conditions for the building up of socialism at home, and the warding off as far as possible of the dangers and burdens of war from the whole of the world's workers. The power to be in the hands of the true defender of international peace—the proletariat, the steadfast pursuit of the lofty principles of the October revolution and the will of Lenin, the non-participation in the political groupings and combinations of certain States against others, the absence of any imperialist desires and aspirations towards the destruction and subjugation of other peoples, the solution of national questions on a basis of the utmost tolerance, the respecting of national culture of nations, however small they may be; these are some of the factors which lend a certain distinction to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The very fact of the existence on one-sixth of the habitable globe of a steadfast State, whole-heartedly devoted to the idea of peace and incapable of any kind of aggressive intention, is in itself a powerful factor for peace.

I am not going to linger to-day, Comrades, upon all the concrete steps which the Soviet Government have taken to consolidate universal peace. I had to report on these to the C.F.C. at the last session.

A fresh supplementary and absolutely objective proof of our peaceful intentions is provided by our 'five years' plan', for the accomplish-

ment of which we must strive for conditions of uninterrupted peace. It must be evident to every one that it would be madness to start this plan, demanding a considerable extension of our resources, if we were not at the same time determined, at whatever cost, not to allow any rupture of peaceful conditions. But the realization of a five years' plan is not our final goal, it is hardly a *sine qua non* for the mighty edifice of socialism which we are building and are going to build. After the first five years' plan will follow other five-year plans, for the realization of which conditions of peace will be just as necessary as for the first one.

But, however notable may be this 'mite' which the Soviet Union has contributed, this business of peace cannot be guaranteed by the efforts of our own country alone. While actively and independently prosecuting their own peace proposal, the Soviet Government are responsive to all peace overtures from whatever source they may emanate, and by whatever impulses they are dictated.

Considering the best guarantee of peace to be the complete suppression or a reduction of armaments, the Soviet Government continues even during the present year to participate in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, notwithstanding the fact that during the current Session the Commission clearly demonstrated its inability and unwillingness to tackle the problem of disarmament. The Preparatory Commission at its 6th Session this year almost completed its work, which, alas, meant that they have finally rejected the proposals of the Soviet Government, both with regard to complete disarmament and substantial reduction of existing armaments. Having rejected both the Soviet proposals of a Convention and having insisted on the examination of their own proposal being carried out at an early date, the Commission turned down successively all the Soviet amendments thereto, and cut out from the proposal itself anything that had the faintest resemblance to disarmament. By means of mutual concessions one to another the delegates succeeded in eliminating from the proposal all articles affecting the armaments of their countries. Thus the Commission struck out from the proposal the articles dealing with military reserves, both human and material. To characterize the work of the last session of the Preparatory Commission it is sufficient to tell you that it decisively and stubbornly refused my repeated proposal to insert in the proposal the words 'reduction of armaments'.

In this way the Commission proposed a further conference on disarmament, not for reduction, but only for limitation of armaments, which admitted not only of the preservation of the existing

level of armaments but of its increase. I said that the Commission had completed its work, as during the last three sessions it had not concerned itself at all with the problem of naval disarmament. About these problems, as you know, there will be separate parleys, probably with little success, between certain maritime Powers who are meeting at a Conference in London in January next.

On that occasion, if they reach any kind of agreement which, as is already well known, will be concerned not with the reduction of naval armaments but only with the adjustment of the ratio between the five naval Powers, the Commission has reserved to itself the honourable function of registering the agreement, and will thereafter submit to the impending International Conference their draft convention, which it can already be said, will have nothing in common with either land, naval, or air disarmament. Thus you will see that in all the changes, and the twistings and turning of their foreign policy, the capitalist countries, in so far as the sabotage of disarmament and kindred peace proposals are concerned, have exhibited a solid, united, and well thought-out plan of campaign.

We shall, however, be unjust to them if we do not record one constant feature in their policy. I refer to the constancy of the dislike and hostility which they have always exhibited towards the Soviet Union. This hostility of course takes different forms at different times and in different States, now appearing stronger and then again temporarily weaker, but always remaining at least latent (if disguised). I speak of course, not of absolutely every country, but of the overwhelming majority of States. I do not forget that in all States there are millions and tens of millions of the proletariat who, with ardent sympathy and affectionate anxiety, watch the life of the country which is building up socialism, who morally participate in its construction and morally co-operate in its success. There must be mentioned, too, the hostility of the reactionary elements of the important and petty bourgeoisie of the governing classes and the majority of the press organs of those countries. The principal agency which aids and abets this policy of hostility is, it must be confessed, the capitalist and the social democratic press, which with unwearying energy for the last twelve years has continued to heap abuse upon the Soviet Union and its representatives, to invent all kinds of incidents which never took place, to misrepresent the actual position of affairs in the Union, to exaggerate our difficulties, which are inevitable in the gigantic task which we have set ourselves, to belittle our successes and achievements, to attribute to us sins never committed, employing the sham revelations of faked witnesses, faked documents,

and other scurrilous methods. Not only the press, but even some of the Governments are not above the flagrant use of the dregs of the White Russian exiles for the forging of documents.

Manufacturers of false documents continue to enjoy the hospitality and sometimes even the protection of the authorities, even in the more friendly countries, and even when the activities of these forgers are directed against the interests of those very countries which afford them shelter.

The hostility which I have mentioned is kept alive, as well, by the continued non-recognition of the Soviet Union by some States, and the efforts of others to damage its prestige. The atmosphere of dislike and hostility thus engendered cannot, of course, serve to strengthen the cause of peace, but on the contrary contributes to the growth in international circles of a feeling of suspicion and alarm. Above all, this atmosphere is sometimes a direct encouragement to the adventurous and irresponsible Governments, inducing them to adopt measures which constitute an immediate threat to peace.

Without encouragement from the Capitalist Powers China would never have risked attacking the Chinese Eastern Railway.

As an illustration of the position I will call attention above all to the conflict with China which began in the summer of this year.¹ It is not necessary for me to linger in detail on the services rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people and the Chinese national movement, to which an enormous impetus was given by the Soviet refusal of unequal treaties of extra-territoriality and other privileges. In other quarters the Chinese people continue to be oppressed by the burden of unequal treaties with States who are defending their own Concessions, their own jurisdiction and privileges with the help of armies and fleets. It may be asked why, in their relations with these States, the Nanking rulers use only the servile language of requests and prayers, suffering both insults and humiliations while, in their dealings with the one State which recognizes the equal rights of the Chinese people, their complete right to order their own existence in their own land, and which has concluded with them on the basis of equal rights treaties which are very favourable to China, the Nanking and Mukden generals, scorning the customary diplomatic methods, replace them by insolent acts of provocation, violence, and expropriation. It is because the history of the relations between the Chinese rulers and our Soviet Union in recent years is a history of the single-handed (on their part) tearing up of voluntarily concluded

¹ See below, p. 274.

agreements, of raids and arbitrary expropriations, and the brutal treatment of Soviet officials in China.

How is it explained that, having rounded off this policy of violence by the total seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was under the management of both Governments according to agreement, the Chinese generals hurled at our Union an insolent challenge which did not lead to instant war, thanks only to the patience and pacific efforts of the Soviet Government? How can we explain the remarkable contrast between the attitude of the Nanking authorities in their relations with the Imperialist Governments on the one hand and with our Soviet Government on the other? It is of course partly explained by their reliance on our pacifist tendency, as they are well aware of the absence of any imperialist ideas in the Soviet Union. To provoke a conflict with the Imperialist States would be dangerous as, notwithstanding both the Kellogg Pact and the League of Nations, it would provide an excuse for fresh seizures in China, the extension of the foreigners' privileges, the imposition on the Chinese of heavy taxes, &c., while from the Soviet Government the Nanking authorities need expect no such repression. Nanking embarks on the adventure in the belief that at the worst the Soviet Union will employ its strength only for the restoration of its illegally impaired rights. But this only partly explains the action of the Nanking authorities. The truth is that the Nanking Government would never have risked everything on the hazardous and costly adventure if they did not count on the general atmosphere of hostility to the Soviet Government, and if they did not reckon on the sympathy or even the direct help of the Imperialist States. Thus even if we reject the highly probable supposition that some Imperialist State or group of States directly forced the Chinese into the conflict, it must be accepted that on each occasion the capitalist States shared the indirect responsibility for the conflict which originated on the Chinese-Soviet frontier, since their anti-Soviet policy always gave promise of their encouragement in any adventure directed against the Soviet Government. There cannot be the least doubt that without the silent or even active encouragement of the other Powers in the early stages of the conflict, and without being able to count on the all-pervading anti-Soviet hostility, the Nanking Government would never have decided upon the provocative policy which led to the present situation.

This situation became so serious that it was necessary to mobilize the special Far Eastern army, as there was no guarantee that the Nanking authorities, encouraged by the unseen influence, would not

proceed to further hostile acts, and that attacks on our frontier would not be made by Chinese or White Russian bandits. And the event proved that our fears were not groundless. During recent months there have taken place several clearly warlike acts of provocation on the part of the Chinese which, however, met with a lively resistance from the Far Eastern Army. With each fresh sortie by the Chinese this resistance became more aggressive as our troops would have been in too unfavourable a position if, when driving back the Chinese bands and detachments which had penetrated into our territory, they had halted on our frontier, thus allowing the enemy to reoccupy their original positions for still further sorties. Our troops were therefore sometimes forced to destroy the points of vantage themselves from which the most stubborn and frequent attacks on our frontier were launched, as this constituted the only guarantee of safety for the frontier population. But these counter-measures were exclusively defensive and were not directed to any political end.

All this time we must not forget that the employees and officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway who were left in Manchuria were suffering unheard-of humiliations, cruelties, tortures, and even executions, without being in any way guilty. The rumours set about by the Chinese about the conspiracies among our citizens which they said they had discovered, about propaganda, &c., are absolute fables which are not believed by a single serious-minded person either inside or outside China. We do not hold the Chinese people responsible for these actions, but only the actual authors of the policy of hostility to us, the present Chinese Government, all the more as this policy has done harm to China herself, as it impedes the Chinese people's struggle for freedom from the unequal treaties and their denial to the foreigners of extra-territoriality, &c. Only recently a certain foreign diplomat in Moscow asked me, not without a certain malicious pleasure, if we did not confess our mistake in refusing extra-territorial rights in China.

'Look', he said, 'what the Chinese are permitting themselves to do in their dealings with your nationals.' I replied, 'Notwithstanding all that has happened, we do not regret our policy of friendship towards the Chinese people. Our policy of refusal of extra-territorial rights was not mistaken; but the mad policy of the Nanking and Mukden Governments was mistaken, who by their actions gave you a reason for regarding as right your policy of insisting on extra-territorial rights and your dislike of recognizing the sovereignty of the Chinese people in their own land.'

We know that the Chinese people are eagerly hoping for a speedy

settlement of the dispute, that they are buoyed up by the report assiduously set about by the Nanking and Mukden Governments that they are entering into negotiations with us. These rumours are clearly meant to pacify the Chinese people, but meanwhile Nanking refused and still refuses to negotiate. The truth is that some time ago the Nanking authorities made us a proposal through the German Government about signing a joint declaration, but when, while we were, as it were, searching for a formula, we proposed, in order to test their sincerity and to obtain some guarantee that they would fully carry out any self-imposed obligations, that the Soviet Manager and Assistant Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be restored to office in accordance with the Pekin and Mukden Agreements, our proposal was rejected. We presented China with the minimum preliminary conditions for the settlement of the dispute from which we were determined not to budge. We so categorically and frequently affirmed this that the Nanking and Mukden Governments were left in no doubt that the dispute could only be settled by accepting these conditions. If none the less they hesitated or protracted the conflict then, we can again find the reason for this in their reliance on the help or interference of the three Powers and the League of Nations.

Only in the very last days, after the Far Eastern Army had successfully carried out a particularly damaging counter-attack on the Chinese and White Russian raiders, Chan Sue-Lian, the Commander-in-Chief and Governor of the Provinces, who was compelled to bear on his own shoulders the economic and military consequences of Nanking's prolongation of the conflict, officially announced his acceptance of our conditions. This was confirmed by a proclamation published to-day and signed by his diplomatic representative, Tsai.

In this connexion, I would remind you that the situation on the C. E. Railway which existed up to the time of the conflict depended not only upon the Pekin but also upon the Mukden Agreement, concluded with Chan Sue-Lian's father, that we had not formally recognized the Nanking Government, and that the actual relations which we did have with them were broken off entirely by their own fault. So that at a time when we are engaged in negotiating a peaceful settlement of the dispute with Mukden, the Pekin Government, either on their own initiative or at foreign instigation, are making fresh efforts to obtain the help of the Imperialist Powers and the League of Nations to prevent a peaceful and speedy end to the conflict.

The unrequested interference of the 'Peace-Makers'

From to-day's paper you will learn that the Governments of the U.S.A., France, and England have announced their readiness to render the assistance asked for by the Pekin Government. They are, you see, greatly concerned about the securing of peace, and so they consider it their duty to interfere and prevent a peaceful end to the conflict. When Nanking was devising and preparing the seizure of the C. E. Railway, when the seizure actually materialized, when we complained in round terms about this sudden Chinese onfall into our territory, it did not occur to these 'peace-loving' Powers that such provocative acts would rupture the friendly relations between China and the U.S.S.R. and would constitute a threat to peace, and they did not do anything to restrain China from her course of action, nor did they urge upon Nanking, either by their interference or reproof, the illegality and rashness of their action or the equity and advantage to China of accepting our conditions. And only now when the Mukden Government are convinced at last that the situation on the C. E. Railway not only holds no promise for China, but causes themselves colossal damage, and demands from them enormous sacrifices, and they are therefore taking the only suitable steps to put an end to that situation, only now I say, do those Powers wake up and begin consulting among themselves how to devise means for encouraging China to further stubbornness and a prolongation of the conflict. And this is done in the name of peace and the Kellogg Pact.

Fifty-five nations signed this Pact, and three only of them, without any authority from any one, have constituted themselves the elected guardians of the Pact. To do this it was necessary to expunge temporarily from their memories their military forces in Pekin, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Wei-hai-wei, their cruiser squadrons, their flotillas of mine-layers, submarines, and gun-boats in Chinese ports and on the River Yangtse, their armies in Egypt and on the Rhine, and the comparatively recent events in Central America, to forget the host of facts with which their past, future, and their present is burdened. And the American Government even forgot that our Soviet Government, which is barely twelve years old, is of such inconsiderable importance that they had refused to recognize it or to take note of its existence. They write in their declaration that they are following the course of events with anxiety. But there are with us in the U.S.S.R. no representatives of the American Government who could follow from our side the events on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier, and we, having no representative in America, are also de-

prived of the power of giving the American Government timely information about events which concern them. And therefore, perforce, doubts arise as to whether they keep a watch on everything and about everything on which they keep a watch. The truth is that in the Washington Government Department the Nanking representative is U. Chao-Chu, of well-known anti-Soviet sympathies, who no doubt is the chief source of Mr. Stimson's information, but does it not occur to Mr. Stimson that such information cannot be distinguished for its completeness or its unbiased character, and that it must be, to say the least of it, one-sided. The principle of *audi alteram partem* is not unknown, I fancy, even to American ethics. That is why we find it especially strange that the American Government is apparently the initiator of the collective *démarche* of the three Powers.

But, however incorrect and one-sided is the information which the partners in this *démarche* have, or would like to have, they cannot ignore the following fact. The last counter-attack delivered by our army against the Chinese raiders convinced, it would seem, the Manchurian generals that they could not oppose the Red Army with any prospect of success, and they acted on this assumption. In the event of a further advance on the part of our Far Eastern Army, it is doubtful whether they would encounter any serious resistance.

We are in the kind of situation in which an Imperialist Government prefers not to open negotiations but to dictate terms. And we? Shall we make use of our favourable position? Shall we impose fresh conditions on China appropriate to the occasion? The Protocol which we signed yesterday with M. Tsai returns a reply to these questions in the negative. Our terms to-day remain exactly the same as we put forward at the beginning of the conflict. From this one fact alone it is entirely clear that the counter-measures of the Far Eastern Army have no political aim and cannot therefore in any way be regarded as a breach of the Kellogg Pact.

What effect will the *démarche* of the Powers have? I think, none. At the worst they will be able to enter on the credit side of their 'pacific intentions' a certain drag upon and complication of the negotiations which have already been initiated with Mukden by strengthening the negative pressure of Nanking on Mukden. I am, however, more inclined to the view that Mukden and perhaps even Nanking will understand that we will not be budged by any *démarches* from the position which we have firmly taken up since the commencement of the conflict, and that delays will only increase the misfortunes of China herself. We think that we are on the way to

a lasting settlement of the dispute on the C. E. Railway, and at the same time to a removal of the possibility of further artificial creation of suspicion and hostility between the Soviet and Chinese people who are striving to live not only in peace but in sincere friendship. But however that may be, whether the direct contact which has now been established with Mukden leads to a speedy cessation of hostilities, or whether forces hostile both to our Union as well as China succeed in preventing this for the time being—we are fully confident that, relying on the universal sympathy which our policy excites among the workers and peasants of our Union, on the recognition of its justice, which so far as the substance of the dispute is concerned is not disputed even by our enemies, on the strength of our Far Eastern Army, which has already given abundant proof of its steadfastness, of their willing devotion and heroism, we shall achieve acceptance of our just conditions and the re-establishment of the violated rights of our worker-peasant State.

England and the U.S.S.R.

Comrades, we have recently succeeded by the exercise of the greatest perseverance, tact, and common sense, in settling another serious dispute which weighed heavily upon the international situation and represented a hardly less serious threat to peace than the events on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. I refer to the Anglo-Soviet dispute which we have now settled. Both those disputes were begun, as you remember, in a similar manner by illegal and provocative attacks upon Soviet institutions. In both, a large part was played by faked documents and false representation of the nature of the Soviet Government's policy. Apart from this purely external resemblance, both conflicts emerged from that background of widespread hatred of the Soviet Government about which I have just told you. The initial rupture of relations on the part of the English, as in the case of the Chinese adventure, came from their expectation of the sympathy and support of the other States, even of their following such an example.

At one time it appeared to us that the Foreign Office should submit for the decision of the Central Executive Committee the questions arising in connexion with the settlement of the Anglo-Soviet dispute. Permit me, therefore, to dwell rather fully on these questions in order that I may explain to you how a reference to the Central Executive Committee was mooted and why the necessity for it failed to materialize. You know that the chief cause of dispute between us

and Great Britain was the alleged financial claim of the English bourgeoisie arising from our decrees about the annulment of the Tsarist Debts and the nationalization of the banks, factories, and workshops. These claims served as an excuse for the intervention which nourished the civil war, prolonging it for several years, and were challenged in their turn by our counter-claims for the huge losses caused to our country and our nationals. Having spent on this intervention hundreds of millions of pounds and having suffered defeat therein, Great Britain continued to seek a settlement of these claims by 'peaceful means'. These 'peaceful means' consisted at first of an economic blockade of our Union and then in a refusal over a number of years to recognize the Soviet Government and to establish diplomatic relations with them. When, however, even these methods failed to have an effect and the Soviet Government obstinately refused to enter into any sort of negotiations regarding the claims before the establishment of normal relations, Great Britain, in the shape of the Labour Party, who had come into power, recognized the Soviet Government, thanks to which negotiations about the disputed questions became possible.

These negotiations led to the framing of a Trade Agreement and to a preliminary general treaty including certain principles for the settlement of the English claims and our counter-claims. With the help of a document forged at the critical moment, historically known as the 'Zinovieff letter', the Conservatives turned the Labour Party out of office and refused to ratify the treaties which I have mentioned. Once more the question of the English claims was suspended in mid-air, as the Soviet Government with characteristic firmness refused to go beyond the concessions which they had agreed to when the treaties were framed. After two and a half years of fruitless endeavour, the Conservative Government had recourse to fresh 'heroic' measures, i.e. to the rupture of diplomatic relations. They calculated by these methods to force upon the Soviet Government acceptance of those conditions which the rabid and reactionary sections of the bourgeoisie had striven to impose upon them. But, there again, they might not have embarked upon such a dangerous and portentous course if they had not reckoned to find accomplices and supporters in the other powerful European countries. In this, however, they were out of their reckoning.

For the restoration of relations, the Conservative Government made a flat demand for the examination of all disputed questions and for their settlement in the spirit desired by them. Negotiating on the basis of the usual diplomatic relations did not commend itself to

the English Conservatives ; they preferred to harass us by a refusal to enter into normal relations and thus extract from us the conditions they wanted. But there again they were out in their reckoning, as the Soviet Government firmly refused to budge from the position which they had taken up. Not only did they not agree to such conditions, but even refused to enter into any form of negotiations until diplomatic relations had been re-established.

Our Union is of such a nature that as a result of each attack from outside it not only does not weaken but grows still stronger, thanks to the growing tide of energy and enthusiasm among the working masses which is called forth by these attacks. We easily weathered the rupture which the English Conservatives had expected we should regard as nothing short of a catastrophe. We did not crave pardon. We did not walk in sackcloth and ashes, and we made no proposals to the Conservative Government. In industrial circles among the English bourgeoisie, not excluding Conservative circles, there arose serious doubts as to the wisdom of the tactics employed by their Government, which not only failed to speed up a settlement of the questions in which they were interested and brought them no advantage, but even caused economic loss to England. The dispatch this year to Moscow of a trade delegation was an expression of these doubts, as was the search instituted by the City of London itself for fresh channels through which a settlement of the questions vital to Great Britain might be reached. It was becoming increasingly evident that the card of breaking off relations played by the Conservative Government in their anti-Soviet game had been trumped.

Together with their other failures in foreign politics, the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations played no small a part in the last English elections. It was not difficult for the Conservative party's opponents to use the rupture for election purposes by submitting an opposition programme of immediate and unquestioned restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

The promises made by the Labour Party in the election campaign were of course the internal affair of England and did not formally impose any sort of obligation on the Government elected by her. But these promises were born in publicity ; they could not be ignored ; it was impossible to behave as if we knew nothing about them. But apart from these promises and obligations, it was impossible to expect that the victorious party at the polls which had so bitterly criticized the policy of severing relations adopted by the Conservatives, when they themselves came into power should not set out upon an opposite policy.

Kindly recall, Comrades, that this policy consisted in an effort to impose upon us a settlement of the disputed questions before the restoration of normal relations. We were therefore not a little astonished when the new British Government, instead of a simple intimation of their readiness to re-establish normal relations immediately, invited us to send a plenipotentiary to London for negotiations. It is true that these negotiations, according to the text of the formal invitation, were to be confined to the procedure for the examination of the substance of disputed questions which must take place after the restoration of normal relations. It seemed to us that even the procedure could with advantage have been examined when negotiations on the substance of the claims were instituted. All the more, as the extent and nature of the questions were well known to both parties, and the Soviet Government had never refused to seek a settlement under normal conditions. Our policy however consists, while firmly maintaining our fundamental position and our essential rights, in not quarrelling over trifles and especially over merely technical points. We therefore dispatched to London as our Plenipotentiary, Comrade Dovgalevsky, previously informing the English Government that the conversations could only touch upon the procedure for the negotiation but not the nature of the disputed points. However, when Comrade Dovgalevsky arrived in London he was met with the following proposition of Mr. Henderson: as the first Session of Parliament with the new Government was over, and the next Session would not open for about three months, and without Parliament the Government does not renew relations, wouldn't it be a good thing to utilize this 'spare time' by examining and settling the actual disputed questions?

So then it was proposed to us that before the resumption of normal relations, and in the continued absence of such relations, we should enter into negotiations for the settlement of the claims of the English bourgeoisie. This proposal in essence, if not in form, was not a whit different from the conditions which the Conservative Government tried unsuccessfully for so long to impose upon us as a preliminary to reopening normal relations. This proposition did not in the least correspond to the purpose for which Comrade Dovgalevsky was invited to London and for which we sent him to London. For him to have remained longer in London would have been useless, and nothing remained to us but to recall him, informing Mr. Henderson that his proposal would be referred to the Central Executive Committee or to its Praesidium.

Why did our Foreign Office decide to submit the matter to the

decision of the Central Executive Committee? Not because, of course, they thought it necessary or possible to abandon the position which they had taken up and which they had maintained for so many years, or because they expected any fresh orders from the Committee. The decision of the Committee could easily be guessed, but in view of the misconception of our position revealed not only by the Conservative Government but by the new Government, a misconception of the immutability of our position, we deemed that the time had come to make it possible for the highest legislative authority of our Union to make it known once for all in the most authoritative way that no Government and no forces of reaction will succeed in driving the Soviet Government from the position by means of which they have preserved the fundamental interests of our Union.

It was necessary, once for all, to disperse any lingering doubts, to destroy any expectation of a possible surrender on our part, which we had repeatedly declared was unthinkable.

However, Mr. Henderson understood that our reference to the Central Executive Committee was a far more complete refusal of his proposal than a simple 'no'. He again invited our plenipotentiary to London, giving him to understand that on this occasion he would keep the conversations exclusively to the question of procedure.

The second meeting between Comrade Dovgalevsky and Mr. Henderson actually concluded with the signing of a protocol about the date of future negotiations, and this protocol, which contained an undertaking for the immediate restoration of full diplomatic relations and an exchange of ambassadors, Mr. Henderson promised to submit for the ratification of Parliament.¹ As you know, by the votes of the Labour Party and Liberals against those of the Conservatives (among whom, however, were found a few heretics who voted against their own party), Parliament ratified the protocol, after which the Soviet and British Governments with the due established formalities appointed their Ambassadors.

We record with pleasure the fact of the restoration of normal relations with Great Britain, which we have no doubt fully accords with the interests of the British people also. All sincere lovers of peace cannot fail to welcome the cessation of a state of hostility between two such powerful States as ourselves and Great Britain. It is impossible not to see in the settlement of the Anglo-Soviet dispute the removal of one of the greatest anomalies in international affairs. But what happened in this case? Surely the existence of diplomatic relations

¹ For text of Anglo-Soviet Agreement and subsequent documents see above, pp. 116-130.

between any two capitalist States would be regarded as a completely normal and usual state of affairs? You may ask why the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain should specially be regarded as an extraordinary event? To answer this question satisfactorily you must recall the general atmosphere of hostility to and hatred of the Soviet State about which I have told you to-day. In spite of the repeated declaration of the Government representatives of the capitalist countries about their supposed efforts to draw us into the 'family of nations' on a basis of equal rights, and their willingness to recognize the right of the peoples in our Union to build up their own social-political system, they none the less really consider that the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries should be the normal state of affairs. The establishment of relations with the Soviet Union is regarded as something unusual, calling for explanation and justification. When some European country makes an exchange of ambassadors with some far-distant State which had practically no ties of political or economic interests with it—no one demands an explanation. But when it comes to establishing diplomatic and economic relations with the 140 millions of our Union, then questions are asked. Why and to whom is it necessary? Where is the profit in it? How large will the profit be? Will there be an actual balance of profit? Will guarantees be given that there will be an actual balance, &c., and when it has been irrefutably proved that relations with the Soviet Union will stimulate trade and industry, will decrease unemployment, cheapen raw materials or articles of general necessity, in a word that they will be extremely profitable for the whole agriculture, the whole economic situation and even the whole population of the country, then fresh questions are forthcoming—Does it satisfy this or that manufacturer, bank, insurance company, this or that group of people who suffered losses twelve years ago at the time of the October revolution? And if no absolutely satisfactory answer to these questions is forthcoming, the interests of the country as a whole are frequently sacrificed to the supposed interests of individual persons or groups of persons. I said 'supposed interests' because in actual fact these individuals and groups, as experience has taught, gain nothing and could not gain anything by the refusal of their country to enter into relations with the Soviet State. Those who defend their supposed interests, whose minds are so hopelessly engrossed by the already historically remote facts of the annulment of debts and the nationalization of works, must remember also certain facts less remote historically, e. g. the intervention from which sprang

claims affecting both our State and a huge number of private individuals. We do not, however, regard the existence of these claims of ours as a hindrance to the maintenance of mutual diplomatic relations with other countries.

*The 'propaganda' accusation against the Soviet Government is
hypocrisy*

The refusal to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union or the rupture of such relations is not always openly justified by the prosaic excuse of the interests of individuals and groups. When a more popular and 'uplifting' explanation is required which can be accepted by the broader-minder bourgeois, and particularly by the less politically educated classes of the population which are not directly interested in the preservation or extension of the unfriendly relations with the Soviet State, then that well-known boggy 'propaganda' is dragged into the light of day.

In all capitalist countries, you must remember, there exist peace, happiness, and a social paradise. All classes of the population, proletarians, peasants, officials and small bourgeois are quite satisfied with their condition. They do not seek to better it. They protest against nothing. There are no street demonstrations, no strikes, no peasant agitations, no communist movement, nobody knows anything about the country which is building up socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat; news of the Communist International has not reached them; in a word nothing threatens the serenity of those countries. But let a political representative or trade delegate of the Soviet Government make his appearance in those countries and the picture at once changes. Suddenly the labour movement swells, taking, as at the waving of a magic wand, the most violent forms of development, according to some the call of the Communist International begins to be heard, according to others the summons emanates from the Proletariat, until such time as tranquil and peaceful people in the Colonies begin to rise against the mother country, and the revolutionary movement of discontent overflows in a broad and mighty torrent. This is the picture drawn of the results of establishing a Soviet political representative in a country where one or other of the bourgeois groups and the political party which stands for their interests, for some totally different reason, do not wish to enter into relations with the Soviet Union. It would be useless for you to explain that the working-class movement existed in sufficiently revolutionary forms long before the October upheaval, that it is now to be found everywhere independently of the existence or non-

existence in any particular country of a Soviet political representative—not only the working-class movement, but the Communist movement as well—that the movement is not even developing solely in the two countries which have a Soviet political representative, and that consequently it has entirely different roots and depends on immutable causes different from those which go to make up a capitalist system, founded as it is upon the exploitation of the workers, and finally that nowhere and at no time has any proof been discovered that there is any sort of connexion between the Soviet agencies abroad and the indigenous working-class movement. And it would also be useless to point out that in any country or Colony you care to mention there is a sufficient number of inhabitants acquainted with local conditions, the native idiom and the psychological outlook of their fellow inhabitants who are far more capable of successfully moulding and directing the existing discontent on economic and national questions than are the ubiquitous legendary emissaries of Moscow.

But to argue is useless, as the people who rush to scare their own fellow-citizens with this so-called propaganda do not themselves believe in it. They count only on the ignorance and unintelligence of their listeners and readers to whom they can tell any tale, without regard to facts or proofs.

The question which I have just touched upon has, however, another side. What particularly do they want from us when they accuse us of propaganda? To this question we can find an authentic reply in the formula of the undertakings which Mr. Henderson proposed and which we agreed to exchange with the British Government. This formula, accepted by us since the Treaty of 1924, says:

‘The contracting parties definitely affirm their desire and intention of living together in peace and amity, of carefully respecting the undisputed right of a State to order its life within the boundaries of its own jurisdiction according to its judgment, to restrain all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations which receive their financial support, from any action overt or covert, calculated in any way whatever to endanger the peace and well-being of any part whatever of the territory of the U.S.S.R. or the British Empire or which aims at vitiating the relations of the Union or British Empire with its neighbours or any other country whatever.’

In this clause are enunciated those undisputed principles by which Governments must be guided in their mutual relations with one another, but which evidently have not in the past been observed by somebody. We will examine these principles one by one. In

pursuance of our own undisputed right to order our own life according to our own judgment we instituted the unshakable principle of a monopoly of our foreign trade. Do the capitalist Governments respect our right when they unceasingly attack our monopoly of foreign trade, seeking as they did, though unsuccessfully of course, to break our monopoly by all the methods of economic pressure available to them? Do they respect our jurisdiction when foreigners and their Governments do not restrain themselves from protesting openly against this or that judicial or administrative measure of the Soviet authorities? Can any analogous examples be quoted for pressure on our part directed against other States with a view to forcing them to give up, for our benefit, some system or other of internal administration? There are no such examples. Who is it who violates the agreed principles of international life, we or they? Moreover, did not the intervention in the years 1918–20 constitute a threat to the peace and well-being of the Union's territory? And the military assistance rendered to Poland during her attack on the Ukraine in 1920! Did it or did it not constitute a threat to the peace and well-being of a part of the Union's territory? And what about the dealings which persons in official positions and even Governments have had with the Royalist emigrant and terrorist organizations, and with the emigrant, self-constituted Governments of the Ukraine, Georgia and similar Governments? Were they, I ask, bolstered up for the benefit of our Union? Surely the ratification of the so-called Bessarabian protocol by Great Britain, France, and Italy, aiming at the fictitious legalization of the war-occupation of Bessarabia, constituted a threat to the peace and well-being of the Union's territory? And did not the very fact of the ratification of the Bessarabian protocol endanger the good relations between us and our Rumanian neighbours, creating the occasion for a long and most serious conflict? And there was the conclusion with both the Polish and Rumanian Governments of warlike conventions for the continued supply to them of war materials and instructors, the dispatch to them of military missions or generals for the stimulation of their military preparations, and finally the encouragement of every kind of combination for the destruction of the Soviet Government by a ring of Baltic and other leagues; surely this did not improve but rather endangered the relations of the Soviet Union with its neighbours? Did the attitude of certain States in the present conflict with Manchuria, especially just recently, have the object of improving and not endangering our relations with our Chinese neighbours? Let them point out a single analogous action, or even one approaching it, on our part in our relations with other

countries. They could not, as there has been none. And if the actions I have described denote 'propaganda', then are not those Governments chiefly responsible for it who shriek about our alleged propaganda and demand guarantees from us for the future ?

If we turn to propaganda in the special sense of the word, which is not referred to at all in the formula which I quoted but is clearly understood, then what do we find ? Hundreds and thousands of organs of the Press in practically every country have abused our Union every day for twelve years ; they have attacked the Soviet régime, they have insulted the Soviet Government in the most unbridled way as a whole, as well as individual members of it by name, they lie and slander in order to show the baseness of our methods and aims ; they foretell our inevitable ruin, exalting the capitalist system to the detriment of the communist system. But it is not only the organs of the Press which do this, but also the most respectable representatives of the State, past, present, and future Ministers. Anti-Soviet sermons, far from parliamentary in language, are delivered in mushroom Parliaments. You will even find these sermons contained in the conclusions and summing up of judgments in foreign legal institutions which are famous for their objectivity. Isn't all this propaganda, directed against the Soviet Union ? This obvious propaganda the stern political jurists on the other side of our frontiers strain every nerve not to notice. But let our *Izvestia* or *Pravda* or some other of our newspapers allow itself to make an irreverent remark about the capitalist system, or about some representative of a foreign Government, and in its turn write about the superiority of a communist organization over a capitalist one, then there is an uproar in the whole foreign Press, questions are asked in Parliament, diplomatic notes and protests fly around, the legend of 'Soviet propaganda' is created, to combat which special measures are necessary and which is even an obstacle to the establishment or preservation of normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. If socialism, established as yet in only one country, though a large and powerful one, is not apprehensive of its fate and does not fear destruction as a result of the verbal and written outpourings of parliamentary orators, church preachers, thousands of newspapers and journals, repeated throughout a mass of countries in hundreds of millions of forms, then why should the capitalist system established on the whole of the remainder of the globe tremble at the literary products of a few Moscow newspapers or the oratorical efforts of some Soviet representatives ? Surely this nervousness exhibited by the defenders of the capitalist system is in itself an admission of weakness or even the best form of propaganda against itself ? All this would

be comic if it did not lead to complications of the international situation.

The complete frivolity, insincerity and baselessness of the 'propaganda' accusation levelled at the Soviet Government is crystal clear.

In this connexion I cannot deny myself the pleasure of quoting to you the remarks made in the English Parliament on November 5, 1929, during the deliberations on the question of propaganda by Mr. Lloyd George, whom no one will suspect of a passionate friendship for our Union. This is what he said:

'With regard to the propaganda in the East, all I can say is that I have been longer a Member of this House than the Leader of the Opposition (Baldwin), and I can tell him of the sort of things that we used to hear about the propaganda of Imperialist Russia in the East. I remember perfectly well how the Russians were constantly accused, and I think rightly accused, of propaganda in India, and of designs against India. I remember the speech delivered by the distinguished father of the late Foreign Secretary (i. e. Chamberlain), when talking about the Russian Foreign Secretary: he said that you could not believe a word he said and that one who supped with the devil must have a long spoon. But nobody ever dreamt, least of all Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, of breaking off relations with Russia, and turning out the Ambassador here, and if anybody had proposed it in this House he would have been treated as if he were a lunatic.'

Further, when speaking about our Union, Mr. Lloyd George went on to say:

'She may not behave at the table in the same sort of way as older Governments, who are more trained in methods of restraint and of concealing their thoughts, and of doing their propaganda against each other. Make no mistake, there is a great deal of that, but it is done in such a way that they can repudiate everything. It has been done in the past, and it will be done again. The Russian Government do it more crudely, but the old Russian subtlety will come back again and they will be able to beat the most exquisite master of that art by doing it in such a way that nobody will be able to point a finger at any particular Minister who has done it all. That is almost inevitable until nations understand each other better, until there is more goodwill between nation and nation.'

As you see, Mr. Lloyd George is not destitute of humour and he lifts himself above the level of other State representatives who put themselves in a ridiculous position when they talk with the utmost seriousness about the so-called propaganda. But the point is that we

now have the authoritative statement, publicly uttered, of Mr. Lloyd George, who has held the most distinguished Ministerial posts in the English Cabinet, among them Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, that the British Government, like other Governments, has carried on and still does carry on propaganda against other States, and one is constrained to believe that it makes no exception even in favour of the Soviet Union. It may be asked whether further proofs are necessary of the hypocrisy of this feeble 'propaganda' accusation against the Soviet Government.

We demand from the countries represented in Moscow non-interference in our internal affairs; and that policy of non-interference we ourselves loyally carry out and intend to carry out in the future in our dealings with other nations. We must, however, state that the unfounded general accusations about so-called propaganda or attempts to make the Soviet Government responsible for people and organizations over which they have no formal or active control, direct or indirect, can only be regarded by us as a pre-arranged excuse for the non-establishment or rupture of normal relations or even for more serious anti-Soviet machinations.

Returning to the importance of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain, I would like to recall that the economic advantage which would result for both countries admits of no doubt, and is not disputed by a soul even in Great Britain itself. The English Trade Delegation which visited us this year was convinced by means of the statistics laid before it of the immense possibilities which lie in economic collaboration between the two countries. On the business world of England itself and in no small degree on the Government, will depend the extent to which these possibilities are utilized, possibilities which to us present themselves as an entirely independent and serious problem unconnected with the settlement of this or that disputed question bequeathed by the past. We believe that the adjustment of the past, demanding, in consequence of the complicated nature of the question, considerable time, need not precede measures which are vital to current interests or to those of the future. We believe too that a way will be found to settle the disputed questions satisfactorily, if the opposing interested party will not make fruitless attempts which are distasteful to us, but will seek with us a solution of the problems which will benefit both countries. On our side there is goodwill, there is a sincere effort to establish friendly relations with the British people to avoid those misunderstandings which up till now have been deliberately fostered in certain quarters for the mutual estrangement of both Governments. One must, however, regret that at the moment

the re-establishment of relations has already been somewhat clouded by Great Britain's association with America's appearance in the Manchurian conflict.

Our relations with Germany

Comrades, I have dealt chiefly with our relations with two countries only, viz. China and Great Britain, as the settlement of our disputes with them has constituted a great portion of our policy in recent years. In our relations with other countries, during the time which has passed since our last report to a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, no important changes have taken place. As formerly, we maintain very friendly relations with Germany. As formerly, we follow with the greatest sympathy her efforts to free herself from the shackles riveted upon her by the Versailles Treaty and from which the working classes principally suffer. We should eagerly welcome the fruits of these efforts if they were actually to lead to the breaking or even only to the weakening of the chains of Versailles. Our interests are not traversed by these efforts of Germany for the adjustment of her position with other countries except when such adjustment involves Germany in some anti-Soviet combination or seduces her from her undertakings under the Rapallo Treaty, which has had such beneficial results both for us and for them. In the last year we have had fresh proof that there are in Germany people, groups, organizations and even parties who have as their object a radical alteration of Germany's whole policy in favour of anti-Soviet machinations in exchange for illusory economic and political gains. It is essential to watch such attempts carefully, however unimportant and few in numbers the initiators may be, but all of them together cannot effect any change in the basic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, on which the unavoidable misunderstandings and differences about questions of secondary importance must not be allowed to have any effect.

The fundamental objective conditions which produced in their time the Rapallo Treaty and our long-standing friendship continue generally to operate even now and will continue to determine our mutual relationship for some time to come. There are still in operation certain fundamental inherent conditions which have conferred upon Germany the power to take first place in our economic dealings with the West. By concluding a series of treaties and agreements we have created a broader juridical basis for the development of these mutual relations with Germany. Our connexion with the Western countries has become wider and will become wider still, thanks to

which the competition of foreign countries for our markets will, of course, become keener, while on the other hand, owing to the rate of development of our industries and rural husbandry, our needs and requirements have increased enormously. Upon Germany herself will depend what share she takes in satisfying these demands.

Relations with other Countries

With regret we have to record somewhat strained, though normal, relations with France. If the French bourgeois Press, as a whole, reflects even in the slightest degree the French Government's attitude to us, then those relations must be regarded as very unsatisfactory. The rôle played by France in yesterday's *démarche* shows that they are not inclined to take a back seat in the international anti-Soviet movement. On our side, no obstacle has been placed in the way of the improvement of these relations, either from the political or the economic point of view. But we have been given no reason to think that any steps on our part in this direction could be expected to call forth the necessary response from the other side.

Our relations with Italy are characterized by their complete correctness. During the last year there have been visits of Italian air squadrons to Odessa, and Soviet warships to Naples, both enjoying full hospitality. Economic collaboration has also been developed with the co-operation and encouragement of both Governments. We are glad, too, to note the almost entire absence of any sort of misunderstanding between the two Governments.

I have just received a short note from the Italian Ambassador in Moscow to the effect that his Government is associating itself with the recent *démarche* of the United States of America. I like to think that the belatedness of this communication is evidence of hesitation on the part of the Italian Government, and a feeling of doubt on their part as to the effect of this step upon the relations which both Governments are striving to establish with each other.

By the signing of the Moscow Protocol about the delay in bringing into force the Kellogg Pact we gave fresh proof of our active efforts to consolidate peace with the world generally and with our immediate neighbours in particular. Above all, we hoped that the Moscow Protocol would have a restraining influence on those Polish elements which have always striven to create and to perpetuate disharmony between the two Governments. I am sorry to say these hopes were not justified and our relations continue to suffer shocks from time to time as a result of blows aimed at us, now by certain representatives of Polish imperialism and now by the Polish Press. The Polish Govern-

ment apparently considers the existing relations to be satisfactory and quite in order, but we have other views as to their correctness and sincerely desire a change for the better, to which end we have in our time made appropriate representations to the Polish Government. So far, from no fault of ours, these have had no results. We are glad to note, however, quite recently more favourable developments in our trade relations with Poland.

With the utmost pleasure we can record the steady growth of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Free City of Danzig, which found an expression in the visit to the U.S.S.R. of the President of the Free City. The Danzig Government recently gave proofs of its loyal policy and its efforts to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Government.

In our relations with the Baltic States there have been no notable changes during the last few years. I am very glad to be able to record undoubted progress in our relations with Estonia, with whom we concluded a Commercial Treaty in May. I feel sure that the atmosphere of better understanding created during recent months between us and the Estonian Government will serve as a basis for the further consolidation of good relations between the two States.

Our relations with all the Scandinavian States are developing normally, although the appearance in certain Swedish circles of imperialist aspirations in regard to the East requires our attention. A new Austrian Government has shown its readiness to co-operate in the maintenance and extension of economic relations with us.

With Greece we have concluded a temporary trade agreement guaranteeing the preservation of favourable trade relations between the two countries.

In surveying our relations with the Western countries it must not be forgotten that one of our provinces which has not formally seceded from our Union is still in occupation by another country. The self-elected champions of the Kellogg Pact take no notice of this occupation. I refer to Bessarabia, the population of which never ceases to aspire to reunion with us, a fact which we must not forget.

Turning to the non-European countries, I must first of all record the maintenance, unsullied and undiminished, of friendly relations with the Turkish Republic. The friendship of our Union contrasts favourably with the friendship of other countries where friendly relations are frequently established every moment by the Government of the particular party which finds itself in power and whose policy may be reversed to-morrow by another party when they in their turn come into power. But the friendship of the Soviet Union does not depend

on any fortuitous conjunctions or chance combinations. Behind our friendship stand hundreds of millions of workers, all the peoples of the United territories. This cannot fail to have an appreciable effect in international relations. We know that our friendship is valued in Turkey just as we value theirs for the same reason. Quite recently Comrade Karachan set out for the capital of Turkey to give personal testimony to the unchanging friendship in our relations to that country. Quite recently, too, in Moscow conversations have been initiated about the introduction of amendments to the Turco-Soviet Treaty of 1927. I am convinced that on the basis of the two years' trial of the working of this Treaty we can quickly conclude the conversations and make a still more lasting basis for further economic collaboration.

We are glad to observe a notable stabilization of relations with our great far-eastern neighbour Japan and the mutual loyalty observed by both Governments. But in Japan, as in other countries, there are certain groups who aim at impairing these relations and who have recourse to the usual methods in such cases. There was a chance of this movement being translated into actions inconsistent with loyalty. I take the liberty of expressing my belief that the efforts of these groups will be frustrated in the future as they have been in the past, and my faith in the desire of the Japanese Government as well as the Japanese people to preserve and develop loyal and neighbourly relations.

Our relations with Persia too still remain amicable. Their efforts to attain economic emancipation and an enhanced international position always meet with our utmost sympathy. Both Governments are adopting the measures required of them for the uninterrupted development of those mutual economic relations which are so important to them.

Big experiments have been carried out this year by our Afghan neighbours. Afghanistan has suffered convulsions which caused alarm even to us who are interested in the complete preservation of independence by the Afghan people. True to the essential principle of our policy, we have refrained from any kind of interference in the acute internal struggle which is taking place in the country, and from backing up one group against another, watching only to see that no such interference came from Afghanistan's other neighbours. At the present time an end has been put to these convulsions. As in 1919, when Afghanistan first entered the international arena as an independent State, so now the Union Government, concerned for a speedy pacification and stabilization of the internal situation in Afghanistan,

has not hesitated to recognize the new Government in the early days of its existence. On receipt of a notification dated October 15, 1929, from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the formation of the Government of Muhammed Nadir Khan, the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in their reply of October 19, confirmed, in the name of the Soviet Government, the unchanged friendliness of the relations between the two Governments, and expressed its readiness to develop those relations on the basis of existing agreements in conformity with the needs of a strengthened and independent Afghanistan and of its economic and cultural progress.

Among the transatlantic countries we have, I am sorry to say, no official relations with the U.S.A., but our connexions with their business world have been extended and strengthened. The industry of that country is peculiarly adapted to the rate of development of our own industry. Subject to the necessary conditions further notable advances could be made with regard to an *economic rapprochement* between the two countries. We calmly await the time when this necessity will also be recognized by those on whom the necessary steps depend, as it has already been realized by a large part of the American business world.

The reception given recently to the Soviet aeroplane 'Land of the Soviets', together with many other facts, is evidence of the extent and progressive growth in America of interest in, and sympathy with, our Union.

To-day the independent Republic of Panama unexpectedly called to mind the existence of our Union. They, too, you see are concerned about the preservation of the Kellogg Pact. We can only wish for them that this Pact will preserve their own republic and will strengthen their independence.

The Capitalist World unflaggingly forges weapons against the U.S.S.R.

From the hasty *résumé* of our foreign activities which I have made you will see that during the accountable period we have fully maintained our position, if you do not count the loss of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which we are assured will shortly be restored to us. A considerable item on the credit side is the restoration of diplomatic relations with Great Britain which were broken off two and a half years ago. It would, however, be naïve and foolish to imagine that we can remain peacefully in the position we have attained or even in our somewhat improved international position, or to think that we have achieved for ourselves security abroad. The convulsions through

which the capitalist world is living, their efforts to destroy those who oppose them by the most violent means; the complete breakdown of the pseudo-pacifist cry of disarmament, evidencing the vitality of the military and imperialist spirit which penetrates into every pore of international politics—all this taken together does not permit us to relax our attitude of watchfulness. But the chief danger is the hatred and hostility displayed by the capitalist world towards the Soviet State, which provides favourable and fertile soil for conflicts like the Manchurian one, for the policy of non-recognition, the breaking off of diplomatic relations and still more serious complications. There is no need at the moment to point out exactly where and when warlike acts are being matured against us. It is sufficient to note the existing hostility to the Soviet country and the continued unwillingness to be reconciled to its existence, in which we cannot help seeing a constant danger to our Union. We must neutralize and balance this threat by diplomatic methods only. Genuine equilibrium can only be attained by a further consolidation of our internal strength, by successful realization of our economic plans, by sustaining and extending the forward movement and enthusiasm of the workers and the middle class and poor peasants, and by further cementing the unity of our party, and, inasmuch as our peace proposals are successively rejected, by constant labour to strengthen the defensive power of our country. It is impossible to expect that the hatred nourished against our country will be appreciably mitigated, still less completely eradicated.

We shall, continuing our steadfast policy of peace, strive to avert the possibility of this hostility being converted into violent action against our Union. At the same time we must by internal economic measures endow our country with such strength, such defensive security that these violent acts could have no chance whatever of success; that the hopelessness or even the risk of such acts are absolutely clear to all our prospective antagonists. But while there exists a capitalist world with its imperialist aspirations, stubbornly rejecting all our proposals for universal disarmament and even increasing their own armaments, there can exist no guarantee that acts of violence will not be undertaken against the Union. On that account and on that account alone, we must take care that the worker-peasant army and fleet are always ready to accept a challenge. The brilliant stroke delivered by our Far Eastern Army at the Chinese raiders and expropriators is a guarantee to us that on that score also we can be absolutely assured.

IX. THE VATICAN STATE

On February 11, 1929, there took place in Rome an event which officially ended the estrangement between the Vatican and the Quirinal, which had dated from September 20, 1870, when King Victor Emanuel II's troops entered the Holy City. This was the signature at the Lateran Palace by Cardinal Gasparri and Signor Mussolini of a political Treaty, a financial Convention and a Concordat, the character and significance of which can be judged from the words of the official communiqué issued after the completion of the ceremony. This read as follows:

'The Holy See considers that with the Agreements signed to-day it possesses the guarantees necessary to provide due liberty and independence to the spiritual government of the dioceses of Rome and of the Catholic Church in Italy and the whole world. It declares the Roman question definitely and irrevocably settled, and therefore eliminated, and recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of the House of Savoy, with Rome as the capital of the Italian State. Italy, on its side, recognizes the State of the Vatican City under the sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff.

'The Law of Guarantees and any other Law or Act contrary to the present Treaty is abrogated.'¹

1. CONCILIATION TREATY²

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity.

Whereas the Holy See and Italy have recognized the desirability of eliminating every reason for dissension existing between them and arriving at a final settlement of their reciprocal relations which shall be consistent with justice and with the dignity of both High Contracting Parties, and which by permanently assuring to the Holy See a position *de facto* and *de jure* which shall guarantee absolute independence for the fulfilment of its exalted mission in the world, permits the Holy See to consider as finally and irrevocably settled the Roman Question which arose in 1870 by the annexation of Rome to the Kingdom of Italy, under the Dynasty of the House of Savoy;

And whereas it was obligatory, for the purpose of assuring the absolute and visible independence of the Holy See, likewise to guarantee its indisputable sovereignty in international matters, it has been found necessary to create under special conditions the Vatican City, recognizing the full ownership, exclusive and absolute dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over that City;

His Holiness the Supreme Pontiff Pius XI and His Majesty Victor Emanuel III, King of Italy, have agreed to conclude a Treaty, appointing for that purpose two Plenipotentiaries, being on behalf

¹ *The Times*, February 12, 1929.

² Translation prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

of His Holiness, His Secretary of State, viz. His Most Reverend Eminence the Lord Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, and on behalf of His Majesty, His Excellency the Cav. Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister and Head of the Government ; who, having exchanged their respective full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have hereby agreed to the following articles :

Article 1

Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle established in the first Article of the Italian Constitution dated March 4, 1848, according to which the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion is the only State religion.

Article 2

Italy recognizes the sovereignty of the Holy See in international matters as an inherent attribute in conformity with its traditions and the requirements of its mission to the world.

Article 3

Italy recognizes the full ownership, exclusive dominion, and sovereign authority and jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican as at present constituted, together with all its appurtenances and endowments, thus creating the Vatican City, for the special purposes and under the conditions hereinafter referred to.

The boundaries of the said City are set forth in the map¹ called Annex I of the present Treaty, of which it forms an integral part.

It is furthermore agreed that, although forming part of the Vatican City, St. Peter's Square shall continue to be normally open to the public and shall be subject to supervision by the Italian police authorities, which powers shall cease to operate at the foot of the steps leading to the Basilica, although the latter shall continue to be used for public worship. The said authorities shall, therefore, abstain from mounting the steps and entering the said Basilica, unless and except they are requested to do so by the proper authorities.

Should the Holy See consider it necessary, for the purpose of special ceremonies, temporarily to prohibit the public from free access to St. Peter's Square, the Italian authorities shall (unless specially requested to do otherwise) withdraw to beyond the outer lines of Bernini's Colonnade and the extension thereof.

¹ Not inserted.

Article 4

The sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the Vatican City, which Italy recognizes as appertaining to the Holy See, forbid any intervention therein on the part of the Italian Government, or that any authority other than that of the Holy See shall be there acknowledged.

Article 5

For the purpose of the execution of the provisions of the preceding Article before the present Treaty comes into force, the Italian Government shall see to it that the territory forming the Vatican City shall remain free from any charge and from possible occupants. The Holy See shall arrange to enclose the access thereto, enclosing such parts thereof as remain open, except St. Peter's Square.

It is furthermore agreed that, in respect of the buildings there existing and belonging to religious institutions or bodies, the Holy See shall settle relations with the latter direct, the Italian Government having no part in such arrangements.

Article 6

Italy shall provide, by means of suitable agreements entered into with the interested parties, that an adequate water supply be fully assured to the Vatican City. Italy shall furthermore provide for connexion with the State railways by constructing a railway station within the Vatican City on the spot shown on the annexed map, and by permitting the circulation of railway carriages belonging to the Vatican on the Italian railways. It shall further provide for direct connexion with other States by means of telegraph, telephone, wireless, broadcasting, and postal services in the Vatican City. It shall equally also provide for the co-ordination of all other public services.

All expenses connected with the arrangements above mentioned shall be defrayed by the Italian State, within the period of one year from the entry into force of the present Treaty.

The Holy See shall, at its own expense, arrange the existing means of access to the Vatican, and those others which it may consider it necessary to make in the future.

Agreements shall be subsequently concluded between the Holy See and Italy concerning the circulation, on and over Italian territory, of land vehicles and aircraft belonging to the Vatican City.

Article 7

The Italian Government undertakes to prohibit the construction, within the territory surrounding the Vatican City, of any new build-

ings which might overlook the latter, and shall for a like purpose provide for the partial demolition of similar buildings already standing near the Porta Cavalleggeri, and along the Via Aurelia and the Viale Vaticano.

In accordance with the provisions of International Law, it shall be forbidden for aircraft of any kind whatsoever to fly over Vatican territory.

On the Piazza Rusticucci, and in the areas adjoining the Colonnade, over which the extra-territoriality referred to in Article 15 hereof does not extend, all structural alterations or street construction shall only be effected by mutual assent.

Article 8

Considering the person of the Supreme Pontiff to be sacred and inviolable, Italy declares any attempt against His person or any incitement to commit such attempt to be punishable by the same penalties as all similar attempts and incitements to commit the same against the person of the King.

All offences or public insults committed within Italian territory against the person of the Supreme Pontiff, whether by means of speeches, acts, or writings, shall be punished in the same manner as offences and insults against the person of the King.

Article 9

In accordance with the provisions of International Law, all persons having a permanent residence within the Vatican City shall be subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See. Such residence shall not be forfeited by reason of the mere fact of temporary residence elsewhere, unaccompanied by the loss of habitation in the said City or other circumstances proving that such residence has been abandoned.

On ceasing to be subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See, the persons referred to in the preceding paragraph, who, according to the provisions of Italian law (independently of the *de facto* circumstances considered above) shall not be regarded as possessing any other citizenship, shall be regarded in Italy as Italian nationals.

Notwithstanding that all such persons are subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See, the provisions of Italian law shall be applicable to them within the territory of the Kingdom of Italy, even in such matters wherein the personal law must be observed (when they are not covered by the regulations emanating from the Holy See) and, in the case of persons of foreign nationality, the legal provisions of the State to which they belong.

Article 10

Such dignitaries of the Church and persons belonging to the Papal Court as shall be indicated in a Schedule to be approved by the High Contracting Parties, shall always and in every case, even when not citizens of the Vatican, be exempt from military service as far as Italy is concerned, jury service, and any other service of a personal nature.

This provision shall also apply to regular officials whose services are considered indispensable by the Holy See, if permanently employed by the latter and earning a fixed salary, or employed in the Departments or Offices mentioned in Articles 13, 14, 15, and 16 hereof and residing without the Vatican City. The names of such officials shall be set forth in another Schedule to be drawn up and approved as above mentioned, and which shall be brought up to date each year by the Holy See.

The ecclesiastics whose duty it shall be to participate, without the Vatican City, in the execution of enactments emanating from the Holy See, shall not, on that account, be subject to any hindrance, investigation, or molestation on the part of the Italian authorities.

All foreigners in official ecclesiastical employment in Rome shall enjoy the personal guarantees appertaining to Italian citizens, in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of Italy.

Article 11

All central bodies of the Catholic Church shall be exempt from any interference on the part of the Italian State (save and except as provided by Italian law in regard to the acquisition of property made by *corpi morali*,¹ and with regard to the conversion of real estate).

Article 12

Italy recognizes the right of the Holy See to passive and active Legation, according to the general rules of International Law. Officials accredited by foreign Governments to the Holy See shall continue to enjoy, within the Kingdom of Italy, all the prerogatives of immunity enjoyed by diplomatic agents under International Law, and their headquarters may continue to be within Italian territory whilst enjoying the immunity due to them under International Law, even in the event of their State not having diplomatic relations with Italy.

It is understood that Italy undertakes in all cases to allow the freedom of correspondence for all States, including belligerents, to

¹ Recognized public bodies.

and from the Holy See, as well as free access to the Apostolic See by Bishops from all over the world.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to establish normal diplomatic relations between each other, by accrediting an Italian Ambassador to the Holy See and a Papal Nuncio to Italy, who shall be the *doyen* of the Diplomatic Corps, in accordance with the ordinary practice recognized by the Congress of Vienna by the Act of June 9, 1815. In consequence of the sovereignty hereby recognized and without prejudice to the provisions of Article 19 hereof, the diplomats accredited by the Holy See and the diplomatic couriers dispatched in the name of the Supreme Pontiff, shall enjoy within Italian territory, even in time of war, the same treatment as that enjoyed by diplomatic personages and couriers of other foreign Governments, according to the provisions of International Law.

Article 13

Italy recognizes the full ownership of the Holy See over the Patriarchal Basilicas of St. John Lateran, Sta. Maria Maggiore, and St. Paul, with their annexed buildings.

The State transfers to the Holy See the free management and administration of the said Basilica of St. Paul and its dependent Monastery, also paying over to the Holy See all monies representing the sums set aside annually for that church in the budget of the Ministry of Education.

It is also understood that the Holy See shall remain the absolute owner of the edifice of S. Callisto, adjoining Sta. Maria in Trastevere.

Article 14

Italy recognizes the full ownership by the Holy See of the Papal Palace of Castel Gandolfo, together with all endowments, appurtenances, and dependencies thereof, which are now already in the possession of the Holy See, and Italy also undertakes to hand over, within six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Villa Barberini in Castel Gandolfo, together with all endowments, appurtenances, and dependencies thereof.

In order to round off the property situate on the northern side of the Janiculum Hill, belonging to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide and to other ecclesiastical institutions, which property faces the Vatican Palaces, the State undertakes to transfer to the Holy See or other bodies appointed by it for such purpose, all real estate belonging to the State or to third parties existing in that area. The properties belonging to the said Congregation and to other

institutions and those to be transferred being marked on the annexed map.

Finally, Italy shall transfer to the Holy See, as its full and absolute property, the Convent buildings in Rome attached to the Basilica of the Twelve Holy Apostles and to the churches of San Andrea della Valle and S. Carlo ai Catinari, with all annexes and dependencies thereof, and shall hand them over within one year after the entry into force of the present Treaty, free of all occupants.

Article 15

The property indicated in Article 13 hereof and in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 14, as well as the Palaces of the Dataria, of the Cancellaria, of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide in the Piazza di Spagna, of the S. Offizio with its annexes, and those of the Convertendi (now the Congregation of the Eastern Church) in Piazza Scossacavalli, the Vicariato, and all other edifices in which the Holy See shall subsequently desire to establish other offices and departments, although such edifices form part of the territory belonging to the Italian State, shall enjoy the immunity granted by International Law to the headquarters of the diplomatic agents of foreign States. Similar immunity shall also apply with regard to any other churches (even if situated outside Rome) during such time as, without such churches being open to the public, the Supreme Pontiff shall take part in religious ceremonies celebrated therein.

Article 16

The property mentioned in the three preceding Articles, as also that used as headquarters of the following Papal institutions—the Gregorian University, the Biblical, Oriental, and Archaeological Institutes, the Russian Seminary, the Lombard College, the two Palaces of St. Apollinaris, and the Home for the Retreat of the Clergy dedicated to St. John and St. Paul—shall never be subject to charges or to expropriation for reasons of public utility, save by previous agreement with the Holy See, and shall be exempt from any contribution or tax, whether ordinary or extraordinary and payable to the State or to any other body.

It shall be permissible for the Holy See to deal with all the buildings above mentioned or referred to in the three preceding Articles as it may deem fit, without obtaining the authorization or consent of any Italian governmental, provincial, or communal authority, which authorities may in this regard rely entirely on the high artistic traditions of the Catholic Church.

Article 17

As from January 1, 1929, salaries of whatsoever nature payable by the Holy See, or by other central bodies of the Catholic Church and by bodies administered direct by the Holy See, whether within or without Rome, to dignitaries employed and salaried (whether permanently or not), shall be exempt from any contribution or tax, whether payable to the State or to any other body.

Article 18

The artistic and scientific treasures existing within the Vatican City and the Lateran Palace shall remain open to scholars and visitors, although the Holy See shall be free to regulate the admission of the public thereto.

Article 19

Diplomats and envoys of the Holy See, as well as diplomats and envoys of foreign Governments accredited to the Holy See, and the dignitaries of the Church arriving from abroad and travelling to the Vatican City, provided with passports of the States whence they come duly furnished with the *visa* of the Papal representative abroad, shall be allowed free access to the Vatican City over Italian territory without formalities.

The same shall apply to the above-mentioned persons who, being duly provided with a regular Papal passport, shall go abroad from the Vatican City.

Article 20

Goods arriving from abroad for destinations within the Vatican City, or without its boundaries for institutions or offices of the Holy See, shall invariably be allowed transit over Italian territory (from any part of the Italian boundary as also from any seaport of the Kingdom) free of payment of any customs or *octroi* dues.

Article 21

All Cardinals shall enjoy, in Italy, the honours due to Princes of the Blood. Those Cardinals who may reside in Rome without the Vatican City shall, for all purposes, be considered as citizens thereof.

In the event of the office of the Holy See falling vacant, Italy shall make special arrangements for the free transit and access of Cardinals over Italian territory to the Vatican, and shall provide that their personal liberty is not impeded or limited.

Italy shall also take all measures, within her territory surrounding

the Vatican City, necessary to prevent the commission of any act which may in any way disturb the meetings of the Conclave.

The same provisions shall apply to Conclaves held beyond the boundaries of the Vatican City and to Councils presided over by the Supreme Pontiff or his Legates, and with regard to all Bishops summoned to attend them.

Article 22

At the request of the Holy See, or by its delegate who may be appointed in single cases or permanently, Italy shall provide within her territory for the punishment of offences committed within the Vatican City, save and except when the author of the offence shall have taken refuge in Italian territory, in which event he shall immediately be proceeded against according to the provisions of the Italian laws.

The Holy See shall hand over to the Italian State all persons who may have taken refuge within the Vatican City, when accused of acts committed within Italian territory which are considered to be criminal by the law of both States.

The same provision shall apply in regard to persons accused of offences who may have taken refuge within buildings enjoying immunity in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 hereof, save and except if the persons having authority within such buildings prefer to request members of the Italian police force to enter and arrest such persons.

Article 23

The regulations provided by International Law shall apply for the execution, within the Kingdom of Italy, of sentences pronounced by the Courts of the Vatican City.

All sentences and measures emanating from ecclesiastical authorities and officially communicated to the civil authorities, in regard to ecclesiastical or religious persons and concerning spiritual or disciplinary matters, shall without other formality have legal effect in Italy even for all civil purposes.

Article 24

In regard to the sovereignty appertaining to it also in international matters, the Holy See declares that it desires to take, and shall take, no part in any temporal rivalries between other States, nor in any international congresses called to settle such matters, save and except in the event of such parties making a mutual appeal to the pacific

mission of the Holy See, the latter reserving in any event the right of exercising its moral and spiritual power.

The Vatican City shall, therefore, be invariably and in every event considered as neutral and inviolable territory.

Article 25

A special Convention signed on the same date as the present Treaty (of which it forms Annex 4), being an integral part thereof, shall provide for the settlement of the payments to be made by Italy to the Holy See.

Article 26

The Holy See considers that the agreements signed to-day offer an adequate guarantee for assuring to it, together with the requisite liberty and independence, the pastoral administration of the Roman Diocese and of the Catholic Church throughout Italy and the entire world, and it declares the Roman Question to be definitely and irrevocably settled and therefore eliminated, and recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under the Dynasty of the House of Savoy; with Rome as the capital of the Italian State.

Italy, on her part, recognizes the State of the Vatican City under the sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff.

The law dated May 13, 1871 (No. 214), and any other dispositions contrary to the present Treaty, are hereby abrogated.

Article 27

Within four months after the signature thereof, the present Treaty shall be submitted for ratification by the Supreme Pontiff and the King of Italy, and shall enter into force as soon as ratifications are exchanged.

Dated in Rome this 11th day of February, 1929.

(Signed) PIETRO Cardinal GASPARRI.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

2. THE FINANCIAL CONVENTION¹

Whereas the Holy See and Italy, following upon the stipulations of the Treaty by means of which the Roman Question has been finally settled, consider it to be requisite and necessary that their financial relations be regulated by a separate Convention which shall, however, form an integral part of such Treaty:

¹ Translation prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

And whereas the Supreme Pontiff—considering from a lofty point of view the great prejudice suffered by the Apostolic See by reason of the loss of the Patrimony of St. Peter, represented by the former Papal States and the property belonging to ecclesiastical bodies, and, on the other hand, the ever-increasing demands made upon the Church, even in the City of Rome alone; and moreover considering the financial position of the State and the economic conditions of the Italian people (especially after the War)—has seen fit to limit the request for indemnity to what is strictly necessary, by asking for a sum, payable partly in cash and partly in Consolidated Stock, the value of which is much less than that which the State should have disbursed to the Holy See, even under the obligation assumed by the Law of May 13, 1871, alone:

And whereas the Italian State, approving the paternal sentiments of the Supreme Pontiff, considers compliance with the request for payment of such sum to be its bounden duty:

The High Contracting Parties, represented by the same Plenipotentiaries, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1

Italy undertakes to pay to the Holy See, upon exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty, the sum of 750,000,000 Italian *lire*, and to hand over simultaneously to the Holy See aforesaid such a sum in Italian 5% Consolidated Bearer Bonds, with coupon payable on June 30 of the current year attached, as shall represent the nominal value of 1,000,000,000 Italian *lire*.

Article 2

The Holy See agrees to the above conditions in final settlement of its financial relations with Italy arising out of the events of 1870.

Article 3

All deeds to be entered into for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the present Convention shall be free of any stamp duty or tax whatsoever.

Rome, this 11th day of February, 1929.

(Signed) PIETRO Cardinal GASPARRI.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

3. THE CONCORDAT¹

In the name of the most Holy Trinity.

Whereas, from the very inception of negotiations between the Holy See and Italy for the settlement of the Roman Question, the Holy See itself suggested that the Treaty relating to this question be accompanied, as its necessary complement, by a Concordat intended to settle the conditions governing religion and the Church in Italy ;

And whereas signatures have this day been appended to the Treaty for the settlement of the Roman Question ;

His Holiness Pius XI, the Supreme Pontiff, and His Majesty Victor Emanuel III, King of Italy, have agreed to enter into a Concordat and for that purpose have nominated the same Plenipotentiaries as those appointed for the Treaty—being, on behalf of His Holiness, his Secretary of State, His Most Reverend Eminence the Lord Cardinal Pietro Gasparri, and on behalf of His Majesty, His Excellency Cav. Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister and Head of the Government ; who, having exchanged their full Powers and finding them in due and proper form, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1

For the purposes of Article 1 of the Treaty, Italy assures to the Catholic Church the free exercise of spiritual power and the free and public exercise of its worship, as well as jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, in accordance with the provisions laid down by the present Concordat, where requisite and necessary, and grants to ecclesiastics for the spiritual ministry the privilege of defence by their own authorities.

In consideration of the sacred character of the Eternal City, the Episcopal See of the Supreme Pontiff, centre of the Catholic world, and goal of pilgrimage, the Italian Government will be careful to keep Rome free from anything which should be inconsistent with such character.

Article 2

The Holy See shall communicate and correspond freely with its Bishops, with its Clergy, and with the whole Catholic world, without any interference on the part of the Italian Government. Similarly, Bishops shall be entitled to communicate and correspond freely with their Clergy and with all the faithful.

Both Holy See and Bishops shall be entitled to publish freely, or

¹ Translation prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

to affix within or at the outer doors of the edifices set aside for their worship, or at the offices of their ministry, all instructions, orders, pastoral letters, diocesan reports or other documents concerning the spiritual government of the faithful, which it may seem good to them to issue within the scope of their jurisdiction. Such publications and notices, and generally all deeds or documents concerning this spiritual government, shall not be subject to any Government dues.

Such publications can, as regards the Holy See, be issued in any language, and as regards Bishops in the Italian or Latin tongue, but it shall be optional for the ecclesiastical authority to add a translation into other languages, side by side with the Italian text.

The ecclesiastical authorities shall be at liberty, without any interference on the part of the civil authorities, to cause collections to be made both inside and outside churches, or in the buildings belonging to them.

Article 3

Such theological students as are completing the last two years of their preliminary studies (*propedeutica alla teologia*) and are proceeding to the priesthood, together with the novices of the institution of religious Orders, shall be entitled, at their own request, to postpone fulfilling the obligations of military service from year to year, until they shall have completed their twenty-sixth year.

Clerics ordained *in sacris*, and members of religious Orders who have taken vows, shall be exempted from military service, save in the case of general mobilization. In that eventuality, priests will be drafted to the armed forces of the State, but shall continue to wear the habit, in order that they may exercise their sacred office amongst the troops, under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Military Ordinary, in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 hereof. The other clerics or members of religious Orders shall preferably be enrolled for hospital work. Priests responsible for the cure of souls shall, even in the event of general mobilization, be exempted from military service. Under this heading shall come Ordinaries, parish priests, assistant parish priests or coadjutors, curates, and priests permanently appointed to rectorships of churches open to the public.

Article 4

Ecclesiastics and members of religious Orders are exempted from jury service.

Article 5

No ecclesiastic may take up, or remain in, an office or employment under the Italian Government or public bodies connected with the

latter, without the *Nulla osta* of the Ordinary of his Diocese first had and obtained. Revocation of the *Nulla osta* shall deprive the ecclesiastic of the possibility of continuing in his employment or office. No priest who is apostate or under censure may take up or continue in a post as teacher, or an office or employment in which he will come in direct contact with the public.

Article 6

Stipends and other emoluments paid to ecclesiastics by reason of their office shall be mortgageable only in the same measure as the salaries and emoluments of Government employees.

Article 7

No magistrate or other authority shall be entitled to request ecclesiastics for information regarding persons or events known to them by reason of their sacred office.

Article 8

Should a priest or a member of a religious Order be brought before a magistrate for a crime committed, the public prosecutor shall immediately inform the Ordinary of the Diocese in whose territory he exercises jurisdiction, and shall promptly notify him of the decision of the examining magistrate, and of the sentence, should one be promulgated, both in the Lower Court and on appeal.

In the event of arrest, the ecclesiastic or religious shall be treated with the consideration due to his cloth and ecclesiastical rank.

In the event of an ecclesiastic or member of a religious order being sentenced, his sentence shall, whenever possible, be served in a prison apart from laymen, unless his Ordinary shall have reduced him to the status of a layman.

Article 9

As a rule, buildings consecrated to religious services shall be exempt from requisition and from occupation. Should it become necessary, for reasons of urgent public necessity, to occupy a sacred edifice, the authorities concerned in the matter shall previously make arrangements with the Ordinary, unless absolutely imperative reasons to the contrary exist. In such an event, the occupying authority shall immediately inform the Ordinary of the fact.

Except in cases of urgent necessity, the police must not enter buildings consecrated to religious services for the purpose of carrying out their duties, without first advising the ecclesiastical authorities thereof.

Article 10

No edifices open for public worship shall be demolished for any cause whatsoever, without previous agreement in the matter with the proper ecclesiastical authorities.

Article 11

The State recognizes the following festivals established by the Church, namely:—

Each Sunday in the year; New Year's Day; Epiphany (January 6); the feast of St. Joseph (March 19); Ascension Day; Corpus Christi Day; the feast of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul; the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary (August 15); All Saints' Day (November 1); the feast of the Immaculate Conception (December 8); and Christmas Day (December 25).

Article 12

On Sundays and days of obligation, the priest celebrating the Chapter Mass shall, in all churches possessing a Chapter, chant a prayer for the prosperity of the King of Italy and the Italian State, according to the usual rules of the holy liturgy.

Article 13

The Italian Government shall communicate to the Holy See a list of ecclesiastics appointed to the cure of souls with the armed forces of the State, as soon as such lists shall have been legally approved. The appointment of ecclesiastics to the direction of spiritual affairs in the Army (Military Ordinary, Vicar-General and Inspectors) shall be notified confidentially by the Holy See to the Italian Government. Should the Italian Government have any reason for opposing any appointment so made, it shall inform the Holy See, which shall make a fresh appointment.

The Military Ordinary shall enjoy the rank and dignity of an Archbishop.

Military chaplains shall be appointed by the proper authorities of the Italian Government, on the suggestion of the Military Ordinary.

Article 14

In so far as their religious duties are concerned, the Air, Land, and Naval forces of the Italian Crown shall enjoy the privileges and exemptions laid down by Canon Law. With regard to such forces, military chaplains shall have the authority of parish priests, and shall carry out their sacred office under the jurisdiction of the Military

Ordinary, assisted by his own *Curia*. The Military Ordinary shall also have jurisdiction over the religious personnel, male and female, attached to military hospitals.

Article 15

The Archbishop who is the Military Ordinary shall preside over the Chapter of the Pantheon Church in Rome, forming with that Chapter the body of clergy serving this Basilica. This body of clergy shall be authorized to carry out all religious ceremonies (even outside and away from Rome) which, in accordance with canonical rule, they may be requested to hold by the Government or by the Royal House.

The Holy See consents to confer on all Canons of which the Chapter of the Pantheon Church is composed the dignity of Protonotary *ad instar, durante munere*. Each individual appointment shall be made by the Cardinal Vicar of Rome, after recommendation on the part of His Majesty the King of Italy, after the nomination has been confidentially notified.

The Holy See reserves to itself the right of transferring the Diaconate to another church.

Article 16

The High Contracting Parties shall, by means of Mixed Commissions, proceed with the revision of the geographical delimitation of Dioceses, in order that it may, if possible, correspond to that of the provinces.

It is understood that the Holy See shall raise Zara to a Diocese; that no part of the territory under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy shall be under a Bishop whose See may be in territory under the sovereignty of another State; and that no Diocese in the Kingdom may include areas of territory under the sovereignty of another State.

The same principle shall be respected in regard to all existing or future parishes situated near the frontiers of the State.

After previous agreement with the Italian Government, the Holy See shall arrange for and cause to be carried out the alterations which may have to be made in future in the circumscription of the Dioceses, in accordance with the provisions above set forth, save and except such unimportant modifications of territory as may be requested for the good of souls.

Article 17

All alterations in the constitution of Dioceses arising out of the

application of the provisions of Article 16 hereof shall be carried out as and when such Dioceses become vacant. It is understood that such alterations shall not involve the suppression of the titles thereof nor of their Chapters, which shall remain in existence, the Dioceses being reconstituted in such a manner that their head-quarters shall be the capitals of the respective Provinces.

The present economic resources of the Dioceses and of ecclesiastical bodies forming a part thereof, including the payments now being made by the Italian State, shall not be affected by the alterations referred to above.

Article 18

In the event of several parishes being either temporarily or permanently amalgamated by the ecclesiastical authorities, either by the appointment of a single parish priest (with one or more assistant priests) or by the allocation of one presbytery to several priests, the State shall make no alteration in the subsidy payable to such parishes.

Article 19

The Holy See shall appoint Archbishops and Bishops. Before nominating an Archbishop or a Diocesan Bishop, or a Coadjutor *cum jure successionis*, the Holy See shall communicate the name of such candidate to the Italian Government, in order to be assured that the latter has no objections of a political nature to this nomination.

The steps necessary in this connexion shall be taken with all possible speed and secrecy, so that the name of the person chosen may not become known until his final nomination.

Article 20

Previous to taking possession of their Sees, Bishops shall swear allegiance to the Head of the State, using the following form of oath, viz:

‘Before God and on His Holy Gospels, I promise and swear allegiance to the Italian State, in such a manner as is proper to a Bishop.

‘I promise and swear to respect, and to cause to be respected by my clergy, the King of Italy and the Italian Government, as constituted by the laws of the State.

‘I further promise and swear that I shall enter into no agreement, nor attend any council, which may be prejudicial to the interests of the Italian State or to public order, and that I shall lay a similar prohibition on my clergy.

‘Being zealous for the good and the advantage of the Italian State, I shall do my utmost to prevent any evil which might threaten it.’

Article 21

The appointment to ecclesiastical benefices shall lie with the ecclesiastical authorities.

The proper ecclesiastical authorities shall confidentially communicate to the Italian Government the names of those appointed to a benefice, and the corresponding appointment shall not be valid until thirty days after such communication. Within this period the Italian Government shall, in the event of grave reasons existing against such appointment, inform the ecclesiastical authorities confidentially thereof. Should the difference of opinion continue, the ecclesiastical authorities shall lay the case before the Holy See.

Should grave reasons arise rendering prejudicial the continuance of an incumbent in a particular parish benefice, the Italian Government shall communicate such reasons to the Ordinary. The latter shall, in agreement with the Government, take the necessary steps within a period of three months.

Should divergency of opinion arise between the Ordinary and the Government, the Holy See shall entrust the settlement of the question to two ecclesiastics chosen by it, who, with the assistance of two delegates appointed by the Italian Government, shall come to a final decision in the matter.

Article 22

No ecclesiastics who are not Italian citizens can be appointed to a benefice. Both Bishops and parish priests must, furthermore, speak Italian. In case of necessity, coadjutors must be appointed to work under them who, besides Italian, understand and speak the tongue locally used, in order that, according to the rules of the Church, the comforts of religions may be afforded by them in the language of the faithful.

Article 23

The provisions of Articles 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, and 22 hereof shall not apply to Rome and the suburban dioceses.

It is further understood that, whenever the Holy See may proceed to reorganize the said dioceses, no alteration shall be made in the present payments made by the Italian State to the Bishop's revenues (known as *mense*), or to other ecclesiastical institutions.

Article 24

The *Exequatur* and the Royal *Placet*, as also any Royal or State (*cesarea o regia*) nomination in the matter of appointment to benefices

throughout Italy, are abolished, save and except in those exceptional cases mentioned in paragraph (g) of Article 29 hereof.

Article 25

The Italian State renounces the sovereign prerogative of Royal Patronage, in regard to the nomination to greater or lesser benefices. The Crown dues payable on such benefices shall be abolished, as also the payment concerning the *terzo pensionabile* in the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The corresponding charges shall no longer be a charge on the State and on the Departments concerned.

Article 26

The appointment of incumbents to greater or lesser benefices, or of those who are temporarily to fill a See or a benefice that has become vacant, shall take effect from the date of the ecclesiastical nomination, which shall be officially notified to the Government. The regulations laid down by Canon Law shall govern the administration and enjoyment of revenues during such a vacancy.

In the event of bad management, it shall be lawful for the Italian State, in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities, to sequester the material part (*temporalita*) of the benefice, causing the nett revenue thereof to be applied for the benefit of the incumbent, or, in his absence, for that of the benefice.

Article 27

The Basilicas of the Holy House at Loreto, of St. Francis at Assisi, and of St. Anthony in Padua, together with all buildings and foundations forming part thereof, save and except those of a purely lay character, shall be handed over to the Holy See, which shall be at liberty to conduct their administration as it thinks fit.

All other bodies of every description managed by the Holy See in Italy, as also the Missionary Colleges, shall likewise be administered and managed without any intervention on the part of the State, and shall not be subject to conversion. The Italian laws governing the acquisition of property by incorporated bodies (*corpi morali*) shall, however, remain applicable in every event.

Property now belonging to the churches referred to above shall be divided and assigned by Mixed Commissions appointed for the purpose, due attention being paid to the rights of third parties and to the endowments necessary for the lay foundations above mentioned. With regard to other churches possessing lay governing bodies, the ecclesiastical authorities shall be at liberty to take over their adminis-

tration, except in the case (where necessary) of the division of property referred to in the last preceding paragraph, and in the manner therein established.

Article 28

For the pacifying of such consciences as may be troubled, the Holy See grants full pardon to all persons who, by reason of the Italian laws concerning the alienation of the patrimony of the Church, shall be in possession of ecclesiastical property.¹ The necessary instructions shall be issued by the Holy See to the Ordinaries in this respect.

Article 29

The laws of the Italian State concerning ecclesiastical matters shall be revised, in order that they may be reformed and completed and brought into harmony with the principles which inspired the Treaty concluded with the Holy See and the present Concordat.

It is hereby agreed, from now on, between the High Contracting Parties, as follows, that is to say:

(a) The legal status of the ecclesiastical bodies at present recognized by Italian law—such as the Holy See, Dioceses, Chapters, Seminaries, parishes, &c.—being admitted and confirmed, a like status shall be conferred on all churches open for public worship which did not formerly possess it, including those belonging to ecclesiastical bodies formerly suppressed. It is also provided that the income assigned to each of the said churches by the Ecclesiastical Fund shall continue to be paid.

Save and except as is provided in Article 27 hereof, there shall be no interference in the matter of church services and worship, &c., on the part of church councils wherever existing, whatever their title may be, when they are either totally or preponderantly composed of laymen. The appointment of members thereto shall be made in agreement with the ecclesiastical authorities.

(b) The legal status of those religious associations (whose members shall or shall not have taken vows) which are approved by the Holy See, and whose head-quarters shall be in Italy and who shall be legally represented there by persons of Italian nationality or domiciled in Italy, are recognized. There shall likewise be recognized the legal status of Italian religious Provinces in Italy and her Colonies, of Associations with head-quarters abroad, when the same conditions occur.

The legal status of Religious Houses shall also be recognized if

¹ *Leggi italiane eversive.*

they are allowed, by the particular rule of each separate Order, to acquire and possess property.

Finally, legal status shall be granted to general houses¹ and to the trustees of religious Associations, including foreign ones.

Those Associations and Religious Houses which already possess a legal status shall continue to enjoy the same.

No dues shall be payable upon deeds and documents relating to the transfer of real property now owned by Associations, from the present nominal holders to such Associations.

(c) The purposes of fraternities whose object is mainly that of worship may not subsequently be modified, and such bodies shall come under the ecclesiastical authorities as regards their working and management.

(d) All religious Foundations, of whatever kind, shall be sanctioned, provided they serve the religious needs of the population, and provided that no financial burden shall fall on the State in consequence. The same stipulation shall apply to other Foundations already existing *de facto*.

(e) In regard to the management by laymen of ecclesiastical property, caused by the laws of alienation, one-half of each Managing Council shall be appointed by the ecclesiastical authorities. The same provision shall apply in regard to the religious funds of the new Provinces.

(f) At the request of the Ordinary, the Italian Government may recognize and regularize all acts performed up to the present by religious or ecclesiastical bodies without the observance of civil law, upon presentation of the necessary documents within three years from the coming into force of the present Concordat.

(g) The Italian State renounces the privileges as to jurisdiction and ecclesiastical exemption enjoyed by the Palatine clergy throughout Italy (save and except the clergy of the Santa Sindone of Turin, the Superga, the Sudario in Rome, and the chapels attached to the palaces serving as residences for the King and Queen and the Royal Princes), the appointments to livings, benefices, and offices coming under the provisions set forth in the preceding Articles hereof.

An appropriate Commission shall arrange for the allotment to each Basilica or Palatine church of a suitable income, in conformity with the conditions laid down in Article 27 hereof.

Whereas the financial facilities already provided in favour of ecclesiastical bodies by Italian legislation in force up to now are

¹ *Case Generalizie*.

confirmed, worship and religious activities for all purposes of taxation shall be placed on an equality with that of charity and education.

The following taxes and dues are abolished, that is to say:

The extraordinary tax of 30 per cent. imposed under the provisions of Article 18 of Law No. 3848 of August 15, 1867; the grant in aid tax ('*quota di concorsa*') referred to by Articles 31 of Law No. 3036 of July 7, 1866, and 20 of Law No. 3848 of August 15, 1867; as also the tax on transfer of revenues of property constituting the endowment of benefices and ecclesiastical bodies, laid down by Royal Decree No. 3270, dated December 20, 1923. It is also provided that no other special tax or dues shall in future be imposed on Church property.

Neither the tax payable on professional income nor the Licence Tax instituted by Royal Decree No. 2538 dated November 15, 1923 (taking the place of the abolished tax on trade), nor any other similar tax shall be payable by ministers of religion on stipends paid in connexion with their ecclesiastical duties.

The use of the clerical or religious habit by laymen, or by such priests and members of religious Orders as have been definitely forbidden so to do by the proper ecclesiastical authorities (whose pronouncement to that effect must be officially notified to the Italian Government), shall be forbidden and punished by the same sanctions and penalties as those provided in the case of the improper use of military uniform.

Article 30

The ordinary or extraordinary administration and management of property belonging to any ecclesiastical institution or religious association shall be carried out under the supervision and control of the proper Church authorities, without any intervention on the part of the Italian Government, and without the obligation of converting real property.

Save as is otherwise provided by civil legislation concerning the acquisition of property by the nominees of incorporated bodies (*corpi morali*), the Italian State shall recognize the capacity of ecclesiastical institutions and of religious associations to acquire property.

Until it shall have been otherwise provided by further agreement, the Italian Government shall continue to make good any deficiencies in the income of ecclesiastical benefices, by means of payments calculated on a scale which shall not be lower than their actual value established by legislation at present in force. In consideration thereof,

the management of the property of such benefices shall, in so far as acts and contracts exceeding the scope of mere administration are concerned, be carried on with the intervention of the Italian Government, and in the event of a vacancy, the handing over of the property shall take place in the presence of a representative of the Government, a formal *procès-verbal* to that effect being drawn up.

Neither the emoluments known as 'Mense vescovili' (episcopal incomes) of the suburban Dioceses of Rome, nor the property of the Chapters and Parishes of the City of Rome and of the Dioceses aforesaid, shall be subject to the State intervention referred to above.

For the purpose of making good the deficiencies hereinbefore referred to, the amount of the income paid to beneficiaries out of such Episcopal *mense* or of such property shall be established by an annual statement made on his own responsibility by the suburban Bishop for the Diocese and the Cardinal Vicar for the City of Rome.

Article 31

The creation of fresh ecclesiastical bodies or religious associations shall be carried out by the ecclesiastical authorities in accordance with the provisions of Canon Law, and recognition thereof for civil purposes shall be effected by the civil authorities.

Article 32

Recognition and authorization, as provided for under the present Concordat, shall take place in accordance with the provisions of civil legislation, which shall be brought into harmony with the contents of the Concordat and Treaty aforesaid.

Article 33

The disposal of the Catacombs in Rome and other parts of Italy shall appertain to the Holy See, together with the corresponding obligation of their custody, upkeep, and care. Whilst respecting the laws of the State and the possible rights of third parties, the Holy See shall, therefore, be at liberty to proceed with any necessary excavations and the removal of sacred remains.

Article 34

Being desirous of restoring to the institution of marriage, which is the basis of the family, that dignity which is in keeping with the Catholic traditions of the Italian people, the Italian State recognizes the sacrament of marriage as legal for civil purposes, when administered according to Canon Law.

The banns of marriage celebrated, as above stated, shall be published at the town hall, as well as at the parish church. As soon as the ceremony is over, the parish priest shall explain to the married couple the civil effects and purposes of marriage, reading out to them those articles of the Civil Code which concern their rights and duties and shall draw up the certificate of marriage, a full copy of which he shall forward within five days to the municipality, in order that it may be entered in the municipal register.

Ecclesiastical Courts and Departments shall alone be competent to hear cases concerning nullity of marriage and of the abrogation of a marriage solemnized, but not consummated. Upon becoming final, all corresponding rulings and decisions shall be laid before the Supreme Tribunal of the *Segnatura*, which shall decide whether the provisions of Canon Law have been respected in regard to the jurisdiction and powers of the Judge, the summoning of the parties, and their proper legal representation or non-appearance. All final rulings and decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of the *Segnatura* shall be transmitted to the territorially competent Court of Appeal, which shall (by means of Orders issued in Council) render them effective for the purposes of civil law, giving instructions that they be entered in the municipal registers, as annotations to the particular certificate of marriage.

In so far as cases of judicial separation are¹ concerned, the Holy See agrees that they should be tried by the Civil Courts.

Article 35

The system of State examinations is applicable to secondary schools managed by ecclesiastical bodies, candidates from such schools being placed on an equal footing with those from State schools.

Article 36

The teaching of Christian doctrine, in the form admitted by Catholic tradition, is considered by Italy to be the basis and the apex of public education. For this reason, Italy agrees that religious education, which is now given in the public elementary schools, be in future extended to and developed in secondary schools, according to a programme to be settled between the Holy See and the State.

Such instruction shall be imparted by means of teachers and professors who are priests or members of religious orders approved by the ecclesiastical authorities, and, in an auxiliary manner, by lay teachers and professors who shall for that purpose be provided with a certificate of qualification issued by the Ordinary of the Diocese. Should

¹ '*Cause di separazione personale.*'

this certificate be revoked by the Ordinary, the teacher concerned shall be immediately deprived of the right to teach. Only books and text-books approved by the ecclesiastical authorities shall be used for such religious instruction in the public schools.

Article 37

In order to render possible the religious instruction and assistance of youths entrusted to their care, the heads of Government associations for physical training, and for instruction preceding military training, of the Avanguardisti and Balilla, shall arrange their timetables in such a manner as not to prevent the carrying out of their religious duties on Sundays and days of obligation. The heads of State schools shall make similar arrangements, in the event of meetings of their pupils on such days.

Article 38

For the purpose of insuring their entire suitability from the moral and religious points of view, the appointment of professors to the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, and to the dependent teachers' training college known as 'Istituto di Magistero Maria Immacolata', shall be subject to the approval of the Holy See.

Article 39

All Universities, greater or lesser Seminaries (diocesan, inter-diocesan, or regional), Academies, Colleges, and other Catholic institutions for training and education of ecclesiastics, shall continue to be solely dependent on the Holy See, without any intervention on the part of the educational authorities of the Kingdom.

Article 40

The theological degrees granted by Faculties approved by the Holy See shall be recognized by the Italian State. There shall in like manner be recognized the diplomas given by the School of Palaeography, the School of Archives, and the Diplomatic and Documentary Schools attached to the Library and Archives of the Vatican City.

Article 41

Italy authorizes the wearing, throughout the Kingdom and the Colonies, of the decorations of Papal Orders of Chivalry, upon registration of the corresponding Patent, which registration shall be effected on production of that Patent, accompanied by the interested party's written request in writing to that effect.

Article 42

Italy shall, by means of a Royal Decree, permit the recognition of titles of nobility conferred by Sovereign Pontiffs both after 1870 and those which may be conferred in future. In some cases to be established, such recognition shall not be subject to payment of any tax in Italy.

Article 43

The Italian State recognizes the organizations connected with the 'Azione Cattolica Italiana', in so far as these shall (as provided by the Holy See) carry out their activities outside any political party, and under the immediate direction of the hierarchy of the Church, for the diffusion and practice of Catholic principles.

The Holy See takes the opportunity afforded by the present Concordat to renew its veto with regard to any Italian ecclesiastics and members of religious Orders joining, or working in, any political party.

Article 44

Should any divergence arise in future with regard to the interpretation of the present Concordat, the Holy See and Italy shall arrive at an amicable settlement by mutual accord.

Article 45

The present Concordat shall come into force on exchange of the ratifications, at the same time as the Treaty concluded between the same High Contracting Parties which settles the Roman Question.

The provisions of the obsolete Concordats of the ex-Italian States shall cease to apply in Italy upon the entry into force of the present Concordat. In so far as they shall not be in agreement with the provisions of the present Concordat, all Austrian laws and the laws, regulations, ordinances, and decrees of the Italian State now in force, shall be abrogated at the coming into force of the present Concordat.

A commission composed of persons delegated by both High Contracting Parties shall be appointed immediately after the execution of the present Concordat, for the carrying out of the provisions thereof.

Rome, this 11th day of February, 1929.

(Signed) PIETRO Cardinal GASPARRI.
BENITO MUSSOLINI.

C. AMERICA

I. UNITED STATES

1. EXTRACT FROM PRESIDENT HOOVER'S ARMISTICE DAY ADDRESS AT WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 11, 1929 ¹

THE world to-day is comparatively at peace. The outlook for a peaceable future is more bright than for half a century past. Yet, after all, it is an armed peace. The men under arms, including active reserves, in the world are almost 30,000,000 in number, or nearly 10,000,000 more than before the Great War.

Due to the Washington Arms Conference and the destruction of the German Navy, the combatant ships in the world show some decrease since the War. But aircraft and other instruments of destruction are far more potent than they were even in the Great War. There are fears, distrusts, and smouldering injuries among nations which are the tinder of war. Nor does a single quarter of a century during all the ages of human experience warrant the assumption that war will not occur again.

Gloomy as this picture may be, yet we can say with truth that the world is becoming more genuinely inclined to peace; that the forces of Imperial domination and aggression, of fear and suspicion, are dying down; that they are being replaced with the desire for security and peaceful development. The old objectives of tortuous diplomacy are being replaced with frank and open relations directed to peace. There is no more significant step in this progress than the solemn covenant that civilized nations have now entered to renounce war, and to settle disputes by pacific means. It is this realinement of the mind of the world that gives the hope of peace.

But peace is not a static thing. To maintain peace is as dynamic in its requirements as is the conduct of war. We cannot say, 'Let there be peace,' and go about other business. Nor are the methods by which peace is to be maintained and war prevented to be established by slogans or by abstract phrases or by academic theory. Progress towards peace can be attained only as a result of realistic practical daily conduct among nations. It can be the result only of a frank recognition of forces which may disturb peace. For instance, we must realize that our industrial life, our employment, our comfort, and our culture depend greatly upon our interchange of goods and ideas with

¹ Official text issued by the U.S. Department of State.

other nations. We must realize that this interchange cannot be carried on unless our citizens are flung into every quarter of the globe, and the citizens of every other nation are represented in our country.

We must realize that some of them will get into trouble somewhere. Certainly their troubles will multiply if other nations are at war. We have an obligation, and every other nation has an obligation, to see to the protection of their lives, and that justice is done to them so long as they comply with the laws of the countries in which they reside. From all these relationships frictions and controversies will arise daily.

By our undertaking under the Kellogg Pact to use only pacific means to settle such controversies as these, we have again reaffirmed the doctrine enunciated by that far-sighted statesman, Mr. Elihu Root, in his famous declaration at Rio de Janeiro in 1907. At that time he announced that we would not use war or warlike means to enforce or collect upon private business contracts. It is our settled policy.

But there are other more deep-seated and more dangerous forces which produce friction and controversy than these eruptions over the rights of citizens. We must realize that there are many unsolved problems of boundaries between nations. There are peoples aspiring to a greater measure of self-government. There are the fears of invasion and domination bequeathed to all humanity from its former wars. There are a host of age-old controversies whose spectres haunt the world, which at any time may touch the springs of fear and ill-will.

We must frankly accept the fact, therefore, that we and all the nations of the world will be involved, for all future time, in small or great controversies and frictions arising out of all these multiple causes. In these controversies lurk the subtle danger that national temper at any moment may become a heat and that emotion may rise to the flaming point. Therefore peace must be the result of unceasing endeavour.

I have said that recently we have covenanted with other civilized nations, not only to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, but also we have agreed that we shall settle all controversies by pacific means. But the machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes among nations is as yet inadequate. We need to strengthen our own provisions for it. Our State Department is the first of these means. It must be strengthened and supported as the great arm of our Government dedicated to the organization of peace. We need further to extend our treaties with other countries, providing methods for

reference of controversies to conference, to inquiry as to fact, or to arbitration, or to judicial determination.

We have need to define the rules of conduct of nations, and to formulate an authoritative system of International Law. We have need, under proper reservations, to support the World Court in order that we may secure judicial determination of certain types of controversies and build up precedents which add to the body of International Law. By these agencies we relegate a thousand frictions to orderly processes of settlement, and by deliberation in action we prevent their development into national inflammation.

We are also interested that other nations shall settle by pacific means the controversies arising between them. From every selfish point of view the preservation of peace among other nations is of interest to the United States. In such wars we are in constant danger of entanglement because of interference with the widespread activities of our citizens. But, of far more importance than this, our ideals and our hopes are for the progress of justice through the entire world. We desire to see all humanity relieved of the hideous blight of war and of the cruelties and injustices that lead to war. We are interested in all methods that can be devised to assure the settlement of all controversies between nations.

There are to-day two roads to that end. The European nations have, by the Covenant of the League of Nations, agreed that if nations fail to settle their differences peaceably, then force should be applied by other nations to compel them to be reasonable. We have refused to travel this road. We are confident that, at least in the Western Hemisphere, public opinion will suffice to check violence. This is the road we propose to travel. What we urgently need in this direction is a further development of methods for the reference of unsettled controversies to joint inquiry by the parties, assisted by friendly nations, in order that action may be stayed and that the aggressor may be subjected to the searchlight of public opinion.

And we have another task equally as great as the settlement of incidental controversies. We must, where opportunity offers, work steadfastly to remove the deeper causes and frictions which lead to disputes and ill-will. One of those causes is competition in armament. In order to stir a nation to the expenditures and burdens of increased armament, some danger and some enemy must be envisaged. Fears and distrust must be used as a goad to stir the nation forward to competitive effort. No one denies that the maintenance of great armament is a burden upon the backs of all who toil. The expenditure for it curtails vast projects of human betterment which Governments

might undertake. Every man under arms means that some other man must bear an extra burden somewhere. But a greater cost is the ill-will resulting from rivalry between nations in construction of armaments.

It is first and foremost to rid ourselves of this danger that I have again initiated naval negotiations. I have full confidence in the success of the Conference which will assemble next January. In setting up this Conference we have already agreed with Great Britain that there shall be a parity in naval strength between us. I am in hopes that there will be a serious reduction in Navies as a relief to the economic burdens of all peoples. And I believe that men and women throughout the world demand such reduction. We must reduce and limit warships by agreement only. Have no faith in the reduction of armaments by example alone!

Until such times as nations can build the agencies of pacific settlement on stronger foundations; until fear, the most dangerous of all national emotions, has been proved groundless by long proof of international honesty; until the power of the world public opinion as a restraint of aggression has had many years of test; there will not have been established that confidence which warrants the abandonment of preparedness for defence among nations. To do so may invite war.

I am for adequate preparedness as a guarantee that no foreign soldier shall ever step upon the soil of our country.

Our nation has said with millions of voices that we desire only defence. That is the effect of the covenant we have entered into, not to use war as an instrument of national policy. No American will arise to-day and say that we wish one gun or one armed man beyond that necessary for the defence of our people. To do so would create distrust in other nations, and also would be an invitation to war. Proper defence requires military strength relative to that of other nations. We will reduce our naval strength in proportion to any other. Having said that, it only remains for the others to say how low they will go. It cannot be too low for us.

There is another of these age-old controversies which stir men's minds and their fears. That is the so-called freedom of the seas. In reality, in our day it is simply the rights of private citizens to trade in time of war, for there is to-day complete freedom of the seas in times of peace. If the world succeeds in establishing peaceful methods of settlement of controversies, the whole question of trading rights in time of war becomes a purely academic discussion. Peace is its final solution.

But I am going to have the temerity to put forward an idea which might break through the involved legal questions and age-old interpretations of right and wrong by a practical step which would solve a large part of the intrinsic problem. It would act as a preventive, as well as a limitation of war. I offer it only for the consideration of the world. I have not made it a Governmental proposition to any nation, and do not do so now. I know that any wide departure from accepted ideas requires long and searching examination. No idea can be perfected except upon the anvil of debate. This is not a proposition for the forthcoming Naval Conference, as that session is for a definite purpose, and this proposal will not be injected into it.

For many years, and born of a poignant personal experience, I have held that food ships should be made free of any interference in times of war. I would place all vessels laden solely with food supplies on the same footing as hospital ships. The time has come when we should remove starvation of women and children from the weapons of warfare.

The rapid growth of industrial civilization during the past half-century has created in many countries populations far in excess of their domestic food supply, and thus steadily weakened their natural defences. As a consequence, protection for oversea or imported supplies has been one of the most impelling causes of increasing naval armaments and military alliances. Again, in countries which produce surplus food, their economic stability is also to a considerable degree dependent upon keeping open the avenues of their trade in the export of such surplus, and this again stimulates armament on their part to protect such outlets.

Thus the fear of an interruption in seaborne food supplies has powerfully tended towards naval developments in both importing and exporting nations. In all important wars of recent years, to cut off or to protect such supplies has formed a large element in the strategy of all combatants. We cannot condemn any one nation. Almost all have participated in it. The world must sooner or later recognize this as one of the underlying causes of its armed situation, but, far beyond this, starvation must not be included among the weapons of warfare.

To those who doubt the practicability of the idea, and who insist that peace-time agreements are futile for the purpose of controlling conduct in war and have been universally set apart in actual conflict, I may point out that the Belgian Relief Commission delivered more than 1,000 shiploads of food through two rings of blockade, and did it under neutral guarantees continuously during the whole World

War. The protection of food movements in time of war would constitute a most important contribution to the rights of all parties, whether neutrals or belligerents, and would greatly tend towards lessening the pressure for naval strength. It would cover about 25 per cent. of the tonnage moving in the world, but would constitute a larger proportion of the commerce likely to be interfered with by blockade.

2. EXTRACT FROM PRESIDENT HOOVER'S MESSAGE TO
CONGRESS, DECEMBER 3, 1929¹

I wish to emphasize that during the past year the nation has continued to grow in strength. The problems with which we are confronted are the problems of growth and progress. We are not only at peace with all the world, but the foundations for future strength are being substantially strengthened. To promote peace is our long established policy. Through the Kellogg-Briand Pact a great moral standard has been raised in the world. By it fifty-four nations have covenanted to renounce war and settle all disputes by pacific means. Through it a new world outlook has been inaugurated which has profoundly affected the foreign policies of nations. Since its inauguration we have initiated new efforts, not only in the organization of the machinery of peace, but also to eliminate dangerous forces which produce controversies among nations.

In January 1926 the Senate gave its consent to accession to the Court of International Justice with certain reservations. In September of this year the Statute establishing the Court has, by the action of the nations signatory, been amended to meet the Senate's reservations and to go even beyond those reservations and to make clear that the Court is a true international Court of Justice. I believe it will be clear to every one that no controversy or question in which this country has, or claims to have, an interest can be passed on by the Court without our consent at the time the question arises. The doubt about advisory opinions has been completely safeguarded. Our accession to the International Court is, as now constituted, not the slightest step towards entry into the League of Nations. As I have before indicated, I shall direct that our signature be affixed to the Protocol of Accession and shall submit it for approval to the Senate.

In the hope of reducing friction in the world, and with the desire that we may reduce the great economic burdens of naval armament,

¹ *The Times*, December 4, 1929.

we have joined in a conference with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to be held in London in January, to consider the further limitation and reduction of naval arms. We hold high hopes that success may attend this effort.

We still have marines on foreign soil—in Nicaragua, Haiti, and China. In the large sense we do not wish to be represented abroad in such a manner. About 1,600 marines remain in Nicaragua at the urgent request of that Government and of the leaders of all parties, pending the training of a domestic constabulary capable of ensuring tranquillity. We have already reduced these forces materially, and we are anxious to withdraw them further as the situation warrants. In Haiti we have about 700 marines, but it is a much more difficult problem, the solution of which is still obscure. If Congress approves, I shall dispatch a Commission to Haiti in an endeavour to arrive at some more definite policy than at present. Our forces in China constitute 2,605 men, which we hope also further to reduce to the normal Legation Guard.

To preserve internal order and freedom from encroachment is the first purpose of Government. Our army and navy are being maintained in a most efficient state under officers of high intelligence and zeal. The extent and expansion of their numbers and equipment as at present authorized are ample for this purpose. We can well be deeply concerned, however, at the growing expense. From a total expenditure for national defence purposes in 1914 of \$267,000,000, it naturally rose with the Great War, but receded again to \$612,000,000 in 1924, when again it began to rise until during the current fiscal year the expenditure will amount to over \$730,000,000 (£146,000,000), excluding all the civilian services of those departments. The programme now authorized will carry it to still larger figures in future years. While the remuneration paid to our soldiers and sailors is justly at a higher rate than that of any other country in the world, and while the cost of subsistence is higher, yet the total of our expenditure is in excess of those of the most-highly militarized nations of the world.

Upon the conference shortly to be held in London will depend such moderation as we can make in naval expenditure. If we are to be compelled to undertake the naval construction implied in the Washington Arms Treaty as well as other construction, which would appear to be necessary if no international agreement can be completed, we shall be committed during the next six years to a construction expenditure of upward of \$1,200,000,000 (£240,000,000), besides the necessary further increase in costs for annual upkeep.

In 1914 the officers and men in our regular forces, both Army and Navy, were about 164,000, in 1924 256,000, and in 1929 250,000. Our citizens' army, however, including the National Guard and other forms of reserves, increased these totals up to 299,000 in 1914, 672,000 in 1924, and 728,000 in 1929. Under the Kellogg Pact we have undertaken never to use war as an instrument of national policy. We have, therefore, undertaken by covenant to use these equipments solely for defensive purposes. From a defence point of view our forces should be proportioned to the national need and should, therefore, to some extent be modified by the prospects of peace, which were never brighter than they are to-day.

The past year has brought us near to the completion of settlements. France ratified her agreement with us on July 27. This agreement will shortly come before Congress and I recommend its approval. The only indebtedness now unsettled is that of Russia and Armenia. The total amount of indebtedness of various countries to the United States now funded is \$11,579,465,885 (£2,315,893,177). The payments of various Governments to us on account of principal and interest for 1930 are estimated at a total of about \$239,000,000 (£47,800,000), for 1931 at about \$236,000,000 (£47,200,000), and for 1932 at about \$246,000,000 (£49,200,000). The measure of American compromise in these settlements may be appreciated from the fact that our taxpayers are called upon to find annually about \$475,000,000 (£95,000,000) in interest, and in addition to redeem the principal of the sums borrowed by the United States Government for these purposes.

The wise determination that the property seized in war should be returned to its owners has proceeded with considerable rapidity. Of the original seized cash and property, valued at a total of about \$625,000,000 (£125,000,000), all but \$111,566,700 (£22,313,320) has been returned. Most of the remainder should be disposed of during the next year.

II. PAN-AMERICA

The sixth Pan-American Conference at Havana adopted a resolution on February 18, 1928 condemning war as an instrument of national policy, and adopting obligatory arbitration as the means for settling disputes between them of a judicial nature. The resolution further provided for a conference of American States to meet in Washington within the space of a year, to 'give conventional form to the realization of this principle'.¹

The Pan-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration sat in Washington from December 10, 1928, to January 5, 1929. Three instru-

¹ For text of resolution see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, pp. 193-4.

ments resulted from its discussions. A General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation; A General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration; and a Protocol of Progressive Arbitration. This last document is of interest, as it forms the first provision, in the form of a definite treaty obligation, of machinery for the gradual or complete abandonment of reservations made to a treaty.

1. TEXT OF GENERAL CONVENTION OF INTER-AMERICAN CONCILIATION, JANUARY 5, 1929 ¹

The Governments of Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the United States of America, represented at the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration, assembled at Washington pursuant to the resolution adopted on February 18, 1928, by the Sixth International Conference of American States held in the city of Havana:

Desiring to demonstrate that the condemnation of war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, set forth in the above-mentioned resolution, constitutes one of the fundamental bases of inter-American relations;

Animated by the purpose of promoting, in every possible way, the development of international methods for the pacific settlement of differences between the States;

Being convinced that the 'Treaty to avoid or prevent Conflicts between the American States', signed at Santiago de Chile, May 3, 1923, constitutes a notable achievement in inter-American relations which it is necessary to maintain by giving additional prestige and strength to the action of the Commissions established by Articles III and IV of the aforementioned Treaty, the general text and appendix of which are hereby confirmed;

Acknowledging the need of giving conventional form to these purposes, have agreed to enter into the present convention, for which purpose they have appointed plenipotentiaries as follows:

Venezuela. Carlos F. Grisanti, Francisco Arroyo Parejo.

Chile. Manuel Foster Recabarren, Antonio Planet.

Bolivia. Equardo Diaz de Medina.

Uruguay. Jose Pedro Varela.

Costa Rica. Manuel Castro Quesada, Jose Tibble-Machado.

Peru. Hernan Velarde, Victor M. Maurtua.

¹ Official English text issued by the Pan-American Union.

Honduras. Romulo Duron, Marcos Lopez Ponce.

Guatemala. Adrian Recinos, Jose Falla.

Haiti. Auguste Bonamy, Raoul Lizaire.

Ecuador. Gonzalo Zaldumbide.

Colombia. Enrioue Olaya Herrera, Carlos Escallon.

Brazil. Sylvino Gurgel do Amaral, Arturo Guimaraes de Araujo Jorge.

Panama. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Carlos L. Lopez.

Paraguay. Eligio Ayala.

Nicaragua. Maximo Zepeda, Manuel Zavala.

Mexico. Fernando Gonzalez Roa, Benito Flores.

El Salvador. Cayetano Ochoa, David Rosales, jr.

The Dominican Republic. Angel Morales, Gustavo A. Diaz.

Cuba. Orestes Ferrara y Marino, Gustavo Gutierrez Sanchez.

United States of America. Frank B. Kellogg, Charles Evans Hughes.

Who, after having deposited their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form by the conference, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The high contracting parties agree to submit to the procedure of conciliation established by this convention all controversies of any kind which may arise between them for any reason and which it may not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels.

Article II

The commissions of inquiry to be established pursuant to the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty signed in Santiago de Chile on May 3, 1923, shall likewise have the character of commissions of conciliation.

Article III

The permanent commissions which have been established by virtue of Article III of the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923, shall be bound to exercise conciliatory functions, either on their own motion when it appears that there is a prospect of disturbance of peaceful relations, or at the request of a party to the dispute, until the commission referred to in the preceding article is organized.

Article IV

The conciliatory functions of the commission described in Article II shall be exercised on the occasions hereinafter set forth:

1. The commission shall be at liberty to begin its work with an

effort to conciliate the differences submitted to its examination with a view to arriving at a settlement between the parties.

2. Likewise the same commission shall be at liberty to endeavour to conciliate the parties at any time which in the opinion of the commission may be considered to be favourable in the course of the investigation and within the period of time fixed therefor in Article V of the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923.

3. Finally, the commission shall be bound to carry out its conciliatory function within the period of six months which is referred to in Article VII of the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923. The parties to the controversy may, however, extend this time if they so agree and notify the commission in due time.

Article V

The present convention does not preclude the high contracting parties, or one or more of them, from tendering their good offices or their mediation, jointly or severally, on their own motion or at the request of one or more of the parties to the controversy; but the high contracting parties agree not to make use of those methods of pacific settlement from the moment that the commission described in Article II is organized until the final act referred to in Article XI of this convention is signed.

Article VI

The function of the commission, as an organ of conciliation, in all cases specified in Article II of this convention, is to procure the conciliation of the differences, subject to its examination, by endeavouring to effect a settlement between the parties. However, when the commission finds itself to be within the case foreseen in paragraph 3 of Article IV of this convention, it shall undertake a conscientious and impartial examination of the questions which are the subject of the controversy, shall set forth in a report the results of its proceedings, and shall propose to the parties the bases of a settlement for the equitable solution of the controversy.

Article VII

Except when the parties agree otherwise, the decisions and recommendations of any commission of conciliation shall be made by a majority vote.

Article VIII

The commission described in Article II of this convention shall establish its rules of procedure. In the absence of agreement to the

contrary, the procedure indicated in Article IV of the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923, shall be followed. Each party shall bear its own expenses and a proportionate share of the general expenses of the commission.

Article IX

The report and the recommendations of the commission, in so far as it may be acting as an organ of conciliation, shall not have the character of a decision nor an arbitral award, and shall not be binding on the parties either as regards the exposition or interpretation of the facts or as regards questions of law.

Article X

As soon as possible after the termination of its labours, the commission shall transmit to the parties a certified copy of the report and of the bases of settlement which it may propose.

The commission, in transmitting the report and the recommendations to the parties, shall fix a period of time, which shall not exceed six months, within which the parties shall pass judgment upon the bases of settlement above referred to.

Article XI

Once the period of time fixed by the commission for the parties to make their decisions has expired, the commission shall set forth in a final act the decision of the parties and, if the conciliation has been effected, the terms of the settlement.

Article XII

The obligations set forth in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article I of the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923, shall extend to the time when the final act referred to in the preceding Article is signed.

Article XIII

Once the procedure of conciliation is under way, it shall be interrupted only by a direct settlement between the parties or by their agreement to accept absolutely the decision *ex aequo et bono* of an American chief of State or to submit the controversy to arbitration or to an international court.

Article XIV

Whenever for any reason the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923 does not apply, the commission referred to in Article II of this

convention shall be organized to the end that it may exercise the conciliatory functions stipulated in this convention; the commission shall be organized in the same manner as that prescribed in Article IV of said treaty. In such cases, the commission thus organized shall be governed in its operation by the provisions relative to conciliation of this convention.

Article XV

The provisions of the preceding Article shall also apply with regard to the permanent commissions constituted by the aforementioned Treaty of Santiago de Chile, to the end that the said commissions may exercise the conciliatory functions prescribed in Article III of this convention.

Article XVI¹

The present convention shall be ratified by the high contracting parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures, provided that they have previously ratified the Treaty of Santiago de Chile of May 3, 1923.

The original convention and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile, which shall give notice of the ratifications through diplomatic channels to the other signatory Governments, and the convention shall enter into effect for the high contracting parties in the order that they deposit their ratifications.

This convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of notice given one year in advance, at the expiration of which it shall cease to be in force as regards the party denouncing the same, but shall remain in force as regards the other signatories. Notice of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile, which will transmit it for appropriate action to the other signatory Governments.

Any American State not a signatory of this convention may adhere to the same by transmitting the official instrument setting forth such adherence to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile, which will notify the other high contracting parties thereof in the manner heretofore mentioned.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed this convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French, and hereunto affix their respective seals.

Done at Washington, on this 5th day of January, 1929.

¹ Up to July 8, 1930, the following states had ratified this Convention: Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador and the United States.

2. TEXT OF GENERAL TREATY OF INTER-AMERICAN ARBITRATION, JANUARY 5, 1929¹

In accordance with the solemn declarations made at the Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration assembled at Washington, December 10, 1928, to the effect that the American Republics condemn war as an instrument of national policy and adopt obligatory arbitration as the means for the settlement of their international differences of a juridical character ;

Being convinced that the Republics of the New World, governed by the principles, institutions, and practices of democracy and bound furthermore by mutual interests, which are increasing each day, have not only the necessity but also the duty of avoiding the disturbance of continental harmony whenever differences which are susceptible of judicial decision arise among them ;

Conscious of the great moral and material benefits which peace offers to humanity, and that the sentiment and opinion of America demand, without delay, the organization of an arbitral system which shall strengthen the permanent reign of justice and law ;

And animated by the purpose of giving conventional form to these postulates and aspirations with the minimum exceptions which they have considered indispensable to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the States, and in the most ample manner possible under present international conditions, have resolved to effect the present Treaty, and for that purpose have designated the plenipotentiaries hereinafter named :

[Here follow the names of the plenipotentiaries.]

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found in good and due form by the conference, have agreed upon the following :

Article 1

The high contracting parties bind themselves to submit to arbitration all differences of an international character which have arisen or may arise between them by virtue of a claim of right made by one against the other under treaty or otherwise, which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law.

There shall be considered as included among the questions of juridical character :

(a) The interpretation of a treaty ;

¹ Official English text issued by the Pan-American Union.

- (b) Any question of international law ;
- (c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation ;
- (d) The nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude any of the parties, before resorting to arbitration, from having recourse to procedures of investigation and conciliation established in conventions then in force between them.

Article 2

There are excepted from the stipulations of this Treaty the following controversies :

- (a) Those which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any of the parties to the dispute and are not controlled by international law ; and
- (b) Those which affect the interest or refer to the action of a State not a party to this Treaty.

Article 3

The arbitrator or tribunal who shall decide the controversy shall be designated by agreement of the parties.

In the absence of an agreement the following procedure shall be adopted :

Each party shall nominate two arbitrators, of whom only one may be a national of said party or selected from the persons whom said party has designated as members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The other member may be of any other American nationality. These arbitrators shall in turn select a fifth arbitrator who shall be the president of the Court.

Should the arbitrators be unable to reach an agreement among themselves for the selection of a fifth American arbitrator, or in lieu thereof, of another who is not, each party shall designate a non-American member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and the two persons so designated shall select the fifth arbitrator, who may be of any nationality other than that of a party to the dispute.

Article 4

The parties to the dispute shall formulate by common accord, in each case, a special agreement which shall clearly define the particular subject-matter of the controversy, the seat of the Court, the

rules which shall be observed in the proceedings, and the other conditions to which the parties may agree.

If an accord has not been reached with regard to the agreement within three months reckoned from the date of the installation of the Court, the agreement shall be formulated by the Court.

Article 5

In case of death, resignation or incapacity of one or more of the arbitrators the vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

Article 6

When there are more than two States directly interested in the same controversy, and the interests of two or more of them are similar, the State or States who are on the same side of the question may increase the number of arbitrators on the Court, provided that in all cases the parties on each side of the controversy shall appoint an equal number of arbitrators. There shall also be a presiding arbitrator selected in the same manner as that provided in the last paragraph of Article 3, the parties on each side of the controversy being regarded as a single party for the purpose of making the designation therein described.

Article 7

The award, duly pronounced and notified to the parties, settles the dispute definitively and without appeal.

Differences which arise with regard to its interpretation or execution shall be submitted to the decision of the Court which rendered the award.

Article 8

The reservations made by one of the high contracting parties shall have the effect that the other contracting parties are not bound with respect to the party making the reservations except to the same extent as that expressed therein.

Article 9 ¹

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the high contracting parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures.

The original Treaty and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the Department of State of the United States of America,

¹ Up to July 8, 1930, the following States had ratified this Treaty: Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador.

which shall give notice of the ratifications through diplomatic channels to the other signatory Governments, and the Treaty shall enter into effect for the high contracting parties in the order that they deposit their ratifications.

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but it may be denounced by means of one year's previous notice, at the expiration of which it shall cease to be in force as regards the party denouncing the same, but shall remain in force as regards the other signatories. Notice of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Department of State of the United States of America which will transmit it for appropriate action to the other signatory Governments.

Any American State not a signatory of this Treaty may adhere to the same by transmitting the official instrument setting forth such adherence to the Department of State of the United States of America which will notify the other high contracting parties thereof in the manner heretofore mentioned.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French and hereunto affix their respective seals.

Done at the city of Washington, on this fifth day of January, 1929.

3. TEXT OF PROTOCOL OF PROGRESSIVE ARBITRATION, JANUARY 5, 1929¹

Whereas a General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration has this day been signed at Washington by plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the United States of America.

Whereas that Treaty by its terms excepts certain controversies from the stipulations thereof;

Whereas by means of reservations attached to the Treaty at the time of signing, ratifying or adhering, certain other controversies have been or may be also excepted from the stipulations of the Treaty or reserved from the operation thereof;

Whereas it is deemed desirable to establish a procedure whereby such exceptions or reservations may from time to time be abandoned in whole or in part by the parties to said Treaty, thus progressively extending the field of arbitration;

¹ Official English text issued by the Pan-American Union.

Up to July 8, 1930, the following States had ratified the above Protocol: Chile, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador.

The Governments named above have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Any party to the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration signed at Washington the fifth day of January, 1929, may at any time deposit with the Department of State of the United States of America an appropriate instrument, evidencing that it has abandoned in whole or in part the exceptions from arbitration stipulated in the said Treaty or the reservation or reservations attached by it thereto.

Article 2

A certified copy of each instrument deposited with the Department of State of the United States of America pursuant to the provisions of Article 1 of this protocol shall be transmitted by the said Department through diplomatic channels to every other party to the above-mentioned General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed this proctocol in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French and hereunto affix their respective seals.

Done at the city of Washington, on this fifth day of January, 1929.

D. ASIA

A. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

1. IRAQ

STATEMENT BY MR. B. H. BOURDILLON, COUNSELLOR TO THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER IN IRAQ, TO PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION,
NOVEMBER 6, 1929¹

I do not propose to deal further with the economic situation, but I should like to say a little about two important features of the report under review. The first of these is the progress of the negotiations in respect of the 1927 Treaty. As the Commission is possibly aware, these negotiations came to nothing. It was not found possible to reach agreement in the matter of the new financial and military agreements, and the final result, reached after the close of the year under review, was a mutual agreement to abandon the Treaty and to continue to allow relations to be governed by existing instruments, ignoring such provisions of the latter (as, for example, the agreement that Iraq should pay for certain capital assets) as have been specifically abandoned by mutual consent or have become obsolete through progress of time.

I venture to remind the Commission that last year I foreshadowed the possibility (though not, indeed, the probability) that the 1927 Treaty might prove to be still-born, and I venture to suggest that its pre-natal decease fully indicates the propriety of the method adopted by my Government in dealing with it, namely, to defer seeking the approval of the Council of the League to the new Treaty and agreements until the approval of the Iraq Parliament to their ratification had been obtained. It would have wasted the time of the Council, and possibly have been somewhat embarrassing to it, if my Government had presented to it for approval, and secured its approval to, a treaty destined never to come into force.

The other important feature of the report upon which I should like to touch is the question of the troubles between Iraq and Nejd. The report deals with these fully, but I think it would make the position clearer to the members of the Commission if I were to take them back a few years.

The Treaty of Mohammerah, signed in May 1922, was the first

¹ Minutes of the Sixteenth Session of the Mandates Commission, C. 538, M. 192, 1929, VI.

concrete step towards a definition of the desert frontier. Prior to the negotiations for that Treaty, each side had indicated the frontier it desired. That demanded by Ibn Sa'ud extended nearly up to the Baghdad-Basra Railway, and was obviously unacceptable. I was the High Commissioner's representative at Mohammerah, and I soon discovered that the Nejd delegate could not be induced to agree to any definite frontier other than that demanded by his master. I therefore abandoned the attempt to fix a frontier, and endeavoured to secure agreement upon a principle which should guide the fixation of a frontier. Such a principle was readily discovered. That certain tribes owed allegiance to Iraq was undisputed, and the allegiance of others to Nejd was similarly accepted. The frontier was to be fixed according to the ancient habitat of these tribes. The principle was obviously reasonable, and it occasioned considerable surprise when the Nejd delegate, on his return to Riyadh, was reprimanded with the utmost severity for having exceeded his instructions. The diplomatic skill of Sir Percy Cox was, later in the year, taxed to the utmost in securing the ratification of the Treaty by Ibn Sa'ud, and he could only succeed by agreeing to a Protocol of which the following two Articles are important:

Article 2

'Whereas many of the wells fall within the Iraq boundaries and the Nejd side is deprived of them, the Iraq Government pledges itself not to interfere with those Nejd tribes living in the vicinity of the border should it be necessary for them to resort to the neighbouring Iraq wells for water, provided that these wells are nearer to them than those within the Nejd boundaries.'

Article 3

'The two Governments mutually agree not to use the watering-places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purpose such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity.'

It is upon this latter Article that Ibn Sa'ud has based all his objections to the desert post of Busaiyah, which he alleges to have been the sole cause of the recent troubles. On the question whether the erection of a small police post at Busaiyah did or did not infringe that Article there can only be one reasonable opinion, and I am prepared fully to demonstrate this to the Commission should it so desire. The root of the trouble lies in Ibn Sa'ud's profound (and perfectly intelligible) desire to avoid any extension of ordered administration into the desert. His bedouin tribes, never the most orderly of subjects,

were accustomed to roam freely within limits defined only by the respective strength of themselves and their neighbours. He knew that they would bitterly resent any apparent attempt to restrict their movements, and, though he was perfectly willing to agree that certain tribes belonged to Iraq, he was anxious to avoid altogether—and, if he could not do that, to delay as long as possible—any action that should make it appear to his tribes that their ancient liberties were being restricted. We may take it as certain that these tribes were kept in ignorance of the provisions of the Treaty of Moham-merah. The 'Uqair Protocol was a desperate effort to limit, as far as possible, the practical evidence of Iraq sovereignty in the neighbourhood of the Akhwan tribes.

For Ibn Sa'ud's difficulties one can only have (and my Government have always had) the profoundest sympathy. There were, however, other points of view to be considered. The British and Iraq Governments saw, the former even more clearly perhaps than the latter, the great importance, not only to Iraq, but to the whole of the Middle East, of tranquillity in the desert lying between the Mediterranean and the Euphrates. There lay a rapidly developing highway for passengers and commerce. There lay the route by which the oil wealth of Iraq must find its way to the markets of the world. It was obvious that the susceptibilities of savage tribesmen must, even at the expense of increasing the difficulties of their able and enlightened ruler, be subordinated to higher considerations. The desert must be pacified; and pacified it has been to an extent little short of amazing. The road from Damascus to Baghdad is now a great (if somewhat uneven) highway with a constant stream of lorries, touring cars, and passenger pullman cars moving across it. Midway, one hundred and ninety-five miles from the nearest human habitation, is a well-appointed hotel with electric light and fans, a wireless telegraph station, and an aerodrome. It is true that there have been one or two cases of banditry on the route; but I would particularly call the attention of the Commission to the fact that none of these has been traced to the bedouin tribes of the desert.

It is obvious that the security of this highway could not possibly have been achieved without a great extension of Government influence to the south of it, and I could wish that more publicity had been given to the wonderful results that have been achieved in this direction. Intertribal raiding between the Iraq desert tribes has literally ceased, as also have raids by them upon their neighbours. Tribes that dared not go within a day's march of each other are now peacefully camped together within sight of the post of Salman, where

there is excellent water, the enjoyment of which is now secured to all instead of being, as heretofore, the privilege of the strong alone. In other words, that which, to the Akhwan tribesmen, appeared to be the bondage of the desert, is in reality its freedom, and the first step has been taken towards making the bedouin tribesman a useful citizen of the State to which he belongs, a process of vital importance to Iraq, whose settled population is undoubtedly insufficient for its proper development.

I do not wish to labour the point, but I hope I have made it clear to the Commission that the difficulties between the Iraq and Nejd Governments have not arisen out of any minor question of territorial rights. The question at issue is one between progress and stagnation. Progress must win in the end, and there is no reason why the present advocates of stagnation should not ultimately benefit by that victory.

II. PERSIA

On May 10, 1927 the Persian Government addressed a Circular Note to the foreign Legations at Teheran informing them that, as from March 10, 1928, the Treaties between the Powers and Persia governing the system of capitulations would be declared annulled.¹ In the case of France, the treaty with Persia had been concluded in perpetuity, but in a special Note to the French Legation, the Persian Foreign Minister, Mirza Fatullah Khan, stated that 'not wishing to treat France . . . less favourably than the other Powers', the duration of the French Treaty would be prolonged for a period of one year at which date it would become void.² Accordingly, on March 10, 1928, a provisional Franco-Persian Treaty was signed for a further period of one year.³ At the expiration of this Treaty a permanent Treaty was signed on May 10, 1929, containing provisions for arbitration which the Contracting Parties reserved the right to review and re-examine at the end of ten years.

TEXT OF FRANCO-PERSIAN TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, MAY 10, 1929

Sa Majesté Impériale Le Schah De Perse
et
Le Président De La République Française

Également animés de désir de consolider les relations d'amitié traditionnelles entre les deux États, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont nommé à cet effet Leurs Plénipotentiaires,

¹ For text of Note see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, p. 200.

² *ibid.*, p. 200 (footnote).

³ *ibid.*, p. 209 (note and footnote). See also *Survey* for 1928, Part III B, section (xii).

Sa Majesté Impériale le Schah de Perse :

Son Excellence MIRZA MOHAMED ALI KHAN FARZINE, Gérant de
Son Ministère des Affaires Étrangères ;

Le Président de la République Française :

Monsieur AUGUSTE WILDEN, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre
Plénipotentiaire à Téhéran ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus
en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

Article 1

Il y aura paix inaltérable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre la
Perse et la France ainsi qu'entre les ressortissants des deux États.

Article 2

Les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de chacune des
Hautes Parties Contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre jouiront, sous
condition de réciprocité, des privilèges et immunités consacrés par le
droit commun international, qui ne pourront, en aucun cas, être
moins favorables que ceux accordés aux représentants diplomatiques
et consulaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

Article 3

Chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes aura la faculté de
nommer ses représentants consulaires sur le territoire de l'autre, qui
résideront soit dans la capitale, soit dans les principales villes où de
pareils agents étrangers sont généralement admis à résider. Ils ne
pourront pas exercer leurs fonctions avant d'avoir régulièrement
reçu l'exequatur, conformément aux règles admises par le droit
commun international.

Article 4

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes sont d'accord pour régler leurs
relations commerciales, douanières et de navigation, les fonctions des
consuls de chacune d'Elles sur le territoire de l'autre, les conditions
de l'établissement et du séjour de leurs ressortissants sur leurs terri-
toires respectifs par des conventions conformes aux principes et à la
pratique du droit commun international et sur la base d'une parfaite
égalité et réciprocité.

Article 5

Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent de soumettre
à l'arbitrage tous les différends qui surgiraient entre Elles à propos
de l'application ou de l'interprétation des prescriptions de tous traités
et conventions conclus ou à conclure, y compris le présent Traité, et

qui n'auraient pu être réglés à l'amiable dans un délai raisonnable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires.

Cette disposition s'appliquera également en cas de besoin à la question préalable de savoir si le différend se rapporte à l'interprétation ou à l'application des dits traités et conventions.

La décision du tribunal obligera les Parties.

Pour chaque litige le tribunal arbitral sera formé sur la demande d'un des États Contractants et de la façon suivante : dans le délai de trois mois à dater du dépôt de la demande, chaque État désignera son arbitre qui pourra également être choisi parmi les ressortissants d'un pays tiers. Si les deux États ne s'entendent pas, dans les trois mois à dater du dépôt de la demande, sur le délai dans lequel ces arbitres devront avoir rendu leur décision, ou si les deux arbitres ne parviennent pas à régler le litige dans le délai à eux imparti, les deux États choisiront pour tiers-arbitre un ressortissant d'un État tiers. Si les États ne tombent pas d'accord sur le choix du tiers-arbitre dans le délai des deux mois à dater du jour où aura été formulée la demande de la nomination d'un tiers-arbitre, ils prieront en commun, ou, faute d'avoir introduit cette requête commune dans un nouveau délai de deux mois, le plus diligent d'entre Eux priera le Président de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de la Haye de nommer ce tiers-arbitre parmi les ressortissants des États tiers. Du commun accord des Parties il pourra lui être remis une liste des États tiers auxquels son choix devra se restreindre. Elles se réservent de s'entendre à l'avance pour une période déterminée sur la personne du tiers-arbitre. La procédure que les deux arbitres auront à observer, si elle n'a pas été réglée dans un compromis spécial entre les deux États et conclu au plus tard lors de la désignation des arbitres, sera, sauf dispositions contraires des deux Gouvernements, réglée conformément à l'article 57 et aux articles 59 à 85 de la Convention de la Haye du 18 Octobre 1907 pour le règlement des conflits internationaux.

Au cas où il aurait fallu procéder à la désignation d'un tiers-arbitre et à défaut d'un compromis entre les deux États Contractants, ayant déterminé la procédure à suivre à partir de cette désignation, le tiers-arbitre se joindra aux deux premiers arbitres, et le tribunal arbitral, ainsi formé, déterminera sa procédure et réglera le différend. Toutes les décisions du tribunal arbitral seront rendues à la majorité.

Pour tout différend autre que ceux de l'espèce à laquelle s'appliquent les prescriptions ci-dessus prévues et qui n'aurait pu être réglé d'une façon satisfaisante par la voie diplomatique, les Hautes Parties Contractantes, respectueuses de leurs obligations en tant que membres

de la Société des Nations, conviennent en tout cas de ne recourir qu'à des procédures de règlement pacifique. Elles se réservent de déterminer, dans chaque cas par un compromis spécial, la procédure qui leur paraîtra le mieux appropriée.

Elles conviennent d'ailleurs que si toutes les deux Elles venaient à adhérer à une formule générale recommandée par la Société des Nations, Elles l'appliqueraient au règlement de tous les différends auxquels elle s'adapte, nonobstant s'il y a lieu les dispositions qui précèdent.

Article 6

Le présent Traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Paris, aussitôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur avec l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent Traité et y ont apposée leurs sceaux.

Fait à Téhéran, le dix Mai mil neuf cent vingt-neuf.

(S:) M. FARZINE.

(S:) WILDEN.

Protocole Final

Au moment de procéder à la signature du Traité d'Amitié conclu aujourd'hui entre l'Empire de Perse et la République Française, les Plénipotentiaires soussignés ont fait la déclaration suivante qui constituera partie intégrante du traité même :

Les Gouvernements Persan et Français se réservent le droit d'examiner à nouveau les dispositions de l'article V du Traité d'Amitié, à l'expiration d'une période de dix ans à dater de l'échange des ratifications du dit Traité.

Fait à Téhéran, le 10 Mai mil neuf cent vingt-neuf.

(S:) M. FARZINE.

(S:) WILDEN.

III. TURKEY

During the year 1929 the Turkish Government proceeded to conclude further treaties with foreign powers based upon the original model of her Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression with the U.S.S.R. in 1925.¹ The Treaty signed with Hungary on January 5 contained the original stipulations for neutrality and non-aggression, but added to their machinery procedure for the settlement of disputes arising between the two countries by means of conciliation and arbitration. A later Treaty signed with

¹ For a note on the Soviet and Turkish systems of Treaties of Neutrality and Non-Aggression see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, pp. 198-9.

Bulgaria on March 6 includes, in addition to these innovations, a further provision for judicial settlement.

The negotiations begun at the close of 1928 between the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and the French Ambassador at Angora, the Comte de Chambord, bore fruit in the form of the following agreement for the solution of the Turco-Syrian frontier controversy which had disturbed the friendly relations of both France and Turkey since 1923.¹

TEXT OF THE TURCO-SYRIAN FRONTIER AGREEMENT, SIGNED
AT ANGORA, JUNE 29, 1929²

Protocole relatif à la surveillance de la frontière, au régime frontalier, au régime fiscal applicable aux troupeaux franchissant la frontière et au contrôle des nomades.

CHAPITRE I

Surveillance de la frontière

Les dispositions du présent chapitre sont applicables à la zone frontière fixée par la convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage du 30 mai 1926.

Article 1

Les deux gouvernements s'engagent réciproquement à mettre obstacle par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir aux agissements d'un ou plusieurs individus qui, à titre isolé ou collectif, utiliseraient la zone frontière pour préparer des actes de banditisme sur le territoire de l'État voisin ou des actes de nature à nuire à cet État.

Article 2

Lorsqu'elles apprendront que des préparatifs sont faits par un ou plusieurs individus dans le but de perpétrer dans la zone frontière des actes de banditisme ou des actes de nature à nuire à l'État voisin, les autorités compétentes s'en aviseront immédiatement et communiqueront tous renseignements qu'elles pourraient recueillir à ce sujet.

Elles s'avertiront réciproquement de tout acte de banditisme, de quelque nature qu'il soit, commis sur leur propre territoire, dont les auteurs pourraient chercher refuge dans le pays voisin.

Les autorités de l'un ou l'autre pays prendront toutes mesures utiles tant pour prévenir ces agressions que pour empêcher leurs auteurs de franchir la frontière.

¹ For the history of this controversy see *Survey* for 1925, vol. i, Part III (viii) and *Survey* for 1928, Part III B (viii).

² *L'Europe Nouvelle*, August 24, 1929.

Article 3

Lorsqu'un crime ou acte de banditisme est commis dans la zone frontière fixée ci-dessus et que les auteurs ont cherché refuge dans la zone frontière du pays voisin, les autorités de ce pays prendront toutes mesures en vue de l'arrestation immédiate des coupables et de la réparation des dommages.

Si les coupables sont ressortissants de l'État où le crime a été commis, ils seront remis, sans autre formalité, à cet État. S'ils sont ressortissants de l'État sur le territoire duquel ils se sont réfugiés, ils y seront poursuivis conformément aux lois de ce pays.

La saisie des armes, du butin et, le cas échéant, celle des biens, sera immédiatement opérée en vue d'assurer les réparations légales.

Article 4

Les auteurs d'actes de banditisme seront dans tous les cas éloignés de la zone frontière où ils ne seront plus autorisés à séjourner.

Article 5

Le désarmement de la zone frontière sera effectué d'une façon progressive et aussitôt que possible. Les autorités compétentes se concerteront pour assurer l'exécution de ces mesures, simultanément de chaque côté de la frontière, dans le secteur où elle sera décidée et en tenant compte des circonstances locales.

Dans chaque village et suivant son importance il pourra être laissé au maximum quatre gardes armés portant un insigne distinctif apparent (brassard, plaque de cuivre, etc.). Il est bien entendu que ces gardes doivent être désignés par les autorités responsables et choisis parmi les autochtones jouissant d'une parfaite honorabilité.

CHAPITRE II

Régime frontalier

La zone dans laquelle s'appliquent les dispositions du présent chapitre est une zone de 5 kilomètres de part et d'autre de la frontière.

Toutefois, dans le cas où des groupes de propriétés appartenant à des ressortissants du pays voisin se trouveraient situés dans une zone ne dépassant pas 10 kilomètres à compter de la frontière, les dispositions du présent chapitre leur seront appliquées après décision, pour chaque groupe, de la commission permanente de frontière prévue à l'article 13.

Article 6

Les habitants sédentaires ou semi-sédentaires ayant, à la date de la signature du présent protocole, des propriétés ou des droits de pâturage, d'abreuvoir ou de culture, de l'un ou de l'autre côté de la frontière continueront, comme par le passé, à jouir de leurs droits.

Ils pourront, pour les nécessités de leur exploitation, traverser la frontière librement, sur présentation d'une carte frontalière annuelle, délivrée par les autorités administratives des circonscriptions dans lesquelles ils sont domiciliés et circuler dans la zone définie ci-dessus.

Ils pourront, dans les limites de cette zone, faire passer d'un côté à l'autre de la frontière, leur bétail, le croît et les produits de leurs troupeaux, les instruments agricoles destinés à leur exploitation, leurs voitures, leurs semences, les produits du sol de leurs propriétés, sans avoir à payer aucun droit de douane, de pâturage ou d'abreuvoir ou toute autre taxe relative à l'entrée en territoire voisin.

Par contre, les habitants visés ci-dessus seront tenus de payer les impôts fonciers concernant leurs biens immeubles au gouvernement sur le territoire duquel ces biens sont situés.

Les impôts et taxes frappant le cheptel vivant ou mort servant à l'exploitation de ces propriétés seront payés au gouvernement du pays dont le propriétaire est ressortissant, et à la diligence de ce gouvernement agissant sur son propre territoire.

En cas d'épidémies, d'épizooties, d'épiphyties, les deux gouvernements se réservent le droit d'appliquer dans la zone frontalière les mesures sanitaires spéciales et les prohibitions d'importation ou exportation qui seraient édictées dans le pays.

CHAPITRE III

Régime fiscal applicable aux troupeaux franchissant la frontière

Article 7

Les bergers des troupeaux traversant la frontière, qu'ils soient au service de sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades, devront être obligatoirement munis d'un titre indiquant le nombre de leurs animaux, le régime sous lequel ces troupeaux traversent la frontière et, le cas échéant, la région où ils exercent leurs droits coutumiers de pacage. Ceux de ces troupeaux ayant droit de pâturage ne sont soumis à aucune taxation dans le pays où ils viennent pâturer.

En cas de contestations sur les droits de pâturage invoqués, le litige sera soumis à la commission permanente de frontière prévue à l'article 13.

Les troupeaux qui pénètrent dans l'un des deux pays pour raison de commerce ou de transit sont soumis aux taxes douanières.

CHAPITRE IV

Contrôle des nomades

Article 8

Les tribus d'allégeance turque ou syrienne, qui jouissent d'un droit coutumier de pâturage sur certains territoires de l'État voisin, doivent, avant de franchir la frontière, obtenir des autorités compétentes les autorisations nécessaires.

A cet effet, le chef de tribu ou Mouktar responsable avisera l'autorité du territoire dont il dépend de son intention de se déplacer. Il fera connaître le nombre de tentes, le nombre des hommes de la tribu et le nombre d'armes à feu qu'elle possède; le nombre, par catégorie, des animaux transhumant; le point où la tribu franchira la frontière; le lieu de destination et la durée prévue de son séjour dans le territoire de l'État voisin.

Si l'autorité saisie de cette demande autorise la sortie de la tribu de son propre territoire, elle en avisera l'autorité du pays voisin, en lui communiquant toutes les indications qui précèdent, dix jours au moins avant la date prévue pour le passage de la frontière.

L'autorité du pays voisin accordera le passage sous réserve que la tribu en question se soumette, pendant son séjour dans le pays où elle se rend, à toutes les lois et règlements intéressant l'ordre et la sécurité publics, ainsi qu'aux règles relatives à la santé publique, notamment en cas d'épidémies ou d'épizooties.

La commission permanente de frontière prévue à l'article 13 fixera au cours de sa première réunion de chaque année le nombre des fusils que chaque tribu, ayant des droits de pâturage hors de son pays d'origine, sera autorisée à détenir pour assurer la garde de ses troupeaux.

A défaut d'une telle fixation par la commission permanente et dans les cas non prévus par elle, l'autorité du pays dans lequel se rend la tribu fixera le nombre de fusils que cette tribu sera autorisée à détenir.

Les bergers de troupeaux appartenant à des sédentaires, semi-sédentaires ou nomades, pourront être autorisés, par l'autorité du pays dans lequel pénètrent ces troupeaux, à porter les armes nécessaires pour assurer leur garde.

Article 9

Au cas de déprédations, la tribu transhumante est astreinte à la réparation immédiate des dommages causés.

Si cette réparation n'a pu être effectuée complètement avant le retour de la tribu sur le territoire de l'État dont elle relève, celui-ci s'engage à faciliter par toutes voies utiles le règlement des dommages causés.

En cas de retour de cette même tribu dans le pays où le dommage a été causé, sans que réparation complète ait été effectuée, l'affaire sera portée devant la commission permanente de frontière et la décision de celle-ci sera exécutée par toutes voies légales.

Article 10

Les différends qui viendraient à se produire entre tribus ou fractions de tribus de la zone frontière seront réglés par les autorités prévues au chapitre 5 ci-dessous.

Article 11

Toute tribu ou fraction de tribu qui se sera insurgée contre les autorités du pays dont elle relève, et qui aura pénétré sur le territoire de l'État voisin, sera, si elle y trouve refuge, désarmée et éloignée de la frontière de telle manière qu'elle ne puisse poursuivre ou reprendre ses agressions.

CHAPITRE V

Dispositions générales

Article 12

Les deux gouvernements désigneront les autorités compétentes qu'ils chargent :

(a) De l'échange des renseignements locaux et des communications urgentes ainsi que du règlement des incidents nécessitant des mesures immédiates ;

(b) A l'échelon supérieur : de la coordination et de la responsabilité des mesures générales à prendre.

Article 13

Il sera constitué, dans le plus bref délai possible, une commission permanente de frontière composée d'un nombre égal de représentants nommés par les gouvernements respectifs.

Cette commission se réunira au moins une fois tous les six mois et plus souvent si les circonstances l'exigent, alternativement en Turquie et en Syrie.

Elle devra s'efforcer de régler à l'amiable toutes questions concernant l'exécution du présent protocole et toutes autres questions

frontières sur lesquelles l'entente n'aurait pu se faire entre les autorités qualifiées en vertu de l'article précédent.

La première réunion aura lieu en octobre 1929 à Beyrouth.

Les deux gouvernements se communiqueront les noms de leurs délégués au moins un mois avant la date fixée pour chaque réunion.

Article 14

Les deux gouvernements se donnent quitus de tous impôts et taxes perçus contrairement aux dispositions du présent protocole et antérieurement à la date de sa signature.

Les dispositions de ce même protocole en ce qui concerne spécialement les impôts fonciers seront appliquées à dater du 1er janvier 1930.

Article 15

Le présent protocole, qui entrera immédiatement en vigueur, est pris en exécution de la convention d'amitié et de bon voisinage du 30 mai 1926.

Fait à Angora, le 29 juin 1929.

IV. THE YEMEN

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE YEMEN, SIGNED AT SANA, NOVEMBER 12, 1928¹

Preamble

Animated by the goodwill and the wishes manifested by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the one side and by His Majesty the King of the Yemen, &c., and his Government on the other side, and the desire of both parties to enter into normal official relations, as well as to establish economic relations between both countries and to help the development of these relations,

And animated further by the principles of sincerity concerning the establishment of friendly relations between both Governments and their peoples, and on the recognition of mutual equality of both parties in all that pertains to the rights and general rules existing between States and peoples,

The above-named parties have agreed to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship and of Trade, and to regard it as a preliminary step to such negotiations for the conclusion of agreements that may become necessary with the development and growth of economic

¹ Translation from the Russian Text, prepared for the Information Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

relations between both countries, such as trade agreements, or others to which both parties agreed.

Article I

The Government of the U.S.S.R. recognizes the complete and absolute independence and sovereignty of the Government of the Yemen and of its King. His Majesty the King of the Yemen and his Government on their side fully appreciate the sincere regard and good sentiments which the Government of the U.S.S.R. entertains for the State and People of the Yemen as for other Peoples of the East. Therefore the contracting parties regard official relations as established between them in conformity with the above preamble.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate trade between their two countries; in virtue of this undertaking the nationals of either country will have the right, on receiving permission, to enter the territory of the other State and to stay there subject to its laws, to carry on business and to execute all transactions necessary thereto, subject to the condition that any dispute which may arise between nationals of the two countries shall be decided by the local tribunals of the State where they reside and in accordance with its laws. The two Governments may each forbid trade in goods which are not allowed by the laws of either of them, or confiscate them when found on the territory of the Government concerned. The contracting parties undertake with regard to taxes and customs dues to grant to the nationals of both countries facilities for trade, conforming to the local laws.

Article III

This Treaty, after signature and ratification by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the usual official manner, shall enter into force and shall become effective on the day on which the official declaration of the Government of the U.S.S.R. is deposited with His Majesty the King of the Yemen, Imam Jahia.¹

Article IV

This Treaty of Friendship and Commerce shall remain in force and be applied for a period of 10 years, beginning from the date mentioned in Article III. On the expiration of this period the Treaty may, subject to the wishes of and future agreements between the two

¹ After ratification by the U.S.S.R. the Treaty entered into force on June 25, 1929.

Contracting Parties, be extended or modified. On the expiration of this period, the prolongation of the Treaty or its replacement by another Treaty will depend upon the wishes of the two contracting parties and upon what they may agree.

Article V

This Treaty of Friendship and Commerce shall be known as 'The Treaty of Sana'; it contains a Preamble, a Conclusion, which follows this Article, and five Articles, of which this Article is one. The Treaty is drawn up in Arabic in two copies, which shall be exchanged between the two Contracting Parties.

Conclusion

In order to prepare this Treaty for the final ratification mentioned in Articles III and IV, it was signed in Sana, the capital of the Yemen, by the plenipotentiary representative of the Government of the U.S.S.R., the citizen Astachov, in the name of that Government, and by Kadi Mohammed Raghif, the representative of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, after full and complete understanding concerning the text of this Treaty and its interpretation had been reached between the two Plenipotentiaries.

Sana, the 17 Djumadah el-Ulah 1347 H.,
corresponding to November 12, 1928.

B. THE FAR EAST

1. CHINA

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

The Sino-Soviet dispute regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway provided the most piquant diplomatic incident of the year 1929. The C.E.R. had been a constant source of dispute between China and the U.S.S.R. ever since the Russian Revolution, the Chinese alleging that the Soviet officials made use of their official position to further the cause of world Revolution in China.¹

Matters came to a head on May 27, 1929, when the Chinese police officials at Harbin raided the Consulate-General and surprised a meeting of Russian and Chinese Communist agents, who were arrested. The Soviet Government protested against this violation of diplomatic immunity and withdrew the corresponding privileges from the Chinese consulates in the U.S.S.R. The Chinese Government's only reply was to close down the offices of the C.E.R., arrest the Soviet officials and the Consul-General at

¹ For the background of Sino-Soviet dispute see 'The Chinese Eastern Railway and Sino-Soviet Relations'. *Bulletin of International News*, vol. vi, no. 1, July 18, 1929. See also *Survey* for 1929, Part IV A, section (iv).

Mukden, and assume complete control of the Railway on June 2. Some weeks of strained relations passed, and then, on July 14, the Soviet Government dispatched an ultimatum to Nanking¹ and began to concentrate troops on the Manchurian frontier, cutting the railway at the two points at which it entered Soviet territory. Clashes occurred between Soviet and Chinese frontier guards and there were reports of air-raids and reconnaissances.²

Thus a peculiarly complex situation was created. Hostilities had broken out, but war had not been declared. Moreover, both disputants were parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact which both had ratified. The interest of the world was centred upon the dispute and it behove the initiators of the Pact to take some action to prevent its violation. On July 18, the United States Secretary of State began conversations with the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the five principal original signatories of the Pact with a view to some common policy, but the Pact was not yet in force and nothing resulted.

Meanwhile the frontier raids became intensified and in some places Soviet forces made comparatively deep penetration into Chinese territory.³ On July 24 the Peace Pact was proclaimed to be in force, and, on August 20, the Chinese Government circularized all the signatories and all Members of the League of Nations to the effect that, except for measures of self-defence, China would loyally abide by Article 2 of the Pact, and was ready, within reasonable limits, to negotiate with the Soviet Union for a settlement of the dispute.

Desultory disputes continued throughout the autumn, and the League of Nations at its Assembly in September took no action in the matter. The German Government did all in its power to act as intermediary, but only succeeded in incurring considerable odium from both sides. It was generally understood, however, that discussions were in progress between Soviet and Chinese officials for a temporary agreement.

On December 2, the British and United States Governments addressed notes to both China and the U.S.S.R., recalling to them their commitments under the Kellogg Pact. France also sent a note and the three Powers urged other signatories of the Peace Pact to add their protests.

The Chinese reply recapitulated the statement of August 20, while the Soviet reply,⁴ couched in less civil terms, informed the Powers that as direct negotiations were already in progress between Moscow and Mukden, the intervention of a third party was ill-timed. Moreover, M. Litvinoff refused to accept the receipt of Notes from Rumania and Egypt, saying that the U.S.S.R. had no diplomatic relations with these countries, although Rumania had signed and ratified the Litvinoff Protocol.

The direct negotiations referred to by M. Litvinoff resulted in the signature, on December 3, of the Preliminary Protocol of Nikolsk, which provided a temporary arrangement for the resumption of direct traffic on

¹ *Bulletin of International News*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

² For Soviet views on these incidents see M. Litvinoff's Report above, p. 192.

³ For later developments of the dispute see *Bulletin of International News*, vol. vi, no. 12, December 19, 1929.

⁴ For Soviet views on this 'interference' of the Powers see M. Litvinoff's Report above, p. 196.

the C.E.R. while negotiations for a restoration of the *status quo* were in progress. These negotiations opened at Harbarovsk on December 16 and terminated six days later with the signature of an Agreement, whereby the *status quo* was restored, Soviet Consulates and commercial organizations in Manchuria and Chinese Consulates in the U.S.S.R. were re-established, all troops on both sides were withdrawn and all arrested persons released.

The final resumption of diplomatic relations was withheld from the Harbarovsk Agreement and left over for consideration by a Conference convened to meet in Moscow on January 25, 1930. As is customary in oriental diplomatic affairs there was considerable procrastination in the matter of this Conference. It was postponed until the spring and then again postponed. On May 9, it was announced that the Chinese delegates had arrived in Moscow, but up till the middle of June 1930 preliminary conversations were still in process and the Conference had not formally met.

(i) TEXT OF THE BRITISH NOTE OF DECEMBER 2 TO CHINA
AND THE U.S.S.R.¹

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have observed with apprehension and concern the course of events between China and the Soviet Union with reference to the situation in Northern Manchuria since July.

The United States Government took steps, through conversations in Washington, to see that the attention of the Chinese and the Soviet Governments was called to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War to which both China and the Soviet Union were signatories. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom associated themselves with that step. Both the Soviet and Chinese Governments then gave formal and public assurances that neither would resort to war unless attacked. The Treaty has now been ratified by no less than fifty-five Powers, including China and the Soviet Union.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom associate themselves with the action which the United States Government are now taking to call attention to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to Article 2, which reads:

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means ;
and to express the earnest hope that China and the Soviet Union will refrain or desist from measures of hostility, and will find it

¹ *The Times*, December 3, 1929.

possible in the near future to come to an agreement between themselves upon a method for resolving by peaceful means the issues over which they are at present in controversy. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel that the respect with which China and the Soviet Union will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will necessarily in great measure depend upon the way in which they carry out these most sacred promises.

(ii) TEXT OF IDENTIC NOTES FROM THE UNITED STATES TO
THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA, DECEMBER 2, 1929¹

The Government and People of the United States have observed with apprehensive concern the course of events in relations between China and Russia in the phase which has developed in reference to the situation in Northern Manchuria since July 10.

On July 18, this Government took steps, through conversations between the Secretary of State and the diplomatic representatives at Washington of the five Powers, to see that the attention of the Chinese and Russian Governments be called to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War to which both China and Russia were signatories. Both the Russian and the Chinese Governments then made formal and public assurances that neither would resort to war unless attacked. Since that time that Treaty has been ratified by no less than 55 Powers, including China and Russia.

The American Government desires again to call attention to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to Article 2, which reads: 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between them shall never be sought except by pacific means'; and the American Government takes occasion to express its earnest hope that China and Russia will refrain or desist from measures of hostility, and will find it possible in the near future to come to an agreement between themselves upon a method for resolving by peaceful means the issues over which they are at present in controversy. The American Government feels that the respect with which China and Russia will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will necessarily in great measure depend upon the way in which they carry out these most sacred promises.

¹ Official text issued by the U.S. Department of State.

(iii) TEXT OF THE REPLY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OF
DECEMBER 4, 1929 ¹

Throughout the present dispute with Soviet Russia the National Government has maintained a peaceful attitude, and refrained from adopting any hostile military actions except for purposes of self-protection, as may be attested by established facts.

'Being a co-signatory of the Treaty of Renunciation of War, the National Government circularized the other signatories of aforesaid Treaty on August 20, 1929, declaring that China would, apart from adopting measures for self-protection in defence of her territorial sovereignty against external invasions, faithfully abide by Article II of aforesaid Treaty, providing for the solution of international disputes by pacific means, and that she was ready at any time within reasonable limits to negotiate with the Soviet Government for settlement of the present dispute.

'Such declaration is in complete harmony with the intent of the Note under reply. The National Government has always reposed implicit confidence in the aforesaid Treaty, and desisted from acting in any way contrary to its spirit. It will continue to adhere to its reiterated policy.'

(iv) REPLY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE U.S. NOTE
OF DECEMBER 2, DECEMBER 4, 1929 ²

L'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes a entrepris, dès le premier jour de son existence, une politique de paix et, contrairement aux autres puissances, elle n'a jamais eu recours à l'action armée, sauf pour des mesures de défense rendues nécessaires par des attaques directes contre l'Union soviétique, ou par l'intervention armée de certaines puissances dans les affaires intérieures. L'Union soviétique a toujours respecté le pacte de renonciation à la guerre, signé à Paris.

Au cours de ces dernières années, le gouvernement de Nankin, dérogeant aux méthodes habituelles de règlement des litiges par la voie diplomatique, a mené à l'égard de l'Union soviétique une politique de provocation, en infraction aux règles et traités internationaux généralement établis, bien que des traités n'eussent point été imposés à la Chine par la force armée ou d'autres mesures coercitives et eussent été conclus sur la base de l'égalité et de la bonne volonté absolues.

¹ *Kuo Min News Agency* Telegram, December 5, 1929. This reply was identic in word to all the Powers.

² *Temps*, December 5, 1929. This reply was identic in wording to all the Powers.

Comme on le sait, l'Union soviétique, avait renoncé, de son propre gré, dans ces traités, au droit d'exterritorialité de la juridiction consulaire et à d'autres privilèges dont le gouvernement chinois s'efforce en vain d'obtenir la révocation de la part des autres puissances.

Le point culminant de cette politique fut la saisie du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, sans aucun avertissement et sans que la Chine eût, au préalable, présenté des revendications quelconques à ce sujet. Cette saisie constituait une infraction aux accords existants en ce qui concerne l'administration commune du chemin de fer.

Le gouvernement soviétique considère qu'une pareille attitude du gouvernement de Nankin, si elle avait été prise à l'égard des États-Unis d'Amérique, de la Grande-Bretagne ou de la France, eût été considérée par les gouvernements de ces pays comme un motif suffisant pour invoquer les réserves faites par eux lors de la signature du pacte de renonciation à la guerre.

Le gouvernement soviétique a déclaré, en son temps, qu'il ne reconnaissait point ces réserves, et il n'a pas l'intention de s'en servir.

Le gouvernement de Nankin ne se borna pas à la saisie illégale du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. Il mobilisa, à la frontière soviéto-mandchoue, une armée dont les différents détachements, renforcés de bandes contre-révolutionnaires russes, firent des attaques systématiques contre l'Union soviétique, pénétrant en territoire soviétique, tirant sur les troupes de l'armée rouge et sur les villages de la frontière, pillant et exerçant des violences contre la population pacifique. Ces attaques ont causé à l'Union soviétique des pertes en hommes et des dommages aux biens. Malgré les avertissements impératifs faits au gouvernement de Nankin par l'intermédiaire du gouvernement allemand, ces attaques ne cessèrent pas et devinrent même plus fréquentes et plus violentes. Ces attaques obligèrent l'armée soviétique d'Extrême-Orient à prendre des mesures pour la défense et la sécurité de la population pacifique de la zone frontière.

L'action de l'armée rouge était donc dictée par les besoins d'une défense absolument nécessaire, et elle ne constitue nullement une infraction aux obligations découlant du pacte de Paris. On ne pourrait en dire autant en ce qui concerne les forces armées qui se trouvent sur le territoire et dans les ports chinois, et qui appartiennent aux puissances qui adressent aujourd'hui des déclarations identiques au gouvernement soviétique.

Le gouvernement soviétique constate que le gouvernement des États-Unis lui a adressé sa déclaration au moment même où le

gouvernement soviétique et le gouvernement de Moukden se sont déjà entendus sur plusieurs conditions et où ont lieu des pourparlers directs qui rendent possible, dans un bref délai, le règlement du conflit soviéto-chinois.

Dans ces conditions, la déclaration susindiquée ne peut être considérée autrement que comme un moyen de pression sur les négociations; elle n'est justifiée par aucun fait et ne peut, en conséquence, être regardée comme un acte amical.

Le gouvernement soviétique constate également que le pacte de renonciation à la guerre ne prévoit, pour aucun des États signataires, les fonctions de gardien du pacte. Le gouvernement soviétique n'a jamais donné son consentement à ce que des États quelconques s'attribuent un droit semblable, de leur propre gré ou à la suite d'une entente.

Le gouvernement soviétique déclare que le conflit soviéto-mandchou ne peut être réglé que par la voie de négociations directes entre l'Union soviétique et la Chine, sur la base des conditions proposées à la Chine et déjà acceptées par le gouvernement de Moukden. Il ne peut admettre l'intervention d'aucune autre partie dans ces négociations et dans ce conflit.

Le gouvernement soviétique, enfin, ne peut s'abstenir d'exprimer son étonnement que le gouvernement des États-Unis, qui, selon son propre désir, n'entretient pas de relations officielles avec le gouvernement de l'Union soviétique, trouve possible de lui adresser des conseils et des avis.

(v) TEXT OF PRELIMINARY PROTOCOL SIGNED ON
DECEMBER 3, 1929¹

1. On behalf of the Mukden Government, the diplomatic commissar, Mr. Tsai Yun-sheng, declares that the chairman of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Lu Jung-huan, has been dismissed from the post of chairman of the board.

On behalf of the Government of the U.S.S.R., the agent of the foreign commissariat at Habarovsk, Mr. Simanovsky, declares that when the chairman of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Mr. Lu Jung-huan, has been dismissed from the post, the Soviet Government, in accordance with the declaration of the acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Litvinoff (handed to the German Ambassador at Moscow on August 29), will be ready to recommend new candidates for the post of manager and assistant-manager of

¹ Tass Agency Telegram, December 3, 1929.

the Chinese Eastern Railway instead of Messrs. Emshanov and Eismont. But in this case the Soviet Government reserves the right to appoint Messrs. Emshanov and Eismont to other posts on the Chinese Eastern Railway, whereupon Mr. Tsai Yun-sheng in personal conversation with Mr. Simanovsky expressed his consent.

2. The diplomatic commissar, Mr. Tsai Yun-sheng, on behalf of the Mukden Government, declared that the latter, desiring by all means to contribute towards the settlement of the conflict between China and the U.S.S.R. and to remove all causes for further complications, will strictly conform with the Mukden and Peking Agreements of 1924 in whole as well as in each part.

The agent of the foreign commissariat at Habarovsk, Mr. Simanovsky, on behalf of the Soviet Government, accepted with satisfaction the declaration of Commissar Tsai Yun-sheng that the Mukden Government will fulfil the Agreements of 1924, and declared on his part that the Government of the U.S.S.R., which has always stood on the basis of the agreements existing between China and the U.S.S.R., will, of course, strictly fulfill them in whole as well as in each part.

The above declarations in the first and second clauses of this Protocol are considered as accepted by both parties.

NIKOLSK-USSURIISK, December 3, 1929.

TSAI, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs (at Mukden).

A. SIMANOVSKY, Agent of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
(of the U.S.S.R.).

(vi) TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED AT HARBAROVSK,
DECEMBER 22, 1929¹

(1) The first point of the preliminary conditions of the Soviet Government is understood by both parties, in full conformity with the telegram of M. Litvinoff, Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, of November 27 and the Nikolsk Ussuriisk Protocol of December 3, as the restoration of the situation existing prior to the dispute and based upon the Mukden and Peking Agreements.

All outstanding questions which arose during the period of joint Soviet-Chinese management of the railway are to be solved at the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese conference. In view of this conference the following measures are immediately to be carried out:

(a) The restoration, on the basis of the old Agreements, of the activi-

¹ Reuter's Agency telegram, December 22, 1929.

ties of the Board of Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway and resumption of their duties by the Soviet members of the Board. Henceforth, the Chinese Chairman of the Board of Management and the Soviet Vice-Chairman of the Board must act only jointly and in conformity with Point 6, Article 1, of the Soviet-Mukden Agreement.

(b) The restoration of the former proportion of offices held by Soviet and Chinese citizens and the reinstatement (or immediate appointment of new candidates should such be recommended by the Soviet) of Soviet citizens in the offices of heads and assistant heads of departments.

(c) Orders and instructions on the railway issued on behalf of the Board of Management and the Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway as from July 10, 1929, are considered to be invalid unless properly confirmed by the local management and administration of the railway.

(2) All Soviet citizens without exception arrested by the Chinese authorities in connexion with the dispute since May 1, 1929, will be immediately released without division into any categories, including Soviet citizens arrested during the search of the Harbin Consulate on May 27, 1929.

The Soviet Union Government will also immediately release all the Chinese citizens without exception, arrested in connexion with the dispute, and interned Chinese soldiers and officers.

(3) All workers and employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway, citizens of the U.S.S.R., who were discharged or resigned as from July 10, 1929, shall be given the right and opportunity immediately to return to the positions they held prior to their discharge and to receive any money owing to them from the railway.

Those persons who were discharged or resigned who fail to exercise this right must immediately be paid the full wages, pensions, dues, &c., owing to them.

Vacancies may be filled only by proper order of the lawful Board of Management and Administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and all former Russian citizens or non-citizens of the U.S.S.R. employed by the railway during the dispute must be summarily and immediately discharged.

(4) The Chinese authorities shall immediately disarm the Russian White Guard detachments and deport from the three Eastern Provinces their organizers and inspirers.

(5) Leaving open the question of full diplomatic and consular relations between the U.S.S.R. and China until the Soviet-Chinese Conference, both parties consider possible and necessary the imme-

diate restoration of Soviet consulates in the territory of the three Eastern Provinces and of Chinese Consulates at their respective seats in the Soviet Far East.

In view of the fact that the Union Government declared on May 21, 1929, that 'Since the Chinese authorities proved by all their actions clear unwillingness and inability to reckon with the generally accepted principles of international law and custom, it on its part does not henceforth regard itself bound by these principles in relation to Chinese representation in Moscow and the Chinese Consulates in Soviet territory and that this representation and these Consulates will no longer enjoy the extra-territoriality to which international law entitles them', and that both parties intend to restore consular relations between them on the basis of conforming with the principle of international law and custom, the Mukden Government declares that it undertakes to assure the Soviet Consulates on the territory of the three Eastern Provinces full inviolability and all privileges to which international law and custom entitle them and will, of course, refrain from any actions violating this inviolability and these privileges. On its part the Union Government will discontinue the special régime established by it between May 21, 1929 and the rupture of relations for Chinese Consulates and will grant these Consulates which are to be restored by virtue of the first clause of this section in the territory of the Soviet in the Far East all privileges and the full inviolability to which international law and custom entitle them.

(6) With the restoration of the Consulates an opportunity shall immediately be given for the resumption of the normal activity of all Soviet business organizations existing before the dispute within the three Eastern Provinces.

A similar opportunity shall be offered to restore the Chinese commercial enterprises which existed within the U.S.S.R. whose operations were discontinued in connexion with the dispute regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The question of commercial relations between the two countries as a whole shall be settled by a Soviet-Chinese conference.

(7) The question of real guarantees for the observance of agreements and the interests of both sides shall be solved at the forthcoming conference.

(8) The Soviet-Chinese Conference to regulate all outstanding questions shall be held in Moscow on January 25, 1930.

(9) The peaceful situation of the frontiers of China and the U.S.S.R. shall be restored immediately with the subsequent withdrawal of the troops on both sides.

- (10) This Protocol enters into force at the moment of its signature.
Signed at Harbarovsk, December 22, 1929.

The Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Republic,
TSAI YUN-SHENG,
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.
The Plenipotentiary of the U.S.S.R.,
SIMANOVSKY,
Agent of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

2. THE ABOLITION OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY

During 1928 the Chinese Government had succeeded in negotiating treaties with five powers, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain, providing for the relinquishment of the privileges of extra-territoriality by January 1, 1930.¹ There was a growing tendency, and one which found expression in various official utterances, to believe that this date should mark the complete abolition of extra-territoriality. Accordingly, the Chinese Government on April 27, 1929 addressed an identic note to the six remaining Treaty Powers, Great Britain, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Brazil, suggesting that as the new civil and commercial codes would be promulgated on January 1, 1930, the Powers might relinquish their privileges from that date also.

The Powers concerned were unwilling to make so definite a commitment, and also refused a second invitation from China to enter into direct negotiations on the matter. Finally, in view of the fact that the Chinese Government was pledged to the abolition of extra-territoriality on January 1, 1930, it was agreed between the Powers (with the exception of France) and China that they would regard the process of abolition as having commenced from that date. The Chinese Government, therefore, issued a Mandate on December 28, 1929, to the effect that on and after New Year's Day, 'all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are enjoying extra-territorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations' of the Chinese Government.²

(i) TEXT OF CHINESE NOTE OF APRIL 27, 1929³

[Text of the identic Note dated April 27 and handed to the American, British, and French Ministers by Dr. C. T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Nanking, regarding the desire of the national Government of China for the removal of extra-territorial privileges as soon as possible. Substantially similar Notes were sent at the same time to the Dutch, Norwegian, and Brazilian Ministers.]

Your Excellency:

I have the honour to recall to Your Excellency that the Chinese

¹ See *Documents on International Affairs*, 1928, p. 231.

² For details of the negotiations, see *Survey* for 1929, Part IV A, section (ii).

³ *The Times*, May 5, 1929.

Government, through its representatives, had had occasion to express at the Paris Peace Conference its strong desire for the removal of limitations on China's jurisdictional sovereignty imposed upon her by the old treaties concluded between China and the foreign Powers, and that the Chinese Delegation emphatically reiterated the same desire at the Washington Conference, which placed on record its sympathetic disposition towards furthering the aspiration of China for the removal of restrictions on her political, jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action.

With the unification of China and the establishment upon a firm foundation of the National Government, a new era has been happily inaugurated in the relations between our two countries through the conclusion of the recent Tariff Treaty, and it is to be confidently hoped that the material well-being of our two countries will henceforth be greatly enhanced. But it is the belief and the conviction of the Chinese Government that the promotion of such material well-being will be accelerated by a readjustment of the relations between our two countries on a basis of friendly equality in matters of jurisdiction, and if Your Excellency's Government could see its way to meet the wishes of the Chinese Government and people in this regard, it is certain that another obstacle to the full and frank co-operation, in trade or otherwise, between the Chinese people and foreign nationals in this country would be happily removed, and that the desire of the Chinese Government for promoting to the fullest extent the material interests of all who choose to associate themselves with our own people would find its early realization.

It goes without saying that extra-territoriality in China is a legacy of the old régime, which has not only ceased to be adaptable to the present-day conditions, but has become so detrimental to the smooth working of the judicial and administrative machinery of China that her progress as a member of the family of nations has been unnecessarily retarded. The inherent defects and inconveniences of the system of consular jurisdiction have been most clearly pointed out by the Chinese Government on various occasions, and also by the jurists and publicists of other countries in their official utterances as well as in their academic discussions. It is a matter for sincere regret that, while many Governments which are playing an important role in international affairs are eager and persistent in their endeavour to promote genuine friendship and harmony among nations, such anachronistic practices as only tend to mar the friendly relations between the Chinese people and foreign nationals should be allowed

to exist at a time when justice and equity are supposed to govern the relations of nations.

With the close contact between China and the foreign Powers, the assimilation of western legal conceptions by Chinese jurists and incorporation of western legal principles in Chinese jurisprudence have proceeded very rapidly. In addition to the numerous codes and laws now in force, the civil code and the commercial code have reached the final stage of preparation and will be ready for promulgation before January 1, 1930. Courts and prisons, along modern lines, have been established, and are being established, throughout the whole country.

Inasmuch as doubt has been entertained with regard to the advisability of relinquishing extra-territorial privileges at this juncture by the interested Powers, it may be pointed out that certain countries, having ceased to enjoy extra-territorial privileges in China, have found satisfaction in the protection given to their nationals by Chinese law and have had no cause for complaint that their interests have been in any way prejudiced. Your Excellency's Government may, therefore, rest assured that the legitimate rights and interests of your nationals will not be unfavourably affected in the least by the relinquishment of the exceptional privileges which they now possess.

As Your Excellency's Government has always maintained a friendly attitude towards China, and has always shown its readiness in the adoption of measures for the removal of limitations on China's sovereignty, I am happy to express to Your Excellency, on behalf of the Chinese Government, the desire of China to have the restrictions on her jurisdictional sovereignty removed at the earliest possible date, and confidently hope that Your Excellency's Government will take this desire of China into immediate and sympathetic consideration and favour me with an early reply, so that steps may be taken to enable China, now unified and with a strong Central Government, to rightfully assume jurisdiction over all nationals within her domain.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) C. T. WANG,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,

April 27, 1929.

(ii) TEXT OF BRITISH REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 27¹

Peking, August 10, 1929.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of April 27, in which you inform me of the desire of the National Government of the Republic of China that the restrictions imposed on the jurisdictional sovereignty of China by the system of extra-territoriality now in force should be removed at the earliest possible date, with a view to the assumption of jurisdiction by China over all nationals in her domain.

2. I have communicated the contents of your letter to my Government, and I am now instructed to transmit to you a reply in the following sense:

3. Animated by the friendly feelings which they have always entertained towards the Government and people of China, His Majesty's Government have given their sympathetic consideration to the request of the Chinese Government relating to the abolition of extra-territorial jurisdiction in China. The high importance of this subject, in its bearings both on the political development of China and the future relations between China and Great Britain, appears to demand that it should be closely examined from every aspect. In particular, a just appreciation of the reasons for which, and the manner in which the present system of extra-territoriality came into existence seems essential to a consideration of the proper method for dealing with the problem.

4. The system of extra-territoriality in force in China has its root deep down in the past. For thousands of years before science had improved communications, the Chinese people were secluded from the rest of the world by deserts and the ocean, and they developed a civilization and a polity peculiar to themselves. A wide gulf was thus fixed between Europe and America on the one hand and China on the other.

5. In particular, the conception of international relations as being intercourse between equal and independent States, a conception which was woven into the very texture of the political ideas of the nations of the West, was entirely alien to Chinese modes of thought. When traders of the West first found their way to the coast of China, the Chinese Government found it difficult to allow them freely to enter into their country and mingle with their people, nor did they recog-

¹ *The Times*, September 5, 1929.

nize that the nations to which they belonged were the equals of China. These traders were therefore confined to a small section of a single city in one corner of the Empire, and while, on the one hand, they were subjected to many disabilities and to grave humiliation, on the other hand, by a species of amorphous and unregulated extra-territoriality, which was the natural outcome of these conditions, the responsibility of managing their own affairs and maintaining order amongst themselves was in some measure left to their own initiative.

6. Relations continued for many years upon this insecure and unsatisfactory footing. Friction was often dangerously intense and conflicts not infrequently arose, generally out of a demand that some innocent person should be surrendered for execution to expiate perhaps an accidental homicide, or that foreign authority should assume the responsibility for enforcing the revenue laws of China.

7. The object of the first treaties was to secure recognition by China of Great Britain's equality with herself, and to define and regulate the extra-territorial status of British subjects. Relations between the two countries having thus been placed on a footing of equality and mutual respect, Great Britain was content that her nationals should continue to bear those responsibilities and to labour under those disabilities, which respect for the sovereignty of China entailed upon them. Conditions did not permit the general opening of the interior of China, and the residence of foreigners has consequently continued down to the present day to be restricted to a limited number of cities known as Treaty Ports.

8. His Majesty's Government recognize the defects and inconveniences of the system of consular jurisdiction to which the Government of China have on various occasions drawn attention. In 1902 in Article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce between Great Britain and China signed in that year, His Majesty's Government stated their readiness to relinquish their extra-territorial rights when they were satisfied that the state of Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations, warranted them in so doing. They have since watched with appreciation the progress which China has made in the assimilation of Western legal principles, to which reference is made in your Note under reply, and they have observed with deep interest the facts set out and recommendations made in the Report of the Commission on Extra-territoriality in the year 1926.

9. More recently, in the declaration which they published in December 1926, and the proposals which they made to the Chinese authorities in January 1927, His Majesty's Government have given concrete evidence of their desire to meet in a spirit of friendship and

sympathy the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people. They have already travelled some distance along the road marked out in those documents, and they are willing to examine in collaboration with the Chinese Government the whole problem of extra-territorial jurisdiction with a view to ascertaining what further steps in the same direction it may be possible to take at the present time.

10. His Majesty's Government would, however, observe that the promulgation of codes embodying Western legal principles represents only one portion of the task to be accomplished before it would be safe to abandon in their entirety the special arrangements which have hitherto regulated the residence of foreigners in China. In order that those reforms should become a living reality it appears to His Majesty's Government to be necessary that Western legal principles should be understood and be found acceptable by the people at large, no less than by their rulers, and that the Courts which administer these laws should be free from interference and dictation at the hands, not only of military chiefs, but of groups and associations who either set up arbitrary and illegal tribunals of their own, or attempt to use legal courts for the furtherance of political objects, rather than for the administration of equal justice between Chinese and Chinese, and between Chinese and foreigners. Not until these conditions are fulfilled in a far greater measure than appears to be the case to-day, will it be practicable for British merchants to reside, trade, and own property throughout the territories of China with the same equality of freedom and safety as these privileges are accorded to Chinese merchants in Great Britain. Any agreement purporting to accord such privileges to British merchants would remain for some time to come a mere paper agreement to which it would be impossible to give effect in practice. Any attempt prematurely to accord such privileges would not only be no benefit to British merchants but might involve the Government and people of China in political and economic difficulties.

11. So long as these conditions subsist there appears to be no practicable alternative to maintaining, though perhaps in a modified form, the Treaty Port system that has served for nearly a century to regulate intercourse between China and British subjects within her domain. Some system of extra-territoriality is the natural corollary for the maintenance of the Treaty Port system, and the problem as it presents itself to His Majesty's Government at the present moment is to discover what further modifications in that system, beyond those already made and alluded to above, it would be desirable and practicable to effect.

12. His Majesty's Government await further proposals from the National Government as to the procedure now to be adopted for examining this question, and they instruct me to assure Your Excellency that they will continue to maintain towards any such proposals the same friendly and helpful attitude to which Your Excellency has paid so generous a tribute in the concluding paragraph of your Note under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MILES W. LAMPSON.

(iii) TEXT OF THE REPLY OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S NOTE ON EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY,
AUGUST 10, 1929¹

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Chinese Government's Note of April 27 in which there are expressed the desire that the United States should relinquish the further exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction over its citizens in China, and the hope that the American Government will take this desire into immediate and sympathetic consideration.

I am directed by my Government to state that it is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the desires expressed by the Chinese Government, giving at the same time, as it must, due consideration to the responsibilities which rest upon the Government of the United States in connexion with the problem of jurisdiction over the persons and property of American citizens in China. My Government has in fact for some time past given constant and sympathetic consideration to the national aspirations of the people of China, and it has repeatedly given concrete evidence of its desire to promote the realization of those aspirations in so far as action of the United States may contribute to that result. As long ago as the year 1903, in Article Fifteen of the Treaty concluded in that year between the United States and China, the American Government agreed that it would be prepared to relinquish the jurisdiction which it exercised over its nationals in China 'when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so doing'. As recently as last year, the American Government gave very definite evidence of its desire to promote the realization of China's aspirations by concluding with

¹ Official text issued by U.S. Department of State.

the Government of China, on July 25, 1928, a treaty by which the two countries agreed to the cancellation of provisions in earlier treaties whereby China's authority in reference to customs duties on goods imported into China by American nationals had been restricted.

The exercise by the United States of jurisdiction over its citizens in China had its genesis in an early agreement that, because of differences between the customs of the two countries and peoples, and differences between their judicial systems, it would be wise to place upon the American Government the duty of extending to American nationals in China the restraints and the benefits of the system of jurisprudence to which they and their fellow nationals were accustomed in the United States.

My Government deems it proper at this point to remind the Government of China that this system of American jurisdiction, as administered by the extra-territorial courts, has never been extended by the United States beyond the purposes to which it was by the treaties originally limited. Those purposes were the lawful control and protection of the persons and property of American citizens who have established themselves in China in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the treaties and with the knowledge and consent of China, in the normal development of the commercial and cultural relations between the two countries. The United States has never sought to extend its sovereignty over any portion of the territory of China.

Under the provisions of the Treaty of 1844 and other agreements concluded thereafter which establish that system, American citizens have lived and have carried on their legitimate enterprises in China with benefit both to the Chinese and to themselves. They have engaged extensively in cultural and in commercial enterprises involving large sums of money and extensive properties, and, as your Government has so graciously indicated in the Note under acknowledgment, there has grown up and existed between the peoples and the Governments of the two countries a friendship that has endured. The American Government believes that this condition of affairs has been due in large part to the manner in which the relations between the two peoples have been regulated under the provisions of these agreements, the existence of which has assured to the lives and property of American citizens in China the security so necessary to their growth and development.

For the safety of life and property, the development and continuance of legitimate and beneficial business depend in the last resort, in China as elsewhere, upon the certainty of protection from

injury or confiscation, by a system of known law consistently interpreted and faithfully enforced by an independent judiciary. Where such protection fails, the life and liberty of the individual become subject to the constant threat of unlawful attack, while his property suffers the ever-present danger of confiscation in whole or in part through arbitrary administrative action. To exchange an assured and tried system of administration of justice, under which it is acknowledged that life and property have been protected and commerce has grown and prospered, for uncertainties in the absence of an adequate body of law and of an experienced and independent judiciary would be fraught with danger in both of the foregoing respects.

My Government has instructed me to say that the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, telegraphed to the Press of the United States on July 26, to the effect that 'all foreign interests in China purely for legitimate purposes will be duly respected', has been noted by it with pleasure as indicating that the Government of China has not failed to appreciate the value to its foreign relations of the factors above mentioned. My Government bids me add that it is therefore persuaded that the Government of China will concur in its belief, based as it is upon the facts set forth in succeeding paragraphs, that the sudden abolition of the system of protection by its extra-territorial courts in the face of conditions prevailing in China to-day would in effect expose the property of American citizens to danger of unlawful seizure and place in jeopardy the liberty of the persons of American citizens.

The Chinese Government has on several occasions during recent years expressed the desire that the Powers relinquish the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction over their citizens. In the Note under acknowledgment reference is made to the position taken at the Washington Conference. It will be recalled that in pursuance of the Resolution adopted at that Conference, there was created a Commission to inquire into the present practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction in China and into the laws and the judicial system and the methods of judicial administration of China, and that, under date of September 16, 1926, that Commission made its report. This report contained an account of the conditions then prevailing in the judicial system of China as well as a number of recommendations carefully suggested as indicating the changes and improvements which would be necessary before there would be adequately developed a system of known law and an independent judiciary capable of justly controlling and protecting the lives and property of the citizens of foreign

countries doing business in China. Your Government will recall that the Commission on Extra-territoriality which made these recommendations was composed of representatives from thirteen countries, including both China and the United States, and that its recommendations, thoughtfully and reasonably conceived, were unanimously adopted and were signed by all of the Commissioners.

Because of its friendship for the Chinese people and its desire, to which allusion has been already made, to relinquish as soon as possible, extra-territorial jurisdiction over its own citizens in China, my Government has followed with attentive consideration this entire subject, including particularly the progress which has been made in carrying out its recommendations since the rendition of this report. It fully appreciates the efforts which are being made in China to assimilate those western juridical principles to which your Government has referred in its Note. But it would be lacking in sincerity and candour, as well as disregardful of its obligations towards its own nationals, if it did not frankly point out that the recommendations aforesaid have not been substantially carried out, and that there does not exist in China to-day a system of independent Chinese courts free from extraneous influence which is capable of adequately doing justice between Chinese and foreign litigants. My Government believes that not until these recommendations are fulfilled in far greater measure than is the case to-day, will it be possible for American citizens safely to live and do business in China and for their property adequately to be protected without the intervention of the Consular Courts.

In conclusion, my Government has directed me to state that it observes with attentive and sympathetic interest the changes which are taking place in China. Animated as it is by the most friendly motives, and wishing as far as lies within its power to be helpful, the American Government would be ready, if the suggestion should meet with the approval of the Chinese Government, to participate in negotiations which would have as their object the devising of a method for the gradual relinquishment of extra-territorial rights either as to designated territorial areas or as to particular kinds of jurisdiction, or as to both, provided that such gradual relinquishment proceeds at the same time as steps are taken and improvements are achieved by the Chinese Government in the enactment and effective enforcement of laws based on modern concepts of jurisprudence.

(iv) TEXT OF BRITISH AIDE-MÉMOIRE HANDED TO THE CHINESE MINISTER IN LONDON BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON DECEMBER 20, 1929¹

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have had under consideration the position which has arisen in consequence of the Note addressed to them by the Chinese Government on April 27 last, and the subsequent correspondence on the subject of the proposed modifications in the present system of extra-territoriality in China. His Majesty's Government are aware of official and semi-official declarations on the part of the Chinese Government, which they interpret as indicating the earnest desire of the Chinese Government that substantial progress should be made before January 1, 1930, if not with the actual process of abolition of extra-territoriality, at any rate with serious negotiations having in view the initiation of that process in the immediate future.

His Majesty's Government, animated by a desire to meet the wishes of the Chinese Government in a liberal and sympathetic spirit, sought to elicit from them concrete proposals which might serve as a basis for detailed negotiations. When it became apparent that the Chinese Government felt some difficulty in putting forward concrete proposals for preliminary study, His Majesty's Government hoped that the common purpose which both Governments had in view might best be served if discussions could be initiated before the end of the year between His Majesty's Minister in Peking, and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nanking. It was their intention that Sir M. Lampson should proceed to Nanking for that purpose, but unfortunately the outbreak of civil war over a wide area in China made it impossible to carry that intention into effect.

The intricate readjustments that will be necessary, both in the legal and administrative spheres, in a gradual progressive solution of the problem of extra-territoriality, such as is contemplated by both Governments, can only be effected as a result of negotiations conducted in a friendly and unprejudiced atmosphere. It would be a grave misfortune were anything to occur to prevent such negotiations from being initiated or from being carried to a satisfactory conclusion. The Chinese Government themselves will realize that any attack upon the legal rights of British subjects or the interests which they have built up, with benefit to China as well as themselves, in the course of nearly a hundred years on the faith of solemn treaty stipulations, would confront His Majesty's Government with a serious

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3480.

responsibility, as such an attack would be gravely prejudicial to the prospects of negotiating a friendly solution of an intricate problem.

His Majesty's Government desire to do their utmost to create a favourable atmosphere for negotiations. No responsibility attaches to them for the political conditions in China which have prevented the commencement of serious discussions. They deplore the fact that this step has been prevented by such conditions, and they appreciate the difficulties with which, in view of the prominence which has been given to the particular date of January 1, 1930, the Chinese Government may be faced should that date arrive without any visible progress having been made with the detailed consideration of the problem of extra-territoriality. His Majesty's Government are, therefore, willing to agree that January 1, 1930, should be treated as the date from which the process of the gradual abolition of extra-territoriality should be regarded as having commenced in principle, and would have no objection to any declaration conformable with that attitude which the Chinese Government may think it desirable to issue. His Majesty's Government are ready to enter into detailed negotiations as soon as political conditions in China render it possible to do so, with a view to agreeing on a method and a programme for carrying abolition of extra-territoriality into effect by gradual and progressive stages to the mutual satisfaction of both Governments.

(v) TEXT OF THE REPLY HANDED TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT BY
THE CHINESE MINISTER IN LONDON ON DECEMBER 24, 1929¹

Sir,

The Chinese Minister is instructed to state that, with reference to the *aide-mémoire* handed to him by the Right Honourable Mr. A. Henderson on the 20th instant, the Chinese Government deeply appreciate the liberal and sympathetic spirit in which the British Government are prepared to enter into negotiations for the abolition of extra-territoriality. It is only to be regretted if no detailed plan, as the result of such negotiations, can be agreed upon before the end of the year, which is fast approaching. In view of the earnest desire and insistent demand of our people for the immediate abolition of extra-territoriality, the Chinese Government regard as most timely and conducive to the promotion of friendly feelings the statement of the British Government that the process of the abolition of extra-territoriality should be regarded as having commenced in principle on January 1, 1930, and that any declaration in that light the

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3480.

Chinese Government may think it desirable to issue would not be objectionable to the British Government.

(vi) TEXT OF THE OFFICIAL MANDATE ISSUED IN NANKING
ON DECEMBER 28, DECLARING THE ABOLITION OF
EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY ¹

In every full sovereign State foreigners, as well as its own nationals, are equally amenable to its laws and to the jurisdiction of its tribunals. This is an essential attribute to State sovereignty and a well-established principle of international law.

For more than eighty years China has been bound by systematic extra-territoriality, which has prevented the Chinese Government from exercising its judicial power over foreigners within its territory. It is unnecessary to state here the defects and disadvantages of such a system. As long as extra-territoriality is not abolished, so long will China be unable to exercise her full sovereignty. For the purpose of restoring her inherent jurisdictional sovereignty it is hereby decided and declared that, on and after the first day of the first month of the nineteenth year of the Republic (January 1, 1930) all foreign nationals in the territory of China who are now enjoying extra-territorial privileges shall abide by the laws, ordinances, and regulations duly promulgated by the Central and Local Governments of China. The Executive Yuan and Juridical Yuan are hereby ordered to instruct the Ministries concerned to prepare as soon as possible a plan for the execution of this mandate, and to submit it to the Legislative Yuan for examination and deliberation with a view to its promulgation and enforcement.

(vii) MANIFESTO ON EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY, DECEMBER 30 ²

For more than eighty years China has been bound by the system of extra-territoriality which has prevented the Chinese Government from exercising its judicial power over the foreigners within its territory. It is unnecessary to state here the defects and disadvantages of such a system; but the Chinese Government and people cannot leave this state of affairs without remedy.

Extra-territoriality is no ordinary diplomatic problem. It touches the life of the Chinese people in so many intimate ways that it must be considered by the Chinese Government as being likewise a domestic

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3480.

² This manifesto was issued by the Foreign Ministry of China on December 30, 1929, a copy of which was sent to the various legations.

question of immediate moment. It is for this reason that the Chinese Government is compelled to declare that the year 1930 is the decisive time, and that the actual process of re-establishing Chinese sovereignty by the abolition of extra-territoriality begins on January 1. With that in view it will undertake measures designed to release the sovereign rights of China from the trammels of extra-territoriality, and has accordingly ordered the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan to instruct the Ministries concerned to prepare a plan for this purpose.

The Chinese Government, relying on the sympathy already shown and the assurances given by the Powers concerned, believes that there is no difference of opinion between those Powers and China regarding the principle involved; and it is prepared to consider and discuss within a reasonable time any representations made with reference to the plan now under preparation in Nanking. In this respect the issuance of the mandate on December 28 should be regarded as a step towards removing the cause of constant conflict and at the same time promoting the relations between Chinese and foreigners.

(viii) AIDE-MÉMOIRE COMMUNICATED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
TO THE CHINESE MINISTER, JANUARY 1, 1930¹

His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the mandate issued by the Chinese Government on December 28 on the subject of extra-territoriality. His Majesty's Government assume that in issuing this mandate it was the intention of the Chinese Government to make a declaration of the character indicated in the final paragraph of the British *aide-mémoire* of December 20. They have, therefore, authorized His Majesty's Minister to accept the invitation extended to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enter into detailed negotiations on the subject, and they understand that His Majesty's Minister is preparing to leave for Nanking on January 2. His Majesty's Government wish to take this opportunity of emphasizing the great importance which they attach to the considerations set forth in the third paragraph of their *aide-mémoire* of December 20. It is of the utmost importance that no untoward incidents should occur to imperil the smooth course of the negotiations about to be initiated. His Majesty's Government, therefore, fully expect that the Chinese Government will issue strict orders to all provincial and local officials that in accordance with the practice of civilized nations the treaty stipulations affecting the

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3480.

status and privileges of British subjects are to be regarded as continuing in full vigour and effect until modifications in the treaties in question have been agreed to as a result of negotiations.

Foreign Office, January 1, 1930.

II. JAPAN

STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY, BY BARON SHIDEHARA IN THE DIET, JULY 9, 1929¹

Improvement of the relations between Japan and China is one of the most urgent duties confronting the new Government. The policy of friendly co-operation which Japan has for China in respect to the revision or abolition of the so-called unequal treaties was fully demonstrated on the occasions of the customs conference and extra-territoriality committee meeting.

In view of the developments of the situation in China the Government recognizes the necessity for adherence to the same policy. For the solution of the problems pending between the two nations it is imperative that the nations concerned should understand each other's position and give this due consideration and find a point of mutual harmony based on fairness and equality. It does not promote the general situation to confine one's attention to partial issues. It does not enhance the prestige of a nation to move military force without sufficient reason.

What the Government seeks consists in co-existence and co-prosperity. As to the economic relations between Japan and China, they should have free and unhindered improvement. Our Government not only rejects a policy of aggression in any part of China but is prepared to render friendly aid to China for the attainment of the national aspirations of China, but it, of course, is the responsibility of the Government to protect and preserve the legitimate rights and interests that are indispensable to Japan's existence and prosperity. The Government believes that the Chinese people understand this point fully.

The Government places importance on the cultivation of friendship with the Powers and the promotion of mutual commerce and enterprises. It is not desirable that the attentions of the Government should be concentrated on domestic politics, disregarding economic relations abroad. Improvement of the trade balance should depend on peaceful progress in Japan's trade and enterprises abroad.

¹ *Japanese Advertiser*, Tokyo, July 10.

In view of the position Japan occupies in the family of nations it shall be the high duty of our country to participate in the activities of the League of Nations and contribute to the betterment of peace, welfare, and happiness of mankind in general. The Government attaches importance to the League and pledges itself to make efforts for the attainment of the aim for which the League exists.

Regarding the armament limitation problem, the Powers ought, with firm determination, to expedite the conclusion of an international agreement. Its aim and purpose should be not only the limitation of armaments but also the practical reduction of them. The sincere attitude of our Empire toward this question has often been fully demonstrated, and, although the attempts at the conclusion of an agreement on this question have often met with difficulties, the public demand for disarmament is now more sincere than ever and the time is steadily ripening for putting the principle of disarmament into practice.

If the Powers will all consider their respective requirements sincerely and face the problems in a spirit of mutual concession, the Government does not deem it a difficult task to accomplish this, the world's great undertaking.

E. AFRICA

EGYPT. NILE WATERS AGREEMENT¹

PURSUANT to an Exchange of Notes between the British High Commissioner, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, and the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ziwar Pasha, on January 26, 1925, there was appointed a Commission 'for the purpose of examining and proposing the basis on which irrigation can be carried out with full consideration of the interests of Egypt and without detriment to her natural and historic rights'.²

The Commission, though originally instructed to present its Report by June 30, 1925, did not in fact do so until March 21, 1926,³ and the acceptance of the scheme contained therein was embodied in the draft Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1927, but when this was rejected by the Egyptian Parliament the matter was postponed. Opposition to the acceptance of the Report was maintained by the Wafdists, but with their temporary fall from power in June 1928 and the replacement of Nahas Pasha by Mahmud Pasha as Prime Minister a more accommodating attitude was apparent, and by an exchange of Notes dated May 7, 1929, between Lord Lloyd and the Prime Minister, the Report was accepted by both countries.

The primary importance of this agreement lies in the fact that it removes from the field of political controversy one of the most important and outstanding problems of the Anglo-Egyptian situation.

1. NOTE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF EGYPT TO THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, MAY 7, 1929⁴

1. In confirmation of our recent conversations, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency the views of the Egyptian Government in regard to those irrigation questions which have been the subject of our discussions. The Egyptian Government agree that a settlement of these questions cannot be deferred until such time as it may be possible for the two Governments to come to an agreement on the status of the Sudan, but in concluding the present arrangements expressly reserve their full liberty on the occasion of any negotiations which may precede such an agreement.

2. It is realized that the development of the Sudan requires a quantity of the Nile water greater than that which has been so far utilized by the Sudan. As your Excellency is aware, the Egyptian

¹ For details of the question see *Survey* for 1925, vol. i, Part iii, section (iii), and *Survey* for 1928, Part III B, section (i).

² For text of Notes see British White Paper, Cmd. 3348, 1929, Appendix A, p. 32.

³ For text of the Report see Cmd. 3348, pp. 6-31.

⁴ *The Times*, May 9, 1929, and Cmd. 3348.

Government has always been anxious to encourage such development, and will, therefore, continue that policy and be willing to agree with His Majesty's Government upon such an increase of this quantity as does not infringe Egypt's natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirements of agricultural extension, subject to satisfactory assurances as to the safeguarding of Egyptian interests as detailed in later paragraphs of this Note.

3. The Egyptian Government, therefore, accept the findings of the 1925 Nile Commission, whose Report is annexed hereto and is considered an integral part of the present Agreement. They propose, however, that, in view of the delay in the construction of the Gebel Aulia Dam, which, under paragraph 40 of the Nile Commission's Report, is regarded as a counterpart of the Gezira scheme, the dates and quantities of gradual withdrawals of water from the Nile by the Sudan in flood months, as given in Article 57 of the Commission's Report, be modified in such a manner that the Sudan should not withdraw more than 126 cubic metres per second before 1936, it being understood that the schedule contained in the above-mentioned Article will remain unaltered until the discharge of 126 cubic metres per second is reached. These quantities are based on the Nile Commission's Report, and are, therefore, subject to revision as foreseen therein.

4. It is further understood that the following arrangements will be observed in respect of irrigation works on the Nile:

- (i) The Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Service in the Sudan, his staff, or any other officials whom the Minister of Public Works may nominate, shall have full liberty to co-operate with the resident engineer of the Sennar Dam in the measurement of discharges and records to satisfy the Egyptian Government that the distribution of water and the regulation of the dam are carried out in accordance with the agreement reached. Detailed working arrangements agreed upon between the Minister of Public Works and the Irrigation Adviser to the Sudan Government will take effect as from the date of the confirmation of this Note.
- (ii) Save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government no irrigation or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the river Nile and its branches or on lakes from which it flows so far as all these are in the Sudan or in the countries under British administration which would, in such a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt,

either reduce the quantity of water arriving in Egypt or modify the date of its arrival or lower its level.

- (iii) The Egyptian Government in carrying out all the necessary measures required for the complete study and record of the hydrology of the river Nile in the Sudan will have all the necessary facilities for so doing.
- (iv) In case the Egyptian Government decide to construct in the Sudan any works on the river and its branches, or to take any measures with a view to increasing the water-supply for the benefit of Egypt, they will agree beforehand with the local authorities on the measures to be taken for safeguarding local interests. The construction, maintenance, and administration of the above-mentioned works shall be under the direct control of the Egyptian Government.
- (v) His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall use their good offices so that the carrying out of surveys, measurements, studies, and works of the nature mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs is facilitated by the Governments of those regions under British influence.
- (vi) It is recognized that in the course of the operations here contemplated uncertainty may still arise from time to time either as to the correct interpretation of a question of principle or as to technical or administrative details. Every question of this kind will be approached in a spirit of mutual good faith.

In case of any difference of opinion arising as to the interpretation or execution of any of the preceding provisions, or as to any contravention thereof, which the two Governments find themselves unable to settle, the matter shall be referred to an independent body with a view to arbitration.

5. The present agreement can in no way be considered as affecting the control of the river, which is reserved for free discussion between the two Governments in the negotiations on the question of the Sudan.

2. Lord Lloyd replied on the same day:

In confirming the arrangements mutually agreed upon as recited in your Excellency's Note I am to express the gratification of His Britannic Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that these discussions have led to a settlement which cannot fail to facilitate development or to promote prosperity in Egypt and the Sudan.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concur in your Excellency's view that this Agreement is and should be essentially directed towards the regulation of irrigation arrangements on the basis of the Nile Commission's Report and has no bearing on the *status quo* in the Sudan.

In conclusion, I would remind your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have already acknowledged the natural and historical rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile. I am to state that His Majesty's Government regard the safeguarding of these rights as a fundamental principle of British policy and to convey to your Excellency the most positive assurances that this principle and the detailed provisions of this Agreement will be observed at all times and under any conditions that may arise.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF TREATIES

(i) Treaties and Agreements between two or more States.¹

N.B. The following abbreviations are used in the references (in brackets) to the published texts of treaties: *A.J.I.L.* = *American Journal of International Law*; *B.Tr.I.* = *Bulletin of Treaty Information* (U.S.A.); *Cmd.* = British Parliamentary Paper; *C.T.S.* = *Canadian Treaty Series*; *E.E.P.S.* = *European Economic and Political Survey* (American Library in Paris); *E.I.* = *L'Esprit International* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Paris); *E.N.* = *L'Europe Nouvelle* (Paris); *F.F.* = *Feuille Fédérale* (Switzerland); *L.N.T.S.* = *League of Nations Treaty Series*; *M.* = *Martens: Nouveau Recueil Général des Traités*; *O.M.* = *Oriente Moderno* (Rome); *R.I.I.C.* = *Revue de l'Institut International du Commerce*; *T.* = *The Times* (London); *U.S.D.* = *United States Daily*; *U.S.T.S.* = *United States Treaty Series*; *Z.D.U.* = *Zbiór Documentow Unzedowyck* (Warsaw).

ABYSSINIA

1929, Aug. 2. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship and arbitration and roads convention with Italy of Aug. 2, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).

ALBANIA

1929, Feb. 12. Ratifications exchanged of arbitration and conciliation treaties with United States of Oct. 22, 1928 (*U.S.T.S.* 770, 771).

Feb. 19. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Belgium by exchange of notes (*L.N.T.S.* xc).

March 28. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with France (*R.I.I.C.* June 1930).

May 17. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of establishment and consular convention, treaty of commerce and navigation, and extradition convention of June 22, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).

June 10. Convention of establishment and commerce signed with Switzerland and Liechtenstein (*M.* 3^e série, xxii).

ARGENTINE

1929, May 23. Agreement for reciprocal protection of trade-marks effected by exchange of notes with Austria.

¹ In order to economize space, a number of agreements providing for postal or telephone facilities or for the abolition of passport visas, as well as certain arrangements for the prolongation of, or accession of Dominions and Colonies to, existing treaties, have not been included in this list. For the same reason, the date on which a treaty came into force has not been given where the date of exchange of ratifications is included; and the dates of coming into force of a few minor agreements concluded during previous years have also been omitted.

With these exceptions, the list of treaties and agreements signed or ratified during the year 1929 is as complete as it was possible to make it from sources available up to the middle of August 1930.

ARGENTINE : *cont.*

- Nov. 8. Commercial agreement signed with Great Britain (*T.* 11. 11. 29).
- Nov. 15. Convention on industrial accidents concluded with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3643).
- Nov. 16. Customs agreement signed with Great Britain.

AUSTRALIA

- 1929. Jan. 25. Exchange of notes between Australia, Great Britain, India and Italy concerning reciprocal recognition of passenger ship certificates and emigrant ship regulations (*Cmd.* 3385).
- Dec. 3. Extradition treaty signed with Colombia.

AUSTRIA

- 1929. Jan. 19. Ratifications exchanged with Denmark of commercial convention of April 6, 1928. Ratifications exchanged with Iceland, March 15 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxv).
- Jan. 26. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of three treaties of July 12, 1926, regarding taxation (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxv).
- Jan. 28. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of judicial convention of March 15, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- Feb. 7. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of commercial convention and exchange of notes of Oct. 5, 1928.
- Feb. 18. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of additional and final protocols to treaty of commerce and navigation of April 28, 1923, signed Dec. 30, 1927.
- Feb. 19. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of judicial convention of May 1, 1928.
- Feb. 22. Convention signed with Italy regarding the upkeep of boundary-stones on the Austro-Italian frontier. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- Feb. 28. Ratifications exchanged with United States of arbitration and conciliation treaties of Aug. 16, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- March 1. Ratifications exchanged with France of commercial agreement of May 16, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- March 21. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of conciliation and arbitration treaty of June 11, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- March 27. Ratifications exchanged with Finland of extradition treaty of Oct. 22, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- March 28. Commercial and navigation treaty signed with Netherlands.
- June 10. Ratifications exchanged of convention of April 6, 1922, and agreement of Feb. 23, 1925, regarding Vienna post office savings bank between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland and Rumania.
- June 19. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of agreement of Dec. 22, 1927, regarding execution of Arts. 266 (last paragraph) and 273 of St. Germain Treaty (*L.N.T.S.* xci).
- June 26. Ratifications exchanged with Estonia of commercial treaty of Dec. 11, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).

AUSTRIA: *cont.*

- July 25. Convention concluded with Switzerland for avoidance of double taxation.
 - July 28. Ratifications exchanged with Estonia of consular convention and protocol of Oct. 15, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
 - July 31. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of insurance conventions of March 29, 1924 (2); June 15, 1924 (2); Dec. 22, 1924 (1); Jan. 17, 1925 (2) (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
 - Aug. 5. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of additional protocol of Nov. 27, 1928, to convention of June 18, 1924, regarding debts in Austro-Hungarian crowns.
 - Oct. 14. Consular and establishment convention signed with Egypt. Came into force Oct. 29 (*O.M.* Jan. 1930).
 - Oct. 16. Agreement with Hungary regarding execution of international railway convention of Oct. 23, 1924, signed at Vienna on Oct. 8 and at Budapest on Oct. 16. Similar agreements signed with Germany on Oct. 25 and Nov. 5; with Yugoslavia on Sept. 20 and Nov. 9; and with Czechoslovakia on Nov. 5 and Nov. 12.
 - Dec. 11. Agreement with the United States signed at Vienna on Nov. 8 and at Washington on Dec. 11 regarding exchange of parcel marks and trade charges.
 - Dec. 27. Agreement signed with Greece regarding claims for war damage during period of Greek neutrality.
 - Dec. 31. Air navigation treaty signed with the Netherlands.
- See also under ARGENTINE, May 23.

BELGIUM

- 1929, Jan. 10. Railway agreement signed with Luxemburg.
- Jan. 28. Declaration signed with Italy modifying paragraph 3 of article 2 of extradition convention of Jan. 15, 1875 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- Feb. 1. Agreement with Greece regarding Belgian nationals expropriated by Greek agrarian law of Oct. 15, 1926, effected by exchange of notes of Jan. 20, 1928, and Feb. 1, 1929.
- Feb. 16. Existing commercial convention denounced by Egypt, as from Feb. 16, 1930.
- Feb. 28. Ratifications exchanged of tariff autonomy treaty with China of Nov. 22, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- March 9. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of agreement of Oct. 26, 1927, regarding intellectual relations (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- March 20. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with United States.
- March 26-8. Notes exchanged with the Netherlands concerning notification of contagious diseases. Came into force April 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- March 27. Agreement concluded with France regarding conditions of reinvestment of indemnities granted to owners of ships by agreement of Oct. 9, 1927. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- March 28. Agreement additional to commercial agreement of Feb. 23, 1928, signed with France. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 18.
- May 9. Residence treaty with Persia and commercial convention

BELGIUM: *cont.*

- between Persia and Belgian mandated territories signed. Ratifications exchanged June 24.
- May 23. Treaty of friendship and arbitration signed with Persia.
- May 24. Agreement concluded with China authorizing re-registration of Belgian trade-marks.
- May 30. Ratifications exchanged with France of convention of June 24, 1926, modifying Art. 2 of extradition convention of Aug. 15, 1874 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv); education convention signed with France. Ratifications exchanged July 17 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- June 25. Arbitration treaty signed with Greece.
- July 1. Agreement signed with France concerning employment of firemen (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- July 4. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of legal agreement of March 28, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- July 13. **Agreement signed with Germany regarding depreciated marks;** also an agreement regarding sequestrated German property (*E.N.* 3.8.29; pp. 56-9 above).
- Aug. 13. Ratifications exchanged with France of convention of May 21, 1927, supplementary to accident compensation convention of Feb. 21, 1906 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- Aug. 26. Commercial treaty concluded between Belgium-Luxemburg and Switzerland (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1929).
- Aug. 28. Notes exchanged with Portugal concerning permanent conciliation commission.
- Aug. 31. Agreement signed with China for retrocession of Tientsin concession.
- Sept. 12. Ratifications exchanged with Persia of provisional commercial agreement of May 15, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- Sept. 16. Ratifications exchanged with France of recruiting convention of Sept. 12, 1928.
- Oct. 4. War memorial agreement signed with United States.
- Oct. 5. Agreement signed with France and Germany regarding Rhineland evacuation amnesty (*E.N.* 31.5.30).
- Oct. 10. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of additional protocol to commercial treaty of Dec. 28, 1925, signed Aug. 30, 1926. Second additional protocol of Feb. 21, 1928, came into force Nov. 15 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1929).
- Oct. 10. Ratifications exchanged with Paraguay of extradition convention of Jan. 20, 1926.
- See also under ALBANIA, Feb. 19; GERMANY, Aug. 30, Aug. 31.

BOLIVIA

- 1929, Jan. 3. Protocol signed with Paraguay providing for conciliation as to Chaco incident of Dec. 1928 (*T.* 4.1.29).
- May 30. Commercial treaty signed with Netherlands.
- June 27. Ratifications exchanged with Brazil of frontier and railway convention of Dec. 15, 1928.

BRAZIL

- 1929, April 16. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of treaty regarding British Guiana frontier of April 22, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
 April 29. Notes exchanged with Denmark regarding diplomatic bags (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
 May 14. Notes exchanged with Germany on April 24 and May 14, regarding diplomatic bags.
 June 7. Notes exchanged with Denmark on May 31 and June 7 regarding reciprocal exemption of shipping profits from income-tax.
 Aug. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Venezuela of protocol of July 24, 1928, concerning frontier. Notes regarding protocol exchanged on Nov. 7.
 Nov. 25. Ratifications exchanged with Paraguay of frontier convention of May 21, 1927.
 See also under BOLIVIA, June 27.

BULGARIA

- 1929, Jan. 21. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with United States. Ratifications exchanged July 22 (*A.J.I.L.* Oct. 1929).
 Feb. 5. Medical assistance convention with Hungary signed.
 Feb. 21. Extradition convention signed with Greece.
 March 6. Treaty of neutrality, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement signed with Turkey.
 May 17. Notes exchanged with Hungary reviving extradition convention of 1911 between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
 June 4. Consular convention with Germany signed.
 July 22. Treaty of conciliation and arbitration signed with Hungary.
 Sept. 26. Protocols regarding frontier régime signed by mixed Bulgaro-Yugoslav Commission at Pirof. Came into force for three months on Nov. 5 (*E.N.* 15.3.30).
 Dec. 23. Extradition convention signed with Turkey.
 Dec. 31. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Poland.

CANADA

- 1929, Jan. 2. Convention and protocol with United States signed providing for remedial works on Niagara Falls and Niagara River (*U.S.D.* 3.1.29).
 Jan. 12. Agreement concerning communications between private experimental wireless stations concluded with United States (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 2).
 Feb. 1. Notes exchanged with Czechoslovakia on Dec. 21, 1928, and Feb. 1, 1929, extending to Canada legal convention of Nov. 11, 1924, between Great Britain and Czechoslovakia (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).
 Feb. 26-8. Agreement concluded by exchange of notes between Canada, Cuba, Newfoundland, and United States concerning assignment of high frequencies to wireless stations on North American Continent (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 6).
 March 27. Treaty signed with United States regarding Fraser River sockeye salmon fisheries.

CANADA : *cont.*

- May 2. Agreement concluded with Norway for reciprocal exemption from income-tax of shipping profits (*L.N.T.S.* xci; *C.T.S.* 1929, No. 8). Similar agreements concluded with Denmark on June 18 (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 9); Japan on Sept. 21 (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 10); Netherlands on Sept. 23 (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 11); Greece on Sept. 30 (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 12); Sweden on Nov. 21 (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 16).
- Oct. 22. Agreement concluded with United States regarding admission of civil aircraft, issuance of pilots' licences and acceptance of certificates of airworthiness (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 13).
- Oct. 23. Agreement concluded with United States regarding quarantine inspection of ships (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 14).
- Nov. 4. Clearing office agreement signed with Germany.
- Nov. 22. Customs agreement with Cuba extended for two years.
- Dec. 3. Extradition treaty with Colombia signed.
- Dec. 20. Notes exchanged with U.S.S.R. on resumption of diplomatic relations (*C.T.S.* 1929, No. 17).

CHILE

- 1929, June 3. **Treaty signed with Peru settling dispute regarding Tacna and Arica.**
- Ratifications exchanged July 28 (*E.N.* 2.10.29).
- July 5. Treaty of friendship signed with Egypt.
- Oct. 19. Conciliation treaty with Poland signed.

CHINA

- 1929, Jan. 12. Notes exchanged with Norway regarding Art. 1 of tariff autonomy treaty of Nov. 12, 1928.
- Jan. 21. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of provisional commercial agreement of Aug. 17, 1928 (*M.* 3^e série, xx).
- Feb. 6. Tariff autonomy treaty with Great Britain of Dec. 20, 1928, brought into force by protocol signed Feb. 6. Ratifications exchanged March 14 (*L.N.T.S.* xc).
- Feb. 20. Ratifications exchanged with United States of tariff autonomy treaty of July 25, 1928. Came into force June 20 (*U.S.T.S.* No. 773).
- March 1. Tariff autonomy treaty with Norway of Nov. 12, 1928, came into force (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- March 13. Notes exchanged with Denmark supplementing preliminary treaty of friendship and commerce of Dec. 12, 1928.
- March 22. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of tariff autonomy treaty of Dec. 20, 1928. Came into force March 27 (*M.* 3^e série, xx).
- March 28. Agreement signed with Japan settling Tsinanfu incident of May 3, 1928 (*E.N.* 4.5.29).
- April 22. Tariff autonomy treaty with France of Dec. 22, 1928, came into force (*E.N.* 5.1.29).
- May 2. Exchange of notes with Japan effecting settlement of Nanking and Hankow incidents (*China Year Book* 1929-30).
- May 21. Ratifications notified of treaty of friendship and commerce with Italy of Nov. 27, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).

CHINA : *cont.*

- June 8. Tariff autonomy treaty with Denmark of Dec. 12, 1928, came into force. Ratifications exchanged on Sept. 13.
 - June 20. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding British Naval Mission and training of Chinese naval cadets in England.
 - Sept. 18. Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with Poland signed.
 - Sept. 30. Treaty of friendship with Greece signed.
 - Oct. 31. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding rendition of Chinkiang concession (*Cmd.* 3469). Nov. 9. Agreement signed regarding Chinkiang claims of 1927 (*Cmd.* 3470).
 - Nov. 12. Exchange of notes of Oct. 21 and Nov. 12 with Mexico, providing for relinquishment of extra-territorial rights.
 - Dec. 22. **Protocol signed with U.S.S.R. providing for restoration of status quo ante in Manchuria and for negotiations on outstanding questions** (pp. 272-4 above).
 - Dec. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of tariff treaty of Dec. 27, 1928.
- See also under BELGIUM, Feb. 28, May 24.

COLOMBIA

- 1929, Jan. 10. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of commercial treaty of March 9, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxv).
 - Feb. 23. Notes exchanged with United States regarding authorization of U.S. commercial aeroplanes to fly over Colombian territory and of Colombian commercial aeroplanes to fly over Panama Canal Zone (*U.S. Press release*, 23.2.29).
 - March (not known). Immigration treaty signed with Japan.
 - June 21. Commercial treaty signed with Denmark.
 - July 1. Literary and artistic property convention signed with Mexico.
 - July 16. Ratifications exchanged with Costa Rica of convention of Oct. 13, 1926, regarding degrees and diplomas (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
 - Sept. 24. Notes exchanged with Honduras on Nov. 16, 1928, and Sept. 24, 1929, regarding sovereignty in frontier districts.
 - Dec. 3. Extradition treaties signed with Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and South Africa.
- See also under AUSTRALIA, Dec. 3; CANADA, Dec. 3.

CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS, see under GERMANY, Aug. 4.

COSTA RICA, see under COLOMBIA, July 16.

CUBA

- 1929, March 2. Ratifications exchanged with France of extradition treaty of Jan. 3, 1925.
 - Oct. 1. Arbitration convention signed with United States.
 - Nov. 6. Commercial convention signed with France (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).
- See also under CANADA, Feb. 26-8, Nov. 22.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- 1929, Jan. 17. Agreement concluded with Hungary regarding exchange of political prisoners.
- Jan. 24. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of judicial convention of Dec. 21, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvi).
- Feb. 12. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of protocol of Sept. 19, 1928, prolonging treaty of alliance (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- Feb. 18. Ratifications exchanged with Greece of three legal conventions of April 7, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- March 27. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of air navigation convention of Jan. 22, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- April 9. Ratifications exchanged with France of commercial agreement of July 2, 1928.
- April 11. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of agreement of Sept. 29, 1928, regarding debts in Austro-Hungarian crowns contracted before Feb. 26, 1919.
- April 11. Ratifications exchanged with United States of arbitration and conciliation treaties of Aug. 16, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- April 22. Exchange of notes with Germany regarding direct relations between police authorities of the two countries.
- April 30. Commercial treaty signed with Persia. Came into force provisionally May 10.
- May 17. Agreement regarding labour questions concluded with Germany.
- May 21. **General act of conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement signed at Belgrade with Yugoslavia and Rumania**, with protocol prolonging existing treaties of alliance. Ratification of general Act exchanged Nov. 16; ratification of protocol exchanged between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on Aug. 27, and between Czechoslovakia and Rumania on Nov. 15.
- June 3. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of railway agreement of Nov. 15, 1924; and notes exchanged concerning its interpretation.
- June 8. Treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration signed with Greece.
- June 17. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of Oder frontier agreement of March 22, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- July 9. Conciliation and arbitration treaty signed with Estonia.
- Aug. 24. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of convention concerning debts in Austro-Hungarian crowns of Nov. 7, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- Aug. 26. Exchange of notes with Denmark regarding trade with Greenland (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- Sept. 9. Arbitration treaty with Norway signed.
- Sept. 14. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with the Netherlands.
- Sept. 20. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Switzerland.
- Sept. 29. Commercial agreement concluded with Turkey. Came into force same day (*I.I.I.*).
- Oct. 2. Treaty of judicial settlement, arbitration, and conciliation signed with Finland.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA : *cont.*

- Nov. 2. Agreement signed with Germany regarding Hamburg Free Zone, in accordance with Arts. 363-4 of Treaty of Versailles.
Nov. 9. Transit agreement signed with Poland and Rumania.
Nov. 11. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of commercial treaty of Nov. 14, 1928.
Nov. 14. Ratifications exchanged with United States of naturalization treaty of July 16, 1928 (*U.S.T.S.* 804).
Nov. 23. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of railway convention of May 30, 1927.
Nov. 30. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of arbitration convention of Nov. 16, 1928, and commercial agreement of Dec. 13, 1928.
Dec. 2. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of additional commercial protocol of Nov. 19, 1928.
Dec. 21. Protocol regarding Tesin signed with Poland.
Dec. 24. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of consular convention of Nov. 7, 1928.
See also under AUSTRIA, Jan. 26, June 10, July 31, Aug. 5, Oct. 16; BELGIUM, Oct. 10; CANADA, Feb. 1.

DANZIG

- 1929, Feb. 2. Protocol signed with Poland regarding the export of lard.
April 8. Agreement signed regarding export of hens' eggs. April 18. Protocol concluded regarding freight and transit dues. May 28. Three double taxation agreements signed. Aug. 19. Accession of Danzig to establishment treaty between Poland and Turkey of July 23, 1923. Nov. 23. Agreement signed additional to commercial agreement of Oct. 24, 1921 (*Z.D.U.* v. 1929).
See also under DENMARK, Dec. 17.

DENMARK

- 1929, Jan. 9. Notes exchanged with Latvia regarding certificates of commerce (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvi).
Jan. 24. Notes exchanged with U.S.S.R. on Jan. 15 and 24 relating to arrangement for reciprocal recognition of tonnage measurement of Dec. 13, 1924 and June 23, and 29, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
Jan. 31. Exchange of notes with Greece of Jan. 29 and 31 prolonging commercial agreement of April 7-19, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).
April 1. Provisional agreement reached to last until coming into force of commercial treaty of Aug. 22, 1928. Treaty came into force Aug. 21.
Jan. 31. Exchange of notes with Spain of Jan. 8 and 31 effecting commercial agreement regarding Spanish Guinea (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).
April 17. Ratifications exchanged with United States of arbitration treaty of June 14, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
June 11. Notes exchanged with Great Britain on May 9, Aug. 1, and Dec. 12, 1928, April 15 and June 11, 1929, effecting agreement between Denmark and Hongkong for mutual recognition of passenger ships certificates (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).

DENMARK : *cont.*

- June 17. Notes exchanged with Germany regarding reciprocal facilities for excursion traffic.
Aug. 17. Notes exchanged with Persia regarding diplomatic and consular representation.
Aug. 28. Ratifications exchanged with Greece of commercial treaty of Aug. 22, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
Oct. 14. Notes exchanged with Germany effecting shipping agreement.
Dec. 4. Ratifications exchanged with Haiti of treaty for pacific settlement of disputes of April 5, 1928 (*M.* 3^e série, xxiii).
Dec. 12. Declaration regarding legal rights of limited companies in Estonia and Denmark signed at Tallinn.
Dec. 17. Convention concluded with Germany, Poland (and Danzig) and Sweden regarding fisheries in the Baltic.
See also under AUSTRIA, Jan. 19; BRAZIL, April 29, June 7; CANADA, May 2; CHINA, March 13, June 8; COLOMBIA, June 21; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Aug. 26; NETHERLANDS, April 25.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- 1929, Jan. 21. Frontier treaty signed with Haiti. Ratifications exchanged April 29.
Feb. 20. Treaty of friendship, peace and arbitration concluded with Haiti.

ECUADOR.

- 1929, Jan. 5. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding commercial travellers and their samples. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* xc).
Feb. 23. Exchange of notes with Germany of Feb. 20 and 23 regarding diplomatic mails.

EGYPT

- 1929, Jan. 12. Agreement signed with Palestine for execution in one country of judgments rendered in the other. Came into force Jan. 28 (*Cmd.* 3368).
Feb. 5. Financial agreement concluded with Great Britain settling certain war claims.
March 17. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding the Ottoman loan of 1855 and other financial questions (*L.N.T.S.* xc).
May 7. Nile waters agreement signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3348).
July 21. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of friendship and establishment with Persia of Nov. 28, 1928.
Aug. 27. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with the United States.

See also under AUSTRIA, Oct. 14; BELGIUM, Feb. 16; CHILE, July 5.

ESTONIA

- 1929, Jan. 24. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey of commercial convention of March 12, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvi).
Feb. 27. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of provisional commercial agreement of July 1, 1928.

ESTONIA : *cont.*

- March 6. Protocol additional to agreement of April 2, 1924, regarding common use of frontier roads signed with Latvia. Came into force April 1.
- March 11. Convention concluded with Latvia prolonging period stipulated in Art. 6 of convention of Nov. 1, 1923, regarding frontier property. Came into force on April 1.
- March 15. Commercial agreement signed with France. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 7 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- April 1. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of agreement of Oct. 19, 1928, regarding exchange of official publications.
- April 23. Notes exchanged with Sweden on Nov. 12, 1928, and April 23, 1929, regarding reciprocal communication of civil status records (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- April 29. Commercial treaty signed with Hungary. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 26.
- May 7. Commercial treaty with Germany signed. Came into force July 29.
- May 17. Commercial treaty signed with U.S.S.R. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 4 (*L.N.T.S.* 94).
- May 25. Protocol signed with Finland modifying extradition convention of Jan. 2, 1925. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 16 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- July 5. Additional protocol to treaty of commerce and navigation of Feb. 19, 1927, signed with Poland.
- July 9. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of commercial treaty of Dec. 7, 1928.
- Aug. 22. Commercial treaty concluded with Portugal (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1929).
- Aug. 27. Arbitration treaty signed with the United States.
- Sept. 14. Provisional commercial agreement, concluded with Turkey by exchange of notes. Came into force provisionally Nov. 30; definitive agreement signed on Sept. 16.
- Nov. 27. Conciliation and arbitration treaty with Hungary signed.
- Dec. 20. Convention regarding submarine cables with Latvia signed.
- See also under AUSTRIA, June 26, July 28; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, July 9; DENMARK, Dec. 12.

FINLAND

- 1929, Jan. 14. Ratifications exchanged with the United States of treaties of conciliation and arbitration of June 7, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- Jan. 29. Notes exchanged with Yugoslavia effecting provisional commercial agreement. Came into force Sept. 14.
- Feb. 8. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of conciliation treaty of June 9, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- April 13. Maritime customs surveillance convention signed with U.S.S.R. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 10.
- April 26. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of conciliation and arbitration treaty of Aug. 21, 1928, and of two agreements regarding passports and civil procedure (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).

FINLAND : *cont.*

- May 16. Protocol of Dec. 3, 1928, modifying convention of arbitration and conciliation with Germany, came into force.
- Aug. 12. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with Turkey. Came into force provisionally on Oct. 1.
- Aug. 15. Agreement regarding legalization of certificates of origin concluded with Italy by exchange of notes.
- Aug. 19. Arbitration and conciliation treaty with Hungary of Dec. 12, 1928, came into force.
- Aug. 21. Commercial agreement concluded with Italy by exchange of notes. Dec. 20. Notes exchanged regarding putting agreement into force on Jan. 1, 1930.
- Nov. 25. Commercial agreement concluded with Germany supplementing that of June 27, 1926 (*R.I.I.S.* March 1930).
- See also under AUSTRIA, March 27; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Oct. 2; ESTONIA, May 25; NETHERLANDS, April 25.

FRANCE

- 1929, Jan. 15. Convention additional to extradition convention of Jan. 6, 1909 signed with United States. Ratifications exchanged May 2 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- Jan. 22. Notes exchanged with Switzerland on Jan. 12 and 22 completing convention of Aug. 10, 1877, regarding liquor control.
- Jan. 30. Convention of commerce and navigation, and consular and establishment convention signed with Jugoslavia. Came into force May 15.
- Jan. 30. Convention signed with Luxemburg regarding customs service at Mindorf-les-Bains.
- Feb. 18. Notes exchanged with Greece regarding exemption of shipping profits from double taxation.
- Feb. 21. Declaration signed with Luxemburg modifying extradition convention of Sept. 12, 1875.
- Feb. 28. Notes exchanged with Greece concerning expropriation of French subjects under agrarian law of Oct. 15, 1926.
- March 10. Agreement signed with Italy regarding Mediterranean air connexions (Text *E.E.P.S.*, April 15-30, 1929). Ratifications exchanged July 31 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- March 11. Treaty of commerce and navigation and establishment convention signed with Greece to replace treaty of Sept. 8, 1926. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 19 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- March 13. Notes exchanged with Great Britain concerning modification of New Hebrides agreement of Aug. 18, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- April 5. Ratifications exchanged with San Marino of extradition convention of April 30, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- April 15. Convention signed with Switzerland regulating fishing rights in River Doubs.
- April 22. Ratifications exchanged with United States of arbitration treaty of Feb. 6, and of notes regarding it of March 1 and 5, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).

FRANCE : *cont.*

- April 24. Commercial convention signed with Poland replacing agreement of Dec. 9, 1924. Came into force provisionally Oct. 15.
- April 25. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of agreement prohibiting use of gas and bacteria in war of June 17, 1925, and of commercial agreement of June 20, 1928. Agreement signed with Germany regarding conditions in frontier districts.
- May 4. Ratifications exchanged with Haiti of commercial convention.
- May 6. Notes exchanged with Great Britain regarding a Senegal-Gambia frontier agreement (*Cmd.* 3340).
- May 10. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of exchange of notes of Oct. 29 and 31, 1928, additional to commercial protocol of June 20, 1928.
- May 10. **Treaty of friendship and arbitration signed with Persia** (*E.N.* 31.8.29; pp. 263-6 above).
- May 25. Exchange of notes with Great Britain of May 21 and 25 concerning British subjects' rights under French Rent Acts of 1926 and 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- May 31. Veterinary convention signed with Italy (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).
- June 6. Agreement with Great Britain regarding French *loge* at Balasore signed at Orissa June 1 and Chandernagor, June 6 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- June 7. Ratifications exchanged with Salvador of agreement of Aug. 25, 1924, concerning the exchange of printed matter (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- June 9. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey of convention of Nov. 1, 1927, concerning commercial travellers (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- June 10. Notes exchanged with Germany extending commercial agreement of Aug. 17, 1927, to Indo-China. Ratifications exchanged July 7.
- June 20. Convention signed with Switzerland regarding international station at Bâle.
- June 22. Agreements and declaration signed with Turkey regarding delimitation of Syro-Turkish frontier, frontier security and railway traffic, negotiations on property questions and Mersina-Tarsus-Adana Railway. June 29. **Protocol signed regarding frontier supervision and régime in frontier districts** (*E.N.* 24.8.29; Aug. 29), pp. 267-72 above.
- June 27. Notes exchanged with Germany regarding modifications of commercial agreement of Aug. 17, 1927.
- July 8. Commercial convention signed with Switzerland replacing that of Oct. 20, 1926 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1929).
- July 10. Treaty of arbitration and amity signed with Spain.
- July 18. Convention signed with Spain concerning the international stations of La Tour de Carol and Puigcerda, with protocol. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 20.
- July 26. Notes exchanged with Switzerland on July 11 and 26 interpreting establishment treaty of Feb. 23, 1882.

FRANCE : *cont.*

- July 27. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of extradition and judicial assistance conventions of Dec. 30, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
 - July 31. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of convention of extradition and judicial assistance of Oct. 29, 1924 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
 - July 31. Commercial agreement signed with Mexico.
 - Aug. 2. Agreement signed with Great Britain and the Irish Free State for compensation of war damage (*Cmd.* 3404).
 - Aug. 10. Provisional traffic agreement concluded with Switzerland.
 - Aug. 29. Commercial *modus vivendi* signed with Turkey. Came into force Oct. 1. Modified by notes exchanged on Sept. 29 and Oct. 5, coming into force provisionally Oct. 21.
 - Sept. 3. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of arbitration and conciliation treaty of March 3, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
 - Oct. 4. Notes exchanged with Italy regarding consular visa of certificates of origin and invoices.
 - Oct. 29. Notes exchanged with the United States on Oct. 11, 1927, and Oct. 29, 1929, regarding customs relations.
 - Nov. 20. Notes exchanged with Germany regarding exchange of extracts from judicial documents.
 - Dec. 1. Agreement signed with the Saar regarding admission of 'stagiaires'. Came into force same day.
 - Dec. 21. Convention signed with Poland regarding miners' insurance.
 - Dec. 22. Agreement concluded with Hungary modifying commercial convention of Nov. 13, 1925.
 - Dec. 31. Agreement signed with Germany regarding liquidation of German property (*E.N.* 22.3.30).
- See also under ALBANIA, March 28; AUSTRIA, March 1; BELGIUM, Feb., March 27, March 28, May 30, July 1, Aug. 13, Sept. 16, Oct. 5; CHINA, April 22; CUBA, March 2, Nov. 6; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, April 9; ESTONIA, March 15; GERMANY, Aug. 30, Aug. 31.

GERMANY

- 1929, Jan. 19. Provisional timber trade agreement signed with Poland to remain in force till Dec. 31. Further prolonged till Dec. 31, 1930.
- Jan. 23. Aviation agreement signed with Norway. Ratifications exchanged July 10 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- Jan. 25. **Conciliation convention signed with U.S.S.R.** Ratifications exchanged April 13 (*L.N.T.S.* xc; pp. 156-9 above).
- Jan. 26. Agreement signed with Lithuania regarding persons in receipt of a pension in Memel territory. Ratifications exchanged May 4 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- Feb. 8. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of debt settlement agreement of Nov. 10, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).
- Feb. 15. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of civil procedure convention of March 20, 1928 (*Cmd.* 3286).
- Feb. 17. Convention of friendship, commerce and establishment concluded with Persia (*E.N.* 31.8.29).
- Feb. 22. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of commercial treaty of Oct. 30, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).

GERMANY : *cont.*

- Feb. 25. Ratifications exchanged with United States of conciliation and arbitration treaties of May 5, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xc).
- Feb. 28. Exchange of notes with Rumania concerning Hague Convention of 1905 and legal relations. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 30.
- March 13. Agreement concluded with Rumania for definitive settlement of obligations under Art. 238 of Versailles Treaty.
- March 28. Agreement signed with Switzerland regarding Rhine between Strasburg and Istein.
- April 3. Railway agreement signed with Lithuania and U.S.S.R.
- April 8. Convention signed with Portugal regarding reciprocal recognition of navigation certificates. Came into force May 1 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- April 13. Agreement for legal co-operation concluded with Switzerland by exchange of notes. Came into force May 12.
- April 16. Exchange of notes with U.S.S.R. concerning reciprocal recognition of tonnage measurements. Came into force same day.
- April 23. Agreement supplementing commercial treaty of July 14, 1926, signed with Switzerland. Ratifications exchanged July 6.
- April 25. Protocol signed with Sweden concerning arbitration and conciliation treaty of Aug. 29, 1924. Ratifications exchanged June 25 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- April 26. Treaty of friendship with Najd-Hijāz signed (*O.M.* July 1929).
- April 30. Aviation agreement with the Saar signed at Berlin on April 25 and at Saarbrücken on April 30.
- May 3. Agreement additional to commercial treaty of May 14, 1926, signed with Sweden.
- May 4. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of five agreements of Jan. 29, 1928, regarding (i) arbitration and conciliation, (ii) frontiers, (iii) upkeep of frontier rivers, (iv) fishing in frontier waters, (v) assistance to military pensioners in Memel territory (Texts of (ii-v) *L.N.T.S.* lxxxix). Ratifications exchanged of consular convention and judicial agreement of Oct. 30, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xc).
- May 10. Notes exchanged with Japan regarding mutual recognition of tonnage measurement certificates.
- May 16. Arbitration treaty signed with Turkey.
- May 17. Ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement with Sweden of Dec. 11, 1928, supplementary to treaty of May 14, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii). On June 26, Sweden denounced treaty of May 14, 1926, as from Feb. 15, 1930.
- May 27. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of treaty of Nov. 24, 1927, regarding Polish agricultural workers (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- May 28. Judicial agreement and consular treaty signed with Turkey.
- June 1. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of commercial agreement of Oct. 19, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- June 7. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of convention of Dec. 7, 1927, regarding Friedrichstollen canal.
- June 11. Ratifications exchanged with S. Africa of commercial treaty of Sept. 1, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).

GERMANY : *cont.*

- June 12. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of protocol of Aug. 29, 1928, modifying arbitration and conciliation treaty of Dec. 3, 1921 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- July 4. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of protocol of Aug. 17, 1928, additional to provisional aviation convention of July 24, 1922 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- July 22. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of convention of March 23, 1928, putting four Hague Conventions of 1905 on private law into force between the two countries.
- Aug. 4. Agreement signed with Conference of Ambassadors regarding railway and constructional works in the Rhineland (*Temps* 19.12.29).
- Aug. 13. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of convention of March 14, 1925, regarding administration of the Netze and Küddow (*M.* 3^e série, xxii).
- Aug. 14. Convention signed with Mexico prolonging for six months from Sept. 6, 1929, additional agreement of March 16, 1925, regarding indemnities to German nationals. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 19.
- Aug. 28. Aviation convention concluded with Poland.
- Aug. 30. Provisional agreement signed with Poland regarding nationality of German minority in Poland.
- Aug. 30. Notes exchanged at Hague Conference between Belgium, France, and Great Britain and Germany regarding evacuation of Rhineland within certain time-limits; Agreement signed by Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and Germany providing for submission of questions arising in Rhineland to Arbitration Commissions established under Locarno Agreements (*Cmd.* 3417; pp. 1-4 above).
- Aug. 31. Final Protocol of Hague Conference on Reparations signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, with four annexes: (i) finance; (ii) deliveries; (iii) transitional period before ratification of Young Plan; (iv) Costs of Rhineland Occupation (pp. 4-9 above).
- Aug. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of convention of April 23, 1928, concerning customs operations affecting transport on Rhine (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- Sept. 11. Arbitration and conciliation treaty signed with Luxemburg.
- Sept. 30. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of social insurance treaty and agreement regarding seasonal agricultural workers of Dec. 15, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).
- Oct. 31. Treaty signed with Poland for cessation of liquidation of property and renunciation of financial claims (pp. 153-5 above).
- Nov. 2. Convention signed with Switzerland regarding recognition and execution of judicial decisions and arbitral awards.
- Nov. 13. Notes exchanged with Switzerland regarding commercial treaty of July 14, 1926. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 31 (*F.F.* 24.1.30).
- Nov. 30. Second additional agreement to commercial treaty of May 14, 1926, signed with Sweden (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).

GERMANY : *cont.*

Dec. 24. Customs agreement with Sweden effected by notes exchanged on Nov. 19 and 27 and Dec. 24.

Dec. 24. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding legal costs.

Dec. 28. Agreement concluded with United States regarding direct payment of Reparation annuities.

Dec. 28. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding liquidation of German property (*Cmd.* 3580).

See also under AUSTRIA, Oct. 16; BELGIUM, July 13, Oct. 5; BRAZIL, May 14; BULGARIA, June 4; CANADA, Nov. 4; CHINA, Jan. 21; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, March 27, April 22, May 17, June 17, Nov. 2; DENMARK, June 17, Oct. 14, Dec. 17; ECUADOR, Feb. 23; ESTONIA, May 7, July 9; FINLAND, May 16, Nov. 25; FRANCE, April 25, May 10, June 10, June 27, Nov. 20, Dec. 31.

GREAT BRITAIN

See under ARGENTINE, Nov. 8, Nov. 15, Nov. 16; AUSTRALIA, Jan. 25; BRAZIL, April 16; CANADA, Feb. 1; CHINA, Feb. 6, June 20, Oct. 31; COLOMBIA, Dec. 3; DENMARK, June 11; ECUADOR, Jan. 5; EGYPT, Feb. 5, March 17, May 7; FRANCE, March 13, May 6, May 25, June 6, Aug. 2; GERMANY, Feb. 15, Aug. 30, Aug. 31, Dec. 28; GREECE, Feb. 1, June 21, July 31, Oct. 9; GUATEMALA, May 29; IRISH FREE STATE, Dec. 10; JAPAN, Aug. 10; LITHUANIA, Dec. 10; NETHERLANDS, March 22; PANAMA, Feb. 21, April 8; PERU, Jan. 3; RUSSIA, Oct. 3; SPAIN, June 27; SWITZERLAND, Nov. 19; TRANS-JORDAN; TURKEY, Jan. 15, July 2.

GREECE

1929, Feb. 1. Agreements regarding property of British subjects expropriated under Hellenic agrarian law of Oct. 15, 1926, effected by change of notes with Great Britain of Feb. 17, 1927 and Feb. 1, 1929 (*L.N.T.S.* xc); similar agreement concluded with Italy by exchange of notes of March 5, 1927, and Feb. 1, 1929.

Feb. 19. Ratifications exchanged with United States of liquor traffic convention of April 25, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).

Feb. 28. Ratifications exchanged of treaty of conciliation and judicial settlement with Switzerland of Sept. 21, 1925 (*M.* 3^e série xx).

March 17. Six protocols signed with Yugoslavia regarding conditions in Salonika Free Zones: (i) train service, (ii) port service, (iii) customs, (iv) veterinary service, (v) posts and telegraphs, (vi) final protocol. Came into force April 16.

March 27. **Pact of friendship, conciliation and judicial settlement signed with Yugoslavia** (pp. 130-8 above).

May 10. Debt settlement signed with United States.

June 11. Treaty of commerce and navigation signed with U.S.S.R. Came into force on June 25.

June 11. Provisional agreement regarding tonnage certificates signed with Sweden. Came into force Oct. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).

June 21. Notes exchanged with Great Britain and India regarding certificates of origin. Came into force July 5 (*Cmd.* 3369).

GREECE: *cont.*

- July 5. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of conciliation and arbitration treaty of March 21, 1928 (*E.I.* July 1928).
 - July 31. Agreement signed with Great Britain and Northern Ireland for reciprocal exemption of shipping profits from income tax (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
 - Aug. 19. Exchange of notes with United States regarding reciprocal exemption of shipping profits from income tax.
 - Oct. 1. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of pact of friendship and arbitration of Sept. 23, 1928 (*E.E.P.S.* 15.9.28).
 - Oct. 9. Agreement concluded with Great Britain by exchange of notes of Oct. 2 and 9 regarding exemption of consular officers from customs examination of baggage.
- See also under AUSTRIA, Dec. 27; BELGIUM, Feb. 1, June 25; BULGARIA, Feb. 21; CANADA, May 2; CHINA, Sept. 30; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Feb. 18, June 8; DENMARK, Jan. 31, Aug. 28; FRANCE, Feb. 18, Feb. 28, March 11.

GUATEMALA

- 1929, May 21-8. Notes exchanged with Honduras regarding frontiers.
- May 29. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of commercial treaty of Feb. 22, 1928 (*Cmd.* 3429).

HAITI

- 1929, April 19. Exchange of notes with Venezuela on March 15 and April 19 concerning frontier treaty of Jan. 1, 1929, between Haiti and Dominican Republic.
- See also under DENMARK, Dec. 4; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC; FRANCE, May 4.

HONDURAS

- See under COLOMBIA, Sept. 24; GUATEMALA, May 21-8.

HUNGARY

- 1929, Jan. 5. Treaty of neutrality, conciliation and arbitration signed with Turkey. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 8.
- Jan. 23. Notes exchanged with Japan effecting commercial agreement. Came into force Jan. 31 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).
- Jan. 26. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with United States. Ratifications exchanged July 24 (*A.J.I.L.* Oct. 1929).
- Feb. 1. Customs agreement with Norway concluded by exchange of notes of Jan. 16 and Feb. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvi).
- Feb. 28. Agreement signed with Spain modifying commercial convention of June 17, 1925. Ratifications exchanged March 30 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- May 4. Treaty signed with Latvia regarding extradition and judicial assistance in criminal matters.
- May 8. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of commercial treaty of Nov. 8, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).
- May 16. Commercial treaty signed with Lithuania. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 12 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1929).

HUNGARY: *cont.*

- May 17. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of veterinary convention, protocol regarding imports and exports and commercial treaty of July 4, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).
- June 10. Treaty of friendship, mediation and arbitration signed with Spain (*M.* 3^e série xxii).
- July 21. Notes exchanged with Yugoslavia on April 20, May 16, and July 21 regarding prolongation of period allowed for transfer of residence under Treaty of Trianon until July 26, 1930 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- Oct. 2. Frontier agreement signed with Yugoslavia.
- Nov. 8. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of commercial treaty of July 24, 1926 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).
- Nov. 14. Commercial agreement concluded with Portugal by exchange of notes.
- See also under AUSTRIA, Oct. 16; BULGARIA, Feb. 5, May 17, July 22; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Jan. 17; ESTONIA, April 29, Nov. 27; FINLAND, Aug. 19; FRANCE, Dec. 22.

ICELAND

- 1929, Jan. 22. Notes exchanged with Latvia regarding legalization of certificates of origin.
- Aug. 26. Treaty of conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration with Spain signed at Copenhagen.
- See also under NETHERLANDS, April 25.

INDIA

- See under AUSTRALIA, Jan. 25; FRANCE, June 6; GREECE, June 21.

IRĀQ

- 1929, Aug. 11. Provisional agreement of friendship, commerce, and establishment concluded with Persia (*O.M.* Sept. 1929).

IRISH FREE STATE

- 1929, Oct. 29. Commercial treaty signed with Portugal replacing treaty of Aug. 12, 1914 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).
- Dec. 10. Notes exchanged between the Irish Free State, Great Britain and Latvia effecting a commercial agreement.
- See also under FRANCE, Aug. 2.

ITALY

- 1929, Feb. 11. Political treaty, concordat and financial convention signed with the Vatican. Ratifications exchanged June 7 (Text, *E.N.* 29.6.29).
- Feb. 22. Notes exchanged with Sweden on March 8 and 16, 1928, and Feb. 14 and 22, 1929, regarding certificates of origin. Came into force March 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxvii).
- April 29. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey of pact of arbitration, neutrality and conciliation of May 30, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xcv).

ITALY : *cont.*

- May 31. Additional protocol to commercial treaty of Jan. 27, 1923, signed with Switzerland. Ratifications exchanged June 14 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
- June 17. Arbitration treaty with Norway signed.
- July 5. Ratifications exchanged of Polish debt agreement of Dec. 18, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
- July 30. Postal agreement signed with the Vatican.
- Aug. 3. Commercial *modus vivendi* signed with Turkey. Came into force Aug. 6.
- Aug. 7. Protocol signed with Switzerland regarding motor transport. Came into force Aug. 10. Dec. 11. Notes exchanged regarding protocol.
- Aug. 26. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of aviation convention of Aug. 15, 1927, and additional protocol of Oct. 3, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- Sept. 5. Treaty of friendship signed with Persia (*O.M.* Oct. 1929).
- Sept. 9. Consular convention signed with Turkey
- Sept. 13. Motor and tourist traffic convention concluded with Switzerland.
- Sept. 16. Convention signed with Yugoslavia regarding upkeep of frontier boundary stones.
- Oct. 16. Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation signed with Panama.
- See also under ABYSSINIA, Aug. 2; AUSTRALIA, Jan. 25; AUSTRIA, Feb. 18, Feb. 22, June 10, June 19; BELGIUM, Jan. 28; CHINA, May 21; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, June 3, Dec. 2; ESTONIA, Feb. 27; FINLAND, April 26, Aug. 15, Aug. 21; FRANCE, May 31, Oct. 4; GERMANY, July 22, Aug. 31; GREECE, Feb. 1, Oct. 1; HUNGARY, May 17.

JAPAN

- 1929, March 30. Provisional agreement of commerce and establishment concluded with Persia by exchange of notes.
- July 31. Notes exchanged with Turkey concerning provisional commercial agreement. Came into force Aug. 6.
- Aug. 5. Notes exchanged with Spain re-establishing commercial convention of March 28, 1900. Came into force Aug. 15.
- Aug. 10. Notes exchanged with Great Britain regarding exemption of shipping profits from income tax (*Cmd.* 3396).
- Aug. 17. Notes exchanged with U.S.S.R. regarding reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates.
- See also under CANADA, May 2; CHINA, March 28, May 2; COLOMBIA, March; GERMANY, May 10, Aug. 31; HUNGARY, Jan. 23.

JUGOSLAVIA

- 1929, Jan. 21. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with United States. Ratifications exchanged June 22 (*A.J.I.L.* Oct. 1929).

JUGOSLAVIA : *cont.*

Sept. 27. Commercial treaty signed with Spain. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 18 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).

Oct. 30. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of commercial treaty of Oct. 18, 1928 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1930).

See also under ALBANIA, May 17; AUSTRIA, Feb. 19, June 10, Oct. 16; BULGARIA, Sept. 26; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Feb. 12, April 11, May 21, Aug. 24, Nov. 11, Dec. 24; FINLAND, Jan. 29; FRANCE, Jan. 30; GERMANY, June 1, Sept. 30; GREECE, March 17, March 27; HUNGARY, July 21, Oct. 2, Nov. 8; ITALY, Sept. 16.

LATVIA

1929, Jan. 12. Agreement regarding certificates of origin concluded with Sweden by exchange of notes (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxv).

Jan. 15. Treaty of friendship signed with Persia.

Feb. 12. Treaty of commerce and railway convention signed with Poland.

April 3. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of agreement of June 21, 1928, regarding legal rights of limited companies (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).

May 13. Notes exchanged with Norway concerning certificates of origin.

June 15. Provisional commercial treaty concluded with Portugal.

Aug. 17. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty with Turkey of May 28, 1928. Existing commercial treaty denounced by Turkey with effect from Dec. 17.

Oct. 30. Ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty of Oct. 18, 1928, with United States.

See also under DENMARK, Jan. 9; ESTONIA, March 6, March 11, April 1, Dec. 20; FRANCE, July 31; HUNGARY, May 4; ICELAND, Jan. 22; IRISH FREE STATE, Dec. 10; JUGOSLAVIA, Oct. 30.

LITHUANIA

1929, Jan. 4. Exchange of notes with Sweden of Nov. 12, 1928, and Jan. 4, 1929, regarding reciprocal communication of civil status records (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).

April 19. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of frontier traffic agreement of Nov. 7, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxix).

Dec. 10. Notes exchanged with Great Britain on Nov. 28 and Dec. 10, regarding commercial agreement of May 6, 1922. Came into force same day (*Cmd.* 3462).

See also under AUSTRIA, Feb. 7; GERMANY, Jan. 26, Feb. 22, April 3, May 4; HUNGARY, May 16.

LUXEMBURG

1929, April 6. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with the United States.

Sept. 16. Treaty of arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement signed with Switzerland.

Sept. 17. Arbitration treaty signed with the Netherlands.

LUXEMBURG : *cont.*

See also under BELGIUM, Jan. 10, Aug. 26; FRANCE, Jan. 30, Feb. 21; GERMANY, Sept. 11.

MEXICO

1929, Aug. 17. Convention signed with the United States prolonging till Aug. 17, 1931 the Special Claims Commission set up in 1923. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 29 (*U.S.T.S.* 801).
 Sept. 2. Convention signed with the United States prolonging till Aug. 30, 1931, the General Claims Commission set up in 1923. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 10 (*U.S.T.S.* 802).
 See also under CHINA, Nov. 12; COLOMBIA, July 1; FRANCE, July 31; GERMANY, Aug. 14.

NAJD-HIJĀZ

1929, Aug. 3. Treaty of friendship signed with Turkey.
 Aug. 24. Treaty of peace and friendship concluded with Persia (*O.M.* March 1930).
 See also under GERMANY, April 26.

NETHERLANDS

1929, Jan. 11. Agreement signed with Norway regarding reciprocal exemption from income tax of shipping profits (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxv).
 Feb. 10. Notes exchanged with Turkey prolonging provisional commercial agreement of Feb. 11, 1926, till Aug. 1, 1929. On July 1, ratifications exchanged of commercial agreement of July 25, 1928. This agreement denounced by Turkey as from Nov. 30. On Nov. 21, notes exchanged effecting provisional agreement to come into force on Nov. 30.
 Feb. 22. Consular convention regarding Netherlands East Indies, Surinam and Curaçao concluded with Uruguay.
 Feb. 27. Convention concluded with the United States prolonging arbitration treaty of May 2, 1908. Ratifications exchanged April 25 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
 March 22. Notes exchanged with Great Britain regarding compensation for war damage granted to Dutch fisheries (*Cmd.* 3311).
 March 27. Declaration signed with Spain regarding abolition of Dutch capitulations in Morocco.
 April 25. Accession of Netherlands to declaration of June 11, 1928, regarding the international convention of Jan. 25, 1906, concerning the navigability and crews of ships. Also signed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (*M.* 3^e série xxii).
 April 30. Exchange of notes with Poland of March 26 and April 30 regarding provisional air navigation agreement of Nov. 4, 1925 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).
 June 28. Ratifications exchanged with Siam of arbitration and conciliation treaty of Oct. 27, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xciii).
 See also under AUSTRIA, March 28, Dec. 31; BELGIUM, March 9, March 26-8, July 4; BOLIVIA, May 30; CANADA, May 2; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Sept. 14; FINLAND, Feb. 8; GERMANY, July 4, Aug. 31; LUXEMBURG, Sept. 17.

NEWFOUNDLAND

See under CANADA, Feb. 26-8.

NORWAY

1929, Feb. 7. Agreement signed with Portugal regarding reciprocal recognition of navigation certificates.

Feb. 10. Provisional customs agreement effected by exchange of notes with Turkey (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxiii).

Feb. 20. Arbitration treaty signed with the United States. Ratifications exchanged June 7 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).

Feb. 25. Additional article to commercial treaty of June 5, 1928 signed with the United States.

April 16. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of protocol of April 26, 1928, additional to commercial treaty of Dec. 22, 1926 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).

May 10. Customs agreement with Persia, to remain valid till Sept. 10, concluded by exchange of notes of May 9 and 10. Prolonged till Dec. 10.

May 11. Agreement regarding maritime law signed with Sweden.

July 26. Agreement with Sweden concluded by exchange of notes on July 25 and 26 concerning honours to be paid to fleets.

Aug. 1. Exchange of notes with Turkey of Feb. 11 and Aug. 1, establishing a commercial *modus vivendi* (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).

Dec. 5. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of arbitration and conciliation treaty of Dec. 27, 1928.

Dec. 9. Arbitration treaty signed with Poland.

Dec. 18. Exchange of notes of Dec. 16 and 18 with Sweden regarding coasting trade.

See also under CANADA, May 2; CHINA, Jan. 12, March 1; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Sept. 9; GERMANY, Jan. 23; HUNGARY, Feb. 1; ITALY, June 17; LATVIA, May 13; NETHERLANDS, Jan. 11, April 25.

PALESTINE

See under EGYPT, Jan. 12.

PANAMA

1929, Feb. 21. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of agreement of Sept. 26, 1928, regarding commercial travellers (*L.N.T.S.* xc).

April 8. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of commercial treaty and two protocols of Sept. 25, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xc).

April 22. Exchange of notes with the United States regarding commercial aviation.

See also under ITALY, Oct. 16.

PARAGUAY

See under BELGIUM, Oct. 10; BRAZIL, Nov. 25.

PERSIA

1929, March 10. Customs agreement signed with U.S.S.R. Came into force March 24 (*E.N.* 31.8.29).

PERSIA : *cont.*

- April 10. Frontier delimitation agreement signed with Turkey.
 May 10. Treaty of establishment, commerce and navigation concluded with Sweden (*E.N.* 31.8.29). Notes exchanged regarding provisional agreement to last until coming into force of treaty.

Nov. 1. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of frontier convention of May 31, 1928.

See also under BELGIUM, May 9, May 23, Sept. 12; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, April 30; DENMARK, Aug. 17; EGYPT, July 21; FRANCE, May 10; GERMANY, Feb. 17; IRÂQ, Aug. 11; ITALY, Sept. 5; JAPAN, March 30; LATVIA, Jan. 15; NAJD-HIJÂZ, Aug. 24; NORWAY, May 10.

PERU

1929, Jan. 3. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding commercial travellers.

See also under CHILE, June 3.

POLAND

1929, Feb. (date unknown). Convention signed with Rumania regarding compensation to Polish owners of property in Bessarabia.

May 24. Two conventions signed with Rumania concerning bridges on the Dniester and Czeremosz.

June 6. Ratifications exchanged with the United States of extradition treaty of Nov. 22, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* xcii).

July 26. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of convention of Nov. 29, 1928, regarding exchange of documents of former Austro-Hungarian military authorities.

Sept. 4. General protocol and economic and technical agreements signed with Rumania. Oct. 24. Arbitration treaty signed (*M.* 3^e série, xxii). Oct. 30. Three railway agreements concluded. Dec. 7. Frontier traffic agreement signed. Dec. 17. Consular convention signed. Dec. 19. Judicial assistance convention signed.

Dec. 28. Commercial convention with Portugal signed.

See also under AUSTRIA, June 10; BULGARIA, Dec. 31; CHILE, Oct. 19; CHINA, Sept. 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Nov. 9, Nov. 23, Dec. 21; DANZIG; DENMARK, Dec. 17; ESTONIA, July 5; FRANCE, April 24, July 27, Dec. 21; GERMANY, Jan. 19, May 27, June 7, Aug. 13, Aug. 28, Aug. 30, Oct. 31; ITALY, July 5; LATVIA, Feb. 12; LITHUANIA, April 19; NETHERLANDS, April 30; NORWAY, April 16, Dec. 9.

PORTUGAL

1929, Jan. 3. Agreement signed with Sweden regarding reciprocal recognition of navigation certificates. Came into force Feb. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii).

Feb. 22. Agreement signed with United States for exchange of information about drug traffic (*B.Tr.I.* July 1929).

March 1. Arbitration treaty signed with the United States. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 30 (*U.S.T.S.* 803).

PORTUGAL : *cont.*

- April 11. Agreement signed with the Vatican concerning the diocese of St. Thomas Mallapur. Ratifications exchanged June 9.
- April 30. Exchange of notes with Spain of April 24 and 30 regarding travelling facilities during period of Ibero-American Exhibition at Seville.
- Sept. 25. Ratifications exchanged with South Africa of Mozambique Convention of Sept. 11, 1928 (*Cmd.* 3495).
- Nov. 9. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of arbitration and conciliation treaty of Oct. 17, 1928.
- Nov. 21. Agreement signed with Sweden regarding recognition of tonnage certificates.
- See also under BELGIUM, Aug. 28; ESTONIA, Aug. 22; GERMANY, April 8; HUNGARY, Nov. 14; IRISH FREE STATE, Oct. 29; LATVIA, June 15; NORWAY, Feb. 7; POLAND, Dec. 28.

RUMANIA

- 1929, March 21. Arbitration and conciliation treaties signed with United States. Ratifications exchanged July 22 (*A.J.I.L.* Oct. 1929).
- April 17. Agreement signed with United States on Feb. 23 and April 17 regarding information about drug traffic (*B.Tr.I.* July 1929).
- June 11. Convention of establishment and commerce signed with Turkey.
- July 7. Ratifications exchanged with the Vatican of concordat of May 10, 1927, and exchange of notes of July 20 and Oct. 22, 1928.
- See also under AUSTRIA, June 10; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, May 21, Nov. 9; GERMANY, Feb. 8, Feb. 28, March 13; GREECE, July 5; POLAND, Feb., May 24, July 26, Sept. 4.

SAAR. See under FRANCE, Dec. 1; GERMANY, April 30.

SALVADOR. See under FRANCE, June 7.

SAN MARINO. See under FRANCE, April 5.

SIAM. See under NETHERLANDS, June 28.

SOUTH AFRICA. See under GERMANY, June 11; PORTUGAL, Sept. 25.

SPAIN

- 1929, Jan. 2. Exchange of notes with Sweden of June 22, Sept. 22 and Nov. 3, 1928, and Jan. 2, 1929, regarding reciprocal recognition of tonnage certificates (*L.N.T.S.* xciv).
- June 27. Judicial convention signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 3409).
- Aug. 24-6. Exchange of notes with Turkey effecting a commercial *modus vivendi*.
- See also under AUSTRIA, March 21; CHINA, Dec. 31; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Nov. 30; DENMARK, Jan. 31; FRANCE, July 10, July 18; HUNGARY, Feb. 28, June 10; ICELAND, Aug. 26; ITALY, Aug. 26; JAPAN, Aug. 5; JUGOSLAVIA, Sept. 27; NETHERLANDS, March 27; NORWAY Dec. 5; PORTUGAL, April 30.

SWEDEN

1929, March 21. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey of commercial treaty of Feb. 4, 1928. Denounced by Turkey Aug. 16 with effect from Nov. 6 (*L.N.T.S.* lxxxviii). New treaty of commerce and residence signed on Sept. 29.

April 15. Ratifications exchanged with the United States of arbitration treaty of Oct. 27, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* xci).

See also under CANADA, May 2; CHINA, March 22; COLOMBIA, Jan. 10; DENMARK, Dec. 17; ESTONIA, April 23; FRANCE, Sept. 3; GERMANY, April 25, May 3, May 17, Nov. 30, Dec. 24; GREECE, June 11; HUNGARY, May 8; ITALY, Feb. 22; LATVIA, Jan. 12, April 3; LITHUANIA, Jan. 4; NETHERLANDS, April 25; NORWAY, May 11, July 26, Dec. 18; PERSIA, May 10; PORTUGAL, Jan. 3, Nov. 21; SPAIN, Jan. 2.

SWITZERLAND

1929, Nov. 15-16. Notes exchanged with the United States regarding exchange of information about drugs.

Nov. 19. Notes exchanged with Great Britain regarding unemployment insurance (*Cmd.* 3489).

See also under ALBANIA, June 10; AUSTRIA, Jan. 28, July 25; BELGIUM, Aug. 26; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Jan. 24, Sept. 20; FRANCE, Jan. 22; April 15, June 20, July 8, July 26, Aug. 10; GERMANY, March 28, April 13, April 23, June 12, Nov. 2, Nov. 13, Dec. 24; GREECE, Feb. 28; ITALY, May 31, Aug. 7, Sept. 13; LUXEMBURG, Sept. 16; PORTUGAL, Nov. 9.

TRANSJORDAN

1929, Oct. 31. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of treaty of Feb. 20, 1928 (*Cmd.* 3488).

TURKEY

1929, Jan. 4. Treaty of friendship signed with Uruguay.

Jan. 15. Convention signed with Great Britain regarding commercial travellers' samples.

May 2. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of pasturage rights treaty of Aug. 6, 1928.

July 2. Commercial *modus vivendi* effected with Great Britain by exchange of notes. Aug. 5. Accession of India took effect (*Cmd.* 3366).

Aug. 10. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of treaty of Aug. 6, 1928, regarding settlement of litigation and local disputes.

Oct. 1. Commercial treaty signed with United States.

Dec. 2. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of frontier convention of Aug. 6, 1928.

Dec. 17. Treaty of neutrality and friendship with U.S.S.R. of Dec. 17, 1926, renewed for two years. Protocol added binding either party not to conclude any political agreement with a third Power without consent of other party (*O.M.*, Jan. 1930).

See also under BULGARIA, March 6, Dec. 23; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Sept. 29; DANZIG; ESTONIA, Jan. 24, Sept. 14; FINLAND, Aug. 12; FRANCE,

TURKEY: *cont.*

June 9, June 22, Aug. 29; GERMANY, May 16, May 28; HUNGARY, Jan. 5; ITALY, April 29, Aug. 3, Sept. 9; JAPAN, July 31; NAJD-HIJĀZ, Aug. 3; NETHERLANDS, Feb. 10; NORWAY, Feb. 10, Aug. 1; PERSIA, April 10; RUMANIA, June 11; SPAIN, Aug. 24-6; SWEDEN, March 21.

UNITED STATES

1929, Sept. 18. Exchange of notes with Venezuela of July 15 and 19 and Sept. 18 regarding honours paid to warships.

See also under ALBANIA, Feb. 12; AUSTRIA, Feb. 28, Dec. 11; BELGIUM, March 20, Oct. 4; BULGARIA, Jan. 21; CANADA, Jan. 2, Jan. 12, Feb. 26-8, March 27, Oct. 22, Oct. 23; CHINA, Feb. 20; COLOMBIA, Feb. 23; CUBA, Oct. 1; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Nov. 14; DENMARK, April 17; EGYPT, Aug. 27; ESTONIA, Aug. 27; FINLAND, Jan. 14; FRANCE, Jan. 15, April 22, Oct. 29; GERMANY, Feb. 25, Dec. 28; GREECE, Feb. 19, May 10, Aug. 19; HUNGARY, Jan. 26; JUGOSLAVIA, Jan. 21; LATVIA, Oct. 30; LUXEMBURG, April 6; MEXICO; NETHERLANDS, Feb. 27; NORWAY, Feb. 20, Feb. 26; PANAMA, April 22; POLAND, June 6; PORTUGAL, Feb. 22, March 1; RUMANIA, March 21, April 17; SWEDEN, April 15; SWITZERLAND, Nov. 15-16; TURKEY, Oct. 1.

URUGUAY. See under NETHERLANDS, Feb. 22; TURKEY, Jan. 4.

U.S.S.R.

1929, June 25. Ratifications exchanged with the Yaman of treaty of friendship and commerce of Nov. 1, 1928 (*O.M.* Sept. 1929).

Oct. 3. **Protocol signed with Great Britain regarding resumption of diplomatic relations, propaganda and settlement of outstanding questions** (*E.N.* 7.12.29). **Notes regarding mutual abstinence from hostile acts exchanged on Dec. 20-1** (*Cmd.* 3467, pp. 156-9 above).

See also under CANADA, Dec. 20; CHINA, Dec. 22; DENMARK, Jan. 24; ESTONIA, May 17; FINLAND, April 13; GERMANY, Jan. 25, April 3, April 16; GREECE, June 11; JAPAN, Aug. 17; PERSIA, March 10, Nov. 1; TURKEY May 2, Aug. 10, Dec. 2, Dec. 17.

VATICAN. See under ITALY, Feb. 11, July 30; PORTUGAL, April 11; RUMANIA, July 7.

VENEZUELA. See under BRAZIL, Aug. 31; HAITI, April 19; UNITED STATES, Sept. 18.

YAMAN. See under RUSSIA, Jan. 25.

(ii) **General International Conventions.**¹**AERIAL NAVIGATION**

(i) Spanish-American Convention (Madrid, Nov. 1, 1926).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, Spain.

1929 Ratification: Costa Rica, July 30.

(ii) Protocols amending Articles 3, 5, 7, 15, 34, 37, 41, 42 and final clauses of convention of Oct. 13, 1919 and May 1, 1920 (Paris, June 15, 1929).

1929 Ratifications: Denmark, Oct. 17; France, Nov. 8; Panama, Oct. 19; Saar, Nov. 14.

AERIAL TRANSPORT: Convention on the unification of certain rules concerning international aerial transport—(1) Convention; (2) Additional Protocol; (3) Final Protocol (Warsaw, Oct. 13, 1929).

1929 Signatures (Unratified): Australia (1-3), Austria (1-3), Brazil (1-3), China (3), Czechoslovakia (3), Denmark (1-3), Egypt (3), Estonia (3), Finland (3), France (1-3), Germany (1-3), Great Britain (1-3), Greece (3), Hungary (3), Italy (1-3), Japan (3), Jugoslavia (1-3), Latvia (3), Luxemburg (1-3), Mexico (3), Netherlands (3), Norway (3), Poland (1-3), Rumania (3), S. Africa (1-3), Spain (3), Sweden (3), Switzerland (1-3), U.S.S.R. (3).

AFRICA: Liquor traffic in—Convention and protocol (St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Italy, United States.

Accession to Dec. 1928: Egypt.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium, British Empire, France, Japan, Portugal.

1929 Ratifications: Italy, March 4; United States, March 22.

ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS: Suppression of contraband traffic in—(1) Convention (Helsinki, August 19, 1925); (2) Protocol (Moscow, April 22, 1926).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Denmark (1), Finland (1, 2), Lithuania (1), Norway (1), Sweden (1), U.S.S.R. (1, 2).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Danzig (1), Estonia (1), Germany (1), Latvia (1), Poland (1).

1929 Ratifications: Lithuania (1), July 2; U.S.S.R. (1, 2), Sept. 10.

ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL MATTERS: Protocol (Geneva, Sept. 24, 1923).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Brazil, Chile, Danzig, Estonia,

¹ Owing to limitations of space, it has only been possible to include in this list those international conventions which were signed, adhered to, or ratified by one or more States during the year 1929. A number of conventions which were still in force in 1929 have been omitted on the ground that there was no change to record.

ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN COMMERCIAL MATTERS: *cont.*

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Salvador, Siam, Uruguay.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, 'Irāq, Palestine.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Albania, Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rumania, Spain, Switzerland.

1929 Signatures: Czechoslovakia, Sweden.

1929 Accessions: Chosen, Taiwan, Kerafuto, the leased territory of Kwantung and Japanese mandated territories, Feb. 26; Uganda, June 28.

1929 Ratifications: Estonia, May 16; Sweden, Aug. 8.

ARBITRAL AWARDS, FOREIGN: Convention on the execution of (Geneva, Sept. 26, 1927).

Signatures (Unratified to Dec. 1928): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand (and Western Samoa), Nicaragua, Rumania.

1929 Signatures: Czechoslovakia, Finland, Luxemburg, Spain, Sweden.

1929 Accession: Danzig, Nov. 1.

1929 Ratifications: Belgium, April 27; Czechoslovakia?; Denmark, April 25; Estonia, May 16; New Zealand, April 9; Sweden, Aug. 8.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION: Supervision of the international trade in (Geneva, June 17, 1925). (1) Convention; (2) Protocol of signature; (3) Declaration regarding territory of Ifni; (4) Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Signatures (Unratified) to 1928: Abyssinia (1-4), Austria (1-3), Belgium (1-3), Brazil (1-4), British Empire (1-4), Bulgaria (1-4), Canada (1-4), Chile (1-4), Czechoslovakia (1-4), Denmark (1-4), Estonia (1-4), Finland (1-4), Germany (1, 2, 4), Greece (2, 4), Hungary (1, 2), India (1-4), Italy (1-3), Japan (1-4), Jugoslavia (1-4), Latvia (1-4), Lithuania (4), Luxemburg (1-4), the Netherlands (2, 4), Nicaragua (1, 4), Norway (1, 4), Portugal (2, 4), Rumania (1-4), Salvador (1-4), Siam (1, 4), Spain (1-4), Sweden (1, 4), Switzerland (1-4), Turkey (2, 4), U.S.A. (1, 2, 4), Uruguay (1, 2, 4).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Liberia (1-4), U.S.S.R. (4).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (4), Belgium (4), China (1), Egypt (1, 3, 4), France (1-4), Italy (4), the Netherlands (1, 3), Poland (1-3), Venezuela (1-4).

1929 Accessions: China (3, 4), Aug. 7; Persia (4), July 4.

1929 Ratifications: Finland (4), June 26; Germany (4), April 25; Jugoslavia (4), April 12; Poland (4), Feb. 4; Rumania (4), Aug. 23; Spain (4), Aug. 22; Turkey (4), Oct. 5.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT

(i) Conventions (Barcelona, April 20, 1921)—(1) Freedom of transit (convention and statute); (2-3) Navigable waterways; (2) (convention and statute); and (3) (additional protocol); (4) Right to a flag of States having no sea-coast.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT: *cont.*

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Belgium (2-3), Bolivia (1, 2, 4), China (1, 2, 4), Estonia (2, 4),¹ France (4),¹ Guatemala (1, 2, 4), Italy (1, 2, 4),¹ Yugoslavia (1, 4), Lithuania (1, 2, 4), Luxemburg (1, 2), the Netherlands (4),¹ Panama (1, 2, 4), Persia (1, 4), Poland (2), Portugal (1-4), Spain (1-4), Switzerland (4),¹ Uruguay (1, 2, 4).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Australia (4), Austria (3), British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories (3), Canada (4), Colombia (2),² Danzig (1), Finland (4), Germany (1), Hungary (1-4), Malay States (1-3), Palestine (1-3), Peru (1-4),² Rumania (2-4), Siam (1-4), S. Africa (4), Sweden (3).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Albania (1-4), Austria (1, 2, 4), Belgium (1, 4), British Empire (1-4), Bulgaria (1, 2, 4), Chile (1-4), Czechoslovakia (1-4), Denmark (1-4), Finland (1, 2, 4), Greece (1-4), India (1-4), Japan (1, 4), Latvia (1, 4), the Netherlands (1), New Zealand (1-4), Norway (1-4), Poland (1, 4), Rumania (1-4), Sweden (1, 2, 4), Switzerland (1, 4).

1929 Accessions: Syria and Lebanon (1) Feb. 7.

1929 Ratifications: Spain (1), Dec. 17, (4) July 1.

(ii) Conventions and Statutes (Geneva, Dec. 9, 1923)—(1) International régime of railways (convention, statute and protocol of signature), (2) International régime of maritime ports (convention, statute and protocol of signature); (3) Transmission in transit of electric power (convention and protocol of signature); (4) Development of hydraulic power affecting more than one State (convention and protocol of signature).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Belgium (3, 4), Brazil (1, 2), Bulgaria (1-4), Chile (1-4), Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Danzig (3, 4), Estonia (1, 2), Finland (1), France (1, 3, 4), Greece (1, 3, 4), Hungary (1-4), Italy (1-4), Yugoslavia (1-4), Latvia (1), Lithuania (1-4), Poland (3, 4), Portugal (1), Salvador (1, 2), Spain (1, 2, 3), Uruguay (1-4).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia (1), Australia (2), Austria (2), British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories (1-4), China (1),² Colombia (1),² France (2),² Netherlands East Indies (2), Palestine (1-4), Panama (1, 2).²

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (1, 3, 4), Belgium (1, 2), British Empire (1-4), Czechoslovakia (3), Danzig (1), Denmark (1-4), Germany (1, 2), Greece (2), India (1, 2), Japan (1, 2), the Netherlands (1, 2), New Zealand (1-4), Norway (1, 2), Poland (1), Rumania (1), Siam (1, 2, 4), Sweden (1, 2), Switzerland (1, 2).

1929 Accessions: 'Irāq (2) May 1.

1929 Ratifications: Estonia (1), Sept. 21; Greece (1), March 6, (3) Feb. 15, (4) March 14; Hungary (1, 2), March 21.

(iii) Convention and Protocol of Signature regarding the measurement of vessels employed in inland navigation (Paris, Nov. 27, 1925).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland, U.S.S.R.

¹ Accepts declaration as binding without ratification.

² Accession *ad referendum*.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT: *cont.*

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Rumania, Spain, Switzerland.

1929 Ratifications: Czechoslovakia, Jan. 17.

CURRENCY: Suppression of counterfeiting—(1) Convention and protocol; (2) Optional protocol (Geneva, April 20, 1929).

1929 Signatures (Unratified): Albania (1), Austria (1, 2), Belgium (1), Bulgaria (1, 2), China (1), Colombia (1, 2), Cuba (1, 2), Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Danzig (1), Denmark (1), France (1), Germany (1), Great Britain (1), Greece (1, 2), Hungary (1), India (1), Italy (1), Japan (1), Jugoslavia (1, 2), Luxemburg (1), Monaco (1), the Netherlands (1), Norway (1), Dec. 28; Panama (1, 2), Poland (1, 2), Dec. 24; Portugal (1, 2), Rumania (1, 2), Spain (1, 2), Dec. 17; Switzerland (1), U.S.S.R. (1), United States (1), July 20.

CUSTOMS FORMALITIES: Simplification of—Convention and Protocol (Geneva, Nov. 3, 1923).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Brazil, Chile, Japan, Jugoslavia, Lithuania, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay.

Accession to Dec. 1928: Persia.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Australia, Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Luxemburg, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rumania, Siam, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunis.

1929 Ratification: Brazil, July 10; Jugoslavia, May 2.

ECONOMIC STATISTICS: Convention and protocol (Geneva, Dec. 14, 1928).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, S. Africa, Sweden.

1929 Signatures: South Africa, Sept. 24; Switzerland, April 4; United States.

1929 Ratifications: Bulgaria, Nov. 29; Denmark, Sept. 9; Norway, March 20.

EMIGRANTS: Arrangement regarding a transit card for (Geneva, June 14, 1929).

1929 Signatures: Belgium, June 14; Danzig *ad ref.*, June 14; Finland, Oct. 9; France, June 14; Greece *ad ref.*, June 14; Hungary *ad ref.*, June 14; Italy, June 14; Netherlands *ad ref.*, June 14; Poland, Dec. 23; Rumania, Nov. 26; Saar, June 14; Spain, Dec. 17; Switzerland *ad ref.*, June 14.

EPIZOOTIC OFFICE: Agreement (Paris, Jan. 25, 1924).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentine Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Peru.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Australia, Austria, British Colonies, Germany, India, 'Irāq, Irish Free State, New Zealand, Palestine, U.S.S.R.

EPIZOOTIC OFFICE: *cont.*

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunis.

1929 Ratifications: Greece, July 29; Hungary, March 2.

GEODESIC CONVENTION (Helsinki, Dec. 21, 1925).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Danzig, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden.

1929 Accession: U.S.S.R., Feb. 9.

IMPORT AND EXPORT.

(i) Abolition of prohibitions and restrictions on import and export trade.

(1) Convention and protocol; (2) Annexed declaration (Geneva, Nov. 8, 1927).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Austria (1), Belgium (1), Bulgaria (1), Chile (1, 2), Czechoslovakia (1), Denmark (1), Egypt (1), Estonia (1), Finland (1), France (1, 2), Germany (1), Greece (2), Great Britain (1), Hungary (1, 2), India (1), Italy (1, 2), Japan (1), Jugoslavia (1, 2), Latvia (1), Luxemburg (1), the Netherlands (1), Norway (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1, 2), Rumania (1), Siam (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1, 2), Turkey (1), United States (1).

1929 Ratifications: Austria (1), June 26; Belgium (1), April 27; Denmark (1), Sept. 9; Finland (1), Sept. 6; France (1, 2), July 31; Germany (1), Nov. 23; Great Britain (1), April 12; Hungary (1, 2), July 26; Italy (1, 2), Sept. 30; Japan (1), Sept. 28; Jugoslavia (1), Sept. 30; Luxemburg (1), June 27; the Netherlands (1), June 28; Portugal (1, 2), Sept. 30; Rumania (1), June 30; Sweden (1), Aug. 8; Switzerland (1, 2), June 27; United States (1), Sept. 30.

(ii) Additional Agreements (Geneva, July 11, 1928). (1) Agreement supplementing convention of 1927; (2) Agreement relating to the exportation of hides and skins, with protocol. (3) Agreement relating to the exportation of bones, with protocol.

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Austria (1-3), Belgium (1-3), Bulgaria (1), Chile (1), Czechoslovakia (1-3), Denmark (1-3), Egypt (1), Estonia (1), Finland (1-3), France (1-3), Germany (1-3), Great Britain (1-3), Hungary (1-3), India (1), Italy (1-3), Japan (1), Jugoslavia (1-3), Latvia (1), Luxemburg (1-3), the Netherlands (1-3), Norway (1-3), Poland (1-3), Portugal (1), Rumania (1-3), Siam (1), Sweden (1-3), Switzerland (1-3), Turkey (1), United States (1).

1929 Signatures: Bulgaria (2, 3), Turkey (2, 3).

1929 Ratifications: Austria (1, 3), June 26; Belgium (1-3), April 27; Czechoslovakia (2, 3), June 28; Denmark (1), Sept. 9, (2, 3) June 14; Finland (1), Sept. 6, (2, 3) June 27; France (1), July 31, (2, 3) June 30; Germany (1), Nov. 23, (2, 3) June 30; Great Britain (1), April 12, (2, 3) April 9; Hungary (1-3), July 26; Italy (1), Sept. 30, (2, 3) June 29; Japan (1), Sept. 28; Jugoslavia (1-3), Sept. 30; Luxemburg (1-3), June 27; the Netherlands (1-3), June 28; Portugal (1), Sept. 30, (2-3) Dec. 2; Rumania (1-3), June 30; Sweden (1), Aug. 8, (2, 3) June 27; Switzerland (1-3), June 27; United States (1), Sept. 30.

IMPORT AND EXPORT: *cont.*

(iii) Agreement regarding provisional putting into force of convention of 1927 and additional agreement of 1928 (Paris, Dec. 20, 1929).

Signatures (Unratified): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary,¹ Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Switzerland, U.S.A.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: Revised conventions—(1) Protection of industrial property; (2) False indications of origin; (3) International registration of commercial and industrial trade-marks; (4) International registration of industrial designs or models (The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Australia (1), Belgium (1, 3, 4), Brazil (1-3), Cuba (1-3), Czechoslovakia (1-3), Danzig (1-4), Denmark (1), Dominican Republic (1), Estonia (1), Finland (1), France (1-4), Hungary (1, 3), Japan (1), Mexico (1, 3), Morocco (1-4), Norway (1), Poland (1), Portugal (1, 3, 4), Sweden (1), Syria and Lebanon (1, 2, 4) ?, Tunis (1-4), United States (1).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Morocco (1-4), Poland (2).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (1, 3), Canada (1), Germany (1-4), Great Britain (1, 2), Italy (1-3), Jugoslavia (1, 3), Netherlands (1, 3, 4), Portugal (1), Spain (1-4), Switzerland (2-4).

1929 Accessions: Trinidad and Tobago, Oct. 21.

1929 Ratifications: Belgium (1, 3, 4), June 12; Brazil (1-3), Oct. 26; Hungary (1, 3), May 16; Mexico (1, 3); Switzerland (1), as from June 15.

LABOUR

(i) Draft Conventions (Washington, Nov. 23, 1919)—(1) Limitation of hours of work; (2) Unemployment; (3) Employment of women before and after childbirth; (4) Night-work of women; (5) Minimum age for admission of children to industrial employment; (6) Night-work of young persons employed in industry.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (1, 2, 4, 6), Belgium (1, 4, 5, 6), Bulgaria (1-6), Chile (1, 3, 5), Cuba (3, 4, 5, 6), Czechoslovakia (1, 4, 5), Denmark (2, 5, 6), Estonia (2, 4, 5, 6), Finland (2), France (1, 2, 4, 6), Germany (2, 3), Great Britain (2, 4, 5, 6), Greece (1-6), Hungary (2, 3, 4, 6), India (1, 2, 4, 6), Irish Free State (2, 4, 5, 6), Italy (1, 2, 4, 6), Japan (2, 5), Jugoslavia (2-6), Latvia (1, 3, 5, 6), Luxemburg (1-6), the Netherlands (4-6), Norway (2), Poland (2, 5, 6), Portugal (1), Rumania (1-6), South Africa (2, 6), Spain (2, 3), Sweden (2), Switzerland (2, 4, 5, 6).

Ratifications 1928: Spain (1), Feb. 22.

(ii) Draft Conventions (Genoa, June 15 to July 10, 1920)—(1) Minimum age for admission of children to employment at sea; (2) Unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of the ship; (3) Facilities for finding employment for seamen.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Australia (3), Belgium (1-3), Bulgaria (1-3), Canada (1, 2), Cuba (1-3), Denmark (1), Estonia (1-3), Finland (1, 3), France (3), Germany (3), Great Britain (1, 2), Greece (1-3), Hungary

¹ With reservations.

LABOUR: *cont.*

(1), Irish Free State (1), Italy (2, 3), Japan (1, 3), Yugoslavia (1), Latvia (1-3), Luxemburg (1-3), Netherlands (1), Norway (1, 3), Poland (1, 3), Rumania (1), Spain (1, 2), Sweden (1, 3).

1929 Ratifications: France (2), March 21; Germany (1), June 11; Yugoslavia (2, 3), Sept. 30.

(iii) Draft Conventions (Geneva, Oct. 25 to Nov. 19, 1921)—(1) Age for admission of children to employment in agriculture; (2) Rights of association in agriculture; (3) Workmen's compensation in agriculture; (4) Use of white lead in painting; (5) weekly rest in industry; (6) minimum age for trimmers and stokers; (7) compulsory medical examination of children and young persons employed at sea.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (1, 2, 4), Belgium (1, 2, 4-7), Bulgaria (1-7), Canada (6, 7), Chile (2-5), Cuba (4, 6, 7), Czechoslovakia (1, 2, 4, 5), Denmark (3, 6), Estonia (1-7), Finland (2, 4-7), France (3-7), Germany (2, 3), Great Britain (2, 3, 6, 7), Greece (4), Hungary (1, 4, 6, 7), India (2, 5-7), Irish Free State (1-3), Italy (1, 2, 5-7), Japan (1, 7), Yugoslavia (5-7), Latvia (2, 4-7), Luxemburg (1-7), Netherlands (2, 3, 7), Norway (6), Poland (1-7), Portugal (5), Rumania (4-7), Spain (4, 6, 7), Sweden (1-4, 6, 7).

1929 Ratifications: France (2), March 23; Germany (6, 7), June 11; Greece (5), May 11; Yugoslavia (2, 4), Sept. 30; Latvia (3), Nov. 29; Norway (2, 4), June 11.

(iv) Draft Conventions (Geneva, June 1925)—(1) Workmen's compensation for accidents; (2) Workmen's compensation for occupational diseases; (3) Equality of treatment of foreign and national workers as regards compensation for accidents; (4) Night-work in bakeries.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (2, 3), Belgium (1-3), Cuba (1-4), Czechoslovakia (3), Denmark (3), Finland (2-4), France (3), Germany (2, 3), Great Britain (2, 3), Hungary (1-3), India (2, 3), Irish Free State (2), Italy (3), Japan (2, 3), Yugoslavia (1-3), Latvia (1, 3), Luxemburg (1-4), Netherlands (1-3), Poland (3), S. Africa (3), Sweden (1, 3), Switzerland (2).

1929 Ratifications: Bulgaria (1-4), Sept. 5; Estonia (4), Dec. 23; Latvia (4), Nov. 29; Norway (2, 3), June 11; Portugal (1-3), March 27; Spain (1, 3), Feb. 22; Sweden (2), Oct. 16; Switzerland (3), Feb. 1.

(v) Draft Conventions (Geneva, June 5-24, 1926)—(1) Inspection of emigrants; (2) Seamen's articles of agreement; (3) Repatriation of seamen.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria (1), Belgium (1-3), Cuba (2, 3), Czechoslovakia (1), Estonia (3), France (2), Great Britain (1), India (1), Japan (1), Luxemburg (1-3), Netherlands (1).

1929 Ratifications: Bulgaria (1-3), Nov. 29; Estonia (2), May 10; Finland (1), April 5; France (3), March 4; Great Britain (2), June 14; Italy (2-3), Oct. 10; Yugoslavia (2, 3), Sept. 30; Sweden (1), Oct. 15.

(vi) Draft Conventions (Geneva, June 16, 1927)—(1) Sickness insurance

LABOUR: *cont.*

for workers in industry and commerce and domestic servants ; (2) sickness insurance for agricultural workers.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Germany (1, 2), Hungary (1), Luxemburg (1, 2).

1929 Ratifications: Austria (1, 2), Feb. 18 ; Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Jan. 17 ; Jugoslavia (1), Sept. 30 ; Latvia (1), Nov. 29 ; Rumania (1), June 28.

(vii) Draft Convention concerning the creation of minimum-wage-fixing machinery (Geneva, June 16, 1928).

1929 Ratifications: Germany, May 30 ; Great Britain, June 14.

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: Protection of—(1) Revised Convention (Berne, Nov. 13, 1908) ; (2) Additional Protocol (Berne, March 20, 1914) ; (3) Revised Convention (Rome, June 2, 1928).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Portugal (2).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Australia (1, 2), Austria (1, 2), Brazil (1, 2), Bulgaria (1, 2), Canada (1, 2), Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Danzig (1, 2), Estonia (1, 2), Finland (1, 2), Greece (1, 2), Hungary (1, 2), India (1, 2), Irish Free State (1, 2), Morocco (French Zone) (1, 2), Netherlands East Indies (1), New Zealand (1, 2), Palestine (1, 2), Poland (1, 2), Rumania (1, 2), S. Africa (1, 2, 3), Syria and Lebanon (1, 2).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium (1, 2), Denmark (1, 2), France (1, 2), Germany (1, 2), Great Britain (1, 2), Haiti (1, 2), Italy (1, 2), Japan (1, 2), Liberia (1, 2), Luxemburg (1, 2), Morocco (1, 2), Netherlands (1, 2), Norway (1, 2), Portugal (1), Spain (1, 2), Sweden (1, 2), Switzerland (1, 2), Tunis (1, 2),

1929 Ratification: Bulgaria (3), July 16.

1929 Denunciation: Liberia (1, 2).

MARITIME LAW: Convention for saving human life at sea (London, May 31, 1929).

1929 Signatures (Unratified): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United States.

MATCHES: Use of white (yellow) phosphorus for—Convention (Berne, Sept. 26, 1906).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, British Colonies, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, French Colonies, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Irish Free State, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Palestine, Poland, Rumania, S. Africa, Sweden, Tunis.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland.

1929 Accession: Jugoslavia, Dec. 24.

MOTOR TRAFFIC: Convention (Paris, April 24, 1926).

Signatures to Dec. 1928: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,

MOTOR TRAFFIC: cont.

Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Saar, Siam, Spain, Switzerland, Tunis, Turkey, Uruguay.

*1929 Ratifications*¹: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Saar, Siam, Spain, Tunis, Uruguay.

OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS: Convention (Geneva, Sept. 12, 1923).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Irish Free State, Japan, Jugoslavia, Lithuania, Panama, Persia, Salvador, Turkey, Uruguay.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, Canada, Egypt, Peru,² San Marino.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Albania, Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands and Colonies, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, S. Africa, Spain, Switzerland.

1929 Accessions: British Guiana, Sept. 23; 'Irāq, April 26; Norway, May 8.

1929 Ratifications: Greece, Oct. 9; Hungary, Feb. 12; Jugoslavia, May 2; Turkey, Sept. 12.

OPIUM Second Conference (Geneva, Feb. 19, 1925)—(1) Convention; (2) Protocol.

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Albania (1, 2), Brazil (1), Chile (1, 2), Cuba (1, 2), Denmark (1), Germany (1, 2), Greece (1, 2), Hungary (1), Irish Free State (1), Jugoslavia (1, 2), Nicaragua (1, 2), Persia (1, 2), Siam (1, 2), Switzerland (1), Uruguay (1).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Bahamas (1, 2), Bolivia (1, 2),² Danzig (1), Dominican Republic (1), Egypt (1, 2), Finland (1, 2), Italy (1),² Monaco (1), New Hebrides (1), Rumania (1, 2), Salvador (1, 2), San Marino (1), Sarawak (1, 2), Venezuela (1, 2).²

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Australia (1, 2), Austria (1), Belgium (1), British Empire (1, 2), Bulgaria (1, 2), Canada (1, 2), Czechoslovakia (1, 2), France (1), India (1, 2), Japan (1, 2), Latvia (1, 2), Luxemburg (1, 2), the Netherlands and Colonies (1, 2), New Zealand (1, 2), Poland (1), Portugal (1, 2), S. Africa (1, 2), Spain (1), Sudan (1, 2).

1929 Accessions ratified: Italy (1), Dec. 11; Venezuela (1, 2), June 19.

1929 Ratifications: Germany (1, 2), Aug. 15; Greece (1, 2), Dec. 10; Jugoslavia (1, 2), Sept. 4; Siam (1, 2), Oct. 11; Switzerland (1), April 3.

¹ Deposited Oct. 24.

² Accession *ad referendum*.

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (Geneva, Sept. 26, 1928).

1929 Ratifications: Belgium, May 18; Finland, Nov. (date unknown); Norway, June 11;¹ Sweden, May 13.¹

PAN-AMERICAN CONVENTIONS

(i) Conventions (Santiago, May 3, 1923)—(1) Arbitration; (2) Trade Marks; (3) Merchandise classification; (4) Customs documents.

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina (1-4), Chile (2), Colombia (1-4), Dominican Republic (1), Ecuador (1-4), Honduras (1-4), Nicaragua (1-4), Panama (2-4), Salvador (2), Uruguay (3), Venezuela (2-4).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Bolivia (1), Costa Rica (1, 3, 4), Mexico (1), Peru (1), Salvador (1).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Brazil (1-4), Chile (1, 3, 4), Costa Rica (1, 3, 4), Cuba (1-4), Dominican Republic (2-4), Guatemala (1-4), Haiti (1-4), Mexico (1), Panama (1), Paraguay (1-4), Peru (1), Salvador (1, 3, 4), United States (1-4), Uruguay (1, 2, 4), Venezuela (1).

1929 Ratifications: Dominican Republic (1), Feb. 22; Ecuador (1), Feb. 22.

(ii) Inter-American Union of Electric Communications (Mexico, July 29, 1924).

1929 Ratifications: Dominican Republic, May 2; Paraguay, Nov. 14.

(iii) Sanitary Conventions—(1) Sanitary Code (Havana, Nov. 14, 1924); (2) Additional protocol (Lima, Oct. 19, 1927).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina (1, 2); Bolivia (2); Brazil (1, 2); Chile (1, 2), Colombia (1, 2), Costa Rica (2), Cuba (2), Dominican Republic (1, 2), Ecuador (2), Guatemala (1, 2), Haiti (1, 2), Honduras (1, 2), Mexico (1, 2), Nicaragua (2), Panama (2), Paraguay (1, 2), Peru (2), Salvador (1), Uruguay (1, 2), Venezuela (1, 2).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Costa Rica (1), Cuba (1), Haiti ? (1), Peru ? (1), Salvador ? (1), United States (1, 2).

1929 Accession: Bolivia (1), Aug. 31.

1929 Ratifications: Chile (1, 2), Nov. 14; Dominican Republic (1, 2), Nov. 18; Honduras (1); Mexico (1, 2), April 24; Nicaragua ?; Panama (1, 2), April 6; Uruguay (1, 2), Feb. 6.

(iv) Second Pan-American Postal Congress (Mexico, Nov. 9, 1926)—(1) Postal Convention and final protocol; (2) Money Orders; (3) Parcel Post.

Ratifications to Dec. 1929: Chile (1-3), Colombia (1-3), Cuba (1), Dominican Republic (1-3), Ecuador (1, 3), Guatemala (1-3), Haiti (1), Honduras (1-3), Mexico (1-3), Panama (1, 3), Peru (1-3), Salvador (1), Spain (1-3), United States (1, 3).

(v) International law conventions (Havana, Jan. 16 to Feb. 20, 1928)—(1) Commercial aviation; (2) Revision of Buenos Aires literary and artistic

¹ Accession to provisions relating to conciliation and judicial settlement and to general provisions.

PAN-AMERICAN CONVENTIONS: *cont.*

copyright convention; (3) Status of aliens; (4) Treaties; (5) Diplomatic officers; (6) Consular agents; (7) Maritime neutrality; (8) Asylum; (9) Rights and duties of States in the event of civil strife; (10) Pan-American Union; (11) Private international law.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Cuba (11), Dominican Republic (10).

1929 Ratifications: Brazil (1), Aug. 9, (3-6, 8, 9) Aug. 29, (10) Aug. 9, (11) Aug. 3; Costa Rica (11), Nov. 1;¹ Cuba (1), May 13; Dominican Republic (11), March 12; Guatemala (1), Dec. 28, (11) Nov. 9; Haiti (11), July 20;¹ Mexico (1), April 24, (5) Feb. 6, (6) Dec. 16; (10) Nicaragua (1) May 4, (3) Dec. 22;¹ (6) Dec. 21, (8) Dec. 22, (9) Dec. 21;¹ Panama (1, 2), May 13, (3, 5-10) May 21; Peru (11), Aug. 19; Venezuela (5, 10), July 23.¹

(vi) Conciliation and Arbitration Conventions (Washington, Jan. 5, 1929)—(1) Conciliation; (2) Arbitration; (3) Protocol of progressive arbitration.

1929 Signatures: Bolivia (1-3),² Brazil (1-3), Chile (1-3),² Colombia (1-3),² Costa Rica (1-3),² Cuba (1-3), Dominican Republic (1-3),² Ecuador (1-3),² Guatemala (1-3),² Haiti (1-3), Honduras (1-3),² Mexico (1-3),² Nicaragua (1-3), Panama (1-3), Paraguay (1-3),² Peru (1-3), Salvador (1-3),² United States (1-3); Uruguay (1-3),² Venezuela (1-3).²

1929 Ratifications: Chile (1), Dec. 28; Dominican Republic (1), Nov. 15, (2, 3) Oct. 28; Salvador (2, 3), Dec. 28; United States (1), March 27; Venezuela (2), July 15.

(vii) Trade-marks (Washington, Feb. 20, 1929)—(1) Convention for the protection of trade-marks; (2) Protocol regarding Pan-American Bureau.

1929 Signatures: Bolivia (1, 2), Brazil (1, 2), Chile (1), Colombia (1, 2), Costa Rica (1, 2), Cuba (1, 2), Dominican Republic (1, 2), Ecuador (1, 2), Guatemala (1), Haiti (1, 2), Honduras (1, 2), Mexico (1, 2), Nicaragua (1, 2), Panama (1, 2), Paraguay (1, 2), Peru (1, 2), United States (1, 2), Uruguay (1), Venezuela (1, 2).

1929 Ratification: Guatemala (1), Dec. 30.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

(i) Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Court (Geneva, Dec. 16, 1920).³

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Liberia, Luxemburg, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia, Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Hungary, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Jugoslavia,

¹ Date of ratification, not deposit.

² With reservations.

³ For accessions to the 'Optional Clause' of the Statute of the Court, see p. 50 above.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: *cont.*

Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, S. Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela.

1929 Signatures: Nicaragua, Sept. 14; Peru, Sept. 14.

1929 Ratification: Panama, June 14.

(ii) Protocols (Geneva, Sept. 14, 1929)—(1) Protocol regarding the revision of the Statute; (2) Protocol regarding the accession of the United States to the Protocol of Signature.

1929 Signatures: Australia (1, 2), Sept. 14; Austria (1, 2), Sept. 14; Belgium (1, 2), Sept. 14; Bolivia (1, 2), Sept. 14; Brazil (1, 2), Sept. 14; Bulgaria (1, 2), Sept. 14; Canada (1, 2), Sept. 14; Chile (1, 2), Sept. 20; China (1, 2), Sept. 14; Colombia (1, 2), Sept. 14; Cuba (2), Sept. 20; Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Sept. 14; Denmark (1, 2), Sept. 14; Dominican Republic (1, 2), Sept. 20; Estonia (1, 2), before Sept. 20; Finland (1, 2), Sept. 14; France (1, 2), Sept. 14; Germany (1, 2), Sept. 14; Great Britain (1, 2), Sept. 19; Greece (1, 2), Sept. 14; Guatemala (1), Sept. 20, (2) Sept. 14; Haiti (1, 2), Sept. 21; Hungary (1, 2), Sept. 24; India (1, 2), Sept. 19; Irish Free State (1, 2), Sept. 14; Italy (1, 2), Sept. 14; Japan (1, 2), Sept. 21; Jugoslavia (1, 2), Sept. 20; Latvia (1, 2), Sept. 17; Liberia (1, 2), Sept. 17; Luxemburg (1, 2), Sept. 17; Netherlands (1, 2), Sept. 14; New Zealand (1, 2), Sept. 19; Nicaragua (1, 2), Sept. 14; Norway (1, 2), Sept. 14; Panama (1, 2), Sept. 19; Paraguay (1, 2), Sept. 23; Persia (1, 2); Peru (1, 2), Sept. 14; Poland (1, 2), Sept. 14; Portugal (1, 2), Sept. 14; Rumania (1, 2), Sept. 24; Salvador (1, 2), Sept. 23; Siam (1, 2), Sept. 14; S. Africa (1, 2), Sept. 23; Spain (1, 2), Sept. 14; Sweden (1, 2), Sept. 14; Switzerland (1, 2), Sept. 14; United States (1, 2), Dec. 9; Uruguay (1, 2), Sept. 14; Venezuela (1, 2), Sept. 14.

1929 Ratification: Belgium (1, 2), Nov. 18.

PHYLLOXERIC CONVENTION (Nov. 3, 1881). Additional convention (Berne, April 15, 1889).

1929 Accession: Bulgaria, as from Sept. 12.

POSTAL

(i) Telegraph Convention (St. Petersburg, July 22, 1875). Revised: Lisbon, June 11, 1908; Paris, Oct. 29, 1925; and Brussels, Sept. 22, 1928.

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belgian Congo, British Colonies, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Danzig, Denmark, Ecuador, French Colonies, Greece, Iceland, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Italian Colonies, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Morocco, New Zealand, Persia, Poland, Portuguese Colonies, Saar, Siam, S. Africa, Syria and Lebanon, Tunis, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Afghanistan, Colombia, Indian Radiotelegraph Company, 'Irāq, Palestine, Surinam and Curaçao, Tanganyika.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Brazil, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Hungary, Japan, Jugoslavia, Netherlands, Netherlands East Indies, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R.

POSTAL: *cont.*

1929 Accessions: Portuguese Colonies, as from Oct. 1; Vatican, as from June 1.

(ii) Universal Postal Union: Revised conventions (Stockholm, August 28, 1924)—(1) Universal postal convention; (2) Insured letters and boxes; (3) Parcel post; (4) Money orders; (5) Postal cheques; (6) Payment on delivery; (7) Subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals; (8) Final protocol.

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia (8), Albania (1-8), Argentina (1-4, 7), Bolivia (2, 5-8), Bulgaria (8), Chile (8), Colombia (1-4, 7, 8), Cuba (1-8), Czechoslovakia (8), Danzig (1-8), Dominican Republic (8), Egypt (8), France (8), Haiti (8), Hungary (8), India (8), Japan and Japanese Dependencies (8), Jugoslavia (8), Liberia (1-4, 8), Lithuania (1-8), Morocco (8), Panama (2-4, 8), Persia (1-3, 8), Peru (2, 4), Poland (1-8), Portugal (8), Rumania (8), Saar (8), Salvador (1, 2, 8), San Marino (8), Siam (8), South Africa (8), Spain (8), Uruguay (1, 4, 7, 8), Venezuela (2, 4-7).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: British Colonies, &c. (2), Dominican Republic (4), Hijāz (1-4, 6, 7), Honduras (1-7), 'Irāq (2), Transjordan (1).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia (1-4), Austria (1-8), Belgian Congo (1-3, 8), Belgium (1-8), Bolivia (1, 3, 4), Brazil (1, 2, 3, 8), British Colonies, &c. (1, 2, 8), Bulgaria (1-4, 7), Canada (1, 8), Chile (1-4, 6-8), China (1-4, 8), Costa Rica (1, 3, 8), Czechoslovakia (1-7), Denmark (1-8), Dominican Republic (1, 3), Ecuador (1), Egypt (1-4, 6, 7), Estonia (1-8), Finland (1-4, 7), France (1-7), French Colonies (1-4), Germany (1-8), Great Britain (1, 2, 8), Greece (1-8), Haiti (1-3), Hungary (1-7), Iceland (1-4, 6, 8), India (1-3), Irish Free State (1, 2, 8), Italy (1-8), Japan and Japanese Dependencies (1-5), Jugoslavia (1-7), Latvia (1-4, 6-8), Luxemburg (1-8), Mexico (1, 8), Morocco (French Zone) (1-4), Morocco (Spanish Zone) (1-7), the Netherlands (1-8), Netherlands East Indies (1-4, 6, 8), New Zealand (1, 2, 8), Norway (1-4, 6-8), Panama (1), Paraguay (1-4, 8), Peru (1, 3, 8), Portugal and Colonies (1-7), Rumania (1-7), Saar (1-7), San Marino (1-7), Siam (1-4), S. Africa (1), Spain (1-7), Spanish Colonies (1-3), Sweden (1-8), Switzerland (1-8), Syria and Lebanon (1-4), Turkey (1-4, 6-8), U.S.S.R. (1, 2, 4, 8), United States (1, 8), Venezuela (1, 3, 8).

1929 Accessions: British Cameroons and Nigeria, as from Jan. 1; 'Irāq (1), as from April 22; Vatican, June 1; Yaman (1-4, 6, 7), May 13.

1929 Ratifications: Colombia (1-4, 7), Jan. 2; Persia (1-3), Nov. 21.

1929 Denunciation: S. Rhodesia (2), Jan. 10.

(iii) Universal Postal Union: Revised conventions (London, June 28, 1929):—(1) Universal Postal Convention; (2) Insured letters and boxes; (3) Parcel post; (4) Money orders; (5) Postal cheques; (6) Payment on delivery; (7) Subscriptions to periodicals.

Signatures (Unratified): Abyssinia (1-7), Albania (1-7), Algeria (1-7), Australia (1), Austria (1-7), Belgian Congo (1-3), Belgium (1-7), Bolivia (1-7), Brazil (1-3), Bulgaria (1-4, 7), Canada (1), Chile (1-4, 6, 7), China (1-4), Colombia (1-4, 7), Costa Rica (1, 3), Cuba (1-7), Czecho-

POSTAL: *cont.*

slovakia (1-7), Danzig (1-7), Denmark (1-7), Dominican Republic (1-7), Ecuador (1, 3), Egypt (1-4, 6, 7), Estonia (1-7), Finland (1-4, 6, 7), France (1-7), French Colonies (1-4), Germany (1-7), Great Britain (1, 2), Greece (1-7), Guatemala (1, 3), Haiti (1-3), Hijāz (1-7), Honduras (1-7), Hungary (1-7), Iceland (1-4, 6), India (1-3), Irāq (1), Irish Free State (1, 2), Italy (1-7), Italian Colonies (1-7), Japan (1-5), Japanese Colonies (1-5), Yugoslavia (1-7), Latvia (1-7), Liberia (1-4), Lithuania (1-7), Luxemburg (1-7), Mexico (1), Morocco (French Zone) (1-7), Morocco (Spanish Zone) (1-7), Netherlands (1-7), Netherlands Colonies (1-4, 6), New Zealand (1, 2), Nicaragua (1-4), Norway (1-4, 6, 7), Panama (1-4), Persia (1-4), Peru (1, 3, 4), Poland (1-7), Portugal (1-7), Portuguese Colonies (1-7), Rumania (1-4, 6, 7), Saar (1-7), Salvador (1, 3), San Marino (1-7), Siam (1-4, 6, 7), S. Africa (1), Spain (1-7), Spanish Colonies (1-7), Sweden (1-7), Switzerland (1-7), Tunis (1-7), Turkey (1-4, 6, 7), U.S.S.R. (1, 2), United States (1), United States dependencies (1), Uruguay (1, 3, 4, 7), Vatican (1-7), Venezuela (1-7).

Accession: Yaman (1-4, 6, 7), Nov. 4.

Ratification: Canada (1), Nov. 6.

POTENT DRUGS: Revised arrangement for the unification of (Brussels, Aug. 21, 1929).

1929 Signatures (Unratified): Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland.

PUBLIC HEALTH: International Office of—Agreement (Rome, Dec. 9, 1907).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Argentine, Australia, Belgian Congo, Bolivia, British Colonies, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, French Colonies, Germany, Greece, India, Irish Free State, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands East Indies, New Zealand, Norway, Persia, Peru, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, S. Africa, Sudan, Tunis, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Uruguay.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, United States.

1929 Accession: British Colonies and Protectorates, Sept.; French West Africa, July 29; Palestine, Sept.; Tanganyika, Sept.

RADIOTELEGRAPHIC: Convention (Washington, Nov. 25, 1927).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, French Colonies, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Italian Colonies, Japan, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Portuguese Colonies, Rumania, Salvador, San Marino, Siam, S. Africa, Spain, Spanish Colonies, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria and Lebanon, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria, Belgium, Belgian Colonies,

RADIOTELEGRAPHIC: *cont.*

Canada,¹ Denmark, Great Britain, India, Netherlands and Colonies, Norway, United States.¹

1929 Accessions: Bolivia (date unknown); Iceland, Dec. 27; Latvia, April 12.

1929 Ratifications: Australia, April 3; Bulgaria, July 22; China, June 2; Czechoslovakia, March 1; Estonia, March 22; Finland, Jan. 24; Germany, Aug. 22; Hungary, Feb. 20; Irish Free State, Jan. 14; Italy, Jan. 18; Japan, Jan. 31; Yugoslavia, Dec. 5; Mexico, March 28; Morocco (excluding Spanish Zone), Feb. 4; New Zealand, Feb. 7; Portugal, July 25; Siam, July 1; S. Africa, Jan. 31; Spain and Spanish Guinea, Jan. 31; Sweden, March 1; Syria and Lebanon, March 12; Venezuela, Sept. 10.

RED CROSS: Revised Conventions (Geneva, July 27, 1929)—(1) Sick and wounded; (2) Prisoners of war.

1929 Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, Uruguay.

REFUGEES: Arrangements—(1) Legal Status of Russian and Armenian refugees; (2) Extension to other refugees of measures in favour of Russian and Armenian refugees; (3) Functions of the representatives of the League of Nations High Commissioner for refugees (Geneva, June 30, 1928).

Signatures to Dec. 1928: Austria (1), Belgium (1–3), Bulgaria (1, 2), Estonia (1, 2), France (1–3), Germany (1, 2), Greece (1), Latvia (1, 2), Poland (1, 2), Rumania (1, 2), Switzerland (1, 2).

In force by Dec. 1928 between: Bulgaria (1, 2), Yugoslavia² (1, 2), Poland (2), Rumania (1, 2), Switzerland (1, 2).

1929 Ratifications: Belgium (3), May 2, France (3), May 21.

In force between: Belgium (1, 2), April 25; Estonia (1), Feb. 27, (2) April 19; Germany (1, 2), March 5; Latvia (2), April 17.

RELIEF: Convention and statute establishing an International Union (Geneva, July 12, 1927).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Albania, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Latvia, Monaco, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: New Zealand, Sudan.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Ecuador, Egypt, Italy, Rumania.

1929 Accessions: Great Britain, Jan. 9; Luxemburg, June 27.

1929 Ratifications: Albania, Aug. 31; Belgium, May 9; Finland, April 10; Germany, July 22; Hungary, April 17; India, April 2; Monaco, May 21; San Marino, Aug. 12; Venezuela, June 19.

¹ With the exception of the additional Regulations.

² Yugoslavia will execute the provisions of the agreement without entering into it.

RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY:
(1) Treaty (Paris, Aug. 27, 1928); (2) 'Litvinov Protocol' bringing the Treaty into effect before ratification (Moscow, Feb. 9, 1929).

For signatures, accessions and ratifications, see pp. 156-9 above.

ROAD TRAFFIC: Convention relating to the international circulation of—
(Paris, April 24, 1926).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium, Cuba, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Monaco, Norway, Spain, Tunis.

1929 Accessions: Brazil, July 30; Chile, Oct. 15; French Colonies, Oct. 24; India, Oct. 24; 'Irāq, Dec. 4; Yugoslavia, Malta, Dec. 4; Palestine, Dec. 4; Switzerland, Oct. 24.

1929 Ratifications: Brazil, Dec. 3;¹ Germany, Dec. 3; Greece, as from Oct. 24; Hungary, Oct. 24; Irish Free State, Oct. 24; Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies, Dec. 4; Poland, Sept. 30; Portugal, Jan. 24; Rumania, Oct. 24; U.S.S.R., Oct. 24; Uruguay, July 4.

SANITARY: Convention modifying sanitary convention of 1912 (Paris, June 21, 1926).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hijāz, Honduras, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Salvador, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, France, French Colonies, Great Britain, Monaco, Morocco, New Zealand and Western Samoa, Rumania, S. Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syria and Lebanon, Tunis, United States.

1929 Accessions: British Colonies and Protectorates, Jan. 24; Irish Free State, Feb. 23; British Guiana, Dec. 20; New Guinea and Papua, Oct. 12; Trinidad, June 11.

Ratifications: Brazil, Dec. 3; Greece, July 29; Yugoslavia, Nov. 10; Mexico, Dec. 31; U.S.S.R., Feb. 26.

SLAVERY: Convention (Geneva, Sept. 25, 1926).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Abyssinia, Albania, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Yugoslavia, Liberia, Lithuania, Panama, Persia, Poland, Rumania, Uruguay.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Dominican Republic,² Ecuador, Egypt, Haiti, Hungary, Monaco, Nicaragua, Sudan.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Australia, Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, S. Africa, Spain, Sweden.

1929 Accessions: 'Irāq, Jan. 18; United States, March 21.

1929 Ratifications: Estonia, May 16; Germany, March 12; Yugoslavia, Sept. 28.

¹ Accession ratified.

² Accession *ad referendum*.

SPITZBERGEN: Treaty (Paris, Feb. 9, 1920).

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hijāz, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Morocco, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United States.

1929 Accession: Chile, March 28.

TANGIER: Protocol regarding convention of 1923-4 (Paris, July 25, 1928).

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain.

Accession to Dec. 1928: Sweden.

1929 Accession: Belgium, Jan. 7; Netherlands, June 12; Portugal, Jan. 15.

TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN : Convention (Geneva, Sept. 30, 1921).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Lithuania, Persia.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, Bulgaria, Denmark,¹ Finland, France, 'Irāq, Italian Colonies, Panama,¹ Peru,¹ Spain, Uruguay.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, British Empire, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, S. Africa, Sweden, Switzerland.

1929 Accessions: Jugoslavia, May 2; Luxemburg, Dec. 31.

1929 Ratification: Chile, Jan. 15.

VENEREAL DISEASES: Facilities to seamen for treatment of—Convention (Brussels, Dec. 1, 1924).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina, Cuba, France, Italy, Peru, Sweden, Tunis.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Belgian Congo, British Colonies, Canada, Iceland, 'Irāq, Morocco, New Zealand.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Monaco, Rumania.

1929 Accession: Australia.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: Revised Convention (Paris, Oct. 6, 1921).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jugoslavia, Peru, Siam.

Accessions to Dec. 1928: Czechoslovakia, Poland, U.S.S.R.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.A., Uruguay.

1929 Accession: The Netherlands, Jan. 1.

1929 Ratification: Jugoslavia, Nov. 10.

¹ Accessions *ad referendum*.

WINE: Convention for the creation at Paris of an international institute of—(Paris, Nov. 29, 1924).

Signatures (Unratified) to Dec. 1928: Chile, Greece, Italy, Mexico.

Ratifications to Dec. 1928: France, Hungary, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Tunis.

1929 Accessions: Austria, Sept. 17; Germany, as from April 1.

1929 Ratification: Greece, July 29.

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